China's SCS Strategy Thread

delft

Brigadier
When defending FON US mention trade flows but very few countries, and never China, violated civil FON in recent years like the US did in the case of Lin Yi and in the case of its undeclared war against Nicaragua.
Military FON is only interesting to US because other countries do not want to be able to fight countries all over the World. It just doesn't make sense for Denmark to be able to conquer Togo.
 

Hendrik_2000

Lieutenant General
Paracel Island and Hainan will become the China primary base for their submarine operation. Heavily defended with hardened air base and underground submarine pen.

The addition of Anti submarine helicopter there will complement the defensive line. It will be even more prominent in the future when the new navy chief Admiral Sun Jian guo installed

Chinese Submarines Step Up Patrols in the Indian Ocean

China’s deployment of surface-to-air missiles to Woody Island (永兴岛) continued to attract attention in Western media. A different sort of a military operation on the other side of the Indochinese peninsula, however, gives important insight into China’s long-term plans. Indian media sources have reported that Chinese submarines were spotted in the Bay of Bengal, south of Myanmar and is home to India’s Andaman Islands earlier this year (
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[India], January 19). New Delhi views the Andaman’s as a platform for exerting control over the western exit of the Strait of Malacca, the narrow passage formed by Singapore and Indonesia, which sees almost one fourth of global trade and is the primary route from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean.

Roughly 400 miles to the northwest of Woody Island is the large island province of Hainan, home to one of China’s largest submarine bases, as well as three large, hardened air bases (including Ledong airbase, home to a large underground facility). Most significant, however, is the hardened submarine pen near Hainan’s capital Sanya. The base hosts China’s growing ballistic missile submarine capability (SSBN) as well as a variety of nuclear- and conventionally powered submarines. As such, Hainan serves as an important stepping stone for submarines operating beyond China’s shores and remote territorial claims. In recent years, Chinese submarines have been pushing out to operate in the Indian Ocean to the southwest and east beyond Japan. [1]

These deployments not only follow Chinese long-distance anti-piracy patrol visits to the Indian Ocean, but also likely have roots in the need to both protect Chinese Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) and to confront emerging threats. Regional rival India, for example, is expected this week to test its “K-4” submarine launched ballistic missile, an important step on its way to creating a ballistic missile submarine deterrent (
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, March 4). China’s own force of SSBNs has been deploying to Sanya since June 2012, first as a single submarine, and now apparently as a permanent force of three Jin-class SSBNs. [2] This would match unconfirmed reports that China has already begun conducting nuclear deterrence patrols.

As the submarine force’s attack and nuclear deterrent components gain significance for China’s military posture, they are likely to gain additional patronage from the highest ranks of China’s navy. Chinese Deputy Chief of the General Staff Department, Admiral Sun Jianguo, has been tapped to be the head of the Chinese Navy after Admiral Wu Shengli (b. 1945) retires. Sun, (b. 1952) has a background as a submariner, serving as captain of a Type 091 Han-class nuclear submarine, (403艇) breaking records for long-distance operations (
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[accessed March 3];
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, January 16, 2009).

As China’s submarine forces grow and expand their patrols, it is likely that tensions over flights in the area by U.S. Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) gathering aircraft (the Boeing P-8, which is also used in a more direct submarine-hunting role) will grow. A P-8 surveillance aircraft flying in international airspace roughly 300 kilometers from Sanya, and 150 kilometers from Woody Island, for example, was challenged by J-11 fighters with a full complement of air-to-air missiles in August 2014.

Chinese submarine operations in the Bay of Bengal have also prompted India to purchase several of the Boeing aircraft to enhance its Anti-Submarine Warfare capability, and Indian P-8s were involved in tracking operations after the sighting in January. Chinese Rear Admiral and prolific military commentator Yin Zhuo also commented that India plans to deploy carriers to the region to help monitor the western exit of the Strait of Malacca (
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, January 22).

Going forward, China’s deployment of submarines, both within the South China Sea as part of China’s nuclear deterrent and beyond as a complement to China’s power projection, will surely be a driving cause of Chinese attempts to further secure the South China Sea.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
China to create maritime judicial center as South China Sea tensions simmer

(CNN)China will create an international maritime judicial center to protect its national sovereignty and maritime rights, the country's Supreme People's Court said Sunday, according to state news agency Xinhua.

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This is a very interesting development, which presumably would be an alternative to UNCLOS?

I can definitely see it being in the interests of Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei to join and influence its development so that it is acceptable to them.

And if China is smart about it, Vietnam would find that its interests are best served by joining as well.

I'm not sure about the Philippines though, because they've backed themselves into a corner by opening embracing the USA.

Chinese leadership indeed.
 
This is a very interesting development, which presumably would be an alternative to UNCLOS?

I can definitely see it being in the interests of Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei to join and influence its development so that it is acceptable to them.

And if China is smart about it, Vietnam would find that its interests are best served by joining as well.

I'm not sure about the Philippines though, because they've backed themselves into a corner by opening embracing the USA.

Chinese leadership indeed.

