China's SCS Strategy Thread

[ahojunk]

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Source: Xinhua | 2016-08-02 11:31:53 | Editor: huaxia


BEIJING, Aug. 2 (Xinhua) -- The Supreme People's Court (SPC) on Tuesday issued a regulation on judicial interpretation to clarify China's jurisdiction over its territorial seas.

The explanation provides a clear legal basis for China to protect the maritime order, marine safety and interests, and to exercise integrated management over the country's jurisdictional seas, said an SPC statement.

The regulation, which takes effect Tuesday, states that Chinese citizens or foreigners will be pursued for criminal liability if they engage in illegal hunting or fishing, or killing endangered wildlife in China's jurisdictional seas.

"Judicial power is an important component of national sovereignty," said the statement, adding, "People's courts will actively exercise jurisdiction over China's territorial waters, support administrative departments to legally perform maritime management duties, equally protect the legal rights of Chinese and foreign parties involved and safeguard Chinese territorial sovereignty and maritime interests."

The judicial explanation, based on Chinese law, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and judicial practices, further clarifies China's maritime jurisdiction, the statement said.

According to the regulation, jurisdictional seas not only include inland waters and territorial seas, but also cover regions including contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones and continental shelves.

The regulation also addresses Chinese citizens or organizations engaged in fishing in fishing zones or the open sea under co-management between China and other countries, according to signed agreements.

The interpretation specifies the standard of conviction and punishment for illegal marine fishing: those who illegally enter Chinese territorial waters and refuse to leave after being driven away, or who re-enter after being driven away or being fined in the past year, will be considered to have committed "serious" criminal acts and will be fined and sentenced to less than a year of imprisonment, detention or surveillance.

This penalty also applies to those who illegally enter China's territorial seas to fish but do not engage in "illegal fishing" under the law, it said.

"The explanation offers legal guarantees for marine fishing law enforcement," defining punishments for fishing without a license in order to encourage legal fishing, said the statement, adding that it also promotes judicial assistance and international cooperation on marine affairs.

 

[PanAsian]

Good article highlighting a fundamental implication of unmanned systems used for military purposes, that it favors offense over defense, the setting in this case is the ECS and SCS but the implication is applicable everywhere and in fact have been proven in many locales.

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Unmanned Systems and Manned Conflict in East Asia
Potential (mis)use of military robotic technology in East Asia’s maritime conflicts is enormous.
ByTobias Burgers and Scott N. Romaniuk
August 02, 2016

The South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS) maritime conflicts, which have occasionally been likened to “Mexican standoffs,” have seen steady escalation over recent years. Contested oil rigs, newly build islands on coral reefs, sunken boats declared islands, military encounters between air and naval forces, contested freedom of navigation, and aggressive fishermen acting like national militias have become an integral part of the SCS. Further north, unilaterally declared air identification zones, incursions into air and sea spaces around the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Islands,locked radar systems, and hostile diplomatic language have become part of the ECS conflict.

Both conflicts have seen a rapid rise in political and security tensions – foremost after the recentarbitral tribunal verdictand through the deployment of military, rather than non-military (fishermen) or para-military (coast guards) assets. Nevertheless these tensions are politically manageable, and will likely not escalate into full military conflict, at least for the time being. Despite recent military deployments and aggressive naval action, the focus among all actors, regional (Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, and Indonesia) and international (the United States and Australia, among others) is to maintain a (fragile) peace.

The rise and increasing use of robotic technology could drastically alter that peace, giving rise to an escalation of tension and hostility in which sustained, albeit likely limited, conflict could become a possibility. This relates to two factors: first, the likelihood that so-called unmanned systems will be deployed in such conflict; second and subsequent, the still-obscure role of unmanned systems in these conflicts.

The role and importance of unmanned systems will only further increase in the near future. Given the operational and economic advantages of unmanned systems, it is likely that their current and still-limited deployment will increase quickly over the next few years, as they have unique capabilities and qualities that would make them ideal for use in both the SCS and ECS. They can remain at sea or in the air for extended periods, patrolling thousands of miles of land and sea – ideal for the extended geographical distances of the SCS and ECS. The development, procurement, and operational costs of unmanned systems are significantly less, making them available for regional actors with limited military budgets. From a quantitative perspective, we can expect that the use of unmanned systems in both conflicts will become more widespread. On a qualitative level, they have the endurance suited for large-scale and extended intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) roles. Indeed, medium and high altitude unmanned systems, such as the Global Hawk and China’s Xianglong Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) are able to conduct surveillance of thousands of square miles within a single day. They could provide states with better means and opportunities to enhance their ISR capabilities, thereby enabling better situational awareness by providing enhanced audio and visual ammunition in addition to evidence for media wars over both conflicts.

