What's the point though. It doesn't seem like money is the bottleneck, but rather, the production space. There are only so many shipyards to that can build a 60K+ ton carrier, be it STOBAR or CATOBAR. Might as well go for the more capable warship.
China's SCS Strategy Thread
- Thread starter lilzz
- Start date
They only have to raise the entire terminal each year.
Depends on the role for 075/076. If they're used mostly for sea control might as well improve them to STOBARs. If they're actually going to be used for amphibious operations then they're actually useful.
Vietnamese PM visiting China soon, going have to explain again how they aren't using US and Japan to counter China in the SCS.
This wall-of-text could be going to venture out-of-topic for a while, so do pardon me.
Also, if these posts are unsuitable for this thread, kindly move these posts to a more suitable thread for any further discussion.
Though, firstly, to clarify - For the "smaller flat-decks", I'm mainly referring to the 076 LHDs with catapult(s) and arresting wires onboard. In fact, I didn't take the 075 LHDs into account.
Regarding the ski-jump-versus-catapult argument: I suppose that China's continuous pursuit for CATOBAR instead of STOBAR from CV-18 onwards is already a very obvious statement. The presence of at least one EMALS catapult planned for the upcoming 076 LHD serves to further reinforce that statement.
Sure, catapults are more expensive and complicated to build and maintain, but those features are pretty much the fundamental price to pay in order to allow larger and/or heavier warplanes to be launched from any flat-decks, not just carriers. The fundamentally of this is basically similar to how fundamentally humans need to eat a balanced diet and exercise to maintain body health.
Ski-jumps are certainly cheaper and easier to build and maintain, but it also imposes stringent limits on whether certain planes can take off from it based on several key factors:
1. Speed of the carrier;
2. Speed and direction of the wind;
3. Weapon and fuel payload of the plane;
4. Distance used for the takeoff of the plane;
5. The stress load of the plane when acted upon by the ski-jump during takeoff -
etc.
Catapults practically eliminate most, if not all of the challenges encountered while using ski-jumps on carriers. This is also why:
1. US always choose CATOBAR configuration for their carriers since Forrestal;
2. France always choose CATOBAR configuration for their carriers since Clemenceau;
3. UK originally planned for the Queen Elizabeth twins to have catapults (but shelved due to cost);
4. India originally planned for the Vishal to have catapults (but most likely shelved in favor of a repeat-Vikrant);
5. Soviet Union and Russia planned for the Ulyanovsk and Shtorm to have catapults; and
6. China choose CATOBAR from Fujian onwards, alongside 076 LHD onwards.
Furthermore, going in the future - With the expected growing size and weight of carrier-based 6th-gen fighters and next-gen UCAVs compared to present-day carrier-based 4th and 5th-gen fighters, the margin of allowance for ski-jumps are only going to get even tighter.
Even if the fighter/UCAV are equipped with more powerful engines, there is no guarantee that the fighter/UCAV can function just like on CATOBAR because of many other factors that has be taken into account as well.
So, in other words, catapults can also be considered pretty future-proof (somewhat, at least).
Hence, if anything, China should go full-steam ahead with catapults across all of their flat-decks (CV(N)s and LHDs) into the future.
China is also not lacking money, resources and manpower either, so China does have a greater degree of freedom and leverage to design and build stuffs that are heavier, larger, better and more capable with less restrictions when compared to most other countries.
Regarding the distribution of the type of carriers in the PLAN (i.e. STOBAR, CATOBAR, CVN) - I don't think that really matters much in the overall look of the PLA carrier fleet.
This is because the ultimate goal for China's carrier fleet is most likely to be all-nuclear-CATOBAR, i.e. following the US footsteps. Conventionally-powered carriers, regardless of STOBAR or CATOBAR, will be gradually phased out in favor of nuclear-powered CATOBAR carriers.
In the meantime, I think that the more important factor would be the number of carriers in the fleet.
Speaking of which, the "6-9 carriers for the PLAN" which I mentioned earlier is actually based the so-called "三三(三)制", or the "3-3-(3-)standard" for carrier deployments, which is considered a common practice for the US CVN fleet.
The general idea is - For every trio of CVs:
- One CV conducts combat patrol;
- One CV conducts training exercises; and
- One CV conducts maintenance & repair at home/friendly base or shipyard.
