Lu Feng: “I feel that China is currently still unable to make up its mind policy wise. The reason for this might be that it has not thought through a comprehensive strategy. It may also have to do with a lack of capacity to actually implement [such a plan].”
“First of all, we must be confident. Almost 20 years ago, when I took part in the discussions surrounding the implementation plan for [our] large aircraft project, we restarted the project after 28 years of stagnation. Talent and technology had almost come to a halt. But looking at how things stand today, we nevertheless succeeded. In this world, therefore, there are only technologies that Chinese people do not dare to do because of psychological barriers. There are no technologies that the Chinese people cannot do.”
“To deal with the US’s tech blockade, China's entire strategic thinking needs to change. Although the US has advantages when it comes to technology, China is not at a disadvantage in all respects.”
“Since the US has used its ‘nuclear weapon’ against China, China should strike back and use its own ‘nuclear weapon’. More specifically, the US’s method of suppressing China is to control the supply of semiconductors. Well then, [in return], China should and can control the demand for semiconductors.”
“For the past few years, the US has wanted both to have a stranglehold on China and to make money in the Chinese market. Well, China’s response should then be, since you want to choke me, I won’t let you make money. If the US is forcing a tech and industrial ‘decoupling’ [from China], then we should impose sanctions on all the foreign companies that are carrying out these orders to decouple from the Chinese market.”
“The US’s ‘nuclear weapon’ is technology and China’s ‘nuclear weapon’ is its market. A “nuclear weapon” versus a “nuclear weapon” – who is afraid of whom? If you have a market, but no technologies, you can [still] develop technologies. If you have technologies, but no market, then [having such] technologies will end up leading you nowhere.”
“In short, China must develop its own IC industry and must not let the US ‘have its cake and eat it too’ [‘鱼和熊掌’兼得].”
“Dutch lithography giant ASML’s main [source of] revenue comes from its mature process DUV lithography machines, not from its most advanced ones. The US is currently asking its own companies to stop supplying high-end chip-making equipment to China. It is also demanding that its allies take part in the containment [围堵] of the Chinese [tech] industry. However, ASML is currently not agreeing. If companies from the US and from other countries allied to the US were to do this, it would be equivalent to the US choking off supplies from companies that are part of China’s chip industrial chain. So why don’t we choke the demand off those companies [too]?”
“We must not be afraid to return to a ‘peace of terror’ [‘恐怖的和平’, later equated with a ‘balance of terror’]. We could demand that sales to the Chinese market of any company that [helps] implement the US’s sanctions against China be subject to investigations by the Chinese government. This way they will need to think twice about being an accomplice to the US. It is the other party that struck the first blow and imposed sanctions on China, it is not China that is infringing on any free trade.”
“ASML’s third quarter 2022 financial report shows that its largest sales come from its mature DUV [lithography equipment], including ArF and KrF [lasers]. The sales from its most advanced EUV lithography machines are very small, however its sales volume should not be belittled.”
“If ASML wants to follow the US’s policy and stop exporting its most advanced lithography machines to China, we could, after implementing reciprocal sanctions, ban [封杀] the sale of its ordinary lithography machines [普通光刻机] to the [Chinese] market … Doing so might even make it easier for Chinese companies such as Shanghai Microelectronics and their lithography machines to unlock China’s domestic market.”
“If NVIDIA follows the US government’s ban and stops selling its most advanced chips to China, then we could ban NVIDIA’s low- to mid-end chips from being sold in China. By the same token, Chinese companies in the low- to mid-end chip sector could [end up] with more opportunities for development. At the end of the day, no one can stop companies that can make low-end products from continuing to advance towards high-end ones.”
“For instance, for any foreign company that sanctions China in the tech field, [we should] implement controls on their orders [对其订单实施管制]. At the same time, we must remain steadfast in developing China's domestic IC supply chain.”
“If China were really to do this, it would allow areas in which we have shortcomings, such as chip manufacturing equipment and materials, to develop [faster]. All we are missing now is for the Chinese government to make up its mind and take a decision. If we build up our industrial base, who will be most afraid then? It will not be the Chinese who are afraid, but the Americans.”
“The above analysis explains why there is a need for a special body at the state level that can coordinate policies centrally. If we were to define the development of [China’s] IC industry as a major mission, then this mission will be far more complex than the ‘Two Bombs, One Submarine, One Satellite’ [‘两弹一艇一星’, an early project in the PRC aimed at developing the atomic and, later, hydrogen bombs, intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear submarines, and satellites], because it will involve many more elements relating to corporate growth, market competition and indirect policy coordination.”
“This type of complexity will place greater demands on the particular body that might be [in charge of] completing this major mission. It will have to have a deeper understanding of the dynamics of the industry, of technologies and of the laws of market competition. It will have to have a greater ability both to communicate with businesses and make use of market mechanisms. And its scope for formulating and coordinating policies will be even greater. For this body to work effectively, it will of course require a centrally approved mandate and the independent exercise of its powers. But, apart from this, it will also need to be sufficiently competent and will probably require organisational innovations, such as an ‘interface’ that increases its direct interactions with businesses and the market (a feature that the ‘Central Special Committee’ [中央专委] historically did not have).”