China's SCS Strategy Thread

Blackstone

Brigadier
@Brumby

Yes, if you think about it, China's actions in the SCS should end up as a overall net positive for the world. I measure this by the end result which will be apparent in a few years which includes

1. The additional infrastructure for civilian use. eg. lighthouses to prevent shipwrecks, airborne surveillance which would have prevented/solved cases like the Malaysian Airlines mystery, eventually joint anti-piracy patrols/facilities etc

2. China will be more secure in investing in infrastructure development and maritime commerce, as it will have greater security that its trillions in investments and trade will be protected. Chinese funding/construction/ownership of infrastructure development could address much of the developing world's needs and boost their efforts to eliminate poverty. This far outweighs the benefits that Filipino fishermen derive.

Hence a net positive for the world.

===

FON is ambiguous enough that there are different interpretations of UNCLOS. In my view, I think China should take the long-view, because it is likely that China will end up with the world's largest navy, and therefore military FON through EEZs is ultimately in China's interest.

===

But we can see that at the nation-state level, the US disregards the same international laws that it champions as lawful rule. It's just rank hypocrisy like every other country in the world.

===
Let's look at some countries that are neutral or support China in the SCS.

Russia - they don't have any interest in the SCS, but they do find it very useful as it distracts the US from their quasi-conflict with Russia.

Central Asia - They're landlocked countries that really don't care what happens in the SCS and they're part of the land-based silk road route which terminates at ports in the Pakistan ports. China securing the sea-based Silk-road route to these ports is in their interests.

Africa - They're part of the sea based silk road, and count China as their largest trading partner. China securing the sea-based Silk-road route to these ports is in their interests

The same calculation applies to other countries like Cambodia, Thailand, etc. They do not have any territorial disputes with China and know that the Chinese military will always keep the commercial trade routes open.

Flag follows trade, as the British Empire once put it
Well said, AndrewS.
 

Blackstone

Brigadier
Well, I think I'm done with the red team view for now.

So let's look at the blue team perspective.

What does the US want, but more importantly what can it realistically get?

The USA wants to retain the status quo of economic and military primacy in the waters of the Western Pacific next to the Chinese coast, and for China is accept this situation.

But if the China economy and military grow much bigger than the USA, then why should China accept this?

China already has escalation dominance in virtually every economic/military scenario (short of war) in the region AND is the one that wants to change the status quo, which has its good points but also its bad points.

And if there is one thing that the Chinese neocons and US neocons both agree on, it is that a full-scale war would be a disaster for both parties.

So let's look at freedom navigation and how it fits into this.

The US wants to use military freedom of navigation to intimidate China, but that is simply not going to work, because China has escalation dominance.

But remember that commercial freedom of navigation is in the interests of the US and China.

China is already the world's largest economy in terms of actual output, largest trading nation, and largest net foreign investor. Chinese companies want access to foreign markets, but at the moment, the Chinese domestic market is still somewhat hostile to foreign companies. But as China moves up the technology ladder, Chinese multi-nationals will know that they can compete and expand globally.

Therefore China's long-term interest is to foster a liberal trade and investment order, which the US also idealises.

So as time goes on, the interests of China and the US - converge on freedom of navigation, a liberal trade and investment order, and the status of artificial islands. We can already see that the Chinese foreign ministry is deliberately vague on the SCS so as to keep its options open.

So does the US conducting and then publicising FON operations against China actually help?

No, because it simply means China has to acknowledge the situation and escalate. If they had to be conducted, it would be better to do it the way the Australians have done it without any publicity at all. It makes the same point, but doesn't goad China into an overt response.

And remember that the legal situation is that messed up and complicated, that most people don't understand what is actually happening anyway.

But if the principle of FON is actually about what territory or EEZ is acceptable, then in the interests of fairness, the US should also be conducting FON operations against Japan like in Okinotorishima and in other countries and then publicising these.

And of course, it would help if the US actually re-entered UNCLOS after storming out in anger last time.
China already dominates the economic environment of Asia, and continues to tighten its grip with bilateral and multilateral enterprises. Beijing's stated preference is general support for the Bretton Woods system, while addressing its shortcomings from the inside. AIIB and "Belt and Road" initiatives are evidence to that affect. Washington basically threw in its hand on continued US economic dominance in Asia, that's why TPP looks more like a security than an economic pact.

On FON, I think it's in China's long-term interests to adopt current global norms, because as its economic endeavors continue to spread or deepen around the world, so would its security interests. In the not too distant future, Beijing Mandarins, Communists or Republicans, might want the option to sail and fly "anywhere, anytime" in pursuance of its national interests.

As you rightly said earlier, the British Empire showed flag follows trade. So do language, culture, social norms, and of course, guns.
 