This ensures that at least one CV of the trio is always ready for action at a moment's notice. Of course, the number can be surged to two CVs depending on the state of the CV that is conducting training exercises, but having one CV on 24/7 standby ensures that any urgent military scenarios can be promptly dealt with, even in the worst-case scenario.
Let's just take the recent (ongoing) IRL example for reference...
China currently has 2 operational carriers, i.e. Liaoning and Shandong. However, because Liaoning is currently undergoing MLU in Dalian, therefore Shandong alone has to handle anything that require CVs.
Notice how after Shandong sailed around Bohai in the north last week to (according to credible sources) undergo certification tests of new carrier pilots - Shandong has to immediately steam south and into the SCS in order to monitor Ronald Reagan (and her CSG) in the region.
Hypothetically speaking, if Fujian is already in active service right now - Perhaps Shandong can remain in Bohai for longer periods of time for certification tests of new carrier pilots and/or training, while Fujian will be the one to monitor Ronald Reagan.
The point is - With a trio-CV configuration, the distribution of tasks between each CV that is capable of sailing will be more balanced, and thus, the pressure on each CV can be reduced or becomes more manageable. There are many benefits of this for both the ship itself and the crew+pilots onboard, but I won't dive deeper due to word constrain.
Of course, with Fujian expected to join the PLAN within the coming 1-2 years, China would have achieved the "3-3-(3-)standard" for her carrier fleet. This will be the first instance outside of the USN since 2010 (as the Royal Navy started to decommission the Invincible trios).
However, pretty much all of us here in this forum already understood that having only 3 CVs is woefully inadequate for China, especially considering her ever-expanding reach of interests across the entire globe - alongside the ever-worsening security situation for China in the Indo-Pacific region.
Therefore, an additional 3-6 CVs is necessary for China if the PLAN is to have the capability to face the USN head-on up till the Second Island Chain. This means that the PLAN would require a carrier fleet of 6-9 CVs in total.
For a total of 6 CVs, the distribution will be:
1. Three CVs for the North Sea Fleet; and
2. Three CVs for the South Sea Fleet.
For a total of 9 CVs, the distribution will be:
1. Three CVs for the North Sea Fleet;
2. Three CVs for the South Sea Fleet; and
3. Three CVs for the East Sea Fleet - Or divided between the aforementioned two fleets - Or on rotational deployment at an overseas naval base.
(continued in the next post)
Also, if these posts are unsuitable for this thread, kindly move these posts to a more suitable thread for any further discussion.
Largely agree.
Though, firstly, to clarify - For the "smaller flat-decks", I'm mainly referring to the 076 LHDs with catapult(s) and arresting wires onboard. In fact, I didn't take the 075 LHDs into account.
Regarding the ski-jump-versus-catapult argument: I suppose that China's continuous pursuit for CATOBAR instead of STOBAR from CV-18 onwards is already a very obvious statement. The presence of at least one EMALS catapult planned for the upcoming 076 LHD serves to further reinforce that statement.
Sure, catapults are more expensive and complicated to build and maintain, but those features are pretty much the fundamental price to pay in order to allow larger and/or heavier warplanes to be launched from any flat-decks, not just carriers. The fundamentally of this is basically similar to how fundamentally humans need to eat a balanced diet and exercise to maintain body health.
Ski-jumps are certainly cheaper and easier to build and maintain, but it also imposes stringent limits on whether certain planes can take off from it based on several key factors:
1. Speed of the carrier;
2. Speed and direction of the wind;
3. Weapon and fuel payload of the plane;
4. Distance used for the takeoff of the plane;
5. The stress load of the plane when acted upon by the ski-jump during takeoff -
etc.
Catapults practically eliminate most, if not all of the challenges encountered while using ski-jumps on carriers. This is also why:
1. US always choose CATOBAR configuration for their carriers since Forrestal;
2. France always choose CATOBAR configuration for their carriers since Clemenceau;
3. UK originally planned for the Queen Elizabeth twins to have catapults (but shelved due to cost);
4. India originally planned for the Vishal to have catapults (but most likely shelved in favor of a repeat-Vikrant);
5. Soviet Union and Russia planned for the Ulyanovsk and Shtorm to have catapults; and
6. China choose CATOBAR from Fujian onwards, alongside 076 LHD onwards.
Furthermore, going in the future - With the expected growing size and weight of carrier-based 6th-gen fighters and next-gen UCAVs compared to present-day carrier-based 4th and 5th-gen fighters, the margin of allowance for ski-jumps are only going to get even tighter.
