China's SCS Strategy Thread

[vesicles]

The South China Seas is the only way out to where? It just leads to a small number of chokepoints like the Malacca Strait or Lombok Strait.

Yes, but SCS is still a much better option than the super crowded East China Sea, which is populated with military bases of strong competitors and potential rivals. Compared to the Eats China Sea, the SCS is much easier. Just imagine building an island next to a US AF base somewhere in the East China Sea...

Yes, countries have plans for all sorts of contingencies. But what made China decide to go with what is likely the most aggressive (and most expensive) version of island reclamation with multiple airbases?

China is planning to establish permanent bases in the area. Because the US traditionally dominates Asia, the Chinese naturally anticipates a variety possible ways of responses from the US. In order to weather every possible kind of responses from the US, including military, it is easy to understand why they want to build the best possible version.

If, as you believe, the Chinese built those islands in responses to the Philippines, then there would be no reason for them to build something that "aggressive". No one expects the Philippines to pose any threat to China, no matter what kind of facility they have on the islands. The fact that they built the islands in the most aggressive manner suggest that their goal has never been to respond to the Philippines. If that's the case, why would they respond to the PCA case?

The implication, the potential controversy and the potential fall-out of island building in the SCS are much bigger than the Philippines alone. Most importantly, this would be the beginning of their bit to challenge the US dominance in Asia. I am sure that the Chinese understand what they would be getting themselves into when the island building began. Such important and vital strategic decision can never be made on a whim.

I also recall that there was a 6-12month gap from when Manila went to arbitration to the beginning of construction. And contrary to what you think about this being pre-meditated, 6months is more than long enough for China to marshall existing resources for this construction project.

China already operated the world's largest fleet of dredgers and has a lot of spare construction capacity for this sort of thing.

The island reclamation project is a piece of cake compared to the much larger high speed railway programme that China enacted back in 2008. They dusted off the plan and then marshalled all the design institutes and resources they needed in less than 6months.

Building a domestic infrastructure is vastly different than a potential international crisis. You are only thinking about the physical planning (materials and stuff). The most time-consuming part is the decision-making process that eventually led to the island building.

You need to think bigger. this is not a local pub, where average Joes start throwing punches on a whim whenever anyone says something insulting.

This is geopolitical maneuvering on the grandest scale when a rising superpower (with 1.5 billion population and 2nd largest economy in the world) is challenging an existing superpower (with the largest economy and best military power) for political, economic and military dominance of a continent. Can you think of anything bigger and more important? How can building a high speed railway compare to this? Can you afford to act on a whim and doing things in a rash? Everything has to be done after careful calculation and meticulous planning. Rushing into things would only lead to disasters.

These strategic decisions must take a long time to make. the fact that the Chinese started island building merely 6 months after the Philippines filed the PCA case suggests that the Chinese had made the decision in the SCS a long time ago.

 

[ahojunk]

Looks like the US/Japan/Philippines now realise that the Arbitration Tribunal has failed.

If Manila hadn't initiated the Arbitration Tribunal, I doubt that China would have embarked on the huge construction projects in the South China Seas, as the money would have been better spent on projects inside mainland China.

.
With China having a large wallet, it certainly helps when talking to ASEAN.

Other than Philippines and Vietnam, the other ASEAN countries don't give a hoot regarding the tribunal.

These countries wouldn't want to be on the wrong side when China has lots of trade goodies and money to wield. After-all, the dispute doesn't concern them at all.

 

[AndrewS]

@vesicles

China is planning to establish permanent bases in the area. Because the US traditionally dominates Asia, the Chinese naturally anticipates a variety possible ways of responses from the US. In order to weather every possible kind of responses from the US, including military, it is easy to understand why they want to build the best possible version.

The US does not traditionally dominate Asia, as you say. China dominated Asia for most of the past 2 millennia and the US is just recent and distant interloper from the other side of the Pacific.

