@WTAN how about N+2, can it be produced using the NXT1980i used by SMIC?
Chinese semiconductor industry
- Thread starter Hendrik_2000
- Start date
- Status
Not the 1980i. Probably the advanced/Improved version of the SMEE 28nm DUVL can do it.
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
Via Vincent from CDF
New info from havok
A 65nm-28nm production line with full domestic equipments is being constructed in Beijing (jointly funded by the Beijing government, SMIC and a host of domestic equipment makers). Production capacity is 3000 12 inch wafer per month. Construction started this month and the expected completion date is September 2022
I can only find an environmental impact study with almost the exact descriptions . Although the impact study said the completion date is August 2022
单位简介
北方集成电路技术创新中心(北京)有限公司租用北京屹唐科技有限公司拟建厂房及设备，建设“集成电路供应链及先导技术产业创新中心项目”。本项目租用的厂房及设备由北京屹唐科技有限公司建设及购置，该公司成立于 2020 年09 月 16 日，注册地位于北京市北京经济技术开发区荣昌东街甲 5 号 3 号楼 2 层 201-1。经营范围包括集成电路产线、代工流片、集成电路的技术开发、技术咨询、技术服务；设备出租；销售计算机、软硬件及辅助设备、电子元器件；市场调查；出租办公用房、商业用房；货物进出口、技术进出口、代理进出口。北方集成电路技术创新中心(北京)有限公司成立于 2017 年 09 月 25 日。经营范围包括与集成电路、半导体技术有关的开发、设计服务、技术服务、技术转让、技术咨询；半导体(硅片及各类化合物半导体)集成电路芯片的制造、针测及测试、光掩膜制造、测试封装；销售自产产品；货物进出口；机械设备租赁。
建设必要性
半导体集成电路是全球十大重点产业之一，也是当今世界竞争最激烈、发展最迅速的领域。集成电路是集多种高新技术于一体的高科技产品，它几乎存在于所有工业部门。集成电路产业是当今世界发展最为迅速和竞争最为激烈的产业。又是技术资金密集、技术进步快和投资风险高的产业。电子工业/半导体工业对世界经济产生着强有力的驱动作用。半导体工业还是支持 21 世纪信息社会的高新技术产业的重要基础，因而成为世界各国的国家级关键战略工业。中国集成电路经过三十多年来的发展，经历了自主研发创业、进提高和重点建设三个重要发展阶段。目前，中国集成电路产业已有了一定的产业基础。但是，中国国内市场需求和世界上经济发达国家相比仍有相当的距离，产品设计开发能力弱、水平低；生产技术水平也不高；产品销售额仅占全球集成电路销售额的6%左右，销售数量计算占国内市场需求份额不到五分之一；产品的技术档次不高，核心的关键产品仍然需要进口。面对国内外集成电路广阔的市场需求和发展机遇，大力发展中国的集成电路产业是国民经济信息化和实现中国国民经济发展第三步战略目标的迫切需要，也是增强中国在下一个世纪综合经济实力和竞争实力的必然要求。基于上述形势，为实现在京发展战略，为满足不断增长的市场需求，提高规模生产效益，提升产业技术水平，为国内的半导体装备、材料及工艺开发提供先进支撑平台，北方集成电路技术创新中心（北京）有限公司，选址北京经济技术开发区核心区建设集成电路供应链及先导技术产业创新中心项目，项目自去年举行仪式后建设方案重新调整。
项目特点
本项目旨在打造集成电路产业链生态圈，搭建多层面沟通平台，携手上下游企业共促新发展，该项目有利于构建以北京为中心的集成电路产业生态圈，提升集成电路生产线效率，降低生产线的建造与运营成本。项目建成后可为 12 英寸晶圆生产线提供厂房及动力配套设施，为多个工艺验证及技术创新研发平台提供场地及设施。项目自去年3月举行仪式后方案重新调整，股权结构，用途等均有变化，大股东从中芯国际更替为芯链融创集成电路产业发展（北京）有限公司，芯链融创去年成立，其股东均为国内半导体产业链上下游的主要企业，方案调整后使创新中心真正成为服务于国产产业链的企业。芯链融创部分股东如下：
