China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

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FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
Registered Member
Quite reassuring, thanks. 50/yr is healthier, but I'd still prefer it to be more like at least 100/yr, on top of SLBM production. 30 didn't seem right because that would mean they'd take 10 years just to fill the currently known silos with 0 mobile expansion.
Are there any other components unique to ICBMs, especially the DF-41 in particular, that I'm not thinking of which could bottleneck production, besides TELs or guidance?

We really need some of that Khrushchev "cranking missiles out like sausages" energy.
no, the core of a missile is the rocket motor and the navigation system. The navigation system is typically inertial navigation with stellar update. Let's take a look at how hard it is to produce.

How hard is inertial navigation to produce?
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How about stellar navigation systems?
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Are these aerospace grade? Well, the INS is, but let's say that to really be sure you spend 100x more on it... but its still negligible compared to the cost of a rocket (~10-20 million USD). The star tracker definitely isn't. But let's say you spend 100x more on an aerospace grade star tracker... still negligible.

Conclusion: cost of electronics is negligible to a rocket. The rocket is the limiting factor.
 

ougoah

Brigadier
Registered Member
Quite reassuring, thanks. 50/yr is healthier, but I'd still prefer it to be more like at least 100/yr, on top of SLBM production. 30 didn't seem right because that would mean they'd take 10 years just to fill the currently known silos with 0 mobile expansion.
Are there any other components unique to ICBMs, especially the DF-41 in particular, that I'm not thinking of which could bottleneck production, besides TELs or guidance?

We really need some of that Khrushchev "cranking missiles out like sausages" energy.

It's in the multiple dozens per year for over 3 decades. That's a lot of missiles, into the thousands including MRBMs and IRBMs. Of course hundreds upon hundreds would have been used in training since we watch them shoot dozens every year in just broadcasted training footage and documentaries.

If we assume 3 warheads per ICBM ranged missile, that's up to and not limited to 1500 missiles made since 1990 assuming they placed priority on production of delivery systems which is a big assumption. 1500 ICBMs with even 1000 over those 30 years either decommissioned or used in training (1500/30 years so about 50 produced per year and phased out older ones and used up in training and regular testing), means 500 missiles or 1500 warheads just for ICBMs. Hardly likely if we assume China currently has between 1000 and 2000 warheads.

The above would have been careful nuclear policy. There's every possibility that CCP considers 500 or so warheads and 100 ICBMs to be more than enough (until more recently with the nuclear force expansion).

We can only estimate the range of production and numbers. Certainly there is no cap or limit at all. China could have 2000 warheads and over 1000 ICBM + SLBM because those achievements between 1990 and 2020 would have been so easily attained it would have demanded next to nothing in terms of China's collective resources and industrial capability.

We know is that China could easily build >50 ICBMs every year (since DF-31 came out in 2000s) and deploy upwards of 2000 warheads IF China chose to take that path. The point of diminishing returns is certainly well under this particularly with more sophisticated delivery systems with higher survival. This doesn't mean China has 2000 warheads and 1000 ICBMs, very unlikely but there has never been any limitations on how many China can produce.

A Soviet or indeed even American approach to this is completely wasteful. Your first car gives you the greatest utility. Your second car is nice and good to have, the third begins to become much less useful, everything after that is just a insane waste. The point is to determine what number you truly should have after accounting for losing half in a first strike (absolute worst case) that somehow manages to avoid Chinese space based, ground based, sea based early warning radars (that number in the hundreds now of different systems and technologies) and then somehow also reaching and destroying many of your hidden missiles, silos, and those hidden deep inside mountain ranges. Then account for another 70% getting intercepted or disrupted somehow. Your remaining missiles must still be enough to totally annihilate all your targets, not just one nation but potentially multiple nations. This I estimate to be roughly a minimum of 1000 warheads delivered by 300 to 500 ICBM and SLBM with new MaRV and HGV. It means you could deliver at an absolute worst case scenario, roughly 150 to 200 warheads onto targets. This basically is enough (since >100KT to 50MT) to end multiple nations even as a worst case.

Pumping them out like sausages like the US and Soviet Union is just going to give you a massive headache a total waste for at least half of that stockpile. These are things to be used to end the world and only in retaliation. It isn't something to be over invested in as necessary as it is! US and USSR both overinvested dramatically because both were engaged in a monkey brained brinksmanship dynamic. China is far more cunning and sensible than that. It has enough to wipe the west clean twice over and three times over in ideal case. That's enough. In the meantime, keep developing better tech and delivery systems because the enemy is constantly deploying new interceptors and not standing still. They work to erode deterrence so they can commit mass murder at any moment they please, it is the duty of others to balance it out and balance it out they have and will continue to do so. This doesn't mean sausage factory for ICBMs. If that is the case, there is a real danger of overspending and then only having one hammer in the toolbox. Conventional military force becomes first priority after deterrence is met two to three times over and technologically secured.
 
