China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

[james smith esq]

Tho’ I can’t cite a reference, I’ve read that it takes 3 warheads targeted at a single silo to “probably” neutralize it. This is what leads me to believe that the US’s SLBMs are their first-strike component. Using this calculus, 7 Ohio class loaded to the hilt could effectively target -784 silo-based missiles (a number that no country’s arsenal is even close to approaching), leaving another 7 Ohio’s and -400 Minuteman III silo-based ICBMs for second and subsequent strikes. That’s almost incomprehensibly destructive power.

It’s this preponderance of US SLBMs (and their capacity to mount 14 100 kt [silo-busting] warheads) that disinclines me to consider a silo-based ICBM force as a deterrent to US first-strike strategies.

Additionally, we might consider that the most-likely vector of any US first-strike against China would certainly not be a trans-polar route, but a trans-equatorial one. The US would certainly not launch an attack against China in such a way as to alert Russian air-defense systems.

 

[Richard Santos]

I would also like to add: silos are targets that the opponent would want to dedicate warheads to to destroy them for obvious reasons. Silo doors can be hardened in such a way and silos themselves can be spaced such that fields of silos must be individually destroyed by landing a nuke each on top of the silo. The spacing can even mean you can't destroy a group of silo with a single MIRV'd missile because the gaps between each silo is too close for different warheads of the same missile to land accurately without interfering with each other as they detonate, yet also far enough apart that you can't destroy two silos with a single warheads by landing between them.

Add on top of of this silos can be decoyed by digging shallow pits and then building a real silo door on top. Each warhead the silo attracts is one less warhead headed to your cities.

These ideas have mostly been considered during the cold war by the US and were rejected:

1. Terrain defense - Putting missile silos only on steep mountain sides facing away from the expected direction of incoming missiles. Mechanics of the trajectory of ICBM means warheads predictably arrive at the target at an angle to ground or approximately 20 degrees, or less. IF Silos are placed on slopes more that 20 degrees from horizontal and facing away from incoming warhead, then the warheads will strike terrain before it can strike the silo. This approach was rejected because fractional orbit bombardment capability was realized by the soviets in the mid 1960s. fractional orbit bombardment warheads approach the silo from the opposite direction than conventional warheads, thus nullifying the benefit of placing silos on steep slopes.

2. Dense pack and “dust defence” - it was recognized silos can be hardened to the point where only a nuclear ground burst within ~200 feet of the silo can destroy the missile inside.. The ground burst would release a burst of gamma ray and also throw up a enormous column of radioactive dirt (hence “dust defence”) that would make it unlikely for some time for another warhead aiming at a point within a few hundred yards of the detonation to survive intact to detonate. So if silos are arranged in a dense pack several hundred feet apart, detonation aimed to destroy one silo would actually protect several silos around it from being targeted. This method was rejected when the Soviets demonstrated the capability to achieve simultaneous impact of all MIRV from the same missile. So MIRVs hit their targets at the same tine, none of which would prevent others from reaching their targets

3. Race track - built many more operational silos for each missile than the number of MIRVs carried by typical soviet missiles, and connect the operational silos by underground tunnels (race tracks) and handling facilities so a missiles can be shuttled from silo to silo unobserved from the outside, making it impossible to know which silo actually housed the missile at any given moment. the intent was to make each missile on one’s own sides soak up many more MIRVs than any enemy missile can carry, thus making it uneconomic for the enemy to build an effective first strike force. This failed when the amount of land required for this scheme proved prohibitive, and the cost was much higher than open mobile basing.

Dummy Decoy silos were also considered. however it proved impossible to disguise which silo being constructed is real, and which are decoys, from satellites. furthermore, decoy silos will be easily recognized if there is to be any effective and verifiable strategic arms limitation treaty, because verification requires the actual missile be subject to inspection, which would instantly reveal which silos were real and which were the dummy. The race track scheme was feasible under SALT inspection regime only because each system of operational silos connected by tunnels have only one entrance point, and the missile is subject to inspection at the entrance, thus assuring that the total number of missile can be verified without revealing where the missiles actually are.

 

[ougoah]

Tho’ I can’t cite a reference, I’ve read that it takes 3 warheads targeted at a single silo to “probably” neutralize it. This is what leads me to believe that the US’s SLBMs are their first-strike component. Using this calculus, 7 Ohio class loaded to the hilt could effectively target -784 silo-based missiles (a number that no country’s arsenal is even close to approaching), leaving another 7 Ohio’s and -400 Minuteman III silo-based ICBMs for second and subsequent strikes. That’s almost incomprehensibly destructive power.