Brumby

Major
@Brumby

Yes, if you think about it, China's actions in the SCS should end up as a overall net positive for the world. I measure this by the end result which will be apparent in a few years which includes

1. The additional infrastructure for civilian use. eg. lighthouses to prevent shipwrecks, airborne surveillance which would have prevented/solved cases like the Malaysian Airlines mystery, eventually joint anti-piracy patrols/facilities etc

2. China will be more secure in investing in infrastructure development and maritime commerce, as it will have greater security that its trillions in investments and trade will be protected. Chinese funding/construction/ownership of infrastructure development could address much of the developing world's needs and boost their efforts to eliminate poverty. This far outweighs the benefits that Filipino fishermen derive.

Hence a net positive for the world.
What you are advocating is the greater good theory. The theory holds water provided it meets three conditions : impartiality; agent neutral; and what is right. Unfortunately it fails in all three conditions in the subject matter of our discussion. For example, you take a healthy agent X against his/her will and organ harvest to save 5 terminally ill patient and argues that it is for the greater good that one individual sacrifice for 5 others. The problem is the benefit is partial. the agent is not neutral and clearly such action is illegal.

FON is ambiguous enough that there are different interpretations of UNCLOS. In my view, I think China should take the long-view, because it is likely that China will end up with the world's largest navy, and therefore military FON through EEZs is ultimately in China's interest.
We have already beaten this to death. There is no ambiguity with FON. Its meaning is laid out in UNCLOS. China's view is in the minority group that had pushed for a different interpretation. That interpretation was rejected by the majority during the various sessions that preceded the final text as embodied in UNCLOS. There are two ways legally to change it. Revise UNCLOS through a full session of members or take it to the International tribunal

But we can see that at the nation-state level, the US disregards the same international laws that it champions as lawful rule. It's just rank hypocrisy like every other country in the world.
Can we please keep this OT

Let's look at some countries that are neutral or support China in the SCS.

Russia - they don't have any interest in the SCS, but they do find it very useful as it distracts the US from their quasi-conflict with Russia.

Central Asia - They're landlocked countries that really don't care what happens in the SCS and they're part of the land-based silk road route which terminates at ports in the Pakistan ports. China securing the sea-based Silk-road route to these ports is in their interests.

Africa - They're part of the sea based silk road, and count China as their largest trading partner. China securing the sea-based Silk-road route to these ports is in their interests

The same calculation applies to other countries like Cambodia, Thailand, etc. They do not have any territorial disputes with China and know that the Chinese military will always keep the commercial trade routes open.

Flag follows trade, as the British Empire once put it
Frankly what has all these countries got to do with the current dispute? One of the institution provided by UNCLOS to settle such issues is the International tribunal but yet is rejected by China. There is a process and a framework as pathway that underpins rule of law. Outside that pathway is simply lawlessness.
 

joshuatree

Captain
We have already beaten this to death. There is no ambiguity with FON. Its meaning is laid out in UNCLOS. China's view is in the minority group that had pushed for a different interpretation. That interpretation was rejected by the majority during the various sessions that preceded the final text as embodied in UNCLOS. There are two ways legally to change it. Revise UNCLOS through a full session of members or take it to the International tribunal

I agree issue is beaten to death. But it stands there is disagreement on issue of ambiguity in FON. UNCLOS is not the most clear cut doc written. The suggestion to revise UNCLOS or tribunal also applies to those that believe there is no ambiguity.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
What you are advocating is the greater good theory. The theory holds water provided it meets three conditions : impartiality; agent neutral; and what is right. Unfortunately it fails in all three conditions in the subject matter of our discussion. For example, you take a healthy agent X against his/her will and organ harvest to save 5 terminally ill patient and argues that it is for the greater good that one individual sacrifice for 5 others. The problem is the benefit is partial. the agent is not neutral and clearly such action is illegal.


We have already beaten this to death. There is no ambiguity with FON. Its meaning is laid out in UNCLOS. China's view is in the minority group that had pushed for a different interpretation. That interpretation was rejected by the majority during the various sessions that preceded the final text as embodied in UNCLOS. There are two ways legally to change it. Revise UNCLOS through a full session of members or take it to the International tribunal


Can we please keep this OT


Frankly what has all these countries got to do with the current dispute? One of the institution provided by UNCLOS to settle such issues is the International tribunal but yet is rejected by China. There is a process and a framework as pathway that underpins rule of law. Outside that pathway is simply lawlessness.

It is greater good theory, but China's actions do stand your 3 tests for the greater good:

Test 1. "The problem is the benefit is partial"

We're talking about economic benefits suffered or gained, not directly taking a life.

