China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread
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About this, I've been discussing the pros and cons with someone else who's more into ballistic missiles than me and he's given me the following reason why FOBS is mated to a HGV:
One thing that people don't often realise is that FOBS use an trajectory that's very different from a regular ICBM. A regular ICBM achieves a very high apogee of over 1000km while a FOBS would use a very low "parking orbit" as it would be called in aerospace trade of no more than 200km. Because it flies so low and "hugs the ground" as it were it's much more difficult for ABM radars to detect in time. FOBS also reach the target faster because it actually reaches nearly 8km/s while ICBMs are often under 7km/s
So FOBS inherently has an advantage penetrating ABM defended area because it flies lower and faster, however when it nears the target and actually deorbits to attack it's no different from regular ICBM and subject to potential terminal phase interception.
A HGV has inherent advantage in dodging terminal phase interception thanks to its atmospheric manoeuvrability. Note also, once a HGV begins its glide it cannot be engaged by mid course interception any more. Mid course interceptor are exoatmospheric and cannot stand up to the raging heat of flying through the upper atmosphere at near orbital velocity without their fairing. If you want to design an interceptor to hit HGV in its glide phase it will have to have similar thermal protection as the HGV.
So basically a HGV compared to a regular warhead has a very long terminal phase and is tricky to hit during this phase too. What this means is if a HGV is mated to a FOBS by the time you detect the FOBS coming over the horizon (assuming you do! You may never see it coming thanks to it's ability to attack from any direction) it would have already either released or is about to release the HGV, thus giving you very small window to attempt a mid course interception before HGV begins gliding and can only be engaged with the relatively limited ranged terminal phase interceptors like THAAD.
Note that if HGV is used as warhead for a conventional ICBM than this ICBM is subject to mid course interception just the same as any other ICBM. The HGV can glide a long way but not 10,000s of kilometre.
One possible solution we came up with to counter this type of weapon is the old Cold War 1.0 hardcore, balls to the wall setup: nuclear tipped terminal phase interceptors like the Sprint missile. But even so the amount of area it could protect would be limited.
So in summery:
FOBS - makes mid course interception harder
HGV - makes terminal phase interception much harder, also makes mid course phase end earlier
By adding the two together you let the advantage of each cover the weakness of the other.
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About this, I've been discussing the pros and cons with someone else who's more into ballistic missiles than me and he's given me the following reason why FOBS is mated to a HGV:
One thing that people don't often realise is that FOBS use an trajectory that's very different from a regular ICBM. A regular ICBM achieves a very high apogee of over 1000km while a FOBS would use a very low "parking orbit" as it would be called in aerospace trade of no more than 200km. Because it flies so low and "hugs the ground" as it were it's much more difficult for ABM radars to detect in time. FOBS also reach the target faster because it actually reaches nearly 8km/s while ICBMs are often under 7km/s
So FOBS inherently has an advantage penetrating ABM defended area because it flies lower and faster, however when it nears the target and actually deorbits to attack it's no different from regular ICBM and subject to potential terminal phase interception.
A HGV has inherent advantage in dodging terminal phase interception thanks to its atmospheric manoeuvrability. Note also, once a HGV begins its glide it cannot be engaged by mid course interception any more. Mid course interceptor are exoatmospheric and cannot stand up to the raging heat of flying through the upper atmosphere at near orbital velocity without their fairing. If you want to design an interceptor to hit HGV in its glide phase it will have to have similar thermal protection as the HGV.
So basically a HGV compared to a regular warhead has a very long terminal phase and is tricky to hit during this phase too. What this means is if a HGV is mated to a FOBS by the time you detect the FOBS coming over the horizon (assuming you do! You may never see it coming thanks to it's ability to attack from any direction) it would have already either released or is about to release the HGV, thus giving you very small window to attempt a mid course interception before HGV begins gliding and can only be engaged with the relatively limited ranged terminal phase interceptors like THAAD.
One possible solution we came up with to counter this type of weapon is the old Cold War 1.0 hardcore, balls to the wall setup: nuclear tipped terminal phase interceptors like the Sprint missile. But even so the amount of area it could protect would be limited.
I can definitely see the pro's of a FOBS approach, the only question is how expensive it is to implement it? Specifically if an ordinary DF-41 can do it or does it need a much bigger booster?
Anyone knows what's the ballpart delta-V of DF-41 or Trident III? If it is very close to 9km/s then FOBS can be done cheaply, maybe just add an extra stage to DF-41 even...
