Again, tho’ I can’t cite a reference, I’ve read that it takes 3 warheads targeted at a single silo to “probably” neutralize it. This is what leads me to believe that the US’s SLBMs are their first-strike component. Using this calculus, 7 Ohio class loaded to the hilt could effectively target -784 silo-based missiles (a number that no country’s arsenal is even close to approaching), leaving another 7 Ohio’s and -400 Minuteman III silo-based ICBMs for second and subsequent strikes. That’s almost incomprehensibly destructive power.
Okay that's fair but that unreferenced source would have no way to know how many warheads it really takes to neutralize a single Chinese silo. It could be three direct hits or one hit 20km away. Who knows. Already a flimsy way to build a reliable theory on how nuclear exchange/initial strike would go.
They have incomprehensibly high destructive power just on the Ohio boats alone. Their entire SSBN fleet is even more warheads delivered from even more directions. Hence the need for China to match eventually but at the moment, absolutely guarantee deterrence and if that fails, mutual destruction.
It’s this preponderance of US SLBMs (and their capacity to mount 14 100 kt [silo-busting] warheads) that disinclines me to consider a silo-based ICBM force as a primary deterrent to US first-strike strategies.
Additionally, we might consider that the most-likely vector of any US first-strike against China would certainly not be a trans-polar route, but a trans-equatorial one. The US would certainly not launch an attack against China in such a way as to alert Russian air-defense systems and risk a Russian response.
It could risk a Russian response. But because there are plenty of chances and reasons it would not result in a Russian response, China has done/needs to do the sensible thing and assume it is not the case. We don't assume that things won't happen because there is a low chance for it. Even when building a dam, it's not "this is good enough" it actually is "well this is definitely good enough for all conceivable situations but we're still going to implement a factor of safety into the design and execution of the project"... this would be just for a dam or bridge where the worst consequence is xyz as opposed to the worst consequence being utter annihilation and no means to prevent that or retaliate.
So in summary, "risk" and "good enough" and "almost certain" should not and doesn't cut it.
Despite what other (long-winded) commentators might think is obvious, which is most-certainly avoided in military strategy and tactics, this observation stands.
Ain’t it funny, tho’ that some lil’ girl can presume to tell me what the subject of my post that she hijacked is? Well, she can join her sister on that list. Y’all know which one!
I backed up everything I wrote with fool-proof logic and reasoning. Try to attack those points logically if you can. Avoid saying useless nonsense like "which is most-certainly avoided in military strategy and tactics" ... you're making me laugh.
Also calling others "lil girl" don't improve your arguments. Pathetic. Readers can judge your arguments and reasoning for all it actually is now that enough rebuttal is provided.
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