So many parallel universes! AIIB and the IMF, the BET awards and the Oscars, yet another incarnation of Spiderman with Captain America, now this! Be inclusive Captain, then we won't need more universes!
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
I'm actually surprised this has gotten so little attention in the west.

Increasingly, China is unsatisfied with the current world order, and is setting forth to change it by creating its own institutions with its own rules and values.

That is China starting to wield its soft power, and if the AIIB was any indication, China has a lot of more it to call upon than most western commentators would seem to think.
 

Blackstone

Brigadier
I'm actually surprised this has gotten so little attention in the west.

Increasingly, China is unsatisfied with the current world order, and is setting forth to change it by creating its own institutions with its own rules and values.

That is China starting to wield its soft power, and if the AIIB was any indication, China has a lot of more it to call upon than most western commentators would seem to think.
China's announced "international" maritime judicial center is light on details, so there's nothing 'there' yet. Of course, if it's anywhere near as successful as the AIIB, which I doubt, then it would be a viable alternative to the current international scheme. Call me jaded, but I suspect the announcement is meant to give the ICJ something to ponder before they render a judgement on Philippine's law suit (which China legally opted out under UNCLOS), and it goes something like 'take extreme care of your rulings, because if we hate it, we might create a new international order that you wouldn't like as much.'
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
It makes sense to be deliberately vague on the details of the proposed centre - because if China wants to lead and for others to follow willingly - there will be a lot of negotiations on the rules that China is voluntarily agreeing to be bound by. After all, China likely accounts for most of the shipping flowing in the SCS and has an interest in the stability of the region.

I expect we will see something similar happen as with the AIIB, where China voluntarily limited its influence in exchange for the other countries accepting China's leadership and money. Then everyone can get on with the business of economic development and lifting millions from poverty.

Note that even the Philippines joined the AIIB due to economic logic - amidst the furious objections of the USA at the time.

And I suspect that it would be in China's interest to setup an enforcement body comprising a multi-national coast guard drawn from the other member countries in the SCS.

So it could be something similar to how the Mekong river is jointly patrolled by gunboats with paramilitary personnel drawn from the countries of China, Thailand, Myanmar and Laos.

In the SCS, we can see that whilst China already has the ability to take every island by force - it hasn't done so. But we can also see that over the past 20 years, that it is Vietnam which has been the most aggressive in terms of physically seizing SCS features. So I imagine part of that multi-national coast SCS coast guard would be tasked with stopping Vietnamese expansion.
 

Equation

Lieutenant General
China's announced "international" maritime judicial center is light on details, so there's nothing 'there' yet. Of course, if it's anywhere near as successful as the AIIB, which I doubt, then it would be a viable alternative to the current international scheme. Call me jaded, but I suspect the announcement is meant to give the ICJ something to ponder before they render a judgement on Philippine's law suit (which China legally opted out under UNCLOS), and it goes something like 'take extreme care of your rulings, because if we hate it, we might create a new international order that you wouldn't like as much.'

Perhaps China by establishing this international maritime judicial center, it would augment the rulings and/or the prestige of the rulings from the ICJ even if it favored the Philippines. By having another competitive world judicial branch it can counter any ICJ verdict against it. As a result, saying that UNCLOS is NOT written in stone and there is NO final border order for the world to follow. That's just my opinion and speculation, but it is a clever chess move by China.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
Agreed.

But if we remember what happened with the AIIB, most people (particularly the USA) didn't pay any attention to it at the beginning.

Then they were shocked at the end result.

Think about it.

Theoretically, this court in China could make judgments completely within the Chinese judicial system, and then order other assets to be seized to pay off those judgments.

The US does this all the time.
 
It makes sense to be deliberately vague on the details of the proposed centre - because if China wants to lead and for others to follow willingly - there will be a lot of negotiations on the rules that China is voluntarily agreeing to be bound by. After all, China likely accounts for most of the shipping flowing in the SCS and has an interest in the stability of the region.

I expect we will see something similar happen as with the AIIB, where China voluntarily limited its influence in exchange for the other countries accepting China's leadership and money. Then everyone can get on with the business of economic development and lifting millions from poverty.

Note that even the Philippines joined the AIIB due to economic logic - amidst the furious objections of the USA at the time.

And I suspect that it would be in China's interest to setup an enforcement body comprising a multi-national coast guard drawn from the other member countries in the SCS.

So it could be something similar to how the Mekong river is jointly patrolled by gunboats with paramilitary personnel drawn from the countries of China, Thailand, Myanmar and Laos.

In the SCS, we can see that whilst China already has the ability to take every island by force - it hasn't done so. But we can also see that over the past 20 years, that it is Vietnam which has been the most aggressive in terms of physically seizing SCS features. So I imagine part of that multi-national coast SCS coast guard would be tasked with stopping Vietnamese expansion.

I suspect that through its "international maritime judicial center" China will try to establish a multinational regulation of military FON around the SCS as multiple claimants and others around the world have a less than permissive position regarding military FON, on top of regulating civilian, economic activities, and possibly settling or stabilizing territorial claims in the area.
 
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