产品定位
本项目用于先进图像传感器、65nm~28nm 及以下逻辑技术研发线的建设，达到或接近国际同类产品的技术指标。
工艺特点
本新建项目FAB位于北京中芯国际亦庄厂区北侧（主体4F），建筑面积约25382.1 m2，将建设集成电路国产验证中试线，产能为每月约 3000 片 12 英寸晶圆，工艺制程以 65nm~28nm 及以下为主，项目虽为 3000 片产能的晶圆制造线，但其与常规生产线不同，还肩负着国产设备的验证任务。项目为国内半导体产业链提供装备平台，材料平台，零部件平台，OPC技术平台，智慧工厂，工艺/器件仿真软件等形成共性技术国产化能力，创新中心同时开展存算一体，ULP技术，大芯片，3nm以下技术，新型存储器等创新先导技术的研发和产业化能力。项目人员总数为900人，其中研发人员300人。
北方集成电路技术创新中心
基本情况表
项目名称 集成电路供应链及先导技术产业创新中心项目
建设单位 北方集成电路技术创新中心（北京）有限公司
建设地点 北京经济技术开发区核心区 34M3 地块
总投资 厂房及设备投资 51.37 亿元
生产规模 项目将建设集成电路国产验证中试线，产能为每月约3000片12英寸晶圆。
产品方案 本项目用于先进图像传感器、65nm-28nm 及以下逻辑技术研发线的建设
开工时间 2021 年 2 月
预计投产时间 2022 年 9 月
New info from havok
A 65nm-28nm production line with full domestic equipments is being constructed in Beijing (jointly funded by the Beijing government, SMIC and a host of domestic equipment makers). Production capacity is 3000 12 inch wafer per month. Construction started this month and the expected completion date is September 2022
I can only find an environmental impact study with almost the exact descriptions . Although the impact study said the completion date is August 2022
单位简介
北方集成电路技术创新中心(北京)有限公司租用北京屹唐科技有限公司拟建厂房及设备，建设“集成电路供应链及先导技术产业创新中心项目”。本项目租用的厂房及设备由北京屹唐科技有限公司建设及购置，该公司成立于 2020 年09 月 16 日，注册地位于北京市北京经济技术开发区荣昌东街甲 5 号 3 号楼 2 层 201-1。经营范围包括集成电路产线、代工流片、集成电路的技术开发、技术咨询、技术服务；设备出租；销售计算机、软硬件及辅助设备、电子元器件；市场调查；出租办公用房、商业用房；货物进出口、技术进出口、代理进出口。北方集成电路技术创新中心(北京)有限公司成立于 2017 年 09 月 25 日。经营范围包括与集成电路、半导体技术有关的开发、设计服务、技术服务、技术转让、技术咨询；半导体(硅片及各类化合物半导体)集成电路芯片的制造、针测及测试、光掩膜制造、测试封装；销售自产产品；货物进出口；机械设备租赁。
建设必要性
半导体集成电路是全球十大重点产业之一，也是当今世界竞争最激烈、发展最迅速的领域。集成电路是集多种高新技术于一体的高科技产品，它几乎存在于所有工业部门。集成电路产业是当今世界发展最为迅速和竞争最为激烈的产业。又是技术资金密集、技术进步快和投资风险高的产业。电子工业/半导体工业对世界经济产生着强有力的驱动作用。半导体工业还是支持 21 世纪信息社会的高新技术产业的重要基础，因而成为世界各国的国家级关键战略工业。中国集成电路经过三十多年来的发展，经历了自主研发创业、进提高和重点建设三个重要发展阶段。目前，中国集成电路产业已有了一定的产业基础。但是，中国国内市场需求和世界上经济发达国家相比仍有相当的距离，产品设计开发能力弱、水平低；生产技术水平也不高；产品销售额仅占全球集成电路销售额的6%左右，销售数量计算占国内市场需求份额不到五分之一；产品的技术档次不高，核心的关键产品仍然需要进口。面对国内外集成电路广阔的市场需求和发展机遇，大力发展中国的集成电路产业是国民经济信息化和实现中国国民经济发展第三步战略目标的迫切需要，也是增强中国在下一个世纪综合经济实力和竞争实力的必然要求。基于上述形势，为实现在京发展战略，为满足不断增长的市场需求，提高规模生产效益，提升产业技术水平，为国内的半导体装备、材料及工艺开发提供先进支撑平台，北方集成电路技术创新中心（北京）有限公司，选址北京经济技术开发区核心区建设集成电路供应链及先导技术产业创新中心项目，项目自去年举行仪式后建设方案重新调整。
