China's SCS Strategy Thread

[Blitzo]

How very magnanimous of you to concede the point. Although now I'm curious what kind of scenarios you are thinking of which could realistically see someone assemble an invasion armada, sail it to China's doorstep and launch a successful invasion of Chinese territory, all before the Chinese even realise what is going on to be able to send forces to defend those islands.

It depends on how such a conflict unfolds, and I do think that in the foreseeable future, it would be far easier for a potential high tech foe to launch a rapid attack against those islands before they are able to be effectively augmented with defences, given the nature of modern weapons, especially cruise missiles and air strikes.

But that's why I'm not choosing to press this point, because it all depends on how a conflict occurs and we could have pages and pages of detailed discussion with dozens of areas of contention or disagreement for how it may occur.

Well, my original full comment was:



That last paragraph was to sum up that the PLA will enjoy the full range of tools and assets that they could deploy from those islands, right into the heart of any conflict zone in the SCS, which would allow the PLA to fight as if they battle zone was right on the Chinese mainland coast in terms of assets available.

Surely you did not think I meant they could literally fight exactly as if they were on the Chinese mainland coast?

The way you wrote it definitely read like you meant simply by deploying the "full range of assets" from the Chinese mainland would allow the PLA to fight around the islands as if they were fighting around the Chinese mainland coast, yes, with the "full home turf advantage".

In terms of your full comment, I interpreted your first paragraph as a premise (which I mostly agree with), and your second paragraph/sentence to be a statement based off the premise. If that second statement is meant to be based off the premise, then I do categorically disagree with it.

After all, there is a big difference between having a similar variety or number of assets that can be deployed to a region, versus how those assets can be used based on the differences of geography and distance.

Also, I would disagree with the idea that the PLA could deploy a similar absolute number of assets to the SCS islands as they could from the Chinese mainland as well.
They may well be able to deploy a similar "variety" of assets, but the absolute number of assets based on the islands that could participate in a conflict scenario in the SCS is likely quite different to a conflict scenario occurring closer to the Chinese mainland coast.
Furthermore as I wrote above, even if a similar absolute number of assets could be deployed to the reclaimed islands, that will not offer the PLA the ability to fight around the islands in a similar way to as if they were fighting off the Chinese mainland coast due to geography limitations.

This is just hair splitting. I never said it would be exactly as if they were fighting along the Chinese mainland coast, which should have been obvious.

Actually you did -- you wrote it like you believed merely deploying a similar variety or number of assets to the islands would allow the PLA to fight around the SCS islands as if they were fighting from the Chinese mainland coast. I'm saying that merely deploying assets to the islands does not mean they will be able to fight the same way as if they were fighting off the mainland coast.
If that isn't what you meant, then okay.

Fighting on and around those islands will of course be different from fighting along the actual Chinese mainland coast, but carries significant advantages as well as the disadvantages you chose to focus on.

I think much of your post gets needlessly bodged down cataloging all the minutia differences without truly considering the full balance of opportunities as well as threats the very different battle spaces have to offer in stark contrast to each other.

The island bases are indeed far from the factories and supply chains that makes weapons and munitions needed for the defence of those islands. However, have you not considered the enormous benefits to be gained from being able to keep the fighting far from your home soil? So those factories could work at full potential without the losses and delays in production they would suffer if the fighting was literally on the Chinese mainland coast, which would bring much of those factories and supply chains into range of direct enemy physical attack?

In my book, the longer and riskier transit of materials to the island bases is incomparable to the logistical difficulties you would suffer with the enemy dropping bombs and missiles all over your industrial heartland.

Furthermore, you are making a fundamental mistake in comparing China fighting on the mainland coast against China fighting on the islands in isolation.

The opposing side's supply lines should also be considered in relation to China's, because its ultimately the difference between the supply lines of the two combating sides that will determine who will enjoy the logistical home field advantage.

Yes, obviously supply island bases on the SCS is going to involve a significantly longer supply line than troops fighting on the mainland coast. However, in comparison to the supply lines of the only country who even has the potential to take those islands by force, China's logistical supply line is still significantly shorter, so will still enjoy the home field logistical advantage.

These are good points, but my last post was not about which side in a conflict would have a strategic logistical advantage, it was merely to demonstrate that merely deploying assets onto the islands would not mean the PLA could fight in that region in the same way that they could fight near the Chinese mainland coast.

If you agree that merely deploying a similar variety or number of assets (of the mainland) to the islands does not equate to the PLA being able to fight around the islands as if they were fighting off the Chinese mainland coast, then I have no further disagreement on this matter.