If, as you believe, the Chinese built those islands in responses to the Philippines, then there would be no reason for them to build something that "aggressive". No one expects the Philippines to pose any threat to China, no matter what kind of facility they have on the islands. The fact that they built the islands in the most aggressive manner suggest that their goal has never been to respond to the Philippines. If that's the case, why would they respond to the PCA case?

The implication, the potential controversy and the potential fall-out of island building in the SCS are much bigger than the Philippines alone. Most importantly, this would be the beginning of their bit to challenge the US dominance in Asia. I am sure that the Chinese understand what they would be getting themselves into when the island building began. Such important and vital strategic decision can never be made on a whim.

The Chinese deliberately left the SCS as a non-core interest because they hadn't decided what to do there. It was inherited from the ROC and that's why 11 dashes became 9 dashes, and why it remained dashes rather than a solid line.

But that changed when Hillary Clinton announced to the world on 2010 that China had changed this policy and the confusion afterwards. It was clever in that it forced China to accept Clinton's lie that the SCS was now a core interest. The thinking behind that was that it would increase demand from SE Asia for U.S. military presence.

Eventually China would want the USA to leave Asia, yes. What great power would want its neighbors to host foreign military bases?

We can also see that when Japan publicly challenged China in the ECS, the Chinese unleashed what European diplomats called a Diplomatic shock and awe campaign against Japan. The Philippines didn't listen either, so they just got the same sort of object lesson (pour encourager les autres / kill the chicken to scare the monkey).

Everyone can now see that the Philippines would have been better off without the PCA ruling.

In the case of the diplomatic shock and awe against Japan, how was China to know that the Japanese minister would deliberately arrest the fisherman and instigate a crisis? But we still saw China react instantly.

Then there was a pre-planned set piece announcement of the ECS ADIZ after Japan nationalised the islands. Again, that was deliberately instigated by Tokyo governor Ishihara who has publicly stated that Japan has to move now to solidify control, as China will inevitably dominate Japan on the future.

Building a domestic infrastructure is vastly different than a potential international crisis. You are only thinking about the physical planning (materials and stuff). The most time-consuming part is the decision-making process that eventually led to the island building.

From the Chinese point of view, it is a domestic endeavour, not an international one as you put it.

And you seem to think 6 months is too short a time to make the sort of decision to decide to build the SCS island bases. Do you really think Chinese foreign policy decisions and analyses under Xi Jinping take that long? 6 months is way enough time to assess the risks and benefits.

This is geopolitical maneuvering on the grandest scale when a rising superpower (with 1.5 billion population and 2nd largest economy in the world) is challenging an existing superpower (with the largest economy and best military power) for political, economic and military dominance of a continent. Can you think of anything bigger and more important? How can building a high speed railway compare to this? Can you afford to act on a whim and doing things in a rash? Everything has to be done after careful calculation and meticulous planning. Rushing into things would only lead to disasters.

These strategic decisions must take a long time to make. the fact that the Chinese started island building merely 6 months after the Philippines filed the PCA case suggests that the Chinese had made the decision in the SCS a long time ago.

Again, you still seem to think that China has you have a premeditated timeline to build on the scale we've seen in the SCS. But the island construction programme is insignificant in comparison to the 2008 crash infrastructure programme which was worth trillions of dollars and which kicked off in less than 6months.

 

[Jura The idiot]

interestingly, at first I've noticed at the Czech server which I use for emailing ... anyway
Russia to Join China in Naval Exercise in Disputed South China Sea

Russian naval forces plan to join Chinese forces for a joint exercise in the South China Sea, highlighting Moscow’s partnership with Beijing after a recent international legal ruling underlined rifts between

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and Southeast Asian nations over rival claims across the sea.

The joint exercise will be held in September, a spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, Senior Col. Yang Yujun,

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on Thursday. But he gave no details about the size of the drill or precisely where it would take place in the vast stretch of sea from southern China nearly to the

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.