项目特点
本项目旨在打造集成电路产业链生态圈，搭建多层面沟通平台，携手上下游企业共促新发展，该项目有利于构建以北京为中心的集成电路产业生态圈，提升集成电路生产线效率，降低生产线的建造与运营成本。项目建成后可为 12 英寸晶圆生产线提供厂房及动力配套设施，为多个工艺验证及技术创新研发平台提供场地及设施。项目自去年3月举行仪式后方案重新调整，股权结构，用途等均有变化，大股东从中芯国际更替为芯链融创集成电路产业发展（北京）有限公司，芯链融创去年成立，其股东均为国内半导体产业链上下游的主要企业，方案调整后使创新中心真正成为服务于国产产业链的企业。芯链融创部分股东如下：
产品定位
本项目用于先进图像传感器、65nm~28nm 及以下逻辑技术研发线的建设，达到或接近国际同类产品的技术指标。
工艺特点
本新建项目FAB位于北京中芯国际亦庄厂区北侧（主体4F），建筑面积约25382.1 m2，将建设集成电路国产验证中试线，产能为每月约 3000 片 12 英寸晶圆，工艺制程以 65nm~28nm 及以下为主，项目虽为 3000 片产能的晶圆制造线，但其与常规生产线不同，还肩负着国产设备的验证任务。项目为国内半导体产业链提供装备平台，材料平台，零部件平台，OPC技术平台，智慧工厂，工艺/器件仿真软件等形成共性技术国产化能力，创新中心同时开展存算一体，ULP技术，大芯片，3nm以下技术，新型存储器等创新先导技术的研发和产业化能力。项目人员总数为900人，其中研发人员300人。
北方集成电路技术创新中心
基本情况表
项目名称 集成电路供应链及先导技术产业创新中心项目
建设单位 北方集成电路技术创新中心（北京）有限公司
建设地点 北京经济技术开发区核心区 34M3 地块
总投资 厂房及设备投资 51.37 亿元
生产规模 项目将建设集成电路国产验证中试线，产能为每月约3000片12英寸晶圆。
产品方案 本项目用于先进图像传感器、65nm-28nm 及以下逻辑技术研发线的建设
开工时间 2021 年 2 月
预计投产时间 2022 年 9 月
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
Via vincent
Nuara’s new production line in Beijing is expected to come online in June this year. Production capacity is 150 per year of various types of equipments for 28nm and below nodes (including 5nm and 7nm)
集微网消息，在北京经开区，高端集成电路装备研发及产业化项目、中芯京城集成电路生产线项目等7个项目“春节不打烊”，持续施工。
其中，高端集成电路装备研发及产业化项目90余名工人坚守岗位，确保项目建设不停工。据北京亦庄消息，该项目经理表示，目前正在装饰装修阶段，该项目预计6月初全部竣工，并将交付业主使用。
据悉，该高端集成电路装备研发及产业化项目为地下2层、地上10层，将建设28纳米以下集成电路装备工艺验证及产业化条件，搭建5或7纳米先进工艺设备测试验证平台，进行先进半导体工艺装备研发及产业化。项目建设完成后，将具备年产刻蚀机、PVD、退火炉、立式炉、清洗机等设备150台以上的能力。
而根据此前中建大成建筑有限责任公司消息来看，该项目为北方华创高端集成电路装备研发及产业化项目。（校对/图图）
Nuara’s new production line in Beijing is expected to come online in June this year. Production capacity is 150 per year of various types of equipments for 28nm and below nodes (including 5nm and 7nm)
集微网消息，在北京经开区，高端集成电路装备研发及产业化项目、中芯京城集成电路生产线项目等7个项目“春节不打烊”，持续施工。
其中，高端集成电路装备研发及产业化项目90余名工人坚守岗位，确保项目建设不停工。据北京亦庄消息，该项目经理表示，目前正在装饰装修阶段，该项目预计6月初全部竣工，并将交付业主使用。
据悉，该高端集成电路装备研发及产业化项目为地下2层、地上10层，将建设28纳米以下集成电路装备工艺验证及产业化条件，搭建5或7纳米先进工艺设备测试验证平台，进行先进半导体工艺装备研发及产业化。项目建设完成后，将具备年产刻蚀机、PVD、退火炉、立式炉、清洗机等设备150台以上的能力。
而根据此前中建大成建筑有限责任公司消息来看，该项目为北方华创高端集成电路装备研发及产业化项目。（校对/图图）
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
That great ! Bro ! Haha !
