China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

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bustead

Junior Member
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This will require 150+360+102+39 = 651 DF-41 equivalents solely for countervalue. Assuming 10% interception rate and 20% destroyed on the ground, this requires ~850 to achieve equal deterrence as the Soviet Union in 1962.
A warhead survival rate of 70% seems to be optimistic. I think more than 50% of all nuclear missiles may be disabled during a first strike. Better have more just to be safe.
 

bustead

Junior Member
Registered Member
Enough for 2000 warheads? I don't know. Enough for at least 1000, almost definitely.

China has uranium ore. It could have some (more than enough for 1000 warheads), it could have almost as much as Australia (in that case enough for tens of thousands of MT warheads). China has been buying Uranium for energy from Australia and possibly from North Korea. North Korea has a fair bit of Uranium ore.

China has had secret enrichment facilities built into underground bases and mountains since the 1960s. They even showed a long decommissioned one on a documentary. Many, many nuclear energy and academic facilities that are capable of refining material. Apparently their operations are tracked but certainly not tracked well enough to log Chinese own ore reserves and material going in to facilities.

There is absolutely no material or facility limit on a minimmum of 1000 warheads China could produce.

There never was a facility limit to how China can refine material. Only China says how much material goes into facility and how much of it is refined for weapons. There never was any reliable and accurate tracing of material because China like the US and Russia, never reported on weapons side.

Fissile material required for 1000 kiloton ranged warheads depends on the warhead design. I don't think anyone here is an expert in those specifics but if we take the fact that there is no fissile material limit for China, not even back in the 1960s, how could there be any limit to building 1000+ warheads if China has for over 60 years, the facilities (and many secretive ones since nearly all the weapon making facilities are secretive!) and all the material it needs within its own borders and supplied from North Korea if not also Australia. It's not hard to import 1000T of Australian ore and then saying 1000T are going towards energy while only 500T went towards energy production.

FYI to everyone, no nuclear power has external organisations cataloging the exact volume of material entering a plant, the exact amount of waste material leaving, AND the exact amount of energy produced.

The most information western nations have as estimates of nuclear energy fuel is material purchased from Australia, amount China says has gone into energy production, the amount China says as been depleted and ended up as waste material, and then the amount of energy China says a public, energy producing nuclear plant has produced. Between all this, it wouldn't be hard to buy 1000T of Australia ore and using only 100T for energy while 900T ended up in warheads. It is so easy to fudge this stuff to keep nuclear weapons estimates off by even many orders of magnitude.

Since the beginning of China buying its first import gram of uranium from Australia and to this day, Australia does not have specifics on how China uses the uranium no more than Australia has on how the US uses imported uranium. They say its for energy and the seller is happy to make his money and believe whatever. You cannot stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons in that way when there is such disparity. China AND Australia both know China has every right to produce nuclear weapons since the US owns the most, continues with aggressive policy, militarily adventurous, AND it is also failing to declare even a no first use policy. The US has shown no real and genuine intention for disarmament and of course not, it has the most warheads in the world. It would be quite an unequal disarmament.

This is only accounting for imported uranium from Australia. Let's keep in mind that China has PLENTY of uranium ore within its own MASSIVE landmass AND North Korea is also home to some significant amount of uranium ore.

These two points have actually always been the weakest points made by the ones who suggest China is capped by fissile material availability (categorically false) and cannot keep enrichment out of the eyes of whoever is supposedly watching... they can and already have since the 1960s.
Again China is known to have 18 tons of HEU and 1.8-2.9 tons of Pu-239. This is enough for at least 2000 weapons.
 

Suetham

Senior Member
Registered Member
Okay I'm well aware of most of what you said but you don't seem to have answered my question. Why use U-235 over plutonium or vice versa, in either the primary or secondary, if both are suitable fissile material? Is one less dense for equivalent yield (warhead weight savings)? Why doesn't China just enrich more uranium, if Plutonium production is slow/difficult/the rate limiting factor holding up the buildup? AFAIK U and Pu are completely interchangeable in the primary at least (Fat Man was plutonium, China's first bomb was uranium implosion), I'm less sure about the secondary (besides that the tamper and radiation case can be depleted uranium).
It is much easier to make a nuclear bomb with plutonium than with uranium.