These advantages, unique abilities, and relatively limited costs make it likely that we will see more unmanned systems on, below, and above the waters of both seas. Indeed, an analysis of regional unmanned system capabilities show that nearly all actors have, to different extents, such capabilities.
...

Cont'd next post due to character limit.

 

[PanAsian]

Cont'd from previous post due to character limit.

...
China has over the course of the last decade developed a wide array of unmanned systems and has slowly become one of the world’s leaders in unmanned systems development. It is developing and producing sophisticated Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) such as the Dark Sword. In addition, it has already operationally deployed other UAVs such as the CH-4, an UAV that bears a stark resemblance to the MQ-9 Predator. It is also developing and is partly capable of deploying Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs).

Japan possesses the U.S. developed Global Hawk, a long endurance, high altitude UAV, and a number of smaller UAVs. It too is aiming to develop UUVs for maritime security purposes.

Vietnam recently revealed an advancedhigh-altitude long endurance unmanned systemwith a range of 2,500 miles that can remain in flight for up to 35 hours. Vietnam’s HS-6L is the product of nearly 10 years of development and will likely be used to maintain constant surveillance on Chinese military deployment and activity in contested SCS waters. Orbiter 2 and Orbiter 3 drones from Israel have likewise also become part of Vietnam’s arsenal.

The Philippines has also turned to unmanned systems in the SCS rivalry. According toDefense World, the Philippine Defense Department’sModernization Programincludes several projects that will result in the supply of surveillance systems, including drones. Interest in acquiring American Predator drones is also largely evident.

Taiwan, too, has developed a wide array of unmanned systems in recent years, among others the Chung Shyang II UAV and a newly developed MALE UAV, which resembles the U.S. MQ-9 Predator.

The United States – the world’s leader in unmanned robotic development – has already deployed its unmanned systems (the Global Hawk) in East Asian airspace. Last April, U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, while aboard theaircraft carrier USSStennissailing in the South China Sea – an unmistakeable signal for China – stated that the United States had operational UUV capabilities and would deploy them as Washington saw fit. His visit signaled the determination of the United States to stand firmly alongside its ally, the Philippines, in the wake of a stout China posture in the area against its much smaller but equally-determined neighbors.

The deployment of unmanned systems would, however, not need to directly lead to contested waters, airspace, and increasing tension. Thousands of vessels and planes fly and sail through both seas monthly, without leading to violent military conflict. Rather, it is the possible purpose for which these systems could be used that could give rise to increasing tensions and possible violent conflict. Unmanned system are relatively easy to spot, making their military value, beyond ISR roles, relatively limited. However, this obvious visibility makes them ideally suited for political purposes: They are perfect tools for highly visible intrusions into opposing actors’airspaces or sea zones. Such actions would fit within the strategy or tactics of the infamous salami slicing tactics, or as what James Holmes refers to assmall stick diplomacy: Small, minor actions, which are not imminent (major) security threats, but which over time would contest actors’ control, dominance and sovereignty

The utility of unmanned systems, vis-à-vis manned systems, is that the absence of human operators creates advantages for the intruding actor. As no direct human interaction is possible – like communication between pilots within visual range, or crew of naval vessels – the opposing forces are limited to only two possibilities: communication or the use of violence. However, if an actor seeks to communicate, warn, and to deter the intruding systems, it would need to relay this effort by means of an extensive and time consuming process: It would need to go up and through various military and diplomatic channels, after which the entire communicational effort would need go back down to the operators of the intruding unmanned system. This is a lengthy, cumbersome process and one during which an unmanned system could remain in the contested air or sea space. If, however, an actor would decide to not pursue this lengthy process it can only decide to damage or destroy the intruding systems. This would be a significant escalation, as it would be the destruction of military material – a novelty in a region of increasing tension – and could be met with a strong political and possible military response. Within the framework of the public relations and media wars, it would make the defender look like the aggressor.

James Holmessummarized the situation of what to do with intruding unmanned systems well when he described such operations: “In effect they dare you to escalate.” As such, the use of unmanned systems could favor those seeking the offensive, intrusive use of such systems for political purposes. Particularly actors with significant military powers and the upper hand could play this game of dare-to-escalate. They could engage in a game of maritime bluff, where they seek to outmaneuver opposing actors with lesser military capabilities, challenging them to contest their actions and power.

