CV-18 Fujian/003 CATOBAR carrier thread

[Gloire_bb]

It's because they haven't settled on a modern, mature design which fulfills all requirements. Just look at how the 052s evolved from B to C to D. They didn't start churning them out until the end, because why would you waste resources mass producing soon-to-be obsolete platforms?

The problem is that all those 052C, D and even 055 don't really have that much value until and unless they have aerial and subsurface components.

And since normal design life for a destroyer(unless you're poor and stretching it) is something like 20-25+10 years - slow carrier production means that much of the 2010 fleets' up time will be spent without this capability to get 100% out of them, and fully capable navy will only be achieved at next iteration.

China is taking a very methodical, careful approach - and IMHO it's almost to the point when it's too careful and too methodical.

 

[Wrought]

The problem is that all those 052C, D and even 055 don't really have that much value until and unless they have aerial and subsurface components.

And since normal design life for a destroyer(unless you're poor and stretching it) is something like 20-25+10 years - slow carrier production means that much of the 2010 fleets' up time will be spent without this capability to get 100% out of them, and fully capable navy will only be achieved at next iteration.


China is taking a very methodical, careful approach - and IMHO it's almost to the point when it's too careful and too methodical.

Sure, and those older designs will be replaced in turn. We are already seeing the start of it with 054B. And fully capable for what? The goals of the navy naturally expand in line with its capabilities.

I would be much more concerned if any country was gambling billions on rushing ahead with unproven designs for platforms which are supposed to operate for decades. That's exactly how you get disasters like the Zumwalt or LCS.

 

[Phead128]

Yep, and the interesting question is for some time now - why actually not.

Is there a peacetime precedent to spamming carriers unless you are anticipating imminent war? Now I think a decent sizeable fleet is necessary to deter USN interdiction in Malacca and Middle East for resource security, but at those very long distances, maybe Type 004 with nuclear endurance is what China settles on for serial production.

Chinese think jumping straight to nuclear (on top of EMCAT as novel tech) is too risky, so step-wise trial-and-error is safer.

 

[Gloire_bb]

Is there a peacetime precedent to spamming carriers unless you are anticipating imminent war?

Well, treaty carrier fleets were built without such anticipation(no more than we anticipate possible Sino-American conflict ("somewhere ahead, maybe yes, maybe no, actual configuration unknown"); so was the initial US supercarrier fleet (Forrestals/Kitty Hawks) - built more or less the traditional way(when series of such ships were still a norm).

Steady carrier construction is a comparatively recent thing actually, beginning in 1970s with both the Soviets and the US.

Now I think a decent sizeable fleet is necessary to deter USN interdiction in Malacca and Middle East for resource security, but at those very long distances, maybe Type 004 with nuclear endurance is what China settles on for serial production.

Yes, it looks plausible. My question with that is that it feels very 2035-40ish, with a relative (comparative) weakness in 2025-35.
a couple more, say, conservative "001B" and maybe two (instead of one) 003 could've led to a massively better-balanced fleet earlier on.

Yes, those designs aren't perfect - but are 2025-35 that unimportant?

 

[Blitzo]

Well, treaty carrier fleets were built without such anticipation(no more than we anticipate possible Sino-American conflict ("somewhere ahead, maybe yes, maybe no, actual configuration unknown"); so was the initial US supercarrier fleet (Forrestals/Kitty Hawks) - built more or less the traditional way(when series of such ships were still a norm).

Steady carrier construction is a comparatively recent thing actually, beginning in 1970s with both the Soviets and the US.

Yes, it looks plausible. My question with that is that it feels very 2035-40ish, with a relative (comparative) weakness in 2025-35.
a couple more, say, conservative "001B" and maybe two (instead of one) 003 could've led to a massively better-balanced fleet earlier on.

Yes, those designs aren't perfect - but are 2025-35 that unimportant?

A better question imo is in 2025-2035 are additional carriers kicking in the best use of opportunity cost/finite resources.

This has been discussed before so I won't dwell on it too much, but over the last few years I've come around to the conclusion that between 2025-2035, after CV-18 Fujian I would be surprised if they aim to build, launch, trial and commission and achieve FOC of more than one additional carrier, or maybe two at most.

Instead I expect most of the money in that era to achieve other capabilities which can be delivered faster with greater effect for that period.

After 2035 is when they may become more comfortable spreading their resources more gratuitously.

 

[AndrewS]

The problem is that all those 052C, D and even 055 don't really have that much value until and unless they have aerial and subsurface components.

If those Type-052C/D and Type-055 are operating within the 1st Island Chain, they will have land-based air cover. And much of this area doesn't suit submarines, whether friendly or enemy.

 

[AndrewS]

A better question imo is in 2025-2035 are additional carriers kicking in the best use of opportunity cost/finite resources.

This has been discussed before so I won't dwell on it too much, but over the last few years I've come around to the conclusion that between 2025-2035, after CV-18 Fujian I would be surprised if they aim to build, launch, trial and commission and achieve FOC of more than one additional carrier, or maybe two at most.

