China's SCS Strategy Thread

[ahojunk]

China is hitting back...

-------------------

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(Agencies) Updated: 2016-02-20 19:15

BEIJING - China's alleged deployment of a missile system on its Yongxing Island in the South China Sea has been met with frantic overreaction from the United States, which has accused China of "militarizing" the region.

"We see no indication that [...] this militarization effort, has stopped. And it's doing nothing [...] to make the situation there more stable and more secure," US State Department spokesperson John Kirby said Thursday as commercial satellite imagery reportedly indicated the "very recent" placement of missiles on Yongxing Island.

It is no secret that the island, home to the municipal government of China's southernmost city of Sansha, has seen deployment of defence measures for decades. In fact, it is well within China's sovereignty rights, as granted by international law, and has no relation to any sort of regional "militarization."

China has repeatedly made it clear that it has no intention to militarize the region. Its island construction is mainly for maintenance purposes, improving the living conditions for stationed personnel and facilitating the movement of public goods in the region.

Then why is the US stirring up this hype? Previous self-defence moves on Yongxing Island seemed to raise little US interest, still less an uproar such as has been seen in recent days.

The change itself looks deliberate and questionable. Criticizing China, regardless of the circumstances, seems to be the tool that the US is using to move more of its own military weight to the region. It is the US, rather than China, who is posing the most significant risk of militarization.

The US frequently sends military vessels or planes to waters in the South China Sea to conduct reconnaissance against China. A US missile destroyer and strategic bombers intruded waters and airspace adjacent to China's Nansha Islands. Not to mention the joint drills between the USand its allies.

Such muscle-flexing has created heightened tension on the sea, enticing US allies to take more provocative measures to press their illegitimate territorial claims.

The US, with a global network of military bases, has also reopened its bases in the Philippines, a move widely interpreted as stirring up tension in the region.

The US has taken double standards on the militarization in the South China Sea. It automatically links Chinese defence facility deployment to militarization while selectively dodging the Philippines and Vietnam that have militarized the Chinese islands they occupy or the US joint drills and patrols.

When asked if sending the large US naval ships and military planes to the region is militarization at a recent press briefing, State Department spokesperson Mark Toner insisted the practice was "basically freedom of navigation."

The US, the self-styled guardian of freedom of navigation, rationalizes its navy and air force patrols for such purposes and says it will continue to do so. However, "freedom of navigation does not give one country's military aircraft and ships free access to another country's territorial waters and airspace," as a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson put it.

Instead of questioning China about "militarizing" the region, the US should reflect on its own behavior. Stopping patrols, drills and reconnaissance will be the right way for it to serve its own interests and others.

China and other claimants of the South China Sea have the capacity to work out their disputes through dialogue and negotiation. As a non-claimant, the US should make good on its repeated commitment that it does not take a position on competing territorial claims.

 

[PanAsian]

Anyway, back on topic now.

Peter Layton has one of the best analyses of the SCS I've seen yet from the Lowy Institute in Australia. Full article below.

South China Sea: Beijing is winning, but here's how to retake the initiative

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My thoughts are:

1. that it's good that someone in the think tank community can cogently recognise that China's interests and its strength/options in the area, although it is still understates China to a degree.

The article also very much understates what others are doing to a significant degree.
- The US has been roping in Japan, Australia, and India to expand their presence and pursue more aggressive actions in the SCS.
- The Philippines has revived US military basing on its territory which the US has been eager for, there may have been attempts from both sides to establish US military basing in Vietnam.
- The US and Japan are pushing arms sales, military aid, and training to at least the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Australia. This is on top of significant organic military capability upgrading by countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and Australia.
- The US has also launched full-fledged diplomatic and economic campaigns to form either exclude- or anti- China fronts across multiple venues including the TPP and the recent US-ASEAN meeting.

2. It may or may not end up as a zero-sum outcome in terms of territory, as it's too early to say at this time what China will ultimately do. But in economic terms, there is a good case that Chinese security control of the shipping lanes will result in a positive economic outcome even for Vietnam/Philippines - due to the spillover from increased trade/investment/resource extraction that will occur as China feels more secure that its investments in Asia can be protected.

Ultimately territory is something for the claimants to settle, the things the US can do to ameliorate the situation is:
- Try to maintain a civilian and military capability balance among all claimants.
- Request all claimants to refrain from violent seizure of territory.
- Not take sides regarding validity of territorial claims.
Unfortunately because a capability balance among all claimants is against the natural order, and the real US concern is about containing Chinese power and influence, all US actions have been taken to single out and counter China and to toughen the stances of other claimants which increases rather than reduces tension. This makes sense as the US has the most to gain, and the least to lose, if conflict breaks out among the claimants especially if the conflict is limited to the SCS and does not escalate to conflict elsewhere.

