This foreword by Theodore C. Mataxis Brigadier General (Retired) perfectly describes/captures the American saga in Afghanistan. Despite possessing exceptional military leaders and an almost peerless military the American hubris and refusing to learn from history is what brought them to this current juncture. This was written for a book titled "
The Soviet-Afghan War How a Superpower Fought and Lost The Russian General Staff Translated and edited by Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Cress"
As we enter the next millennium, our society is trying to adapt to the impact of an unprecedented and turbulent technological and social revolution. The impact of this revolution is similar to that of the Industrial Revolution on the agricultural society of eighteenth-century Europe and America. The Information Age, with its rapidly expanding technology, has already positioned its guideposts marking our future. Westerners, particularly Americans, love technology. Computers, VCRs, cellular phones, and CD players are commonplace in our homes. Our armed forces reflect this love of technology. We equip our forces with sophisticated equipment and, during times of tight budgets, expect technology to replace expensive manpower. Our view of future conflict is skewed by computer games, popular entertainment, defense contractor pronouncements, and an abiding belief in the omniscience of science. It is prudent for the armed services to incorporate or nullify new technologies as they appear, yet every future war will not be a high-tech war. The military must also prepare for manpower-intensive low-tech wars that may also threaten national interests.
A country or faction within a country can effectively fight a technologically superior state or coalition using guerrilla war.
Guerrilla warfare is a test of national will and endurance in which technological advantages are often degraded or negated. In order for a guerrilla war to succeed, a portion of the local populace must support or acquiesce to the presence of indigenous guerril-las in their midst. There must be a willingness to accept considerable casual-ties-combatant and noncombatant. Guerrillas must have a safe haven and a source of supplies. What guerrillas do not need is military victory. Guerrillas need to survive and endure over the years or decades of the conflict. The guer-rillas remained when the French left Algeria and Indochina, the United States left South Vietnam, and the Soviets left Afghanistan.
The side with the greater moral commitment, be it patriotic, religious, or ideological, eventually won because of higher morale, greater obstinacy, stronger national will, and the determination to survive.
Guerrilla war does not fit into the popular image of high-tech future war, but it may well be the future war that a high-tech country finds itself fighting.
The Soviet Army, a modern, mechanized high-tech force, fought a guerrilla war for over nine years in Afghanistan. Despite their best efforts, the application of over-whelming air power, and the expenditure of national treasure and young lives, the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, leaving the field to the defiant Muja-hideen guerrilla.
A wise army prepares for future war by examining the lessons of the past.
This does not mean that armies should prepare to fight as the last war was fought. Rather, they should draw lessons from the past that will guide the future.
The Taliban spokesperson here showed exactly why it's winning and why they're able to beat an Army that's well funded, supported by major powers politically and economically because of CORRUPTION AND CURRENT AFGHANISTAN LEADERS INDIFFERENCE TO THE VAST MAJORITY OF HER PEOPLES SUFFERING.