China's SCS Strategy Thread

[Blitzo]

That's a matter of opinion.

If left to fend for themselves, those islands would be massively vulnerable.

However, with the PLAN fleet backing them up, it would be exceptionally difficult and costly to inflict enough damage with missiles and air strikes to knock them out of the fight and keep them out.

With a PLAN fleet nearby, those islands will enjoy the kind of multi layered air defences the equal of any CSG. And that's just from the PLAN fleet elements.

In addition, they could put dozens of LD2000 CIWS, AAA, short and medium ranged missiles on each of the islands and just exhaust and attacker's missile stocks.

-quote snipped due to character limit-

In terms of missiles and bombs, I am confident those islands can take anything any hostile fleet could throw at them. It's keeping those islands reinforced and supplied where the PLAN will probably have the biggest worries and take the bigger losses.

Heh, this is why I said I'd prefer to discuss a conflict scenario in any great detail -- because everything you described would be dependent on how a conflict unfolds.... specifically, whether the early stages of the conflict or preceding tensions before the conflict would allow China to deploy the kind of air defences, fighters, AEW&C etc to the reclaimed islands and to "dig in" and to send their naval fleet into the SCS around the islands before the first shot is fired.
During peacetime I expect China to have only a minor military presence and minor defensive capabilities on those reclaimed islands -- so the effectiveness of these islands during a conflict scenario will depend on the state of their armament once battle is joined, and that is why I wrote what I did about the island's utility and vulnerability... because I don't think we can assume that any conflict will occur in such a way where China's able to deploy its weapons on the islands and its naval forces in the SCS in the way you've described.

However, for the sake of discussion I won't press this point, and I'll assume in the rest of this reply, that the conflict unfolds in such a way where the Chinese military is able to deploy its forces in the way that you describe

Funny you cut the quantifying remark out in that quote. Trying to make it sound less reasonable to strengthen your counter?

I'm not sure what quantifying remark you're talking about, but do you really think I would descend to such lows?
Obviously my position on the matter is inclusive of your other premises which underlay that sentence you said.

I'll elaborate on my position in the next part of my reply.

In terms of defensive and offensive power, any enemy fleet assaulting those islands will face pretty much the same threats as they would if they were assaulting the Chinese mainland itself. They will have to contend with the PLAN fleet, the PLAAF top cover and AWACS support, coastal FACS as well as probably land based air defences and offensive missile batteries.

If anything, assaulting those islands may actually be harder than attacking the Chinese mainland.

If the Chinese fleet were defending the mainland, they need to place themselves in front of the coast, both because of simply geography, but also because there are high value assets they need to protect on the mainland, which are pretty much entirely absent with the islands.

-quote snipped due to character limit-

The only way to make such an bombardment 'stick' is to immediately follow it up with a full amphibious invasion to take those islands.

You are correct in saying that if China were able to deploy the kinds of assets you mentioned to the islands, that they would offer similar capabilities that could be deployed from the mainland. (keyword here being "capabilities" or weapons systems)

However, the key reason why I still think it is not enough to say that such capabilities can "allow the PLA to fight as if they were fighting along China's mainland coast," is because of the difference in geography -- or rather, strategic depth, which will limit how those capabilities can be supported, limit how they can be placed or hidden, and effect how vulnerable they are to the opposing force's attack vectors.

I think the Chinese mainland offers a substantially greater strategic depth than the reclaimed island bases, in two key ways that are very operationally relevant:
1: significantly greater ease of resupply, rearmament, and repair (and general logistics reliability) compared to the island bases.
2: significantly greater land area on the Chinese mainland (even the Chinese mainland's coastal regions) to situate and move defences (edit: and general capabilities/weapons systems) between, compared to the island bases.
And in terms of general geography, there is a key difference as well:
3: the Chinese mainland faces different threat vectors and distances compared to the reclaimed islands of the SCS.