For example, if North Korea wanted to manufacture significant amounts of plutonium to make a nuclear bomb, the North Koreans could easily use Pu-239 to create nuclear weapons.

North Koreans could make the bomb the easy way, using the chemical element Pu-239 instead of U-235. The most common uranium in nature as you already know is U-238, and it is not suitable for the bomb. The solution is to "enrich" the mixture by increasing the proportion of U-235.

To make the bomb faster, you can convert U-238 into plutonium. This is done with the help of a nuclear reactor. Neutrons emitted by the reactor are used to "bomb" atoms of U-238. The atom captures a particle for its nucleus, which transforms into unstable U-239, then Np-239, and finally Pu-239.

If there is no inspection, the nuclear fuel of a power plant can be converted in this way into the raw material of the nuclear bomb in an easier way than enriching to 90%. Exactly for these reasons Japan manages to be a latent nuclear state and capable of quickly producing nuclear bombs through reprocessed plutonium.

Also, answering your question, yes, "one is less dense for equivalent yield (warhead weight savings)". Plutonium bombs like Trinity, Fat Man and Rufus used the implosion principle, in which the plutonium sphere is compressed by a shock wave (this increases its density, which goes into a supercritical state). Therefore, the uranium nuclear bomb is less powerful than a plutonium one.

For example -

Trinity:
Weight: 6.2 kg of plutonium
Yield: 22 kT

Fat Man:
Weight: 6.4 kg of plutonium
Yield: 21 kT

Rufus:
Weight: 6 kg of plutonium
Yield: 15 kT

Little Boy:
Weight: 65 kg of uranium
Yield: 15 kT
 

bustead

Junior Member
Registered Member
In this case, to produce an atomic bomb, 52 kilos of uranium would be needed. According to an article written by a group of scientists at Los Alamos National Laboratory, which helped develop US nuclear technology, this is the amount needed for a so-called critical mass to occur, starting the chain reaction that causes the bomb to explode. If simple modern technology is used, a kind of mirror that bounces off the particles inside the bomb, the amount of uranium needed drops to 26 kilograms. But it's still a lot compared to modern enrichment processes.

Let's take for example the warhead
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. that the W76 has a ratio of 100 kT/61.5 kg - 0.615 g/1 kT.

The W-76 is a medium-yield (100 kT instead of 1,000 kT) warhead bomb in relatively light weight packages. These are weapons that take advantage of the fact that they are expected to be relatively accurate (they don't have to be in the several hundred kT range to have strategic implications), along with what are seemingly sophisticated thermonuclear design tricks to extract a lot of energy from the which is a relatively small amount of material.

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Let's say that for China their warheads are of small yield - something around 2 to 3x less than the nuclear yield of American warheads, thus requiring larger amounts of kg for each kT, this could require 1.23-1.84 kg for every kT of yield of a nuclear bomb.

In the case of plutonium, six to eight kilograms are enough to produce a nuclear device.

I am quite sure that currently, to produce a nuclear weapon with recent technologies, at least 50 kg of uranium could have been reduced to something around 15-20 kg of uranium.

About the uranium supply. Mongolia has virtually untouched reserves and Xi Jinping has already declared that China and Mongolia can increase trade relations, including uranium mining.

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I disagree with your analysis. A thermonuclear primary can be produced with around 1.5-2 kg of Pu-239. To further save weight on modern warheads, the US opted for HEU tamper instead of DU tamper. This increases the yield of the warhead and decreases the weight. Think of it this way, since U-238 may undergo fission when impacted by neutrons, the tamper itself actually contribute to the total yield of the warhead. However, HEU is fissile instead of fissionable. Thus, it will be able to sustain a chain reaction if there is a neutron source. The thermonuclear primary in this case is the neutron source. So when it is detonated, the tamper is also detonated.

What does this have to do with China? While firstly, China did not use HEU tamper in their earlier nuclear warheads (506/535 warheads). Newer Chinese warheads (575) are lighter and smaller, suggesting that now the HEU tamper is being used as a part of the weapon design. Thus, 2 tons of Pu-239 is enough for 1000 weapons already. Much of the HEU can also be saved for further warhead production.
 

ZeEa5KPul

Colonel
Registered Member
It is much easier to make a nuclear bomb with plutonium than with uranium.

For example, if North Korea wanted to manufacture significant amounts of plutonium to make a nuclear bomb, the North Koreans could easily use Pu-239 to create nuclear weapons.

North Koreans could make the bomb the easy way, using the chemical element Pu-239 instead of U-235. The most common uranium in nature as you already know is U-238, and it is not suitable for the bomb. The solution is to "enrich" the mixture by increasing the proportion of U-235.

To make the bomb faster, you can convert U-238 into plutonium. This is done with the help of a nuclear reactor. Neutrons emitted by the reactor are used to "bomb" atoms of U-238. The atom captures a particle for its nucleus, which transforms into unstable U-239, then Np-239, and finally Pu-239.

If there is no inspection, the nuclear fuel of a power plant can be converted in this way into the raw material of the nuclear bomb in an easier way than enriching to 90%. Exactly for these reasons Japan manages to be a latent nuclear state and capable of quickly producing nuclear bombs through reprocessed plutonium.

Also, answering your question, yes, "one is less dense for equivalent yield (warhead weight savings)". Plutonium bombs like Trinity, Fat Man and Rufus used the implosion principle, in which the plutonium sphere is compressed by a shock wave (this increases its density, which goes into a supercritical state). Therefore, the uranium nuclear bomb is less powerful than a plutonium one.

For example -

Trinity:
Weight: 6.2 kg of plutonium
Yield: 22 kT

Fat Man:
Weight: 6.4 kg of plutonium
Yield: 21 kT

Rufus:
Weight: 6 kg of plutonium
Yield: 15 kT

Little Boy:
Weight: 65 kg of uranium
Yield: 15 kT
Little Boy was a gun type nuclear weapon, it's not comparable to implosion devices. Also, civilian reactors can't produce weapons grade plutonium without giving the game away because Pu-239 has a tendency to further absorb neutrons and become Pu-240. If enough of that builds up the plutonium becomes unsuitable for a weapon. To get around this, the fuel has to be cycled into and out of the core fairly quickly (which is what dedicated reactors do), whereas in a civilian reactor the fuel is kept in the core much longer.
 

Suetham

Senior Member
Registered Member
I disagree with your analysis. A thermonuclear primary can be produced with around 1.5-2 kg of Pu-239. To further save weight on modern warheads, the US opted for HEU tamper instead of DU tamper. This increases the yield of the warhead and decreases the weight. Think of it this way, since U-238 may undergo fission when impacted by neutrons, the tamper itself actually contribute to the total yield of the warhead. However, HEU is fissile instead of fissionable. Thus, it will be able to sustain a chain reaction if there is a neutron source. The thermonuclear primary in this case is the neutron source. So when it is detonated, the tamper is also detonated.

What does this have to do with China? While firstly, China did not use HEU tamper in their earlier nuclear warheads (506/535 warheads). Newer Chinese warheads (575) are lighter and smaller, suggesting that now the HEU tamper is being used as a part of the weapon design. Thus, 2 tons of Pu-239 is enough for 1000 weapons already. Much of the HEU can also be saved for further warhead production.
You are right. But I still have reservations about the statement that 2 tons of plutonium is enough for 1000 nuclear warheads, I would expect something around 1/5 of this production ratio. Do you have any source for this? I would like to analyze.
 

gelgoog

Lieutenant General
Registered Member
The other advantage of Soviets was that they had a shorter polar path to the US for ground based missiles and had the Arctic for SSBNs so even their medium ranged SLBMs were OK.