But the economic benefits are in the trillions AND in countries where hundreds of millions of people are in dire poverty that this money DOES translate into large number of lives. Their benefit far outweighs the loss suffered by a few fishermen.

Test 2. "the agent is not neutral"

I think we're now delving into one of the fundamental cultural differences between Confucian societies (China/Japan/Korea/Taiwan/HK/SIngapore/Vietnam) and Anglo societies. Confucian societies are more hierarchial and focus on the overall health of the group rather than an individual. Therefore agent neutrality is not seen as a requirement for a greater good test.

Plus what neutral agent can credibly adjudicate in the SCS?

The Anglo principle would be that one should be judged a jury of one's peers, but who are the peers who have no vested interest in the outcome in the SCS? And international law on the seas is but what the biggest navy decides it to be, as any international relations student will tell you.



Test 3. "clearly such action is illegal"

Remember that Anglo common-law also allows precedent to be set and therefore it takes the pragmatic route of legitimising what actually happens in the real world.

There are clearly enough ambiguous territorial and EEZ claims that there is a genuine dispute.
Plus genuine differences in UNCLOS interpretation.

So again, where are the truly impartial agents that will judge, and by what cultural yardstick will they judge the greater good?

And in international relations, it really is the law of the jungle, as the US itself demonstrated by withdrawing from UNCLOS when it didn't like a judgement, amongst other actions.

At least until there truly is a world government which can censure the US or China, but that is a whole other discussion in itself.

===

How the US acts is important, because its actions DO set the benchmark by which China acts.
So it would be better if the US wasn't so hypocritical sometimes , but that's for the US to recognise and reflect upon.

China actually spends way more time thinking about its positions and making sure they are consistent, whereas even US politicians are surprised at some of the hypocritical crap that the US actually does in the background.

===

And I mention those other countries because you didn't believe Russia / Central Asia / Africa were neutral or supportive of Chinese activities in the SCS. I believe your exact words were "You are kidding, right?"

Think about it. China is now setting up a military base in Djibouti on the horn of Africa, as once again, the countries in Africa know that China has an interest maintaining the shipping lanes.

Flag follows trade, indeed.

I'll repeat again, Chinese trade in the SCS is essential to the Chinese economy, and the Chinese trade probably accounts for more trade in the SCS than everyone else combined.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
China already dominates the economic environment of Asia, and continues to tighten its grip with bilateral and multilateral enterprises. Beijing's stated preference is general support for the Bretton Woods system, while addressing its shortcomings from the inside. AIIB and "Belt and Road" initiatives are evidence to that affect. Washington basically threw in its hand on continued US economic dominance in Asia, that's why TPP looks more like a security than an economic pact.

On FON, I think it's in China's long-term interests to adopt current global norms, because as its economic endeavors continue to spread or deepen around the world, so would its security interests. In the not too distant future, Beijing Mandarins, Communists or Republicans, might want the option to sail and fly "anywhere, anytime" in pursuance of its national interests.

As you rightly said earlier, the British Empire showed flag follows trade. So do language, culture, social norms, and of course, guns.

Agreed.

It is in China's long term interest to continue with the general Bretton Woods System.
After all, China has been the biggest beneficiary over the past 30 years.
But the Bretton Woods system does need to change to reflect how China and other nations are far more influential and should have a greater say in how the system should look and how it is run.

And the long-term goal for China should be that language, culture, social norms follow in the wake of Chinese trade and influence. That is always better than guns and traditional Confucian societal norms actually hold violence in disdain.

And a soft power strategy fits the Chinese vision of itself as a civilised society that leads and that others want to emulate, as was the case for most of the past 2000-odd years. One only needs to think of how Christopher Columbus was actually looking for India and always carried a copy of the Travels of Marco Polo with him.

But China still has a long way to go in terms of internal development before they get to that point.
 
China already dominates the economic environment of Asia, and continues to tighten its grip with bilateral and multilateral enterprises. Beijing's stated preference is general support for the Bretton Woods system, while addressing its shortcomings from the inside. AIIB and "Belt and Road" initiatives are evidence to that affect. Washington basically threw in its hand on continued US economic dominance in Asia, that's why TPP looks more like a security than an economic pact.

On FON, I think it's in China's long-term interests to adopt current global norms, because as its economic endeavors continue to spread or deepen around the world, so would its security interests. In the not too distant future, Beijing Mandarins, Communists or Republicans, might want the option to sail and fly "anywhere, anytime" in pursuance of its national interests.

As you rightly said earlier, the British Empire showed flag follows trade. So do language, culture, social norms, and of course, guns.

Agreed.