Regarding 1, you have rightfully mentioned that the islands may face challenges in resupply, rearmament, etc, however I think this is a much bigger issue than you have given it weight to -- or at the very least, I believe it would be reasonable to say that the islands are far more difficult to resupply, rearm and repair compared to any equivalent facility on the Chinese mainland, even if it were on the coast. Not only is the distance between the reclaimed islands and Chinese mainland so much greater (meaning a longer transit time), but the logistics tail to shuttle these materials from the Chinese mainland and the reclaimed islands is obviously significantly more vulnerable than the logistics tail that would exist for a base or facility within the Chinese mainland and the source of logistics support (also in the Chinese mainland).
In short, I think the difference in distance and vulnerability of the overall logistics tail that the reclaimed islands need is far greater than any equivalent facility on the Chinese mainland would suffer from.

Regarding 2, ground based defensive weapons like SAMs, radars, can be significantly more distributed among the much greater area of land on the Chinese mainland's coast, even if they are required to guard a single airbase or facility. The greater surface area of the Chinese mainland means these defensive weapons can conceal themselves better, as well as providing the opportunity to "shoot and scoot," which will significantly hamper any attempts at SEAD/DEAD by the enemy. However, the reclaimed islands all have very limited real estate by comparison, meaning all the ground based defences will not only be significantly, massively more visible than they would be compared to deployment on the Chinese mainland, but they would also be far more clustered among each other as well, versus the defences deployed on the mainland seeking to guard a base or facility.
This isn't to say there are not ways for defences on the islands to reduce their vulnerability, by increasing the integration of their layered defences or by using some camoflauge, but they are still fundamentally limited by the small surface area of the islands and the limited room for maneuver, placing them at far greater risk of detection, and thus identification and elimination.
Another key factor of strategic depth obviously, is the greater number of multiple bases, facilities which are in close proximity to each other allowing substantially easier mutual support during times of conflict, compared to the reclaimed island bases of which there are 3-4. This isn't only talking about logistics, but also the ability to easily redeploy forces from one base to another (in the mainland), such as fighter aircraft, bombers, as well as air defences, EW, etc.

Regarding 3, what I mean by this is that the reclaimed islands are surrounded by ocean which a foe can deploy naval forces and naval aviation from, and the west, south and east sides are an archipelego of potentially hostile states many of which have air, naval and missile forces or which a potential foe can base air, naval and missile forces from. In other words, the reclaimed islands face potential threats from almost three quarters of its surrounding sea and airspace.
OTOH, the Chinese mainland's coast is bounded only by ocean and international air space on its eastern and southern flanks, which are the main avenues which an enemy can attack by, and where sovereign airspace of other nations surrounds the rest of China where an enemy cannot easily transit over (depending on how alliances unfold, obviously).



All this isn't to say that the reclaimed islands will not have an operational or tactical or even strategic usefulness -- especially if the Chinese military are able to deploy their forces to the islands in the way that you describe before a conflict occurs.

However, I do believe that even if the Chinese military can deploy its forces in the way that you describe, there are enough large scale physical differences in strategic depth and geography between the reclaimed islands vs the Chinese mainland, which I think would cast significant if not overwhelming doubt to the idea that the PLA could fight around the reclaimed islands like they could fight around the Chinese mainland coast.

After all, combat is not only about the weapons systems that one can deploy to a particular area, but also how easily one can supply, repair, rearm those weapons, and the area where one can hide and operate those weapons from, as well as the degree of mutual support those weapons offer to each other, and the vulnerability of those weapons to the opposing force.

 

[AndrewS]

Just one point to add.

The cost/benefit ratio of long-range SAMs versus incoming cruise missiles does not favour the defender.

But that does not apply to point defence systems like the inexpensive FK-1000, which use gun rounds and missiles without expensive guidance seekers.

 

[tidalwave]

India gave Vietnam $500 mil line of credit (Not aid) to buy Indian equipments. LOL
Vietnamese always bashed China made products are Inferior or low quality and now turn around trying to buy Indian equipments.

Got my head scratching on that one. Not sure what India has that's worthwhile to purchase.

the Only thing that might worthwhile to put on the table is the Brahmos missile. That's about it.