Approaching the SCS and ECS like a game of poker is risky strategy, foremost if what is at stake are not merely chips, but geopolitical powers and human lives. It is therefore essential that all nations involved in both conflicts develop frameworks and understandings on how to deal with the rise of unmanned systems and their possible offensive and assertive use. The South and East China Seas have recently seen their waters become increasingly stormy though they remain sailable. It would be a mistake if the rise and use of unmanned systems turned them into inaccessible waters.

Tobias Burgers is a Doctoral Candidate at the Otto-Suhr-Institute (Free University of Berlin) where he researches the rise and use of cyber, robotic systems in security relations, and the future of military conflict.

Scott Nicholas Romaniuk is a PhD Candidate in International Studies (University of Trento). His research focuses on asymmetric warfare, counterterrorism, international security, and the use of force.

 

[Blackstone]

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Instead of taking a hard line, can China make lemonade out of the PCA lemon? What if it set aside the PCA's legitimacy question, and deals only with the four main points in the Tribunal's rendering? They are:

1. China's 9-dash line is invalid
2. All of the land features in the SCS are "rocks" and none are entitled to 200 mi EEZ; 500m/3mi/12mi are all the water they're entitled
   
3. China infringed on Filipino fishing and other resource rights in contested area
4. China didn't live up to environmental pledges while creating artificial islands

So, let's examine each point. The invalid 9DL opinion might be a blessing in disguise. I say that because no one seriously believe any nation could own the high seas, not even the PRC, so it's better to make a great showing of supreme sacrifice and ditch the 9DL altogether. In the end, comprehensive national power will determine China's success or failure in dominating the SCS, not a few dash lines on some maps that no one else accepts. Bottom line is the 9DL is more trouble than it's worth.

'All land features are rocks' is a real doozy of an opinion, with consequences that could impact nations around the world. Therefore, China might be able to take a strong stance against it with little consequences.

Filipino people fished the contested area for centuries, so it's true China infringed their livelihoods. China could bring back joint resource development, including fishing rights. Beijing always preached shared development, so it's not giving anything extra, plus the resource sharing scheme could be done without addressing sovereignty.

On the environmental part, no rational person could deny China damaged SCS environment with its large-scale artificial island building and land reclamation. China could mouth regrets on damaging SCS environment, and make a nice contribution to the UN environment protection fund. The act could also make Chinese citizens happy, because the environment is a big concern in China right now.

Finally, it's clear China's neighbors are nervous about what comes next, and might clutch at anything reasonable from Beijing. Therefore, China has an opportunity to seize the initiative and make a negative into a positive. Being carefully magnanimous wouldn't damage China's position in the SCS, but may lower tensions and garnish some goodwill around the world.

 

[vesicles]

I don't think China should touch the PCA at all. You can't cherry pick only the parts that you like and deny other parts and still justify it all.

Keep in mind that the argument used by the Chinese has always been that the PCA had no jurisdiction. If they accept parts of the decision, then that means they have recognized the jurisdiction of the PCA. They would dig a huge hole where they can't possibly get out. At this point, the PCA ruling is more like a hot potato. No one knows what to do with it. So why grab it?!

At this point, China has pretty much cemented their foundation in the SCS. Most of the island building is done. The airstrips are done. So they can simply say "ok! Now we can go back to the negotiation table and in the mean time let's keep the (new) status quo." And they have the choice of moving forward with the militarization of the islands (if the Philippines doesn't behave), or maintain the current status quo (if everyone agrees to negotiate.

 

[Jura The idiot]

LOL in the newest video (which I noticed at first on a Czech server) China blames the US also for the SCS, I guess:

source (I don't know how to link this vid directly):

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[Blackstone]

I don't think China should touch the PCA at all. You can't cherry pick only the parts that you like and deny other parts and still justify it all.

Keep in mind that the argument used by the Chinese has always been that the PCA had no jurisdiction. If they accept parts of the decision, then that means they have recognized the jurisdiction of the PCA. They would dig a huge hole where they can't possibly get out. At this point, the PCA ruling is more like a hot potato. No one knows what to do with it. So why grab it?!

At this point, China has pretty much cemented their foundation in the SCS. Most of the island building is done. The airstrips are done. So they can simply say "ok! Now we can go back to the negotiation table and in the mean time let's keep the (new) status quo." And they have the choice of moving forward with the militarization of the islands (if the Philippines doesn't behave), or maintain the current status quo (if everyone agrees to negotiate.