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Suetham

Senior Member
Registered Member
In theory it is possible to use civilian reactors to breed weapons grade plutonium, it just means you have to run the reactor for a little bit, shutdown, dig out all the fuel rods and reprocess them to separate out the plutonium, load up the reactor with new fuel rods and fire it up, rinse and repeat. It would just be a very slow and tedious process compared to reactors specifically designed to breed plutonium continuously.
Does this comment of mine really imply that the reprocessed plutonium would be produced in the same nuclear station that generated it?

It's not possible.

I said the same thing that basically everyone is telling me in two posts:



As for your argument, I agree. This is apparently the only way to keep it within acceptable limits in order to limit the fuel exposure time in the reactor.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
Quite reassuring, thanks. 50/yr is healthier, but I'd still prefer it to be more like at least 100/yr, on top of SLBM production. 30 didn't seem right because that would mean they'd take 10 years just to fill the currently known silos with 0 mobile expansion.
Are there any other components unique to ICBMs, especially the DF-41 in particular, that I'm not thinking of which could bottleneck production, besides TELs or guidance?

We really need some of that Khrushchev "cranking missiles out like sausages" energy.

I agree, China has the capacity to produce even 50 a year, but I don't think China would do that for DF-4

If we look at the DF-26 alone, we see the US had an estimate of up to 120 produced in a year.

Given that a DF-41 ICBM class missile is approximately 4x the weight, that would translate roughly to an equivalent capacity of 30 per year of DF-41.

Plus there are other programmes.

And I wouldn't focus too much on the number of missiles, rather it is the number of warheads that matters. If only 30 missiles are produced per year with a minimum of 3 warheads each, that is 90 warheads per year.

After 5 years, there would be 450 warheads on 150 missiles.
 

Totoro

Major
VIP Professional
any developement on china icbm silo fields?
As far as I can tell, no. It's really weird that 8 months later we haven't gotten any photos or analysis of those construction sites. I try googling some news on that front every month or so but still nothing.
 

caohailiang

Junior Member
Registered Member
What is the tactics and corresponding targeting solution for PLARF conventional missile units, especially against targets on island chains other than Taiwan?
I dont think just targeting runway will make a lot of sense, simply because there are just so many of airports (In Japan alone, 100+ airports and among which 40+ military ones), combine that number with the distributed deployment concept, directly hitting the runway will only have very limited effect.
Or should they try to hit the airplane on the ground? that will require a near-real time targeting solution plus the ability to distinguish fake targets, is that possible by just satellites?
Or they hit the gas/ammo depot? i think that will also only have limited effect, let alone the fact those are usually hidden in underground shelter

appreciate your insights on this
 

gelgoog

Lieutenant General
Registered Member
There are loads of airports, sure, but they don't have the proper ground support facilities. Plus their air forces aren't trained to operate from other airfields or stretches of road in the first place. In a first strike I think hitting the airplanes proper as well as gas and ammo depots would be the most viable solution yes. In particular the air refueling assets should be highly vulnerable.
 

bustead

Junior Member
Registered Member
What is the tactics and corresponding targeting solution for PLARF conventional missile units, especially against targets on island chains other than Taiwan?
I dont think just targeting runway will make a lot of sense, simply because there are just so many of airports (In Japan alone, 100+ airports and among which 40+ military ones), combine that number with the distributed deployment concept, directly hitting the runway will only have very limited effect.
Or should they try to hit the airplane on the ground? that will require a near-real time targeting solution plus the ability to distinguish fake targets, is that possible by just satellites?
Or they hit the gas/ammo depot? i think that will also only have limited effect, let alone the fact those are usually hidden in underground shelter

appreciate your insights on this
This is a big topic that I have actually written essays about.

1. Targeting airbases with missiles is not difficult. A good source of how a Chinese attack can paralyze American bases can be seen
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. The rough idea is that it takes around 8-12 missiles to deny large aircraft from taking off or landing in an airbase with 2 runways. The runways can be further damaged with runway cratering munitions. With all taken into account, it is estimated that China (in 2017) can keep Kadena Air Base shut for 43 days.

2. It is also possible for missiles to sweep the open parking areas of these airbases. Using cluster munitions can greatly increase the efficiency of such an attack. This will surely destroy any aircraft parked in the open and increase repair times. For example, 100 DF-26s can be used to make a full sweep of all unsheltered aircraft parking areas and keep the Andersen air force base shut to large aircraft for 11 days. (
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3. If the enemy is hiding their planes in reinforced hangers/bunkers, then penetrator warheads will have to used to knock them out. The PLA has been practicing this in their missile ranges. (
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4. You can also knock out enemy power supply, command and control assets or fuel tanks to stop enemy air operations. As seen in the same report above.

5. One final way is to target the engineers working to repair battle damage. UAVs and satellites can be used to track their progress, as well as coordinating a strike when the engineers are exposed. You cannot repair an air base if all your men are dead or wounded, your vehicles burning and your construction materials destroyed.

In short, there are plenty of ways for China to target an airbase. The most efficient way being to sweep the parking areas. However, reinforced hangers and bunkers are largely immune to said attacks. Thus, it is better to use a combination of penetrator warheads and cluster munitions against hangers and parking areas. Conventional or runway cratering munitions can be used to damage the runway and perhaps kill any combat engineers on site.
 
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