Instead I expect most of the money in that era to achieve other capabilities which can be delivered faster with greater effect for that period.

After 2035 is when they may become more comfortable spreading their resources more gratuitously.

I see 2030-ish as being when the Chinese military are secure enough in the 1st Island Chain that they feel they can focus on a blue-water navy.

And if US-China relations are still bad, I wouldn't be surprised if China launched 4 CVNs in a 2030-2035 timeframe. That assumes a CVN design is proven out between 2025-2030.

EDIT. I notice that the Indopacom commander just testified to Congress. He's repeating that China has a declining economy - "An economy that has taken a 30% hit at a best estimate" - which is an insane statement given his position. And that he expect China to end up with a bigger Navy and also Air Force.

 

[Gloire_bb]

A better question imo is in 2025-2035 are additional carriers kicking in the best use of opportunity cost/finite resources.

This has been discussed before so I won't dwell on it too much, but over the last few years I've come around to the conclusion that between 2025-2035, after CV-18 Fujian I would be surprised if they aim to build, launch, trial and commission and achieve FOC of more than one additional carrier, or maybe two at most.

Well, i won't go to claim I am sure - but IMHO a more reasonable proportion between surface combatants and even not ideal carriers would've been beneficial. Something along 7-8 fleet combatants(i.e. 052d/055 destroyers) per carrier. Which is actually still ship-rich, the US has way less per escorted hull.

China has shipbuilding pull that allowed that to happen - and, again IMHO, getting to a 4-carrier fleet ca. 2023-24 (+2 additional 001) and a 6-carrier fleet ca. 2026-27(+1 additional 003) would've been more optimal for the currently available number of surface combatants, carrier-capable planes/pilot classes and SSNs.

Add the second, nuclear part on top of that (with two hot&experienced carrier shipyards) and by 2035 we're at local ~parity with the entirety of the USN in Eastpac(or realistically deployable USN+its loyal allies). Quite a tasty result, am I wrong?

And this can't be explained by "no money printer dear", at least not completely. Carriers are expensive as f when taken as package deals.
When PLANAF already pays for its current naval aviation revamp - a large part of that money is already paid; it's the cost of carrier hulls now. And by themselves, even true fleet carriers cost in the order of a few destroyers each (more reserved "medium" carriers cost in order of around 2-2,5 contemporary heavy frigates).
Not a bad deal.

If those Type-052C/D and Type-055 are operating within the 1st Island Chain, they will have land-based air cover. And much of this area doesn't suit submarines, whether friendly or enemy.

SCS/ECS is the exact area where the single most successful submarine campaign ever took place - and ASW was a major focus for PLAN for a big reason. Furthermore, PLAN is in fact rapidly expanding SSN program right now - so it's realistic to assume them having a good fleet of them in the second half of the 2020s, with their crew training being a relatively straightforward thing.

Furthermore, (1)land-based air cover is not mutually exclusive with carrier one, (2) the current fleet is already too capable for just 1st IC(and this capability came at a cost), just can't fully realise itself due to relative lack of balance.

The situation for Bluefor is better than it should've been, but at the same time, the perceived threat by Bluefor is fully here (because civilians responsible for budget allocations and foreign policy ultimately count in ships).
It could've been a good goal by itself（it is sort of the trick the Soviet Union did - it built to the capacity, to look as scary as possible) - but in my understanding, it makes more sense for country limited financially or by shipbuilding capacity. China is limited by neither.
So a balanced, most optimal fleet(i.e. best possible capability in every moment, instead of even better at some specific date later) sounds to be a better goal.

Like yes, the political goal is 2049. But why wait...

 

[externallisting]

As someone that served on FIVE US Navy CVs..I must state that Fujian is one impressive looking ship! I really like the design of the island. Very sleek! I'm looking forward to seeing her operate aircraft. soon I hope...

I wish all aboard fair winds and following seas!

Nice to see old hands like yourself on deck here, hope you’ve been well!

 

[FairAndUnbiased]

The problem is that all those 052C, D and even 055 don't really have that much value until and unless they have aerial and subsurface components.

And since normal design life for a destroyer(unless you're poor and stretching it) is something like 20-25+10 years - slow carrier production means that much of the 2010 fleets' up time will be spent without this capability to get 100% out of them, and fully capable navy will only be achieved at next iteration.

China is taking a very methodical, careful approach - and IMHO it's almost to the point when it's too careful and too methodical.

Destroyers can last 40-50 years especially large ones like 055 which have substantial room to grow.

Also the destroyers were 100% absolutely vital to Chinese security in 2010s especially when backed by STOBAR CV and ground based aviation. Even alone they were useful for muscling out Japanese, Korean and Vietnamese navies. Back in 2000s, even Vietnamese navy was challenging China for control. Now they're sitting quiet because even with a fleet of Russian heavy frigates and SSKs, they know that destroyers are just better.