3. The author suggests one strategy which is to target the CCP to obtain leverage, but I think that this would have to be handled very carefully, because it could so easily become counter-productive when the CCP pushes back even harder and escalates.

US undermining and demonizing of China and the CCP has been underway for decades and the latest intensive round is already several years old. It has never been an effective way to obtain leverage over China as China sees any actual issues as a practical challenge to improve itself, including any PR or propaganda attacks as a practical challenges to improve its own PR or propaganda response.

4. The 2nd strategy the author suggests is to demilitarise the SCS islands under UN or ASEAN control. However, permanent UN or ASEAN only facilities in the SCS islands are just not in China's interest, as China gets nothing from this.

But a joint civilian facility with ASEAN or selected ASEAN members is something that I think China would seriously consider, because it would comprise a multi-lateral effort that would inevitably be led and dominated by China. However, note that this would likely only be stationed on 1 island, which means the other 2 big SCS islands would remain under exclusive Chinese control.

I would expect that this joint facility would share the same island with a separate China-only facility under coast guard or military jurisdiction. This means that the joint China-ASEAN assets and presumably Chinese military and coast guard assets become mixed together on the same island. It means that the interests of China-ASEAN become more comingled, and any potential attack on the islands also becomes an attack on ASEAN in addition to China.

The benefits of this joint China-ASEAN force are that the day-today interactions take the heat off the SCS and invite a compromise between China-ASEAN. But from the US perspective, it means they lose influence to a China-led grouping.

The author suggest a civilian disaster relief command, which sounds reasonable to me as it benefits everyone in the region and indeed the world. But aren't most of these sorts of assets in ASEAN and China actually paramilitary or military in nature? Think a Tsunami or Hurricane.

And if the remit of this joint force expands to anti-piracy etc, then it definitely becomes a paramilitary or military force.

Then we see China leading a China-ASEAN security grouping, which should lead to much more stability in the SCS and which would be in the interests of China and ASEAN. But again, it means a loss in influence for the US.

The US' ultimate goal is to preserve its dominant power and influence and freedom of unilateral action in all of East Asia not just the SCS despite it not being local to the area and China being at the top of the natural local order with neither broad nor deep antagonism with any other local. This is an unrealistic goal short of the US instigating or participating in a conflict against China, or China imploding.

Comments anyone?

As I have previously posted in the Other Nations SCS Strategy thread but subsequently been censored, the only peaceful option available to the US is for it to include China and treat it as as much of an equal as it is powerful enough to be in order to continuously mold it into as much of an ally as possible. Yes this may be at the expense of other allies but at the gain of China as an ally, and these webs of relationships are not all or nothing but require balance..

The toughest two expectations for the US to change in this strategic calculation is first that given as fair competition as is realistic China's rise will net reduce US freedom of unilateral action in East Asia, however if US power and influence is preserved through an agreeable working relationship with China based on common objectives, isn't the net result ultimately the same or better? Second, the US and China will both have to accept and respect each other's inherent differences in methods and minor variances in goals as long as they essentially align.

This is a 180 from the direction the US has been heading, but not as much of a direction change for China. As the overall dominant power still for a long time to come, the US gets to set the tone and its quite late but hopefully not too late.

 

[ahojunk]

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Source: Xinhua | 2016-02-25 21:02:56 | Editor: huaxia

BEIJING, Feb. 25 (Xinhua) -- The whole brouhaha stirred up by the United States over alleged "militarization in the South China Sea" is clearly double standards, Defense Ministry spokesperson Wu Qian said Thursday at a monthly press briefing in Beijing.

Several high-ranking U.S. officials have recently accused China of militarizing the South China Sea and ratcheting up tensions.

The U.S. has sent military vessels and planes into China's territory without authorization to conduct surveillance, he said.

Some countries in the South China Sea are illegally occupying China's islands and reefs, and have deployed radars and artillery there.

He added that the U.S. had called on its allies and partners to conduct "targeted" joint drills and patrols.

"Is that not a kind of militarization?" he asked.

He said that the U.S. should not turn a blind eye to all those behaviors while throwing accusations at China. Otherwise it was blatant double standards.