 

[supercat]

This is significant if true, worth re-posting here.

It's starting:

China building in disputed shoal: Philippines' Duterte

Beijing is expanding its large-scale land reclamation in the disputed South China Sea, Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte said Friday, despite an international court ruling rejecting most of China's claims in the resource-rich area.

A UN-backed tribunal ruled in July that China's claims to almost all of the strategic sea had no legal basis and its construction of artificial islands in disputed waters was illegal.

But Duterte said he received an "unsettling" intelligence report showing China had sent barges to the contested Scarborough Shoal and had appeared to begin construction in the area for the first time.

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[siegecrossbow]

This is significant if true, worth re-posting here.

I think it's still too early to say that China commenced construction. Is it confirmed that Scarsborough was the final destination for the barges? Likwise, is it confirmed that the barges were carrying construction material?

 

[tidalwave]

China gonna build something there in Scarbourough but it won't have a airstrip.

 

[PanAsian]

This is significant if true, worth re-posting here.

It all appears to be conjecture for now and no major media have picked up the story which would indeed be significant if true.

 

[Iron Man]

I agree with an earlier article saying that right about now would be the best time to start reclamation of Scarborough Shoal given where we are in the US election cycle. The next president will be confronted by a fait accompli by the time he/she/it steps into office on January 20, 2017 and the current president is a lame duck with declining executive authority as each day passes; some would say he has been a lame duck for quite a while.

 

[plawolf]

Heh, this is why I said I'd prefer to discuss a conflict scenario in any great detail -- because everything you described would be dependent on how a conflict unfolds.... specifically, whether the early stages of the conflict or preceding tensions before the conflict would allow China to deploy the kind of air defences, fighters, AEW&C etc to the reclaimed islands and to "dig in" and to send their naval fleet into the SCS around the islands before the first shot is fired.
During peacetime I expect China to have only a minor military presence and minor defensive capabilities on those reclaimed islands -- so the effectiveness of these islands during a conflict scenario will depend on the state of their armament once battle is joined, and that is why I wrote what I did about the island's utility and vulnerability... because I don't think we can assume that any conflict will occur in such a way where China's able to deploy its weapons on the islands and its naval forces in the SCS in the way you've described.

However, for the sake of discussion I won't press this point, and I'll assume in the rest of this reply, that the conflict unfolds in such a way where the Chinese military is able to deploy its forces in the way that you describe

How very magnanimous of you to concede the point. Although now I'm curious what kind of scenarios you are thinking of which could realistically see someone assemble an invasion armada, sail it to China's doorstep and launch a successful invasion of Chinese territory, all before the Chinese even realise what is going on to be able to send forces to defend those islands.

I'm not sure what quantifying remark you're talking about, but do you really think I would descend to such lows?
Obviously my position on the matter is inclusive of your other premises which underlay that sentence you said.

I'll elaborate on my position in the next part of my reply.

Well, my original full comment was:

In any conflict scenario now, any PLAN fleet will enjoy the full range of home turf advantage, able to deploy land based missile batteries, fighters, strikers and support assets from those island bases right in the heart of the region. All its short ranged assets like 022 FAC and 056 FFGs will also be able to be effectively utilised, and the island bases will also make PLAN SSK operations far easier and more effective.

In effect, those island bases would allow the PLA to fight as if they were fighting along China's mainland coast.

That last paragraph was to sum up that the PLA will enjoy the full range of tools and assets that they could deploy from those islands, right into the heart of any conflict zone in the SCS, which would allow the PLA to fight as if they battle zone was right on the Chinese mainland coast in terms of assets available.

Surely you did not think I meant they could literally fight exactly as if they were on the Chinese mainland coast?

However, the key reason why I still think it is not enough to say that such capabilities can "allow the PLA to fight as if they were fighting along China's mainland coast," is because of the difference in geography -- or rather, strategic depth, which will limit how those capabilities can be supported, limit how they can be placed or hidden, and effect how vulnerable they are to the opposing force's attack vectors.