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
Here is the Naura production once again translated google translation. I am pretty sure they work night and day to finish this factory and start producing equipment by mid year and have it ready end of the year. It is once in life time opportunity for Naura to deAmericanize FAB equipment
Via vincent
Nuara's new production line in Beijing is expected to come online in June this year. Production capacity is 150 per year of various types of equipments for 28nm and below nodes (including 5nm and 7nm)
collect micro-network news, in Beijing Economic Development Zone, high-end integrated circuit equipment R&D and industrialization project, SMIC Beijing integrated circuit production line project and other 7 projects "Chinese New Year Do not close" and continue construction.
Among them, more than 90 workers in high-end integrated circuit equipment R&D and industrialization projects stick to their posts to ensure that the project construction will not stop. According to Beijing Yizhuang news, the project manager said that it is currently in the decoration stage . The project is expected to be completed in early June and will be delivered to the owner.
It is reported that the high-end integrated circuit equipment R&D and industrialization project consists of 2 floors underground and 10 floors above ground. It will build process verification and industrialization conditions for integrated circuit equipment below 28 nanometers, and build a 5 or 7 nanometer advanced process equipment testing and verification platform for advanced R&D and industrialization of semiconductor process equipment. After the project is completed, it will have the capacity to produce more than 150 sets of etching machines, PVD, annealing furnaces, vertical furnaces, cleaning machines and other equipment per year.
According to previous news from China Construction Dacheng Construction Co., Ltd., the project is a high-end integrated circuit equipment R&D and industrialization project of North Huachuang. (Proofreading/Pictures)
Via vincent
Nuara's new production line in Beijing is expected to come online in June this year. Production capacity is 150 per year of various types of equipments for 28nm and below nodes (including 5nm and 7nm)
collect micro-network news, in Beijing Economic Development Zone, high-end integrated circuit equipment R&D and industrialization project, SMIC Beijing integrated circuit production line project and other 7 projects "Chinese New Year Do not close" and continue construction.
Among them, more than 90 workers in high-end integrated circuit equipment R&D and industrialization projects stick to their posts to ensure that the project construction will not stop. According to Beijing Yizhuang news, the project manager said that it is currently in the decoration stage . The project is expected to be completed in early June and will be delivered to the owner.
It is reported that the high-end integrated circuit equipment R&D and industrialization project consists of 2 floors underground and 10 floors above ground. It will build process verification and industrialization conditions for integrated circuit equipment below 28 nanometers, and build a 5 or 7 nanometer advanced process equipment testing and verification platform for advanced R&D and industrialization of semiconductor process equipment. After the project is completed, it will have the capacity to produce more than 150 sets of etching machines, PVD, annealing furnaces, vertical furnaces, cleaning machines and other equipment per year.