 

[confusion]

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CNOOC Taps First Ultra-Deepwater Gas Discovery in South China Sea
Friday, February 26, 2016

BEIJING, Feb 26 (Reuters) - China's CNOOC Ltd said on Friday it had tapped the country's first ultra-deepwater natural gas discovery in the northwestern part of the South China Sea.

The state-owned offshore oil and gas explorer started to drill the Lingshui 18-1-1 exploration well last October in water depths of 1,688 metres (5,538 feet) and a test of the well in December was a success, the company said in a report published on the website of parent company China National Offshore Oil Corp (

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).

An "ultra-deep" well is categorized as one more than 1,500 metres under the sea.

The report didn't give any estimate of gas flows at Lingshui 18-1-1, but said the discovery has been certified by the Ministry of Land & Resources.

It's located next to another deepsea gas find Lingshui 17-2, which has certified proven reserves exceeding 100 billion cubic metres as reported by the state media a year ago.

CNOOC deployed the country's flagship deepwater rig, the "Haiyang Shiyou 981", to drill the well, the report said.

Map below shows the location of Lingshui within the Qiongdongnan Basin:

The Qiongdongnan Basin relative to Hainan Island and the Paracels/Xisha Islands:

 

[Hendrik_2000]

That is an excellent news It prove that chinese deep water technology is as good as anybody.I know Husky oil of Canada controlled by Li Ka Shing want to bring the Lingshui field into production. It is not easy to drill a hole 5000 feet without snapping the tube. Anyway this is an excellent article from Hugh White
Poker in the Paracels

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There comes a time in every poker game when you have to decide whether the other guy is bluffing, or whether he really does hold a stronger hand than you do. If he does, it's time to stop raising the stakes because from that moment on, you are only increasing your losses. Instead, you should say goodbye to your bet and bow out gracefully, hoping for a chance to play again another time, with better cards.

The news last week that China has deployed advanced, long-range surface to air missiles (SAMs) to Woody Island in the disputed Paracels marks the point at which US policymakers need to make this call about their game with China in the South China Sea. They ought to be asking themselves how sure they should now be that American diplomatic pressure, backed by low-risk symbolic military manoeuvres, will force China to back off from the provocative assertion of its claims over contested features and waters in the South China Sea.

That is not because the newly deployed missiles radically change the military balance in the region. China has long sent fighter aircraft to the same base on Woody Island, so its capacity to defend the airspace it claims is not entirely new. Nonetheless, the HQ-9 is a very potent weapon. It is an impressive example of how quickly and successfully China has been able to develop and improve the systems and technologies it had acquired from the former Soviet Union and elsewhere to produce advanced air and naval capabilities that are now comparable with any in the world.

And like any capable long-range SAM, the HQ-9 poses tactical challenges to any adversary operating within its wide combat radius which are different and in some ways more formidable than those posed by fighter aircraft. The missiles' presence would therefore certainly affect tactical calculations, and limit the operational options, of any other air force flying in their vicinity.

However, the real significance of these missiles' deployment is the strategic message it sends about China's resolve, and its confidence in having the upper hand against America in the South China Sea. This undermines the entire logic that has driven US policy on the South China Sea ever since this time last year.

ST ILLUSTRATION: MANNY FRANCISCO


That policy aims to use the South China Sea issue to reassert US strategic leadership in Asia against China's growing challenge by raising the diplomatic and military temperature over the issues there - especially China's developing island bases - to the point that Beijing blinks and backs off. That's what we've seen ever since the US Pacific Commander started talking about Beijing's newly-built island bases as its "Great Wall of Sand" last April.

The stakes for China's leaders are very high, because today's dispute in the South China Sea is not about rocks and reefs, or about the Law of the Sea. It's about whether China must continue to acknowledge US leadership in Asia, or can take America's place as Asia's primary power - as policymakers in Washington are only now starting to understand.

But, of course, this policy assumes that China will indeed blink and back off. It presupposes that America can impose diplomatic costs and military risks on Beijing that are high enough to make its leaders abandon their pushy posture in the South China Sea. And it presupposes that America can impose those costs and risks on Beijing at a price that it is willing to pay itself. So it works only if China's tolerance for diplomatic embarrassment and military risk is lower than America's.

But what has become clearer since April last year, and has now been underlined decisively by the SAM batteries on Woody Island, is that that this is not the case - especially in regard to the dangers of a military confrontation. Washington has been energetically trying to raise the diplomatic costs to Beijing by courting South-east Asian partners - as US President Barack Obama did last week at the Sunnylands summit with Asean leaders.