“Following a joint understanding reached between China and

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, the navies of the two countries will hold a joint military exercise in the relevant sea and air areas of the South China Sea in September under the name Joint-Sea 2016,” Colonel Yang said.

The drill was not aimed at any other country, he said. But he also said that the experience gained would “enhance the capacities of the two navies to jointly respond to maritime security threats.”

On July 12, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague decisively rejected Beijing’s expansive claims to sovereignty across the South China Sea, where China has been building artificial islands and consolidating its control of disputed areas.

Beijing refused to take part in the case brought by the Philippines, and Chinese officials and state media have pilloried the decision and suggested the United States was somehow to blame. The Philippines has been especially worried that China will start building islands on the

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, about 220 miles northwest of Manila.

But several experts said that the joint naval exercise would probably serve more as a show of partnership at a tense time than as a substantive military shift in the area.

“It is premature to draw a definitive judgment,’’ said Bonnie Glaser, the director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “My inclination is to view this as one of a series of Chinese reactions to the ruling that can demonstrate the Chinese Communist Party’s resolve to defend Chinese sovereignty and thus fend off pressure from the public and the military.”

“In my view, however, the China-Russia exercise is not necessarily a departure from what has so far been a pattern of relative restraint” in China’s reaction to the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling, she said.

Whether Russian participation in the joint exercise would add more than symbolic support to China’s position over the sea disputes remained unclear, said

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, a scholar at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who studies China’s military forces and its multiple maritime disputes.

“The key question will be where in the South China Sea the exercise occurs,” he said. The two countries might hold their exercise close to Guangdong Province in southern China, or Hainan, a Chinese island-province that extends into the sea. That would be a less contentious site. Or they might hold them near the disputed Spratly Islands, which would be more likely to alarm neighbors, Mr. Fravel said.

China and Russia have a long history of friction and mutual suspicion over their own territorial disputes. But they have been trying to strengthen military and security cooperation, and joint Chinese-Russian naval exercises have become increasingly frequent

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.

China’s president, Xi Jinping, has, like his predecessor, Hu Jintao, striven to build a close relationship with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia. In June, Mr. Xi and Mr. Putin

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on “strengthening global strategic stability” that stressed their shared views on many issues.

“China and Russia should support each other on issues concerning core interests,” Mr. Xi said at the time.

In public, Russian officials have said they

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to the disputes in the South China Sea, but they have not given a full-throated public endorsement to China’s rejection of the international court’s decision.

This drill will not be the first time that China has displayed its partnership with Russia by holding sea exercises.

China is locked in a longstanding dispute with Japan over claims to islands in the East China Sea. Last year, China and Russia held joint drills in the

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, and a year before that in the

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. But the exercises did not enter waters around the disputed islands.

source:

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[vesicles]

The US does not traditionally dominate Asia, as you say. China dominated Asia for most of the past 2 millennia and the US is just recent and distant interloper from the other side of the Pacific.

Please note that I used "traditionally", not "historically". China has dominated Asia "historically" for the past 2000 years. Yet, the current "tradition" handed down since the end of the WWII is that the US dominates Asia. And China is trying to challenge such tradition. I think my statement stands.

But that changed when Hillary Clinton announced to the world on 2010 that China had changed this policy and the confusion afterwards. It was clever in that it forced China to accept Clinton's lie that the SCS was now a core interest. The thinking behind that was that it would increase demand from SE Asia for U.S. military presence.

The US doesn't need any pretext for increasing military presence in Asia. Obama declared the pivot to Asia long time ago before anything was happening in the SCS. He simply said that the US has been ignoring Asia and needs to pay more attention to Asia. Then there you go: pivot to Asia. I don't think Obama used any pretext to explain why they need to do that.

We can also see that when Japan publicly challenged China in the ECS, the Chinese unleashed what European diplomats called a Diplomatic shock and awe campaign against Japan. The Philippines didn't listen either, so they just got the same sort of object lesson (pour encourager les autres / kill the chicken to scare the monkey).

