CV-18 Fujian/003 CATOBAR carrier thread

Blitzo

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Well, i won't go to claim I am sure - but IMHO a more reasonable proportion between surface combatants and even not ideal carriers would've been beneficial. Something along 7-8 fleet combatants(i.e. 052d/055 destroyers) per carrier. Which is actually still ship-rich, the US has way less per escorted hull.

China has shipbuilding pull that allowed that to happen - and, again IMHO, getting to a 4-carrier fleet ca. 2023-24 (+2 additional 001) and a 6-carrier fleet ca. 2026-27(+1 additional 003) would've been more optimal for the currently available number of surface combatants, carrier-capable planes/pilot classes and SSNs.

Add the second, nuclear part on top of that (with two hot&experienced carrier shipyards) and by 2035 we're at local ~parity with the entirety of the USN in Eastpac(or realistically deployable USN+its loyal allies). Quite a tasty result, am I wrong?

And this can't be explained by "no money printer dear", at least not completely. Carriers are expensive as f when taken as package deals.
When PLANAF already pays for its current naval aviation revamp - a large part of that money is already paid; it's the cost of carrier hulls now. And by themselves, even true fleet carriers cost in the order of a few destroyers each (more reserved "medium" carriers cost in order of around 2-2,5 contemporary heavy frigates).
Not a bad deal.

It isn't only about the procurement cost of the carriers but also about the ongoing operational costs and personnel costs.

I agree with your "optimal ratio of carrier to destroyer" but there are also optimal ratios of SSNs, modern land based fighters and bombers and tankers and missiles which have yet to be attained.

This is what I mean by opportunity cost, in terms of what should come first in terms of procurement.


My feeling is that beyond an additional one carrier (or maybe two at most) entering operational capability in the 2025-2035 period, the additional money is better spent in other procurements.
 
The problem is that all those 052C, D and even 055 don't really have that much value until and unless they have aerial and subsurface components.
That is only true from the context of power projection in the far seas. From the objective of securing naval supremacy within the first island chain and contesting waters out to the second island sea, a powerful surface fleet backed by SSK and land based airpower is by far the most cost effective investment. The PLAN has a different mission set than the USN, and will therefore always be more destroyer/frigate heavy than the USN, even in the future as capabilities in SSN and carriers mature.
 

tamsen_ikard

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The problem is that all those 052C, D and even 055 don't really have that much value until and unless they have aerial and subsurface components.

And since normal design life for a destroyer(unless you're poor and stretching it) is something like 20-25+10 years - slow carrier production means that much of the 2010 fleets' up time will be spent without this capability to get 100% out of them, and fully capable navy will only be achieved at next iteration.

China is taking a very methodical, careful approach - and IMHO it's almost to the point when it's too careful and too methodical.

I don't think you need carriers with manned planes to project power in the modern battle field. Modern air defense missiles and radars are so strong that manned air planes are very likely to be shot down before they can get close to destroyers and even more vulnerable attacking towards a well-defended land.

So, the only option these planes have is to fire standoff missiles from far away. Firing standoff missiles is something destroyers can also do. Things that a destroyer cannot do can be taken over by drones such as long term survellience, spotting, over the horizon radar capabilties. You don't need a full carrier to fly and land drones.

So, I think China's strategy on focusing more on its destroyer fleet and also this new drone carrier concept is actually more strategically sound thinking compared to old US approach of getting lots of super heavy carriers with 100s of land based planes. I think that thinking is obsolete.

Big super carriers are a juicy target. Unlike land based airfields that can be repaired after getting hit by missiles, a carrier will be sunk if properly attacked and completely out of commision.

Distributed lethality will become more and more popular for all navies as well and I think China will have a lot more drone carriers and destroyers than it will have manned air plane carriers. And China will be quite capable of projecting power with such a naval force that will be as powerful as having carriers
 

Gloire_bb

Captain
Registered Member
Destroyers can last 40-50 years especially large ones like 055 which have substantial room to grow.

