01:07 – August 10, 2014 – The Operational Crisis of August 9, 2014
Original: Colonel Cassad LiveJournal
Translated from Russian by Gleb Bazov
Despite continuing battles for Saur-Mogila, where the Militia was forced to withdraw from the top of the mountain, today the attention was focused on the operational crisis around Miusinsk (Миусинск) and Krasniy Luch (Красный Луч).
The crux of the operational crisis was as follows – the grouping that was surrounded in the Southern Cauldron gathered the remaining forces and rushed to break out of the encirclement. The 79th, the remnants of the 72nd and the spetsnaz regiment retreated strictly to the west and, having lost up to half of the vehicles and approximately 250 men killed and wounded (there are now attempts to attribute all these losses to Russian artillery fire) broke out of the Cauldron.
The remnants of the 24th Separate Mechanized Brigade (“OMBr”) fought their way out in the northwestern direction. An armoured group was put together, consisting of 10 tanks and just as many BTRs and BMPs, with infantry on board, which punched through the ring of encirclement and on August 8, 2014 burst into Miusinsk. All day on August 8, 2014 heavy battles continued in the area, as a result of which the main forces of the enemy were driven out to the north of Miusinsk.
At night, this armoured group began a march toward Krasniy Luch, which it entered in the morning of August 9, 2014. At the same time, by the looks of it, mechanized forces of the enemy attacked from the direction of Debaltsevo (Дебальцево), broke through to Fashchevka (Фащевка) and continued their offensive toward Vakhrushevo (Вахрушево).
Considering the strategic importance of Krasniy Luch, these maneuvers created an operational risk to the main highway that enables the supply of Donetsk. The small garrison present in the city (the city was considered to be safely in the rear) put up stiff resistance in the southern suburbs of Krasniy Luch, near the local mines. As a result, several critically important hours were gained, enabling the Militia quickly to bring up its reserves and to prevent the enemy from taking control of Krasniy Luch.
In addition to the heroism of the militiamen, it bears mentioning that the lack of fuel and ammunition hampered the efforts of the 24th OMBr. Its lengthy sojourn in the Cauldron left it unable to engage in a persistent and prolonged battle, and, having met resistance, the 24th OMBr was forced out of the southern suburbs of Krasniy Luch. Were this a fully equipped armoured group, rather than one exhausted by several weeks of fighting, the outcome might have been not in favour of the Militia.
Nevertheless, for several hours Donetsk and Gorlovka faced a real danger of complete encirclement. If the 24th OMBr had managed to gain a foothold in Krasniy Luch, and the Junta had punched a full-fledged corridor to the city through Vakhrushevo, then, apart from communication lines to Donetsk and Gorlovka being cut off, the forces of the Militia in the area of Torez and Snezhnoye immediately would have found themselves in a dire operational situation and the southern front of the DPR could have rapidly collapsed.
Thankfully, the worst-case scenario has so far been avoided; like they say, the bullet whizzed right past the temple. The continuing fighting in the area of Miusinks and to the west of Krasniy Luch is meant to localize the effects of the extremely unpleasant breakout, which, by the looks of it, the Militia did not expect (it appears that they expected the encircled troops to withdraw as a crowd and that they would be able to bombard with impunity using artillery, similar, essentially, to what happened with the remnants of the 72nd and 79th Brigades). The armoured group’s strike on Miusinsk and the corresponding strike from the side of Debaltsevo through Fashchevka became a very unpleasant surprise.
On the part of the Junta these maneuvers of course were a gamble, but one that nearly succeeded. The pessimistic assessments made by Zakharchenko and Strelkov demonstrate that the breakout had shaken the DPR command’s confidence in their ability to retain Krasniy Luch. It also should be noted that the situation surrounding the breakout of the 24th OMBr once again identified the flaws in the interaction between the commands of the DPR and the LPR, as well as the old problem of Ataman Kositsyn, who subordinates to no one and, by the looks of it, wages his own war in isolation from the rest.
The causes of the roaming about in the Militia’s rear of the tanks that had broken through are fairly trivial – the Militia is unable to create a layered defence, it simply lacks the troops to do it. The most battle worthy units and the primary antitank means are concentrated at the front, while the rear-line cities are protected by militiamen with light arms and a minimum of antitank weaponry. Mobile reserves are extremely limited. As a result, whenever the enemy’s mechanized units break the line of front, they end up in literally in an operational voice, such that the Militia is unable to do anything to counteract their maneuvers until sufficient reserves are transferred into the area.
Overall, the operational crisis around Krasniy Luch has not been entirely overcome, but is nearing its resolution. At the same time, however, the overall strategic situation is still close to being critical. More on that tomorrow.