 

[Blitzo]

Part 2 because of character limit.



Several problems with the above.

Firstly, you are again failing to take into consideration the full range of operational differences the islands offer, and seek to assess the effectiveness of their defence as if they were defended like land based facilities ring fenced into a small arbitrarily defined zone rather than adjust your thinking to take into account the very different defensive posture and procedures any half competent military commander would take to adapt to the very different battle space the islands represents.

Secondly, you are showing a common confusion of just why modern air defences operate the way the do; how enemy forces counter them and the counters employed to defeat SEAD and DEAD attacks.



Right, lets get to the specifics here.

The reason long range missile defences on the mainland employ concealment is because China has way too much space. Far from purely a strength like you are assuming, space and strategic depth can be a massive liability and risk factor to defenders as well.

It would simply be cost prohibitive for China, or anyone with such a vast territory, to build an impregnable air defence shield to cover its entire territory. A problem which is made more acute with modern stealth platforms that could shrink the effective detection and engagement ranges of missiles batteries, and force you to need significantly more systems to cover the same area of land.

By concealing themselves and constantly going on the move, SAMs in a modern integrated air defence network seeks to add risk and unknowns to enemy mission planning. The enemy cannot purposely fly around your air defences if they do not know where your air defences are.

Its only when your air defences are already smashed and the enemy has nearly free rein of the skies would you seem SAMs employ the kind of hit and run tactics that has been mistakenly assumed to be their primary function in popular western internet lore.

In a real near-peer fight, SAMs would be employed very differently to help secure the skies as part of an integrated network of assets, so shouldn't have to really worry over much about focused enemy SEAD and DEAD attacks unless/until something goes seriously wrong, because they should enjoy top cover from friendly fighters that will make enemy SEAD/DEAD missiles exceptionally hazardous if not suicidal.

Its for good reason that during the height of the Cold War, both sides were think of using tactical nukes from the offset of hostilities - the integrated air defences of the other side would be too effective at engaging attacking aircraft without nukes blown giant holes in that air defence net first.

The point is that even if the PLA did place land based long range SAMs on those islands (which I have already said they may well not), it will be no easy task trying to get at them.

You are also making a very unfortunately fundamental mistake in assuming the islands will be defending all by themselves, when I have repeatedly stressed the important of the role the PLAN and PLAAF will play in their defence.

It may help if you just think of the islands like giant air bases on the mainland, and PLAN warships as the mobile long range SAM batteries that can and will roam around to defend it.

They do not need to park long range SAMs on the islands, because they will have those from the naval support.

They may well place a few batteries of land based long range SAMs on the islands, much like how the Russians deployed their S400 battery to their air base in Syria, but if they do that, such a long range SAM will no longer employ shoot and scoot, maximum coverage/disruption engagement tactics. Instead they will hunker down and rely on the massed layered air defences of the air base to keep them safe while they take advantage of their fixed location to light radars and actively scan with no interruptions in radar coverage.

When they do that, they might as well be part of the air base, and no matter where the fight, island base or mainland, how you defend fixed, massive strategic locations are going to be the same. Being able to successful defend the SAMs at the air base is only to be pretty much the same mission as defending fighters, bombers and other assets on the ground at an air base on the mainland.

(and the last part of your post, below) :

Well said, now if only you had applied that philosophy to the rest of your analysis above.

Of course my above statements which you quoted were made with the assumption that the islands would be operating in concert with Air Force and Navy support -- after all in the beginning of that post I did say this:
"However, for the sake of discussion I won't press this point, and I'll assume in the rest of this reply, that the conflict unfolds in such a way where the Chinese military is able to deploy its forces in the way that you describe"

So operating off that assumption, my point is that even with the Air Force and Navy having been deployed as you had described in your previous posts (i.e.: offering mutual support for the islands), the fundamental limitations of the island's geography/surface area, relative distance and the consequences of those factors, means the PLA would not be able to fight around the islands as if they were fighting along the Chinese mainland coast.

Again, missing the point, and this ties in with the earlier point I made about you not recognising the double edged nature of space and distance.

For the Chinese mainland, they might 'only' be facing the sea (odd you seem to be forgetting all about the likes of South Korea, Japan and even Vietnam and Taiwan from which a hostile foreign power could potentially launch strikes from, but I have little interest in splitting hairs), but an attack could still come from almost any vector from the sea.