But it has been much more timid on the military front. After a lot of tough talk about sending its navy and air force wherever international law allows, Washington has been very reluctant to approve freedom of navigation operations to defy China's maritime claims, and those that have occurred so far were carefully scripted to minimise any serious challenge to Beijing and not offer a pretext for a robust Chinese military response.

Evidently, policymakers in Washington are not willing to run even a small risk of a military confrontation with People's Liberation Army forces, fearing that it might escalate into a clash which would prove impossible to contain.

Beijing, on the other hand, has not blinked. In response to US actions, it has taken steps that signal plainly its willingness to risk a confrontation rather than step back from its positions in the South China Sea. This is what China has done more starkly than ever with the recent SAM deployment, which is why it is time for America to rethink its strategy.

Some people in Washington and elsewhere - like the old warhorse Senator John McCain - say that the US now has no choice but to take some risks because the only possible response to China's move is to push back harder. Anything less would be surrender, so they urge more, and more intrusive, US military operations around China's claims, perhaps in conjunction with US allies and partners like Japan and Australia. But they need to think very carefully how China would respond in turn. Is there any reason to believe that Beijing would not simply push back harder yet again, perhaps by sending SAMs to the Spratlys, or declaring an air defence identification zone? And what would the US do then? How many rungs up the escalation ladder is it willing to climb?

And the risk of China responding with yet another counter- escalation is high, for two reasons. The first is that they have grown confident that America would eventually back off to avoid a confrontation, so they don't have to. The second is that the stakes for China's leaders are very high, because today's dispute in the South China Sea is not about rocks and reefs, or about the Law of the Sea. It's about whether China must continue to acknowledge US leadership in Asia, or can take America's place as Asia's primary power - as policymakers in Washington are only now starting to understand.

And that poses the big question for Washington: Is America more determined to preserve US regional leadership than China is to take its place? Which of them is ultimately more willing to risk a clash to achieve their aim? Because whichever is more determined, and can convince the other of that, will win this game of bluff. And so far China is winning.

That means America needs to be very careful about what it does next. But China needs to be careful too. America is a proud country, and it can be a dangerous and unpredictable adversary. It would be unwise to be too sure that America will keep backing off to avoid a confrontation - even if that would be contrary to America's deepest interests. It might be a massive mistake for America to risk war with China over the leadership of Asia, but that would be no consolation to China if it finds itself locked into such a war anyway, because the costs to China too would be incalculable. One hopes the hard men in Zhongnanhai know that sometimes the most dangerous moment is when you seem to be winning.

• The writer is professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra.

 

[Hendrik_2000]

CNOOC in pre-feasibility study of FLNG technology; Facility size under discussion at 2.4 million tpy, 1,500-metre water depth

BEIJING — Chinese energy giant CNOOC Group is studying the possibility of building a multi-billion-dollar floating liquefied natural gas (FLNG) vessel, as-yet untried technology that would likely be used to produce gas from the deep waters of the South China Sea.

While the state-run company has made no public announcement, a pre-feasibility study was well under way, CNOOC and other industry officials said. CNOOC was already talking to global engineering firms about possible joint design of the vessel, two industry officials added. FLNG ships are ocean-based liquefaction plants that can be positioned above reserves to chill extracted gas and load it into LNG tankers for delivery. That could make fields too remote or too small to develop using undersea pipelines viable for production.

About 10 FLNG facilities are being planned globally with a handful under construction, among them the biggest, Prelude, owned by Royal Dutch Shell and due to be producing from an offshore Australian field by 2017. Shell has shied away from offering estimates of Prelude’s likely cost, but analysts say it could be more than US$12 billion.

While a Chinese FLNG plant might be some years away, industry officials said such vessels could become an important component of Beijing’s strategy in the South China Sea — including in disputed waters — as the country looks to boost its offshore energy output.

CNOOC Group also owns a US$1 billion oil rig that was deployed by state-run China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) to drill in waters claimed by Vietnam in early May. On Wednesday, CNPC said the rig had finished exploration after finding signs of oil and gas near the Paracel Islands.

SEARCHING FOR ANOTHER DAQING

CNOOC Group was doing a pre-feasibility study to evaluate the potential costs and returns of using FLNG technology, the firm’s chief deepwater researcher, Xie Bin, told a seminar last month.

In the energy sector, a pre-feasibility study comes first and is usually followed by more detailed research and design, which could involve outside experts and a bigger budget. "For disputed waters, we need to be self-sufficient because we can’t expect onshore support from any neighbouring nations," Xie said in the Chinese city of Tianjin. Approached later at the seminar by Reuters, Xie declined to make additional comments.