Even if the fighter/UCAV are equipped with more powerful engines, there is no guarantee that the fighter/UCAV can function just like on CATOBAR because of many other factors that has be taken into account as well.
So, in other words, catapults can also be considered pretty future-proof (somewhat, at least).
Hence, if anything, China should go full-steam ahead with catapults across all of their flat-decks (CV(N)s and LHDs) into the future.
China is also not lacking money, resources and manpower either, so China does have a greater degree of freedom and leverage to design and build stuffs that are heavier, larger, better and more capable with less restrictions when compared to most other countries.
Regarding the distribution of the type of carriers in the PLAN (i.e. STOBAR, CATOBAR, CVN) - I don't think that really matters much in the overall look of the PLA carrier fleet.
This is because the ultimate goal for China's carrier fleet is most likely to be all-nuclear-CATOBAR, i.e. following the US footsteps. Conventionally-powered carriers, regardless of STOBAR or CATOBAR, will be gradually phased out in favor of nuclear-powered CATOBAR carriers.
In the meantime, I think that the more important factor would be the number of carriers in the fleet.
Speaking of which, the "6-9 carriers for the PLAN" which I mentioned earlier is actually based the so-called "三三(三)制", or the "3-3-(3-)standard" for carrier deployments, which is considered a common practice for the US CVN fleet.
The general idea is - For every trio of CVs:
- One CV conducts combat patrol;
- One CV conducts training exercises; and
- One CV conducts maintenance & repair at home/friendly base or shipyard.
This ensures that at least one CV of the trio is always ready for action at a moment's notice. Of course, the number can be surged to two CVs depending on the state of the CV that is conducting training exercises, but having one CV on 24/7 standby ensures that any urgent military scenarios can be promptly dealt with, even in the worst-case scenario.
Let's just take the recent (ongoing) IRL example for reference...
China currently has 2 operational carriers, i.e. Liaoning and Shandong. However, because Liaoning is currently undergoing MLU in Dalian, therefore Shandong alone has to handle anything that require CVs.
Notice how after Shandong sailed around Bohai in the north last week to (according to credible sources) undergo certification tests of new carrier pilots - Shandong has to immediately steam south and into the SCS in order to monitor Ronald Reagan (and her CSG) in the region.
Hypothetically speaking, if Fujian is already in active service right now - Perhaps Shandong can remain in Bohai for longer periods of time for certification tests of new carrier pilots and/or training, while Fujian will be the one to monitor Ronald Reagan.
The point is - With a trio-CV configuration, the distribution of tasks between each CV that is capable of sailing will be more balanced, and thus, the pressure on each CV can be reduced or becomes more manageable. There are many benefits of this for both the ship itself and the crew+pilots onboard, but I won't dive deeper due to word constrain.
Of course, with Fujian expected to join the PLAN within the coming 1-2 years, China would have achieved the "3-3-(3-)standard" for her carrier fleet. This will be the first instance outside of the USN since 2010 (as the Royal Navy started to decommission the Invincible trios).
However, pretty much all of us here in this forum already understood that having only 3 CVs is woefully inadequate for China, especially considering her ever-expanding reach of interests across the entire globe - alongside the ever-worsening security situation for China in the Indo-Pacific region.
Therefore, an additional 3-6 CVs is necessary for China if the PLAN is to have the capability to face the USN head-on up till the Second Island Chain. This means that the PLAN would require a carrier fleet of 6-9 CVs in total.
For a total of 6 CVs, the distribution will be:
1. Three CVs for the North Sea Fleet; and
2. Three CVs for the South Sea Fleet.
For a total of 9 CVs, the distribution will be:
1. Three CVs for the North Sea Fleet;
2. Three CVs for the South Sea Fleet; and
3. Three CVs for the East Sea Fleet - Or divided between the aforementioned two fleets - Or on rotational deployment at an overseas naval base.
(continued in the next post)
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(continued from the previous post)
In the meantime, the smaller flat-decks with catapults (i.e. 076 LHDs) will only, at most, serve in a supportive role for the CVs for any significant naval engagements in the WestPac, i.e. providing one or two extra catapults + parking spaces and service stations for more carrier-based fighters and UCAVs for the CSG. Unless deployed for expeditionary tasks against weaker enemy units or formation, I don't really agree that 076 LHDs be used like a CSG of her own as the US attempts to do with their Wasp and America LHD/LHAs.
