CV-18 Fujian/003 CATOBAR carrier thread

[AndrewS]

SCS/ECS is the exact area where the single most successful submarine campaign ever took place - and ASW was a major focus for PLAN for a big reason. Furthermore, PLAN is in fact rapidly expanding SSN program right now - so it's realistic to assume them having a good fleet of them in the second half of the 2020s, with their crew training being a relatively straightforward thing.

If you're arguing that ASW is a threat in SCS/ECS, then having enough destroyers, submarines or carriers is not relevant.

Instead, you want large numbers of Frigates, Corvettes and MPA aircraft. Particularly since they can rely on land-based fighter air from mainland China. In addition, SSKs are just ill-suited to conducting ASW warfare.

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It is only 700km from Shanghai to the Japanese Home Islands.

You've got a similar situation in the SCS, where the Philippines is 700km from Guangdong. Then there are the SCS Island airbases which are even closer to the Philippines and also dominate the sea lanes in the SCS.

Note that US carriers (and SAGs) are looking to dash to within 1500km to conduct intense ops, before retiring out of range of land-based missiles and air.

Furthermore, (1)land-based air cover is not mutually exclusive with carrier one, (2) the current fleet is already too capable for just 1st IC(and this capability came at a cost), just can't fully realise itself due to relative lack of balance.

The US Navy has about 80 Arleigh Burkes and the current Chinese Destroyer fleet is still significantly smaller than the equivalent US+Japanese one.

Today, the Chinese Navy has about 40 modern AEGIS-type destroyers and they're adding 20? more in the 2021-2025 Plan. If they add another 20 in 2026-2030, that is only parity with the US.

That matters in the area around Taiwan, which can be covered by land-based air, and which China has to secure.

The situation for Bluefor is better than it should've been, but at the same time, the perceived threat by Bluefor is fully here (because civilians responsible for budget allocations and foreign policy ultimately count in ships).
It could've been a good goal by itself（it is sort of the trick the Soviet Union did - it built to the capacity, to look as scary as possible) - but in my understanding, it makes more sense for country limited financially or by shipbuilding capacity. China is limited by neither.
So a balanced, most optimal fleet(i.e. best possible capability in every moment, instead of even better at some specific date later) sounds to be a better goal.

Like yes, the political goal is 2049. But why wait...

Historically in blue-water naval battles, the smaller force suffers a catastrophic defeat.
So near the Chinese coast, China can project significantly more airpower than its opponents, with destroyers underneath, particularly in the Taiwan area.

But in the deep Pacific, it is the US Navy which has the advantage because of its carriers.

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In the field of aircraft carriers, China at the moment is limited because it doesn't have a mature carrier design, nor a mature naval air wing with stealth fighters and AWACs.

No amount of money or shipbuilding capacity can make this go faster.
It takes time to design, build, test and improve.

The same applies to nuclear submarines

But by 2030, I expect carriers, their airwings and nuclear submarines all to be ready for mass production. And I would expect Destroyer and Frigate production to reduce, with more carriers being ordered instead.

So we'll see the Destroyers shift from operating with shore-based air cover to carrier-based air cover in the Western Pacific. Roughly speaking.

 

[Blitzo]

Well, i won't go to claim I am sure - but IMHO a more reasonable proportion between surface combatants and even not ideal carriers would've been beneficial. Something along 7-8 fleet combatants(i.e. 052d/055 destroyers) per carrier. Which is actually still ship-rich, the US has way less per escorted hull.

China has shipbuilding pull that allowed that to happen - and, again IMHO, getting to a 4-carrier fleet ca. 2023-24 (+2 additional 001) and a 6-carrier fleet ca. 2026-27(+1 additional 003) would've been more optimal for the currently available number of surface combatants, carrier-capable planes/pilot classes and SSNs.

Add the second, nuclear part on top of that (with two hot&experienced carrier shipyards) and by 2035 we're at local ~parity with the entirety of the USN in Eastpac(or realistically deployable USN+its loyal allies). Quite a tasty result, am I wrong?

And this can't be explained by "no money printer dear", at least not completely. Carriers are expensive as f when taken as package deals.
When PLANAF already pays for its current naval aviation revamp - a large part of that money is already paid; it's the cost of carrier hulls now. And by themselves, even true fleet carriers cost in the order of a few destroyers each (more reserved "medium" carriers cost in order of around 2-2,5 contemporary heavy frigates).
Not a bad deal.

It isn't only about the procurement cost of the carriers but also about the ongoing operational costs and personnel costs.

I agree with your "optimal ratio of carrier to destroyer" but there are also optimal ratios of SSNs, modern land based fighters and bombers and tankers and missiles which have yet to be attained.

This is what I mean by opportunity cost, in terms of what should come first in terms of procurement.


My feeling is that beyond an additional one carrier (or maybe two at most) entering operational capability in the 2025-2035 period, the additional money is better spent in other procurements.

 

[A.Man]

What A Beast!

 

[ikaleem]

Shouldn't those antennas be down since they are on open sea. Or is this a CGI

 

[dcmanno]

What A Beast!


View attachment 129079

CG for sure, as the pennant number 18 is a dead giveaway

 

[FriedRiceNSpice]

The problem is that all those 052C, D and even 055 don't really have that much value until and unless they have aerial and subsurface components.

That is only true from the context of power projection in the far seas. From the objective of securing naval supremacy within the first island chain and contesting waters out to the second island sea, a powerful surface fleet backed by SSK and land based airpower is by far the most cost effective investment. The PLAN has a different mission set than the USN, and will therefore always be more destroyer/frigate heavy than the USN, even in the future as capabilities in SSN and carriers mature.

 

[tamsen_ikard]

The problem is that all those 052C, D and even 055 don't really have that much value until and unless they have aerial and subsurface components.