He gave no cost estimate for building an FLNG facility, although other industry officials said it could run to several billions of dollars.

CNOOC Group, parent of the flagship listed unit CNOOC Ltd, told Reuters on Tuesday that research into FLNG technology was under way but declined to say more.

The group has long said it wanted to conduct more exploration in deeper waters off China, having in 2010 set a goal to find by 2020 another "Daqing" — an onshore field in the country’s northeast that produces one million barrels per day of oil equivalent.

China has so far made only one major gas find in the deep waters of the South China Sea, the Liwan 3-1 field in undisputed Chinese territory off Hong Kong. The field is being developed by CNOOC and Canada’s Husky Energy.

Beijing claims about 90 percent of the South China Sea, whose estimated energy potential varies widely, although geologists believe it holds more gas than oil. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan also claim parts of the key waterway.

MINI-VESSEL

Xie said CNOOC was looking at an FLNG plant that could handle up to 2.4 million tonnes of gas per year (tpy) and operate at a depth of 1,500 metres. Other industry sources said it might start with a smaller 1 million tpy vessel.

Prelude by comparison will produce about 3.6 million tpy — still small versus some land-based LNG plants.

In April, an in-house article on CNOOC Group’s website said its research and development arm together with two Chinese universities had designed a small-scale FLNG vessel with a capacity of about 5,000 tpy.

The company planned to build the model by the end of September and test it off the northeastern port city of Yingkou, the article said.

CNOOC Group is also courting foreign firms about possible joint design of an FLNG ship, said Li Jianmin, head of the deepwater engineering department at CNOOC Ltd, and Feng Qin, chief specialist for offshore engineering at Asia’s top oil refiner Sinopec Corp.

Both Li and Feng declined to name potential partners. They spoke to Reuters this month.

Feng said he was aware of CNOOC’s study as well as plans by other Chinese energy firms to research FLNG technology. While Feng would not say if Sinopec was interested in FLNG, he said it was a promising option for the South China Sea.

"FLNG has an unrivalled advantage for relatively small-scale deepwater gas fields versus subsea pipelines," Feng said.

In disputed waters, a single vessel would also be much easier to protect than potentially hundreds of kilometres of pipeline.

Wang Jinlian, secretary-general of the China Association of the National Shipbuilding Industry, told Reuters the government was ready to finance research and development and offer tax incentives for any local manufacturing work needed to build such floating liquefaction plants. Government officials could not be reached for comment, but the Ministry of Finance issued a policy document in April supporting local companies developing offshore engineering technology through tax incentives and the waiving of import tariffs on components and raw materials.

 

[AndrewS]

I'm expanding the line of reasoning regarding the economic benefits of China's SCS expansion (which result in the greater good for the world) because I don't think anyone in the world has suggested this before, nor put together a robust argument in defence.

So let's look at the impact of China island construction which could be used to control the SCS if they are militarised.

===

Fishing in the SCS

Vietnamese and Filipino fisherman lose out as they can no longer fish in the SCS, which is obviously bad for them. But presumably Chinese fishermen would move in and maintain the SAME level of fish catches. So overall, I would judge this as a slight net negative for the world, because the Chinese are significantly richer than the Vietnamese and Filipinos, so they who would benefit more from that fish catch. But also remember that the economic value of catching fish is really low compared to that of industry and other higher-value economic activities. Also note that fishing fleets employ very few people.

===

Resource extraction in the SCS

There was a joint oil/gas exploration deal that China/Vietnam/Philippines agreed some 15 years ago, but which was scuppered by Australia on ideological opposition to China, despite the clear economic benefits China/Vietnam/Philippines would have obtained from oil production.

Today, some 15 years later, there still hasn't been widespread oil exploration because the area is still disputed. But if China obtains defacto control of the SCS, then presumably oil exploration/production could go ahead solely by China and result in greater oil supply in the long run and LOWER oil prices.

So even if Vietnam and the Philippines do not agree that China should proceed unilaterally with oil development in the SCS, they will still benefit as the studies show that lower oil prices result in higher global economic growth overall, particularly in oil importing nations like China/Vietnam/Philippines/USA/Japan/Korea/etc where almost EVERYONE would benefit.

But yes, it would have been better if Vietnam and the Philippines had been joint exploration partners along with China some 15 years ago, but I fear that it now may be too late. And this is all due to interference from Australia on ideological grounds against the expansion of Chinese influence, rather than looking at the pragmatic view of what is best for the countries involved.