While this arrangement may seem to be not as much useful - Yet, for Liaoning and Shandong - Unless the KJ-600 and J-35 are officially STOBAR-capable, attaching one 076 LHDs for each of the twins can significantly alleviate the problem by providing a platform where KJ-600s can operate from alongside Liaoning and Shandong. This arrangement helps to complete the aerial formation and role-distribution for the CSG. With this, even Liaoning and Shandong can conduct their own aerial-based AEW&C without having to depend on land-based KJ-200s and KJ-500s of the PLAAF and PLANAF.
This is also why compared to CV-19, I'm actually more attentive at the progress of the 076 LHD, considering their value as an ad-hoc catapult-equipped CV in terms of providing additional support for the current two STOBAR CVs that are in service right now.
To clarify - The "10~ smaller flat-decks" requirement stated in my previous post is basically just a mirror of what the USN have with their LHA/LHD fleet, i.e. 10 (11 before Bon Homme Richard got roasted). Though, judging by the immediate needs of amphibious operations against Taiwan (and maybe even the Ryukyus as well in case Japan gets naughty), perhaps an additional 4-6 076 LHDs are needed...
Finally, if there was indeed an acute need for ski-jump somewhere, that place would be the 20-25 thousand-ton, small-sized "escort carriers", which I have discussed about here. To put it simply, being the Chinese version of the Anadolu LHD, or simply swap the sole catapult in that "escort-carrier" illustration by @大包CG with a ski-jump at the bow section.
Very cheap and easy to maintain for sure, but just as mentioned before, the #1 caveat being that only smaller and lighter UCAVs (drones of the TB-3 and Kizilelma-categories) can be deployed on these "escort carriers".
In the meantime, the smaller flat-decks with catapults (i.e. 076 LHDs) will only, at most, serve in a supportive role for the CVs for any significant naval engagements in the WestPac, i.e. providing one or two extra catapults + parking spaces and service stations for more carrier-based fighters and UCAVs for the CSG. Unless deployed for expeditionary tasks against weaker enemy units or formation, I don't really agree that 076 LHDs be used like a CSG of her own as the US attempts to do with their Wasp and America LHD/LHAs.
While this arrangement may seem to be not as much useful - Yet, for Liaoning and Shandong - Unless the KJ-600 and J-35 are officially STOBAR-capable, attaching one 076 LHDs for each of the twins can significantly alleviate the problem by providing a platform where KJ-600s can operate from alongside Liaoning and Shandong. This arrangement helps to complete the aerial formation and role-distribution for the CSG. With this, even Liaoning and Shandong can conduct their own aerial-based AEW&C without having to depend on land-based KJ-200s and KJ-500s of the PLAAF and PLANAF.
This is also why compared to CV-19, I'm actually more attentive at the progress of the 076 LHD, considering their value as an ad-hoc catapult-equipped CV in terms of providing additional support for the current two STOBAR CVs that are in service right now.
To clarify - The "10~ smaller flat-decks" requirement stated in my previous post is basically just a mirror of what the USN have with their LHA/LHD fleet, i.e. 10 (11 before Bon Homme Richard got roasted). Though, judging by the immediate needs of amphibious operations against Taiwan (and maybe even the Ryukyus as well in case Japan gets naughty), perhaps an additional 4-6 076 LHDs are needed...
Finally, if there was indeed an acute need for ski-jump somewhere, that place would be the 20-25 thousand-ton, small-sized "escort carriers", which I have discussed about here. To put it simply, being the Chinese version of the Anadolu LHD, or simply swap the sole catapult in that "escort-carrier" illustration by @大包CG with a ski-jump at the bow section.
Very cheap and easy to maintain for sure, but just as mentioned before, the #1 caveat being that only smaller and lighter UCAVs (drones of the TB-3 and Kizilelma-categories) can be deployed on these "escort carriers".
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Very nice analysis. Could you explain or give a link about the 3-3-(3-)standard of the US navy ?
Unfortunately, I don't know the proper terms or methods required to find the English version.
The only reference sources that I could find are on Baidu, and those are mostly doing brief descriptions only: