Anyway, back on topic now.
Peter Layton has one of the best analyses of the SCS I've seen yet from the Lowy Institute in Australia. Full article below.
South China Sea: Beijing is winning, but here's how to retake the initiative
My thoughts are:
1. that it's good that someone in the think tank community can cogently recognise that China's interests and its strength/options in the area, although it is still understates China to a degree.
2. It may or may not end up as a zero-sum outcome in terms of territory, as it's too early to say at this time what China will ultimately do. But in economic terms, there is a good case that Chinese security control of the shipping lanes will result in a positive economic outcome even for Vietnam/Philippines - due to the spillover from increased trade/investment/resource extraction that will occur as China feels more secure that its investments in Asia can be protected.
3. The author suggests one strategy which is to target the CCP to obtain leverage, but I think that this would have to be handled very carefully, because it could so easily become counter-productive when the CCP pushes back even harder and escalates.
4. The 2nd strategy the author suggests is to demilitarise the SCS islands under UN or ASEAN control. However, permanent UN or ASEAN only facilities in the SCS islands are just not in China's interest, as China gets nothing from this.
But a joint civilian facility with ASEAN or selected ASEAN members is something that I think China would seriously consider, because it would comprise a multi-lateral effort that would inevitably be led and dominated by China. However, note that this would likely only be stationed on 1 island, which means the other 2 big SCS islands would remain under exclusive Chinese control.
I would expect that this joint facility would share the same island with a separate China-only facility under coast guard or military jurisdiction. This means that the joint China-ASEAN assets and presumably Chinese military and coast guard assets become mixed together on the same island. It means that the interests of China-ASEAN become more comingled, and any potential attack on the islands also becomes an attack on ASEAN in addition to China.
The benefits of this joint China-ASEAN force are that the day-today interactions take the heat off the SCS and invite a compromise between China-ASEAN. But from the US perspective, it means they lose influence to a China-led grouping.
The author suggest a civilian disaster relief command, which sounds reasonable to me as it benefits everyone in the region and indeed the world. But aren't most of these sorts of assets in ASEAN and China actually paramilitary or military in nature? Think a Tsunami or Hurricane.
And if the remit of this joint force expands to anti-piracy etc, then it definitely becomes a paramilitary or military force.
Then we see China leading a China-ASEAN
security grouping, which should lead to much more stability in the SCS and which would be in the interests of China and ASEAN. But again, it means a loss in influence for the US.
Comments anyone?