China's SCS Strategy Thread

dingyibvs

Senior Member
To sort of sum up what plawolf said (with a lil addition of my own), time is on China's side, the U.S. knows it and tried to hurry things along, but China turned out to be more ready than expected.

The key for China is to realize that time is still on its side, so don't rush things just because it's had success so far. It's current success relies on a foundation built over time, and it'll be even more successful if given more time.
 

Ultra

Junior Member
It's a sobering reminder of how powerful the western media is at shaping people's views and even their memories that well read members of this board could fall prey to their manipulations

Those who are voicing the belief that China somehow planned the SCS disputes as a challenge to the US is simply unwittingly parroting the lies force fed to them daily by the western media.

China did not choose to make the SCS a flashpoint, the US did.

Even a few years ago, no one was concerned about the SCS. Then suddenly its importance shot to prominence seemingly overnight, and that happened even before China started building islands.

The biggest triggers to the heightening of tensions are twofold.

The first event, which while did not directly trigger Chinese plans for the SCS, most certainly, and in my view, most fundamentally changed China's entire mindset towards the current international order, which underlies more recent Chinese actions.

This seismic event is none other than Japan's nationalisation of the Diaoyu Islands.

In doing so, Japan tore up one of the fundamental cornerstones of Sino-Japanese post war relations. But it was the western reaction to that incident with had by far the biggest impact on Chinese strategy.

Before the Diaoyu incident, Chinese policy toward territorial disputes was consistent across the board. China favoured bilateral, peaceful negotiations to settle disputes, but did not really see any urgency in settling disputes, and was happy to leave disputes unresolved and focused more on improving trade and diplomatic relations.

Part of that was strategic, because time was on China's side. The longer China left a dispute unresolved, the stronger its negotiating position when the two sides to eventually come together to resolve it. But part of it was also hopeful, that as the trade grows between China and its neighbours, so would goodwill and understanding. So a bitter dispute might be resolved more easier if the two peoples are more friendly towards each other.

In the meantime, it was adopting a purposefully low-key approach towards the disputes, favouring to agree to disagree and not press its claims to hard as to damage broader relations.

Not only did the west unanimously give China zero credit for its past self restrain and maturity in handling disputes, it went so far as to try and twist that to use to weaken Chinese claims.

It was western leaders and diplomats who first stressed the paramount importance of demonstrating effective control, and argued that because Japane demonstrated effective control of the Diaoyu Islands while China had not, that Japan has the stronger claim irrespective of the historical and legal claims China might have. They tried to spin it as China acquiescing to Japan's claims becomes it only made diplomatic protests to Japanese control and never tried to physically challenge Japanese control.

In effect, the west told China that might equals right. It didn't matter that China could point to history and actual treaties which support its claims to the Diaoyu islands, all that matters was that Japan had demonstrated actual control.

It was a stunning development for China, because before that, the dominant view within China was that the west respected laws and treaties.

Immediately after that, China started routine patrols to the Diaoyu islands to demonstrate its own effective control, and to challenge Japanese control.

As such, when the second major development came in the form of Hillary sticking her nose into the SCS disputes by sabotaging a grand bargain China was on the very cusp of signing with the other claimants to peacefully resolve the SCS territorial disputes, alarm bells started to go off in Beijing.

Determined not to be caught out by the same trick twice, China's answer to American interference in the SCS was to demonstrate and extert actual physical control.

The distances and logistics involved has always been the Achilles' heel in China's ability to effectively monitor the SCS. Which is how Vietnam and others have been able to steal so many islands.

They can occupy and fortify features before China could find out about it, at which point they would already be dug in and established and China could not evict them without resorting to using direct force, which China has been hesitant to do so far.

The solution to that problem is for China to turn the features it does control into enormous FOBs, from where China could not only effectively monitor the activities of others, but also have forces ready yo stop them from being able o seize more features.

Thanks to the western media's relentless efforts, the entire narrative has been turn out its head when they explain how the SCS dispute first developed.

It was never China who was looking to cause trouble, it makes zero sense for anyone to be setting fires on their own doorsteps.

It has always been America that has been the driving force in both elevating the status of the dispute, and in heightening tensions by enouraging and aiding those with rival disputes against China to press their claims as forcefully as possible.

The reason for all of this, the Americans gave away themselves with their endless stressing of the value of shipping that goes through the SCS and its importance.

However, the fundamentally important detail censored from western news reports is the fact that the overwhelming majority of that shipping is Chinese.

The real narrative of the SCS dispute isn't one of China trying to put a death choke on world shipping and America heroically resisting as the western media would have you believe. Instead it's pretty much the reverse, with America seeking to control the Chinese trade jugular that is the SCS by actively encouraging land grabs by allies and client states in the SCS, to allow them to threaten Chinese trade by proxy if necessary, and China having absolutely none of it.



Great writing, 10 thumbs up!
 

Ultra

Junior Member
True, but that underhanded tactics by the US certain interests groups is starting to back fired. Starting with the ASEAN nations are NOT coming to together to force China in anyway to accept that unlawful and unfair PCA Arbitration ruling at all. Second China and Russia are doing military drills in the SCS in the near future. Finally, more and more people from around the world are starting to get sick and tired of this US World Police underhanded tactics and policies that's failing to wind hearts and minds.

You know what is funny about the police analogy? That Police in the US as institution is failing miserably - so much so there are more and more protest about it, and urban warfare against police being carried out. It is almost like a foretelling of what is going to happen in the international arena of the future. The people will rebel and the police is going to get shot dead.
 

Ultra

Junior Member
That PDF from RAND is funny, they are hoping the scenerio they device will convince the Chinese leadership not to seek confrontation with US and submit to the US will.

"While the primary audience for this study is the U.S. policy com-
munity, we hope that Chinese policymakers will also think through
possible courses and consequences of war with the United States, includ-
ing potential damage to China’s economic development and threats to
China’s equilibrium and cohesion. We find little in the public domain
to indicate that the Chinese political leadership has given this matter
the attention it deserves.
"

Their foregone conclusion seems to be China will lose regardless, the message is "we will lose a little but you will lose more, so back off".


"It would be far better for stability and at least as good for deter-
rence for the U.S. military to emphasize, in general, planning for a pro-
longed high-intensity war and to make this emphasis known to China."


This seems to be the US response to their view the expected Chinese current strategy of high intensity short war. The expected response in China would be China dug-in, and prepare for a long high attrition war which it has fought longer than anyone else - Against the Japanese and the KMT. I don't believe merely threatening China with the prospect of long high intensity war is going to make China back-off. infact I think it will just prepare China for it.
 
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Ultra

Junior Member
The more I read the more it looks like nothing has change in US's strategic thinking. They think making China yield to its demand is the way to go while China merrily go the conventional force route. The whole thing is a wishful thinking from the point of view of US - What they don't understand is that if backed into a corner China will go unconventional route.

Just like the Russian before them, the Chinese will most likely do the tit-for-tat, regardless of international norm or rules. If US threatens the Chinese mainland as they proposed in the document by targetting their A2AD bases in mainland, I don't think China is just going to sit and get beat. They will start going for their IRBM and then a cold to lukewarm war suddenly becomes a hot war, and US lose the Guam, Japan, South Korea and even Hawaii and probably the whole PACOM. Then it will dawn on US policy maker just how much harder choice they going to make - to back down and limit the loss, or have a mutal annilation.


"After analyzing numerous historical cases, a RAND study concluded that
“confidence that an adversary will comply with one’s script and . . .
that the results of a decision can be controlled is tantamount to assuming away risk.
When this leads to failure to prepare for bad results, the
consequences can be that much worse.”
 
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Ultra

Junior Member
LOL, finished reading. I can sum up the whole thing as follow:
It looks like those boffin at RAND postulated that the fight between US and China will be limited like a FIST FIGHT. They discount the possibility of either side bringing guns or grenades to the fist fight. So as the theory goes it favours the US, as the US is the heavy weight champion while China is the fly weight Champion - and US has more stamina to finish the fight while China can do some mean punches!
 

dingyibvs

Senior Member
Two things.

One, it's inappropriate to analyze any situation in terms of risks, it's always risk vs. benefit ratio, and China has more to gain in a successful confrontation in the SCS than the U.S. since China losing would not result in a change in the status quo of the U.S. being the dominant power in Westpac.

Two, it's also inappropriate to analyze any situation in terms of capabilities only, it's always capabilities and will. The SCS is a core interest of China's, what is it to the U.S.? A few rocks, at least as the west apparently sees them, thousands of miles away from home.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
@lucretius

How on earth would a land war on the Korean peninsula be good for China?

Massive cost, massive attrition and a restive population hostile to any foreign takeover/meddling

It would be a quagmire.

In a prolonged conflict, China loses if the battle realm is confined to Air and Sea.

But in a land conflict in Korea, yes, the worse case is a quagmire and war of attrition eg. the US runs out of soldiers first. Hence the US-China war ends up as a draw instead of a loss.

But the best case in a Korean land conflict is that China wins and captures an entire US army division.

South Korea becomes an unfortunate casualty, which is why I advocate that South Korea needs to terminate the US alliance and remove all US troops, before any such scenario occurs.
 
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AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
Given that the US-China conflict discussion is going to be shut down soon, there's already a discussion on this RAND report on CDF which I'll be moving to.
 
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