And since normal design life for a destroyer(unless you're poor and stretching it) is something like 20-25+10 years - slow carrier production means that much of the 2010 fleets' up time will be spent without this capability to get 100% out of them, and fully capable navy will only be achieved at next iteration.

China is taking a very methodical, careful approach - and IMHO it's almost to the point when it's too careful and too methodical.

I don't think you need carriers with manned planes to project power in the modern battle field. Modern air defense missiles and radars are so strong that manned air planes are very likely to be shot down before they can get close to destroyers and even more vulnerable attacking towards a well-defended land.

So, the only option these planes have is to fire standoff missiles from far away. Firing standoff missiles is something destroyers can also do. Things that a destroyer cannot do can be taken over by drones such as long term survellience, spotting, over the horizon radar capabilties. You don't need a full carrier to fly and land drones.

So, I think China's strategy on focusing more on its destroyer fleet and also this new drone carrier concept is actually more strategically sound thinking compared to old US approach of getting lots of super heavy carriers with 100s of land based planes. I think that thinking is obsolete.

Big super carriers are a juicy target. Unlike land based airfields that can be repaired after getting hit by missiles, a carrier will be sunk if properly attacked and completely out of commision.

Distributed lethality will become more and more popular for all navies as well and I think China will have a lot more drone carriers and destroyers than it will have manned air plane carriers. And China will be quite capable of projecting power with such a naval force that will be as powerful as having carriers

 

[Gloire_bb]

Destroyers can last 40-50 years especially large ones like 055 which have substantial room to grow.

Also the destroyers were 100% absolutely vital to Chinese security in 2010s especially when backed by STOBAR CV and ground based aviation. Even alone they were useful for muscling out Japanese, Korean and Vietnamese navies. Back in 2000s, even Vietnamese navy was challenging China for control. Now they're sitting quiet because even with a fleet of Russian heavy frigates and SSKs, they know that destroyers are just better.

Well, they can last that long. They're just growing outdated, and require ever more expensive maintenance and repairs with diminishing returns.
Ultimately, over keeping keels is a sign of either fiscal or shipbuilding weaknesses.
With Chinese shipbuilding, i don't see why.
Normal service life with a single MLU, then a decade in reserve - and we're good.

As for the second - i don't mean earlier frigate/destroyer buildup, or continuing 2010-2020s frigate program; i mean specifically fleet program of 2010s. 052d, 055 and associated fleet support.
That's helluva money at sea, which could have been exploited more completely with larger carrier core.

China has 2+1 carriers of course, but in my understanding, only half as many as it makes best sense for a force this large...

 

[FairAndUnbiased]

Well, they can last that long. They're just growing outdated, and require ever more expensive maintenance and repairs with diminishing returns.
Ultimately, over keeping keels is a sign of either fiscal or shipbuilding weaknesses.
With Chinese shipbuilding, i don't see why.
Normal service life with a single MLU, then a decade in reserve - and we're good.

As for the second - i don't mean earlier frigate/destroyer buildup, or continuing 2010-2020s frigate program; i mean specifically fleet program of 2010s. 052d, 055 and associated fleet support.
That's helluva money at sea, which could have been exploited more completely with larger carrier core.

China has 2+1 carriers of course, but in my understanding, only half as many as it makes best sense for a force this large...

PLAN is very reluctant to retire ships - even the original type 052s launched in the early 1990s are still around. Compare also to the US with the VLS Ticonderogas - none had a lower than 30 year lifespan in service.

In addition, 055 is designed for growth while 052s were obsolete upon launch. Example: 055 has 30 MW electrical generation while AB class only has 12 MW electrical generation even though both have the same total propulsion power. This looks to me like 055 has clear room to grow and improve even into the 2050's. What can you do with more than double the electricity? Laser weapons, railgun, shipboard supercomputer? Possibilities are endless.

In addition with 2x STOBAR carriers in the 2010's, the main function of the carriers is fleet air defense, the heavy hitters are 052D and 055 with long range cruise missiles. It's hard for STOBAR planes to take off with strike munitions.

So I'd say that the 2010's buildup was actually very wise considering the capabilities/challenges China had at the time and in fact, still has today. 055 is a best in class ship with clear longevity and it was well worth getting then. And it is still being built, showing the power and usefulness of the class.

 

[Lethe]

The two factors that are missing from this discussion about fleet balance are PLAN's evolving strategic circumstances and doctrinal ambitions, and also varying levels of competency between different arms. China's slow buildout of nuclear submarine capabilities over the past two decades almost certainly reflects a judgement that those 093 boats were insufficiently competitive to commit to a greater rollout, coupled with a belief that ongoing development would soon allow for the production of more competitive assets, rather than an inability to appreciate the value of such assets in the first place. PLAN went hard on surface combatants first both because surface combatants are inherently defensive assets and therefore well-aligned with China's historically more limited strategic posture, and because the science-engineering-industrial base was better positioned to deliver competitive capabilities in that category than it was in other categories such as nuclear submarines.

Well, they can last that long. They're just growing outdated, and require ever more expensive maintenance and repairs with diminishing returns.
Ultimately, over keeping keels is a sign of either fiscal or shipbuilding weaknesses.

Retaining older hulls while also building lots of new ones is characteristic of a growing Navy, i.e. one that envisions that it will eventually have more of everything than it currently does. Retiring older hulls at a steady rate while matching those retirements with new ships built at a steady rate is a sign of a mature Navy that is seeking to maximise efficiency, as in the case of JMSDF and USN. Retaining older hills in service because you are unable for one reason or another to build new ships of sufficient quantity and capability in a timely fashion is characteristic of a declining Navy, as in the case of Russia and some European navies.