According to previous news from China Construction Dacheng Construction Co., Ltd., the project is a high-end integrated circuit equipment R&D and industrialization project of North Huachuang. (Proofreading/Pictures)
1/ Good to see the US formalizing its undeclared economic war against China, and even better to see Taiwan island eagerly putting itself on the front lines of containing mainland China's tech industry
很高兴看到美国正式对中国进行不宣而战的经济战，更高兴看到台湾岛急切地把自己放在遏制中国大陆科技产业的第一线
2/ This undeclared economic war is intimately related to the semiconductor shortages currently roiling global supply chains. Specifically, since May of last year, the Tsai regime, Trump/Biden, and TSMC have conspired to deliberately cause a shortage and exploit it to damage China
2/这场不宣而战的经济战，与目前困扰全球供应链的半导体短缺密切相关。具体来说，自去年5月以来，蔡政权、特朗普/拜登和台积电合谋故意制造短缺，并利用短缺损害中国的利益
3/ This is fact not theory. ASML (TSMC's main supplier of EUV machines) admitted as much in its recent earnings call, when it said that after Huawei was sanctioned, TSMC told them it would not need as many new machines to grow capacity...
4/ ...but then, after TSMC and the Tsai regime successfully lobbied the US to sanction SMIC, they turned around and told ASML in Q4 2020 "oops we're going to have a lot more orders" and thereby created a shortage situation by design.
5/ What did the Tsai regime do with the shortage? For one, it tried browbeating BioNTech into breaking its contract with Fosun while Germany was experiencing a shortage of vaccines; for another, it tried getting the Biden admin to endorse a TW indy referendum in August
6/ Neutral observers are less than impressed by this set of moves. One EU executive has privately said "The other China is being more irritating to the global community than Saddam Hussein was in 1990"
7/ This irritation has led to predictable effects in international relations. Note, for example, that the EU is *not* listed in the Nikkei article. And my contacts in both Korean semiconductor majors indicate they will minimize their involvement as much as possible.
8/ Where this gets interesting is how it impacts potential post-conflict diplomacy if China does a Taiwan op. The default assumption seems to be that China would immediately be subject to crippling sanctions and diplomatic isolation...
9/ ...but that might not be the case if non-US economic blocs view Chinese management of the fabs as an acceptable alternative to being hostage to the emotions of the DPP's increasingly irrational base.
10/ Now, the bottleneck here is ASML's main US dependency, Cymer, a US subsidiary which makes the LPP light source in their EUVL machines. If China can research a substitute for that, then in a post-op world, China can provide that IP to ASML and still get the EUVL it needs
11/ The US can stamp its feet about that, but it won't be able to compel global compliance with sanctions, because China's share of relative global demand is so high post-COVID that overseas dollar users would rather abandon the dollar than comply with blanket sanctions on China
12/ Plus, after a Taiwan op, China would own roughly 60% of worldwide semiconductor capacity and 80%+ of the electronics supply chain as a whole. It would be too big to sanction, without levels of pain tolerance in the world that - for the Tsai regime - are simply not there
13/ And last but not least, don't forget the EU is well aware that ASML was hoodwinked by TSMC at the direction of the Tsai regime to create this shortage - and then, the Tsai regime used the resultant shortage to cut ahead of EU citizens in getting vaccines for themselves.
14/ All this means that China's last remaining challenge for the Operation - giving the EU, Korea, and eventually the US a face-saving way to come to terms with the fait accompli - has just been made much easier.
15/ In perhaps a belated recognition of its mistake, the Tsai regime put a dove into the Mainland Affairs Council, but China holds Tsai responsible for stoking the HK riots and knows 武统 is just a matter of time, so this just reshuffles the deck chairs
end/ And with the Tsai regime so enthusiastically trying to hollow out China's economy with a chip shortage, the business community in China isn't in the mood for talks either.
The adults are going to be put back in charge, one way or another.
很高兴看到美国正式对中国进行不宣而战的经济战，更高兴看到台湾岛急切地把自己放在遏制中国大陆科技产业的第一线
2/ This undeclared economic war is intimately related to the semiconductor shortages currently roiling global supply chains. Specifically, since May of last year, the Tsai regime, Trump/Biden, and TSMC have conspired to deliberately cause a shortage and exploit it to damage China
2/这场不宣而战的经济战，与目前困扰全球供应链的半导体短缺密切相关。具体来说，自去年5月以来，蔡政权、特朗普/拜登和台积电合谋故意制造短缺，并利用短缺损害中国的利益
3/ This is fact not theory. ASML (TSMC's main supplier of EUV machines) admitted as much in its recent earnings call, when it said that after Huawei was sanctioned, TSMC told them it would not need as many new machines to grow capacity...