It’s this preponderance of US SLBMs (and their capacity to mount 14 100 kt [silo-busting] warheads) that disinclines me to consider a silo-based ICBM force as a deterrent to US first-strike strategies.

Additionally, we might consider that the most-likely vector of any US first-strike against China would certainly not be a trans-polar route, but a trans-equatorial one. The US would certainly not launch an attack against China in such a way as to alert Russian air-defense systems.

China has early warning radars. It has had large phased arrays built into mountains since the 1970s. Most have closed down before 2000 and have been replaced with more capable air defence and ship based radars that are used for long range air defence and BMD/ASAT. As for stationary dedicated early warning, a new program started a few years ago to bring the Russians in to develop a new generation of advanced early warning based on Russia's Voronezh system

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This will be a direct replacement for old Chinese 7010 phased arrays and probably be relatively versatile. Russians have spent a good amount of resources and effort to develop modern early warning. It could complement the dozen Type 055 and 052C/D that can detect SLBMs and the hundreds of land based mobile radars that surely can do all that, not to mention satellites. It's another layer of missile warning and diverse expertise (Russian based system) adds to resilience while sending money to a friendly nation to purchase their expertise. The Russians would be unlikely to provide a degraded since Chinese assessors would easily be able to measure and judge its capability plus information is going to be shared with the Russians so they basically will have a few more early warning systems placed in China which peer closer to western pacific and Indian ocean directions.

They would launch across poles because that's one area where China has fewer early warning systems - ship and land based. Russia does not need to provide China with intel and China would have no way of knowing in time if Russia is worried about a swarm of missiles they're not certain is targeted at China or their eastern regions. China has the western pacific covered the most tightly.

 

[Richard Santos]

Most of the vital Russian military installations, industrial and population centers, and critical national command infrastructures are in Europe. All of the Chinese ones are in the Far East, predominantly near East coast. So the trajectories of any large missile strike launched over the pole against China can be readily distinguished from those launched over the poles against Russia from early in their flights.

 

[SimaQian]

Are there any references that some Chinese nuke silos are placed on border regions such as China - Russia, China - India, China - North Korea or China - Vietnam borders? So that in case of silo attack, this will also provoke other state on the opposite border. I wonder if this strategy is considered or implemented.

 

[Richard Santos]

It is a rather serious security risk to put missile silos near borders with countries that can’t be counted on to always be entirely friendly.

I think a good rule might be, if you don’t trust that country enough to put your missile silo in their territory, then you don’t trust them enough to put your missile silo near their boarder.

 

[ougoah]

Most of the vital Russian military installations, industrial and population centers, and critical national command infrastructures are in Europe. All of the Chinese ones are in the Far East, predominantly near East coast. So the trajectories of any large missile strike launched over the pole against China can be readily distinguished from those launched over the poles against Russia from early in their flights.

This doesn't mean they won't be launching through the north pole.

My argument against the assumption that the US will not launch through the pole isn't based on the fact that it's easy for Russia to distinguish between targets. Yet China has no early warning system in Russia that can detect this. Russia is not obliged to share intel on missile launches. Therefore the best way to launch a nuclear attack on China would actually be through the north pole.

This conversation is basically:

jse; No way US would launch nuclear attack on China through the poles.

me; why not? Russia won't provide China with any messages saying hey btw maybe you should know there are hundreds/thousands of missiles coming at "us" through the north pole and they seem to be heading to eastern Sibera. China also has no Type 055 or 052C/D near the border with Mongolia to warn China. It barely has land based early warning because most of China's land based BMD/ASAT and long range AD missiles are in the east and south.

RS; well you're wrong because it's logical and easy to tell the intended target of pole passing missiles based on industry centres.

lol you don't say. Does that prove anything? I feel the main point has been missed.

 

[Richard Santos]

This doesn't mean they won't be launching through the north pole.

My argument against the assumption that the US will not launch through the pole isn't based on the fact that it's easy for Russia to distinguish between targets. Yet China has no early warning system in Russia that can detect this. Russia is not obliged to share intel on missile launches. Therefore the best way to launch a nuclear attack on China would actually be through the north pole.

Unless Russia is openly hostile to China for some other reason, Russia risk nothing by sharing, and risk a great deal by not sharing.