I think the Chinese mainland offers a substantially greater strategic depth than the reclaimed island bases, in two key ways that are very operationally relevant:
1: significantly greater ease of resupply, rearmament, and repair (and general logistics reliability) compared to the island bases.
2: significantly greater land area on the Chinese mainland (even the Chinese mainland's coastal regions) to situate and move defences (edit: and general capabilities/weapons systems) between, compared to the island bases.
And in terms of general geography, there is a key difference as well:
3: the Chinese mainland faces different threat vectors and distances compared to the reclaimed islands of the SCS.

This is just hair splitting. I never said it would be exactly as if they were fighting along the Chinese mainland coast, which should have been obvious.

Fighting on and around those islands will of course be different from fighting along the actual Chinese mainland coast, but carries significant advantages as well as the disadvantages you chose to focus on.

I think much of your post gets needlessly bodged down cataloging all the minutia differences without truly considering the full balance of opportunities as well as threats the very different battle spaces have to offer in stark contrast to each other.

The island bases are indeed far from the factories and supply chains that makes weapons and munitions needed for the defence of those islands. However, have you not considered the enormous benefits to be gained from being able to keep the fighting far from your home soil? So those factories could work at full potential without the losses and delays in production they would suffer if the fighting was literally on the Chinese mainland coast, which would bring much of those factories and supply chains into range of direct enemy physical attack?

In my book, the longer and riskier transit of materials to the island bases is incomparable to the logistical difficulties you would suffer with the enemy dropping bombs and missiles all over your industrial heartland.

Furthermore, you are making a fundamental mistake in comparing China fighting on the mainland coast against China fighting on the islands in isolation.

The opposing side's supply lines should also be considered in relation to China's, because its ultimately the difference between the supply lines of the two combating sides that will determine who will enjoy the logistical home field advantage.

Yes, obviously supply island bases on the SCS is going to involve a significantly longer supply line than troops fighting on the mainland coast. However, in comparison to the supply lines of the only country who even has the potential to take those islands by force, China's logistical supply line is still significantly shorter, so will still enjoy the home field logistical advantage.

 

[plawolf]

Part 2 because of character limit.

Regarding 2, ground based defensive weapons like SAMs, radars, can be significantly more distributed among the much greater area of land on the Chinese mainland's coast, even if they are required to guard a single airbase or facility. The greater surface area of the Chinese mainland means these defensive weapons can conceal themselves better, as well as providing the opportunity to "shoot and scoot," which will significantly hamper any attempts at SEAD/DEAD by the enemy.

Several problems with the above.

Firstly, you are again failing to take into consideration the full range of operational differences the islands offer, and seek to assess the effectiveness of their defence as if they were defended like land based facilities ring fenced into a small arbitrarily defined zone rather than adjust your thinking to take into account the very different defensive posture and procedures any half competent military commander would take to adapt to the very different battle space the islands represents.

Secondly, you are showing a common confusion of just why modern air defences operate the way the do; how enemy forces counter them and the counters employed to defeat SEAD and DEAD attacks.

However, the reclaimed islands all have very limited real estate by comparison, meaning all the ground based defences will not only be significantly, massively more visible than they would be compared to deployment on the Chinese mainland, but they would also be far more clustered among each other as well, versus the defences deployed on the mainland seeking to guard a base or facility.

Right, lets get to the specifics here.

The reason long range missile defences on the mainland employ concealment is because China has way too much space. Far from purely a strength like you are assuming, space and strategic depth can be a massive liability and risk factor to defenders as well.

It would simply be cost prohibitive for China, or anyone with such a vast territory, to build an impregnable air defence shield to cover its entire territory. A problem which is made more acute with modern stealth platforms that could shrink the effective detection and engagement ranges of missiles batteries, and force you to need significantly more systems to cover the same area of land.

By concealing themselves and constantly going on the move, SAMs in a modern integrated air defence network seeks to add risk and unknowns to enemy mission planning. The enemy cannot purposely fly around your air defences if they do not know where your air defences are.