It is in China's long term interest to continue with the general Bretton Woods System.
After all, China has been the biggest beneficiary over the past 30 years.
But the Bretton Woods system does need to change to reflect how China and other nations are far more influential and should have a greater say in how the system should look and how it is run.

And the long-term goal for China should be that language, culture, social norms follow in the wake of Chinese trade and influence. That is always better than guns and traditional Confucian societal norms actually hold violence in disdain.

And a soft power strategy fits the Chinese vision of itself as a civilised society that leads and that others want to emulate, as was the case for most of the past 2000-odd years. One only needs to think of how Christopher Columbus was actually looking for India and always carried a copy of the Travels of Marco Polo with him.

But China still has a long way to go in terms of internal development before they get to that point.

I disagree that China should support or eventually would support military vessel FON as the US and other colonial and expeditionary powers practice it.

Historically even when China was the dominant power it practiced an overall much more laissez faire foreign security policy than the colonial and expeditionary powers ever did or do. That is one of the reasons why the US is currently finding it difficult to rally others against China either at all or to the degree the US desires as there is minimal resentment born from minimal armed conflict between China and others.

This is part of Chinese strategic culture and choice where armed conflict is very much not the preferred tool. This is reflected by which parts of UNCLOS China chose to opt out of, and which parts it interprets differently from the US. Another present day reflection of this strategy can be seen in the recent articulation of how China might participate in the fight against IS: only under UN auspices, and only with the agreement of the local sovereign authority.

Despite or because the world, including China, having been subject for a long time to the colonial and expeditionary powers' much more aggressive international military practices, China is not about to adopt them now nor even when it gains sufficient military capability to pursue them.
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
On FON, I think it's in China's long-term interests to adopt current global norms, because as its economic endeavors continue to spread or deepen around the world, so would its security interests. In the not too distant future, Beijing Mandarins, Communists or Republicans, might want the option to sail and fly "anywhere, anytime" in pursuance of its national interests.

I do not agree at all.

FON is a mission looking for a purpose.

Sending warships and warplanes so close to someone else's coast for the purpose of being there rather than merely passing through is an exercise of gunboat diplomacy and intimidation.

While great powers are certainly not beyond resorting to intimidation, there is an art to it.

The highest form of intimidation is to intimidate without appearing to need or have to do so. You do that with words.

People are not stupid, if subtle or even explicit verbal threats from diplomats isn't enough to cow them, the sight of warships of their coast isn't likely to either, since it's not like they somehow overlooked or forgot that you had those ships to start with.

So if you really need to send in the hardware, odds are you are already well past the point where just showing the flag would be enough anyways.

Take the SCS as a case in point. Unless the US is prepared to actually order its warships to open fire, their presences in those waters does not advance American interests one iota.

Those FON patrols are not going to deter the Chinese from doing whatever the hell they want, and indeed, may actually be actively pushing China into doing what the US is more afraid of in the first place.

The problem with intimidation and the threat of use, even if only implied, is that you end up looking weak and like you lost and backed down if the other guy stands his ground and refuses to be cowed.

China has zero problems with actual freedom of navigation. If your warships just want to conduct innocent passage, the Chinese have zero problems with that.

What China strongly object to is foreign military ships conducting military operations within Chinese EEZ. It's basis for those objections lie with its interpretation of UNCLOS, so people can drop the rule of law BS before that starts. China's position is based precisely on the rule of law.

The US might have a different interpretation of what that law means, but by not adopting UNCLOS, it means there is no court anyone can take the US to on getting a ruling on the differing interpretations.

If anyone was daft enough to try, I am confident that a) the US would use all its influence to make sure no court would hear it. And they b) if any court did dare defy it and take on the case, the US government would take precisely the sa,e stance as China currently is with the Philippines and not bother to recognise the authority of the court to hear it.

However, even the legality of it all is in fact tangential.

In this day and age, warships don't need to close to within 12 miles of a coast to place it firmly within weapons range and threaten it. Hell, if there was really a chance of a shooting war breaking out, no warship would want to be anywhere like as close to a hostile shore and coastal defence missiles.

Other than intelligence gathering, getting within 12nm of someone coast serves very little tangible military needs other than the aforementioned intimidation value.

That's just not in the style of the Chinese. They don't like to make threats, but prefer to make promises instead.

If they promise you consequences and you are foolish enough to not take the hint, they will follow through on general principle alone.
 

solarz

Brigadier
I do not agree at all.

FON is a mission looking for a purpose.

Sending warships and warplanes so close to someone else's coast for the purpose of being there rather than merely passing through is an exercise of gunboat diplomacy and intimidation.

Exactly! Those missions are meant to intimidate China and embolden its rivals. It is rather reminiscent of the way 19th century western powers dealt with China. Fortunately, the People's Republic is not the Qing dynasty.
 
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