Korea was a very different war. Firstly it was land based, so China had no air or sealift problems, they could just send troops and materiel by land over the border. That makes a *huge* difference. The Americans had to air or sea lift in every single bullet.
Not being rude, but have you actually studied the Korean War in any detail? Or looked at the geography of Korea?
Korea is mountainous with few roads and total American air dominance. Logistics was a massive problem for the PVA. Had it been remotely as easy as you make it out to be, the PVA would have driven the US into the see in one continuous move from the start, rather than having to pause to wait for supplies and allowing the US and SK forces to dig in and be reinforced. OTOH, American supply lines were untouched throughout the war, meaning they could bring in men and material without any disruption.
In Taiwan, both sides would have to do this, and the hard reality is that the US Navy still has a much larger sealift capability than China, and would also have the advantage of having local allies on the ground in Taiwan. The PLAN is rapidly improving but in sheer lift capacity are still a good way behind the Americans in scale, and that makes everything else harder. If the Americans go literally all-in, and throw everything short of nukes at Taiwan, China just won't be able to land enough troops and materiel quickly enough to maintain a viable force.
See lift capabilities is meaningless if you cannot get your men ashore. When even USN carrier battle groups are putting themselves in extreme danger just trying to get within fighter range of the mainland, how the hell do you expect US marines to get close enough to land? And just how much attrition do you think the US is prepared to suffer to get boots on the ground in Taiwan?
This is the 21st century. Wars are no longer won through massed ground forces, but rather through air dominance. Only if the air war is an inconclusive draw would ground forces numbers start to count.
With air dominance, the PLA doesn’t need huge number of boots on the ground, especially not against Taiwan’s infamously poor conscript army.
That is why the PLA is unconcerned with plugging this apparent gap, and instead are focusing their amphibious assault investment in LPDs, LHDs and potentially even LHAs. All of which are massive overkill for a Taiwan scenario and would not be what the PLAN would be building if it feels like it does not have the sea lift capabilities already in place for a Taiwan scenario.
The other issue is experience, and there is no shortcut to it. Going from "no experience of full scale conflict for 70 years" to "Lets launch an amphibious assault against a full scale American force on their allied territory" in one go doesn't seem like a terribly wise strategy.
A full-on amphibious assault on Taiwan to confront a joint Taiwan-American force there would be one of the most complex and demanding war scenarios since WW2. America has a wealth of experience of doing it before, with equipment and personnel that have been tried and tested in the field. China has got completely new equipment is has never had to use in anger, with men and women who have no experience of full-scale conflict. This is another reason why I think a limited scale action on the outer islands would be more likely, as it would be a low-risk way for Chinese forces to be tested and perfected in real-world conditions, and apply lessons learned to future conflicts.
That’s the same kind of self serving reasoning that places America head and shoulders above everyone else in Pandemic preparedness.
America has fought plenty of wars, but it has not fight against a near-peer opponent who could contest every domain with a fair degree of competitiveness and even clear advantages in many key fields since WWII.
Even Korea and Vietnam are not comparable since there was no naval challenge while the air challenge was at best only a nascence factor with American control of the skies never seriously challenged, never mind threatened.
Indeed, America’s frequent low intensity wars might actually prove to be a major hindrance to the combat effectiveness of their forces against a near-pear adversary. For example, USN carrier pilots who return from operational tours require months of training once back home to re-hone their air combat skills, because when operationally deployed all they do is strike missions in danger free airspace in support of ground troops. So other skills become rusty through a lack of use and practice.
It’s the same with American infantry, who‘s combat experiences are tailored to counter insurgency, but what works flawlessly against insurgents could easily get you killed if you tried it on a near-peer opponent.
As such American combat experience is highly inflated and largely inapplicable in such a scenario.
At the end of the day, the deciding factors are going to be numbers and quality of fighters, strikers, missiles and detection means. The US has no clear advantage over China in any of those fields in a Taiwan scenario, and are in fact decidedly outmatched in most key areas.