Rather obviously the ground based missiles of either the US or the Soviet Union would travel the same distance to hit their targets. Both used polar paths. I will grant you that the Soviets could more easily operate submarines close to the pole than the US could. Soviet approaches to the pole had a lot less obstructions.

Polaris also wasn't that short ranged. 4600 km was sufficient for Russia because distances in Europe are tiny compared to distances in Asia. First Russian SLBM was barely 1500 km.

The initial Polaris missiles were crap. Polaris A-1 had 2600 km range in 1958. It was also highly unreliable. The first Polaris A-3 missiles with 4600 km range were put into service in 1964. But yes the Soviets were behind in SLBM and naval nuclear reactor technology. It was also much easier to scale up a land based missile than an SLBM even if your warhead was larger.

However at this point the US had overtaken the Soviets conventionally. While the F-4 was nothing spectacular the F-15 and F-16 we're game changers. When launched in 1972 and 1976 they were outright better than everything else in the Soviet air force, even projected Soviet spending. The other part was the Mig-25 defection which destroyed their premier 70s fighter program.

The Soviets started falling behind in engine technology and electronics. The Soviets had access to crashed F-111s in Vietnam. It clearly made some sort of an impression since the MiG-23 was supposed to be a stopgap answer to both the F-111 and the F-4 in terms of technology. But the MiG-23 was kind of a failure in retrospect. It used highly advanced turbojets because they did not have viable turbofan engine technology. The engines had a short lifetime when you used peak power. The use of variable geometry increased airframe weight a lot and bogged down performance. Only really late on did they get a radar on it. I would not consider the MiG-25 an equivalent to teen series technology. The MiG-25 was a stopgap solution which used engine technology from supersonic drones. The MiG-25 was developed in response to the threat of the Mach 3 bombers like the XB-70 that never entered service.

I'd say that up to 2017, the threat assessment was far more benign. This was still the era of Obama and engagement.
So there wasn't any rush or need for a large nuclear arsenal.

But relations rapidly went downhill after Trump was elected and China became the bogeyman in every respect.
So after 2017 there was more urgency to increasing the nuclear arsenal.

Well, I would say that China was busy upgrading the nuclear arsenal with the DF-31 and DF-41 series. Relying on a limited amount of liquid ICBMs for the deterrent was a really dangerous proposition by then.

What has raised doubts in the scientific community is the fact that most nuclear power plants try to use as much of their fuel as possible – and not produce more. Breeder reactors do the opposite and fell into disuse early on in the history of nuclear power plants
...
China, meanwhile, has invested in fast reactors – which use more uranium – which is why nuclear scientists also turned away from it decades ago, due to the high cost of the fuel. China has invested in the research and development of fast neutron reactors since 1964.

Yelp. The whole point of the fast reactors is to better use U-238 that would otherwise go unburned. This way the U-238 gets transmuted into plutonium and then gets burned. The difference is current known uranium reserves worldwide only allow for powering nuclear reactors for like 100-200 years. If you use fast reactors the fuel supply would easily last over 2000 years. This is particularly critical given China wants to massively ramp up nuclear energy production to replace coal. China alone is expected to build more reactors in China proper than are currently available worldwide. Just let that sink in for a moment. It is impossible to generate that much nuclear energy on a country the scale of China long term without a closed fuel cycle.

Okay I'm well aware of most of what you said but you don't seem to have answered my question. Why use U-235 over plutonium or vice versa, in either the primary or secondary, if both are suitable fissile material? Is one less dense for equivalent yield (warhead weight savings)? Why doesn't China just enrich more uranium, if Plutonium production is slow/difficult/the rate limiting factor holding up the buildup? AFAIK U and Pu are completely interchangeable in the primary at least (Fat Man was plutonium, China's first bomb was uranium implosion), I'm less sure about the secondary (besides that the tamper and radiation case can be depleted uranium).

Because plutonium is much, much cheaper than U-235. U-235 was also supposedly not possible to use on an implosion type bomb back when that design was considered. An implosion type bomb requires less material than a gun type.
 
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