Its only when your air defences are already smashed and the enemy has nearly free rein of the skies would you seem SAMs employ the kind of hit and run tactics that has been mistakenly assumed to be their primary function in popular western internet lore.

In a real near-peer fight, SAMs would be employed very differently to help secure the skies as part of an integrated network of assets, so shouldn't have to really worry over much about focused enemy SEAD and DEAD attacks unless/until something goes seriously wrong, because they should enjoy top cover from friendly fighters that will make enemy SEAD/DEAD missiles exceptionally hazardous if not suicidal.

Its for good reason that during the height of the Cold War, both sides were think of using tactical nukes from the offset of hostilities - the integrated air defences of the other side would be too effective at engaging attacking aircraft without nukes blown giant holes in that air defence net first.

The point is that even if the PLA did place land based long range SAMs on those islands (which I have already said they may well not), it will be no easy task trying to get at them.

You are also making a very unfortunately fundamental mistake in assuming the islands will be defending all by themselves, when I have repeatedly stressed the important of the role the PLAN and PLAAF will play in their defence.

It may help if you just think of the islands like giant air bases on the mainland, and PLAN warships as the mobile long range SAM batteries that can and will roam around to defend it.

They do not need to park long range SAMs on the islands, because they will have those from the naval support.

They may well place a few batteries of land based long range SAMs on the islands, much like how the Russians deployed their S400 battery to their air base in Syria, but if they do that, such a long range SAM will no longer employ shoot and scoot, maximum coverage/disruption engagement tactics. Instead they will hunker down and rely on the massed layered air defences of the air base to keep them safe while they take advantage of their fixed location to light radars and actively scan with no interruptions in radar coverage.

When they do that, they might as well be part of the air base, and no matter where the fight, island base or mainland, how you defend fixed, massive strategic locations are going to be the same. Being able to successful defend the SAMs at the air base is only to be pretty much the same mission as defending fighters, bombers and other assets on the ground at an air base on the mainland.

Regarding 3, what I mean by this is that the reclaimed islands are surrounded by ocean which a foe can deploy naval forces and naval aviation from, and the west, south and east sides are an archipelego of potentially hostile states many of which have air, naval and missile forces or which a potential foe can base air, naval and missile forces from. In other words, the reclaimed islands face potential threats from almost three quarters of its surrounding sea and airspace.
OTOH, the Chinese mainland's coast is bounded only by ocean and international air space on its eastern and southern flanks, which are the main avenues which an enemy can attack by, and where sovereign airspace of other nations surrounds the rest of China where an enemy cannot easily transit over (depending on how alliances unfold, obviously).

Again, missing the point, and this ties in with the earlier point I made about you not recognising the double edged nature of space and distance.

For the Chinese mainland, they might 'only' be facing the sea (odd you seem to be forgetting all about the likes of South Korea, Japan and even Vietnam and Taiwan from which a hostile foreign power could potentially launch strikes from, but I have little interest in splitting hairs), but an attack could still come from almost any vector from the sea.

What more, because of the aforementioned far greater volume of space that needs to be defended along the mainland coast, as well as the profusion of choice targets an attacker could choose from, the Chinese air defence net will be spread far thinning along the mainland coast than it ever will be for those islands.

Along the Chinese coast, the enemy does not need to attack any defensive hard points, they could simply skirt around them to attack soft targets lightly or undefended to wear China down with attritional loss.

To attack those islands, it doesn't matter which direction they come from, the point is, when they get within range, they will have no choice but to engage the industrial meat grinders that these islands could easily be transformed into, head-on. And that will cost any attacker gravely.

It will likely also cost the Chinese defenders gravely, but the exchange rates will be very balanced, if not even in China's favour.

After all, combat is not only about the weapons systems that one can deploy to a particular area, but also how easily one can supply, repair, rearm those weapons, and the area where one can hide and operate those weapons from, as well as the degree of mutual support those weapons offer to each other, and the vulnerability of those weapons to the opposing force.

Well said, now if only you had applied that philosophy to the rest of your analysis above.