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
Thanks for the write up. As you said the profile for FOB is different than conventional missile It is not parabolic flight path instead it is almost round. So any radar meant to engage the missile will only have very short time reaction. Another thing is before the radar can engage the missile will dive back to atmosphere and do the evasive move making it almost impossible to hit the missile with kinetic energy. So when China perfect this system it will bye bye for coercive, threat or any other hubris from the hegemon. They just have to accommodate China rise and live with it. Good countermove
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
Well this is only test I am pretty sure they will miniaturize the warhead once they can improve the accuracy of the warhead!
I though the other day I posted an article from SCMP about Chinese scientist who propose using AI to improve the accuracy of hypersonic missile here it is. Maybe it is related to the test I am sure China will straighten the kink in this test
China military researchers pinpoint AI for hypersonic weapons accuracy
- PLA scientists say artificial intelligence could write flight algorithm within seconds and be 10 times more accurate
- The system would need considerable computing power but ‘is feasible’ based on current technology
Leaving aside the nuclear thing, I am very excited about it having a conventional warhead. This would set up a US-style Global Strike capability for China to have the option to strike some countries who are too smart for their own good (looking at you, Lithuania).
Ofc this would set to an arms race but thats a things for the diplomats to consider. A global and very quick weapon to strike anywhere on the world would be very beneficial for the Chinese leaders to have.
This development would strike fear to those countries which needlessly provoke China.
A tremendous asset for the PLA
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Well I'm not too concerned with the claimed accuracy of this test (How do they even know it missed the target by 22miles? did the pla guys painted a big bullseye in the desert for their benefit?). As you said, accuracy can be improved.
I'm more concerned about the economics of the strategy. If The missile needs more delta-V it will have to sacrifice payload mass, the question comes down to a trade off between whether you want more warheads or less but really difficult to intercept ones.
That's why I'm asking about the delta-V of DF-41 or similar ICBMs (roughly ballparts of course I'm not a spy lol...). Because I can then calculate the exact trade-off.
I agree with this conventional warhead thought, in fact I think it's more beneficial for it to have conventional warhead and publicly known by repeated demonstration. Prompt global strike aside I can think of following uses:
1. In the unfortunate event of nuclear war, you launch your FOBS HGV together with the rest of your ICBM fleet, targeting key components of their ABM system, say the big phase array radars. Because FOBS are faster than ICBMs it will reach its target first and have high chance of taking it out, therefore hughly degrade their ABM response opening the door for the more conventional warheads coming up behind it.
2. The worst hasn't happen yet but it's getting close and you suspect the other guy is itching to press the red button. You might elect to launch a single FOBS HGV to target ABM radar. The fact that only a single missile is launched and its flying in the unique FOBS trojectory hopefully signals clearly to the other guy that this is not a first strike. It successfully knocks out the ABM site. Assuming the other side didn't get spooked enough to launch all their missiles, now there's a big hole in his ABM system and he will be running calculation in his head on how much this changes the equation in the event of a full on nuclear exchange. It may have swung the equation enough that he decides it's best to pick up the phone and talk it out. If he doesn't follow up with another FOBS HGV the next day and take out another ABM radar to apply more pressure.
Such system gives you a lot of options between "do nothing" and "launch all the missiles" and politicians love more options.
Yeah, no sane mind ever predicted things like the SARS-CoV-2 chaos might happen in today's world either... and occurred at a nation as large as China!
I believe too many among us have much underestimated that the world has really changed since the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak! When something unimaginable at this scale could happen at one of the major powers then many other things just become possible....
actually, during much of the cold war, Hawks in the US were heard talking about preemptive nuclear strike against the soviet union or the conviction that the US can win a nuclear war against the USSR, and many of them were absolutely not just bluffing.
In 1964, when the soviet ability to launch nuclear ballistic missile attack against the US was already significantly greater than china’s now, the republican presidential candidate talked about “dropping a hydrogen bomb in the men’s room at the kremlin” should USSR do some act of aggression.
In 1980, when the soviet ability to launch strategic nuclear strike against the US at least equaled American ability to do the reciprocal, Reagan’s strategic defense initiative was justified publically with the bullshit about making nuclear weapon obsolete, but internally as giving the US the option to fight a nuclear war instead of living with a nuclear balance of terror by giving the US a margin required to win an out out nuclear exchange.
from the end of WWII to about 1965, the US enjoyed a strategic nuclear superiority over the USSR, during this time voices for preemptive strikes were loud in both political parties. the cost of the vietnam war and the development of soviet strategic nuclear forces temped that down a bit from 1965-1975, with wider grudging acceptance of reality of mutural assured destruction. but the strategic policy establishment took this time to observe and reorient itself to break out of MAD paragdim. the result was stretched defence initiative of the 1980s.
Again, the US never really accepted its choices of actions towards an adversary should be long circumscribed by the adversary’s ability to launch a debilitating nuclear strike against that adversary.
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