What more, because of the aforementioned far greater volume of space that needs to be defended along the mainland coast, as well as the profusion of choice targets an attacker could choose from, the Chinese air defence net will be spread far thinning along the mainland coast than it ever will be for those islands.

Along the Chinese coast, the enemy does not need to attack any defensive hard points, they could simply skirt around them to attack soft targets lightly or undefended to wear China down with attritional loss.

To attack those islands, it doesn't matter which direction they come from, the point is, when they get within range, they will have no choice but to engage the industrial meat grinders that these islands could easily be transformed into, head-on. And that will cost any attacker gravely.

It will likely also cost the Chinese defenders gravely, but the exchange rates will be very balanced, if not even in China's favour.

You're making it sound like I'm arguing that fighting along the Chinese mainland coast will be somehow "superior" to fighting around the islands, or that I'm saying that fighting around the islands is somehow "inferior" to fighting along the Chinese mainland coast.
(edit: for example, fighting along the mainland coast does mean more industrial centres could be under threat of attack, as well as of course greater surface area and air space to monitor and defend, which could be seen as adverse factors, depending on how a conflict unfolds...)

"Superiority" of fighting near the mainland coast or fighting near the islands isn't my position at all -- I'm just saying that they're different, based on the differences in geography.
Again, from that post, which basically sums up my position:

"However, I do believe that even if the Chinese military can deploy its forces in the way that you describe, there are enough large scale physical differences in strategic depth and geography between the reclaimed islands vs the Chinese mainland, which I think would cast significant if not overwhelming doubt to the idea that the PLA could fight around the reclaimed islands like they could fight around the Chinese mainland coast."

 

[tidalwave]

A few US think tank suggest philippines should file lawsuit against CHina at US so, US court can freeze China assets for violating Philippines rights. "Back rent" for occupying mischieve island.

Freeze China assets in US.

That would open a can of worms. China can retaliate by freezing US assets in CHina.
And China will sell all its US bonds and liquidate all its other assets at US.

 

[Yvrch]

A few US think tank suggest philippines should file lawsuit against CHina at US so, US court can freeze China assets for violating Philippines rights. "Back rent" for occupying mischieve island.

Freeze China assets in US.

That would open a can of worms. China can retaliate by freezing US assets in CHina.
And China will sell all its US bonds and liquidate all its other assets at US.

I find it really hard to believe US think tanks would have suggested such an absolutely outlandish idea with a clear view to freeze Chinese assets in US.
Which think tanks you say?

 

[tidalwave]

I find it really hard to believe US think tanks would have suggested such an absolutely outlandish idea with a clear view to freeze Chinese assets in US.
Which think tanks you say?

Do you know who's Anders Corr and jerry Hendrix? You need read more!

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Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

Those two guys are pretty hardcore and influential much like a Peter Navarro ,who's an advisor for Trump. You can't simply dismiss them.

 

[tidalwave]

People simply do not understand. Some people in US are willing to sabotage the world economics . Like Trump's 45% Tariff across the board for all China products. That's a gross WTO violation but people like Trump, Peter Navarro, and Gordon Chang don't care. They promote to get out of WTO altogether.

Along that line of thinking, freezing China assets in US is definitely in their playbook.

So, China better empty out their bonds and move their assets out before it's too late...

 

[Yvrch]

I thought you said a few thinks tanks. Are you saying what these two guys wrote actually represents some think tanks' public position on these matters? Just to clarify before wasting my time any more than it already is.

I have no reasons or need to know them at all. I see no loss in not knowing the stupid.

 

[Yvrch]

People simply do not understand. Some people in US are willing to sabotage the world economics . Like Trump's 45% Tariff across the board for all China products. That's a gross WTO violation but people like Trump, Peter Navarro, and Gordon Chang don't care. They promote to get out of WTO altogether.

Along that line of thinking, freezing China assets in US is definitely in their playbook.

So, China better empty out their bonds and move their assets out before it's too late...

I sure can tell that you have no clue what you are talking about. I'll stop it here.

 

[tidalwave]

I thought you said a few thinks tanks. Are you saying what these two guys wrote actually represents some think tanks' public position on these matters? Just to clarify before wasting my time any more than it already is.

I have no reasons or need to know them at all. I see no loss in not knowing the stupid.

There's the Corr analytics . Hendrix represents the thinking of conservatives in Pentagon.

Gordon Chang and Peter Navarro also mention too.

 

[tidalwave]

I sure can tell that you have no clue what you are talking about. I'll stop it here.

Like you have alot of clue what you talk about? !
I gave a few examples already. and yet you give none other than your opinion, which counts for nothing,