And if that joint resource exploration deal had come to pass some 15 years ago, would we even be in the current situation where China, Vietnam and the Philippines are locked in dispute? It's an interesting question.

In the future, China may voluntarily offer joint development stakes to Vietnam and Philippines once China has defacto control of the SCS, in exchange for their acceptance of a situation that they cannot change. And it would be in the long-term interests of China to setup a multi-lateral security grouping with Vietnam, Philippines and the other ASEAN members - which would restrain the ambitions of all the parties involved - but would inevitably be led by China and exclude the USA.

Increased economic activity and spillover in the region

If China has significant bases in the SCS, they could easily be militarised so that China's can control the SCS at will. That would allow China to safeguard the trade routes that China is already dependent on, as it is already the world's largest trading nation with most of that trade passing through the SCS. And note that there are almost no circumstances where China would EVER want that trade to stop, which is also in the interests of SE Asia as a whole.

So Chinese investments and trade with SE Asia will suffer from LESS RISK, as they will no longer depend on the US Navy guaranteeing commercial freedom of navigation, which it may not do in certain circumstances.

Therefore additional Chinese investments become viable, and we're talking about China which alone has the investment capital, technological expertise, spare capacity and risk appetite to make substantial investments in infrastructure and in trading relationships in Asia.

We're talking about the potential $8trillion deficit in terms of infrastructure in Asia alone, along with trillions in terms of mutually beneficial trade between China and Asia over the coming years, which will impact hundreds of millions of the poor people in developing Asia. Depending on the US Navy to protect this is not good strategy for China, nor for SE Asia as a whole.

The Philippines and Vietnam will inevitably benefit from this spillover of economic activity, because they are located BETWEEN China and the rest of SE Asia. So as wages in China and the rest of SE Asia go up, wages in the Philippines and Vietnam equalise and get dragged upwards

What is up for debate is how much the Phllipines/Vietnam will benefit, but if we're talking about trillions of dollars, then yes, it is reasonable to estimate that they will see a significant overall net economic benefit. We can already see how Vietnam is booming as an investment destination, precisely because China has gotten so rich and expensive that it now makes sense to invest in Vietnam instead.

Leaving aside this, we can also see that China is bailing out the Malaysian Sovereign Wealth Fund and providing very generous terms for a railway deal with Indonesia for example, partly as a response to their concerns about Chinese activities in the SCS. If I look at the railway deal in particular, this should end up as a significant benefit to tens of millions of desperately poor Indonesians.

===

So on balance, it is possible to see that unilateral Chinese control of the SCS would result in a significant economic benefit globally and particularly to Asia. The Philippines and Vietnam would probably experience a net economic benefit due to the spillover effect

And yes, these economic benefits only apply with defacto Chinese control of the SCS.

Does anyone think China will sink trillions into low yield infrastructure/investments/trade without some sort of security that the shipping lanes will stay open and that its investments are safe?

As the British Empire once noted, flag follows trade.

===

Comments are welcome, and feel free to take these ideas and run with them yourselves.

 

[PanAsian]

...
So on balance, it is possible to see that unilateral Chinese control of the SCS would result in a significant economic benefit globally and particularly to Asia. The Philippines and Vietnam would probably experience a net economic benefit due to the spillover effect

And yes, these economic benefits only apply with defacto Chinese control of the SCS.

Does anyone think China will sink trillions into low yield infrastructure/investments/trade without some sort of security that the shipping lanes will stay open and that its investments are safe?

As the British Empire once noted, flag follows trade.

===

Comments are welcome, and feel free to take these ideas and run with them yourselves.

I would say that as long as there is clearly no military antagonism in the SCS then all this is possible, this does not necessarily mean unilateral Chinese control of the SCS but it does mean acceptance that China is the dominant force in the natural local order.

 

[AndrewS]

Good point.

If you go to SE Asia (and indeed India/Japan/Korea), I think there is a growing awareness and acceptance that China is becoming dominant in the region. And that change is translating into uncertainty and nervousness, at a minimum.

 

[Blackstone]

That is an excellent news It prove that chinese deep water technology is as good as anybody.I know Husky oil of Canada controlled by Li Ka Shing want to bring the Lingshui field into production. It is not easy to drill a hole 5000 feet without snapping the tube. Anyway this is an excellent article from Hugh White
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Another good piece by Hugh White, and I believe he's spot on about China having greater resolve in the SCS disputes. There's also the larger question of who leads Asia, and what happens in the SCS will affect that equation too.