4/ ...but then, after TSMC and the Tsai regime successfully lobbied the US to sanction SMIC, they turned around and told ASML in Q4 2020 "oops we're going to have a lot more orders" and thereby created a shortage situation by design.
5/ What did the Tsai regime do with the shortage? For one, it tried browbeating BioNTech into breaking its contract with Fosun while Germany was experiencing a shortage of vaccines; for another, it tried getting the Biden admin to endorse a TW indy referendum in August
6/ Neutral observers are less than impressed by this set of moves. One EU executive has privately said "The other China is being more irritating to the global community than Saddam Hussein was in 1990"
7/ This irritation has led to predictable effects in international relations. Note, for example, that the EU is *not* listed in the Nikkei article. And my contacts in both Korean semiconductor majors indicate they will minimize their involvement as much as possible.
8/ Where this gets interesting is how it impacts potential post-conflict diplomacy if China does a Taiwan op. The default assumption seems to be that China would immediately be subject to crippling sanctions and diplomatic isolation...
9/ ...but that might not be the case if non-US economic blocs view Chinese management of the fabs as an acceptable alternative to being hostage to the emotions of the DPP's increasingly irrational base.
10/ Now, the bottleneck here is ASML's main US dependency, Cymer, a US subsidiary which makes the LPP light source in their EUVL machines. If China can research a substitute for that, then in a post-op world, China can provide that IP to ASML and still get the EUVL it needs
11/ The US can stamp its feet about that, but it won't be able to compel global compliance with sanctions, because China's share of relative global demand is so high post-COVID that overseas dollar users would rather abandon the dollar than comply with blanket sanctions on China
12/ Plus, after a Taiwan op, China would own roughly 60% of worldwide semiconductor capacity and 80%+ of the electronics supply chain as a whole. It would be too big to sanction, without levels of pain tolerance in the world that - for the Tsai regime - are simply not there
13/ And last but not least, don't forget the EU is well aware that ASML was hoodwinked by TSMC at the direction of the Tsai regime to create this shortage - and then, the Tsai regime used the resultant shortage to cut ahead of EU citizens in getting vaccines for themselves.
14/ All this means that China's last remaining challenge for the Operation - giving the EU, Korea, and eventually the US a face-saving way to come to terms with the fait accompli - has just been made much easier.
15/ In perhaps a belated recognition of its mistake, the Tsai regime put a dove into the Mainland Affairs Council, but China holds Tsai responsible for stoking the HK riots and knows 武统 is just a matter of time, so this just reshuffles the deck chairs
end/ And with the Tsai regime so enthusiastically trying to hollow out China's economy with a chip shortage, the business community in China isn't in the mood for talks either.
The adults are going to be put back in charge, one way or another.
Globe and Mail is trash when it comes to China. Basically far-right agenda.That is the funniest thing anyone from China has done in recent years.
Ren Zhengfei comes to your house to do the reverse brain drain.
Ever since that story was published in the Globe And Mail, Canada's national newspaper, it seems to me the anti-China feelings kicked up in the usually polite Canadians.
According to the law and property rights, Huawei owns those IP that was done by Canadians working in a Huawei facility in Canada.
Canadian research into 5G goes straight to Huawei, a company the Canadian government could soon ban. As the white people say, this is awkward.
It is the "National Newspaper" in their own mind only...
They still have some former Nortel VP occaisonally write articles detailing how Huawei "hacked and destroyed Nortel". Conveniently, he leaves out the part: "my former bosses overstated asset values and subsequently destroyed our workers' pension fund when exposed, while we still enjoyed golden parachutes"
Bonjour à tous. C'est ma première intervention sur ce forum. J'ai une question. Pourquoi Huawei n'est-il pas intéressé par l'architecture ouverte risc-v? L'architecture arm n'est pas en dehors de la puissance des États-Unis et n'est pas fiable et sécurisée à long terme Je sais que la société est membre de la communauté risc-v mais envisage-t-elle de concevoir des processeurs?
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