Everyone can now see that the Philippines would have been better off without the PCA ruling.

In the case of the diplomatic shock and awe against Japan, how was China to know that the Japanese minister would deliberately arrest the fisherman and instigate a crisis? But we still saw China react instantly.

Then there was a pre-planned set piece announcement of the ECS ADIZ after Japan nationalised the islands. Again, that was deliberately instigated by Tokyo governor Ishihara who has publicly stated that Japan has to move now to solidify control, as China will inevitably dominate Japan on the future.

Yes, the ADIZ in the East China Sea. That policy is very flexible. China can have all the different zone that they want. It is still up to them to decide whether to enforce it. They can choose not to enforce the zone if they decide not to. It is a much more flexible policy, compared to the permanent and imposing island buildings happening in the SCS.

Enforcing an ID zone is nowhere near the kind of investment spent on building islands. A simple comparison between what China is doing in the ECS vs. the SCS can tell you that China thinks the SCS is much more important to them.

From the Chinese point of view, it is a domestic endeavour, not an international one as you put it.

LOL... You are completely fooling yourself if you actually believe the Chinese government treats the SCS in a completely same manner as they would treat something happening in Shanghai.

Legally, Taiwan is a Chinese province. Does Mainland China appoint a governor to Taiwan?

And you seem to think 6 months is too short a time to make the sort of decision to decide to build the SCS island bases. Do you really think Chinese foreign policy decisions and analyses under Xi Jinping take that long? 6 months is way enough time to assess the risks and benefits.

I would like to encourage you to think big. It's not just the SCS. It's about challenging the US. It's about the future of China. There must be different voices, different opinions on the matter. Some might think it's too early. Some might think it's too risky. Some might think it's inevitable. Some might think it's about time. Who is right? These voices do not come from average Joes like us. They are all powerful people in the Chinese government. they all have their own political circle powerful enough to influence government policies. You have to let the debate continue and you have to weigh different options. Different factions would have to come up with their own contingent plans and debate.

You need to keep in mind that a military conflict in the SCS is still a real possibility. How would China prepare for it? Would China be ready for it? How would such conflict escalate? Would China be ready for a potential WWIII?

These would be some of the things that they must consider. It's not an easy decision to make.

And you seem to think 6 months is too short a time to make the sort of decision to decide to build the SCS island bases. Do you really think Chinese foreign policy decisions and analyses under Xi Jinping take that long? 6 months is way enough time to assess the risks and benefits.

I thought you said this was a domestic matter???

Again, you still seem to think that China has you have a premeditated timeline to build on the scale we've seen in the SCS. But the island construction programme is insignificant in comparison to the 2008 crash infrastructure programme which was worth trillions of dollars and which kicked off in less than 6months.

It's not about the money. As I have eluded in painful detail, this is about strategic interests of China on the most fundamental level. This is about whether China would be going to war with some of its neighbors or even the US. If any side responds in a rash, this could quickly escalate into an all out war. When dealing with such undisciplined parties like the Philippines (who opens fire to fishing boats and kidnap fishermen for ransom), anything becomes possible. This is about the lives of countless Chinese soldiers.

This has nothing to do with money. Don't compare it with some domestic infrastructure programs. The US would not sail its two CSG's to downtown Beijing is something goes wrong with the construction of a railway.

You seem to believe that the whole situation is like a bar fight between two hotheaded drunks, where billions of dollars of taxpayers money is being thrown down to the drain just so that the 500 Ib giant can beat a 60 Ib midget.

On the other hand, I believe that this is a carefully planned and expertly executed event by the Chinese, in an effort to maneuver themselves to a better position to gain strategic interests.

This is a free country. We are all free to believe what we believe. We will agree to disagree. This will be my last post on the matter.

