China’s strategy is grounded in the Maoist tradition of insurgent warfare, resulting in a form of “people’s war at sea.” The ruling State Council reaffirmed this Maoist heritage in 2015 when it published a document outlining “China’s Military Strategy.” This has three crucial implications for the struggle for nautical freedom. One, insurgent warfare is protracted warfare. No one should expect a quick victory. Two, Beijing relies on irregular means and methods to get its way. Rather than bully Southeast Asian states with the big stick of conventional military force, it harnesses a host of paramilitary or nonmilitary implements—the coast guard, a maritime militia embedded in the fishing fleet, and merchant shipping—as its tools of choice. Beijing backs them up with regular forces from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force—putting rival claimants on notice that China will prevail should an encounter come to blows.
And three, in operational terms, China is staging what Wylie called a “cumulative” campaign that refrains from “sequential” operations characteristic of open warfare. In other words, rather than repeatedly hammer away at foes with massed forces until they can no longer resist, Chinese commanders spread the field. They strive to win lots of small-scale tactical confrontations, dispersed in time and geographic space. Many minor results, they hope, will add up to something major over time.