Like it or not, the Tribunal's illegitimate rendering isn't going away anytime soon, and China's rivals in the region and across the wide Pacific could and would use the opinion paper as leverage; claimants pressing for concessions, and US as another tool in its large war chest for containment. Beijing can co-op its neighbors and work around the PCA's position paper, if it deftly uses finesse and hard power to shape outcomes, while at the same time lower tensions with US.

 

[Blackstone]

LOL in the newest video (which I noticed at first on a Czech server) China blames the US also for the SCS, I guess:

source (I don't know how to link this vid directly):

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It's just PR for domestic consumption. To retain legitimacy, the Red Dynasty has to show will uphold Chinese core interests and resist US encirclement.

 

[solarz]

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Source: Xinhua | 2016-08-02 11:31:53 | Editor: huaxia


BEIJING, Aug. 2 (Xinhua) -- The Supreme People's Court (SPC) on Tuesday issued a regulation on judicial interpretation to clarify China's jurisdiction over its territorial seas.

The explanation provides a clear legal basis for China to protect the maritime order, marine safety and interests, and to exercise integrated management over the country's jurisdictional seas, said an SPC statement.

The regulation, which takes effect Tuesday, states that Chinese citizens or foreigners will be pursued for criminal liability if they engage in illegal hunting or fishing, or killing endangered wildlife in China's jurisdictional seas.

"Judicial power is an important component of national sovereignty," said the statement, adding, "People's courts will actively exercise jurisdiction over China's territorial waters, support administrative departments to legally perform maritime management duties, equally protect the legal rights of Chinese and foreign parties involved and safeguard Chinese territorial sovereignty and maritime interests."

The judicial explanation, based on Chinese law, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and judicial practices, further clarifies China's maritime jurisdiction, the statement said.

According to the regulation, jurisdictional seas not only include inland waters and territorial seas, but also cover regions including contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones and continental shelves.

The regulation also addresses Chinese citizens or organizations engaged in fishing in fishing zones or the open sea under co-management between China and other countries, according to signed agreements.

The interpretation specifies the standard of conviction and punishment for illegal marine fishing: those who illegally enter Chinese territorial waters and refuse to leave after being driven away, or who re-enter after being driven away or being fined in the past year, will be considered to have committed "serious" criminal acts and will be fined and sentenced to less than a year of imprisonment, detention or surveillance.

This penalty also applies to those who illegally enter China's territorial seas to fish but do not engage in "illegal fishing" under the law, it said.

"The explanation offers legal guarantees for marine fishing law enforcement," defining punishments for fishing without a license in order to encourage legal fishing, said the statement, adding that it also promotes judicial assistance and international cooperation on marine affairs.

This is a very important development, something that western pundits seem to have missed. I've seen it brought up in the news, but they seem to dismiss it as just bluster.

Again and again, they make the same mistake: China does not bluff, and China does not bluster. None so blind as those who don't wish to see.

China has two end games in mind for the SCS: military security, and maritime economic security. Military security has as objective the protection of vital Chinese shipping lanes.

Maritime economic security is all about fishes.

Currently, the SCS is a lawless region where various coast guards act as little more than pirates. Fishermen operating in the area risks their life savings and even their lives. Worse, because of the lawless nature of the region, natural resources are being unsustainably depleted.

The Supreme Court motion paves the way for Chinese coast guard to step up law enforcement in the SCS. Expect to see foreign fishermen detained and prosecuted (likely at Sansha) in the future.

 

[vesicles]

Like it or not, the Tribunal's illegitimate rendering isn't going away anytime soon, and China's rivals in the region and across the wide Pacific could and would use the opinion paper as leverage; claimants pressing for concessions, and US as another tool in its large war chest for containment. Beijing can co-op its neighbors and work around the PCA's position paper, if it deftly uses finesse and hard power to shape outcomes, while at the same time lower tensions with US.

It's not about the PCA ruling going away. It's about how China treats it. The moment China considers any point in the ruling, they legitimize it and completely overturn their original legal position. then they lose their legal ground.

At this point, they can still make concessions without acknowledging the ruling. they can negotiate in bilateral meetings with the Philippines. when they make concessions in these bilateral meetings, they would look like a gracious giant who is considerate of his small neighbors. On the other hand, when they make the same concessions based on the PCA ruling, they look like a loser who is forced to concede because they have lost a legal battle.