 

[AndrewS]

The US does need a local bases or port visits rights to increase it's presence in the SCS. Othereise it's at the end of a very long supply chain which limits time on station. That objective has been accomplished by the USA.

As for the importance of the ECS versus SCS - I would agree that the SCS is way more important to China. And the other big difference is that Japan is still a formidable challenge in the ECS, whereas China dominates the SCS.

From the Chinese perspective, we can see they do treat the SCS mostly as a *domestic* matter. And they can do that, because they dominate the SCS over the rest of the countries in the area.

As for Taiwan, China does regard Taiwan as a *domestic* issue, and gets very worked up when they see the USA interfering or being involved. And China does have to analyse what other countries will do in Taiwan.

As for challenging the USA, yes, there are different schools of thought.

But even the hardliners understand that China is not yet in the position to overtly challenge the USA. Then you have the liberals and moderates who normally hold sway, but whose influence was undercut. In any case, everyone in China understands that domestic economic development comes first.

Military conflict in the SCS is not something that China wants, and the Chinese military understand that.

You're right that this is a strategic move by China to assert its dominance in the SCS and that it has been carefully planned, but it does stem from being overtly challenged by the Philippines.

I think we'll just have to agree to disagree on how much influence the Chinese hardliners have in the government.

 

[PanAsian]

...
Yes, the ADIZ in the East China Sea. That policy is very flexible. China can have all the different zone that they want. It is still up to them to decide whether to enforce it. They can choose not to enforce the zone if they decide not to. It is a much more flexible policy, compared to the permanent and imposing island buildings happening in the SCS.

Enforcing an ID zone is nowhere near the kind of investment spent on building islands. A simple comparison between what China is doing in the ECS vs. the SCS can tell you that China thinks the SCS is much more important to them.
...

China does not think that the SCS is more important to them than the ECS otherwise they wouldn't do as much as they did in the ECS, they merely have fewer options in the ECS. China thinks that eventual re-unification with Taiwan will balance out Japan's and the US' forward military basing in the Ryukyus, however there must not be foreign military basing within the first island chain thereby the importance of the Diaoyus/Senkakus as well as the Nanshas/Spratleys. This is purely from a military standpoint aside from historical and other issues.

 

[AndrewS]

The end of the ill-defined 9 dash line?

South China Sea Arbitration Award: Breathtaking (But Counterproductive)

The quiet disappearance of the ‘nine-dash line’ from China’s official claims is a major policy change. Although it will be hard to ascertain the Chinese leadership’s latest view on the ‘nine-dash line,’ this statement is ground-breaking in implying that China doesn’t take it as a territorial demarcation line—that is, China doesn’t claim 90% of the South China Sea as ‘a Chinese lake’, as is so often alleged in international media. Such clarification, even if only deducible by implication, is probably the most important signal Beijing wants to send to the outside world following the award.
...
Unfortunately, the lopsided award has put the credibility of the Foreign Ministry’s efforts on the line, especially in the eyes of growing domestic nationalistic criticisms. The counterproductive effect of the award is to stir up Chinese nationalism while undermining moderate voices represented by professional diplomats.
...
I’ve earlier

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three camps inside China vying for policy influence over the South China Sea: the realists, hardliners and the moderates. From the perspective of Chinese domestic policy debates, the biggest winner of the award is the hardliners, who have long held that the case is but an American conspiracy against China. Now they may even attack the award as a new ignominious chapter in China’s ‘century of humiliation’ dating from the mid-19th century that can justify any response, including military force. The realists’ position will remain secure, although they’re likely to be pulled toward the hardliners’ direction.
...
The moderates are now in a precarious situation, further besieged by attacks from all sides. That hardly bodes well for China’s South China Sea policy or Asia’s troubled maritime order. The outside world—the Philippines, the United States, and ASEAN, in particular—needs to help the moderates’ cause by exercising restraint and demonstrating good will in an uncertain post-award world.