Also the destroyers were 100% absolutely vital to Chinese security in 2010s especially when backed by STOBAR CV and ground based aviation. Even alone they were useful for muscling out Japanese, Korean and Vietnamese navies. Back in 2000s, even Vietnamese navy was challenging China for control. Now they're sitting quiet because even with a fleet of Russian heavy frigates and SSKs, they know that destroyers are just better.
Well, they can last that long. They're just growing outdated, and require ever more expensive maintenance and repairs with diminishing returns.
Ultimately, over keeping keels is a sign of either fiscal or shipbuilding weaknesses.
With Chinese shipbuilding, i don't see why.
Normal service life with a single MLU, then a decade in reserve - and we're good.

As for the second - i don't mean earlier frigate/destroyer buildup, or continuing 2010-2020s frigate program; i mean specifically fleet program of 2010s. 052d, 055 and associated fleet support.
That's helluva money at sea, which could have been exploited more completely with larger carrier core.

China has 2+1 carriers of course, but in my understanding, only half as many as it makes best sense for a force this large...
 

FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
Registered Member
Well, they can last that long. They're just growing outdated, and require ever more expensive maintenance and repairs with diminishing returns.
Ultimately, over keeping keels is a sign of either fiscal or shipbuilding weaknesses.
With Chinese shipbuilding, i don't see why.
Normal service life with a single MLU, then a decade in reserve - and we're good.

As for the second - i don't mean earlier frigate/destroyer buildup, or continuing 2010-2020s frigate program; i mean specifically fleet program of 2010s. 052d, 055 and associated fleet support.
That's helluva money at sea, which could have been exploited more completely with larger carrier core.

China has 2+1 carriers of course, but in my understanding, only half as many as it makes best sense for a force this large...
PLAN is very reluctant to retire ships - even the original type 052s launched in the early 1990s are still around. Compare also to the US with the VLS Ticonderogas - none had a lower than 30 year lifespan in service.

In addition, 055 is designed for growth while 052s were obsolete upon launch. Example: 055 has 30 MW electrical generation while AB class only has 12 MW electrical generation even though both have the same total propulsion power. This looks to me like 055 has clear room to grow and improve even into the 2050's. What can you do with more than double the electricity? Laser weapons, railgun, shipboard supercomputer? Possibilities are endless.

In addition with 2x STOBAR carriers in the 2010's, the main function of the carriers is fleet air defense, the heavy hitters are 052D and 055 with long range cruise missiles. It's hard for STOBAR planes to take off with strike munitions.

So I'd say that the 2010's buildup was actually very wise considering the capabilities/challenges China had at the time and in fact, still has today. 055 is a best in class ship with clear longevity and it was well worth getting then. And it is still being built, showing the power and usefulness of the class.
 

Lethe

Captain
The two factors that are missing from this discussion about fleet balance are PLAN's evolving strategic circumstances and doctrinal ambitions, and also varying levels of competency between different arms. China's slow buildout of nuclear submarine capabilities over the past two decades almost certainly reflects a judgement that those 093 boats were insufficiently competitive to commit to a greater rollout, coupled with a belief that ongoing development would soon allow for the production of more competitive assets, rather than an inability to appreciate the value of such assets in the first place. PLAN went hard on surface combatants first both because surface combatants are inherently defensive assets and therefore well-aligned with China's historically more limited strategic posture, and because the science-engineering-industrial base was better positioned to deliver competitive capabilities in that category than it was in other categories such as nuclear submarines.

Well, they can last that long. They're just growing outdated, and require ever more expensive maintenance and repairs with diminishing returns.
Ultimately, over keeping keels is a sign of either fiscal or shipbuilding weaknesses.

Retaining older hulls while also building lots of new ones is characteristic of a growing Navy, i.e. one that envisions that it will eventually have more of everything than it currently does. Retiring older hulls at a steady rate while matching those retirements with new ships built at a steady rate is a sign of a mature Navy that is seeking to maximise efficiency, as in the case of JMSDF and USN. Retaining older hills in service because you are unable for one reason or another to build new ships of sufficient quantity and capability in a timely fashion is characteristic of a declining Navy, as in the case of Russia and some European navies.
 
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