Read more:

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[AndrewS]

The Paradox at the Heart of the South China Sea Ruling

What looked like a huge defeat for China may actually play into Beijing's hands.

On their face, these decisions, which rejected every argument that China made, drastically reduce China’s maritime rights in the Spratly chain of the South China Sea; international observers have almost unanimously described the ruling as an

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for Manila, a

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for Beijing, and a

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for Asian maritime disputes. But so far, the award hasn’t changed the underlying dynamics of regional politics in the South China Sea, and ASEAN, a powerful southeast Asian body, refrained from commenting on the award following a meeting, a move widely seen as the result of arm-twisting from Beijing. In fact, it is becoming clear that the tribunal’s finding was so sweeping that it is paradoxically less likely to have any real-world impact.
...
Perhaps the biggest paradox of the ruling is that many policy elites inside China now privately see it as a big gift to their government. That, at least, was the immediate post-ruling reaction from several leading scholars at prestigious think tanks in Beijing, who wished not to be named. For those who have questioned Beijing’s refusal to take part in the arbitration and who would have liked to see meaningful engagement instead, the outcome came as a personal disappointment and a blow to their cause. But for those who have opposed the arbitration process, there is more than a sigh of relief at the fact that the nature of the award makes it far easier for Beijing to delegitimize it, at least at home.
...
Three camps — realists, hardliners, and moderates — are currently vying for influence over South China Sea policy within China’s policy-making apparatus. The award is likely to make the hardliners a winner in these internal debates. They have long maintained that the arbitration case is but an American conspiracy against China; now the outcome serves as vindication of those suspicions. Beijing will now have no qualms about upgrading administrative and physical control to further strengthen its positions in the South China Sea — in recent days, China’s military has already swiftly moved to begin regular patrol of the South China Sea, in addition to conducting a new round of military exercises. China’s top naval commander has affirmed Beijing’s determination to complete island construction, likely including military installations.
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The sweeping nature of the award has invited Chinese analysts and officials to try to tear it apart.
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in the months leading up to the award, Chinese diplomats heard calls from many countries for China to comply with the outcome of the arbitration. The pressure was mounting. The more limited the outcome, the easier other countries would have found it to call for Chinese compliance, and the more combative Chinese resistance would have appeared. That pressure has now abated; one senior Chinese diplomat privately described the award as “stupid.” Although China expected the ruling to favor the Philippines, this diplomat said, the findings still came as a surprise.
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Chinese officials hope that the broad nature of the award helps to convince other countries that the tribunal is biased.
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Another paradoxical effect of the award is its potential to effect Chinese attitudes toward international law. Beijing’s refusal to take part in the arbitration process has always confused Chinese scholars, particularly legal experts.
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The “anti-participation” camp is now arguing more forcefully that advocates of participation are naïve and utopian in placing hope in international law.
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Had the award been more attentive to Chinese interests, a future, more enlightened leadership in Beijing might have gradually and quietly complied with some of the rulings (whatever its public statements to the contrary), thus bringing China’s claims broadly in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. But this award doesn’t appear to give Chinese leaders such face-saving opportunities.
...
The many paradoxes the award presents are not all bad for regional politics. Beijing has moved

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to prevent large-scale demonstrations against the ruling, inviting some confidence in its basic policy rationality. The ruling also makes it less likely for Southeast Asian countries to initiate new arbitrations, since the award’s reasoning also applies to and favours their EEZ claims. In addition, the United States will have

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to conduct its Freedom of Navigation operations in such a public manner, since the ruling makes much of the South China Sea international waters as far as American naval vessels are concerned. Moving forward, American restraint will reduce the likelihood of maritime incidents with China and create conditions for more effective diplomacy. It will be needed, given the uncharted territory awaiting Asia’s troubled maritime order in a post-arbitration world.

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[A.Man]

Most ASEAN countries 'want to stay out of Beijing's South China Sea dispute with the Philippines'

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Most Asean countries want to stay out of the South China Sea dispute between China and the Philippines, says a diplomat with inside knowledge about the negotiations that went on before the bloc issued a joint statement on the matter this week.

The Philippines had pushed to include this month’s international court ruling on the South China Sea in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ joint statement, the diplomat said, but the communique released on Monday left it out in the end.

No one but the Philippines insisted that the arbitral ruling be included, the diplomat said on condition of anonymity.

He said most countries in the bloc, especially those who had no claims in the South China Sea, wished to stay out of the dispute.

The Asean statement carried a section on the contested waters, expressing serious concern over land reclamations and “escalations of activities” in the region, but did not directly challenge China nor mention the ruling.

The bloc had, during a meeting in Laos, been deadlocked over the language of the initial statement and whether to mention the ruling handed down by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague on July 12. The court had ruled in the Philippines’ favour, declaring China’s claims to the contested South China Sea invalid.

“The arbitration was never intended to be included in the statement,” the diplomat said on the sidelines of the Laos meeting on Tuesday.

He added that the impression that China had emerged as the winner and Asean the loser after the statement’s release had caused pressure on the bloc.

“For some small countries, if they think Asean cannot be relied on, they will go to the big powers,” the diplomat said.

On Tuesday, Vice-President Li Yuanchao thanked Cambodia’s visiting National Assembly President Samdech Heng Samrin in Beijing for his country’s “impartial stance” and for “speaking out for justice on the South China Sea issue”.

Earlier reports said that according to Asean diplomats, Cambodia had spoken out in opposition to the inclusion of the ruling in the bloc’s statement.

In 2012, the Asean summit held in Cambodia for the first time failed to issue a joint statement because its members could not agree over the South China Sea disputes with China.

If anyone or anything had divided the Asean, it was the ruling itself, because it wiped out any possible grey areas in the disputes ... and made it impossible for the Asean to take a position in such a take-it-or-leave-it situation

In June, the Asean foreign ministers retracted a joint statement expressing concern over the South China Sea situation, after a special Asean-China foreign ministers’ meeting held in Yunnan province.

Philippines foreign minister Perfecto Yasay said that the issuance of the joint communique this time was a victory for Asean.

The bloc had initially been divided but eventually showed its united stance on the need to abide by international law and ensure peace, Yasay said.

“I am just saying this to dispel the reports that have been said that China came out victorious in the Asean meeting because we precisely agreed not to mention the arbitral award,” Yasay told a news conference on Wednesday.

He said the arbitration was a matter between China and the Philippines and that his country did not want to gloat over the win or rock the boat with Asean.

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It is no surprise that the Asean omitted the arbitration ruling in their joint statement as the countries each hold very different opinions on the issue, analysts say.

Among the Asean’s 10 members, Cambodia and Laos have sided with China since 2012, while the Philippines and Vietnam have been pushing for a more hardline approach, said Oh Ei-sun, senior fellow at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University. The remaining nations are somewhere in between.

“The Asean way is if there is no consensus among all members, the Asean will not make a statement on it,” he said.

There has been speculation that China, the United States or Japan have been trying to influence the smaller Asean nations and are dividing the 49-year-old bloc from the inside.

But Xue Li, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said the Asean countries – just like the European Union – had the right to balance their own national interests and the unity of the regional group.

“The policy choices of the Asean countries on the South China Sea issue is fundamentally based on their own interest needs, not outside pressure,” Xue said.

Huang Jing, a professor at the National University of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, said individual Asean countries were reluctant to back the one-sided ruling on the South China Sea as it would mean that they wholly supported the Philippines. Some of these countries were themselves also locked in maritime disputes with the Philippines, he said.

“If anyone or anything had divided the Asean, it was the ruling itself, because it wiped out any possible grey areas in the disputes, which are necessary for negotiation towards a compromise, and made it impossible for the Asean to take a position in such a take-it-or-leave-it situation,” Huang said.