All of 1991-2015 showed Russia that America has zero interest in any live and let live relationship with any Russia that holds onto any part of its former czarist and soviet spheres of influence. Pretty much every thing the US did in Eastern Europe, near and Middle East and Central Asia from collapse of the USSR to 2015 was aimed at weakening Russia, peeling of Russia’s client states, and degrading Russia’s ability to profit from her abundance of natural resources. This is despite the fact Russia tried repeatedly to establish a modus Vivendi with the US, such as supporting American operation in Afghanistan and iraq, giving America use of Russian air bases, and agreeing to let the US have the fissile material from dismantled soviet nuclear weapons. In the long run, Russia is a power in hopeless demographic decline. In the long run Russia will not be able to withstand the concentrated attention of a United States not tied down by a super power rivalry with China. Russia is unlikely to have any delusions about having any long future as a major power if the US defeats China in a nuclear war and emerge largely unscathed.

So Russia has no interest whatsoever in letting America nuke China more effectively, nor in lessening china’s ability to retaliate painfully.

 

[james smith esq]

China has early warning radars. It has had large phased arrays built into mountains since the 1970s. Most have closed down before 2000 and have been replaced with more capable air defence and ship based radars that are used for long range air defence and BMD/ASAT. As for stationary dedicated early warning, a new program started a few years ago to bring the Russians in to develop a new generation of advanced early warning based on Russia's Voronezh system

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

This will be a direct replacement for old Chinese 7010 phased arrays and probably be relatively versatile. Russians have spent a good amount of resources and effort to develop modern early warning. It could complement the dozen Type 055 and 052C/D that can detect SLBMs and the hundreds of land based mobile radars that surely can do all that, not to mention satellites. It's another layer of missile warning and diverse expertise (Russian based system) adds to resilience while sending money to a friendly nation to purchase their expertise. The Russians would be unlikely to provide a degraded since Chinese assessors would easily be able to measure and judge its capability plus information is going to be shared with the Russians so they basically will have a few more early warning systems placed in China which peer closer to western pacific and Indian ocean directions.

They would launch across poles because that's one area where China has fewer early warning systems - ship and land based. Russia does not need to provide China with intel and China would have no way of knowing in time if Russia is worried about a swarm of missiles they're not certain is targeted at China or their eastern regions. China has the western pacific covered the most tightly.

Air defense systems weren’t the object of analysis, at all!
Russian air defenses were mentioned only because their activation in the event of any trans-polar strike would risk a Russian response, a risk not worth taking and not likely to be taken.

Should a first-strike be considered a viable option, air-defense networks will have, already, been factored into that (psychotic) calculus and are not, in and of themselves, a deterrent. The element of surprise is not the primary factor in first-strike calculus, pre-empting an effective response is.

Does the western-Pacific include the southern-Indian Ocean, the most-likely launch-area?

 

[ougoah]

Air defense systems weren’t the object of analysis, at all!
Russian air defenses were mentioned only because their activation in the event of any trans-polar strike would risk a Russian response, a risk not worth taking and not likely to be taken.

Should a first-strike be considered a viable option, air-defense networks will have, already, been factored into that (psychotic) calculus and are not, in and of themselves, a deterrent.

Does the western-Pacific include the southern-Indian Ocean, the most-likely launch-area?

You're very confused. No one said air defence networks have or have not been factored in. I referred to them due to their early warning component i.e. radars. Not all AD have radars suitable for providing any meaningful early warning. Since China's are mostly focused on the western pacific and in the likely conflict zones (where you would expect LR-SAMs to be), they leave trans polar strikes as more effective since China has less means of having earlier notice of missile launches.

AD indeed aren't the object of analysis. You have misread/misunderstood everything surrounding the words "air defence" in previous posts.

Most likely launch area is not a topic of debate.

Here is my point, you said transpolar launches is unlikely - "Additionally, we might consider that the most-likely vector of any US first-strike against China would certainly not be a trans-polar route, but a trans-equatorial one. The US would certainly not launch an attack against China in such a way as to alert Russian air-defense systems."

This is untrue and a terrible, existential mistake for Chinese planners to make.

So what it alerts Russia? What reasoning suggests that Russia definitely won't know what the intended targets are (both myself and RS consider it quite likely that they would based on trajectory of missiles and the fact that any strike on Russia would have missiles flying towards European Russia) and what reasoning suggests that Russia will definitely tell China about launches when missiles don't take much time to reach their targets. If Russia doesn't mention anything to China, China would have little time to prepare and launch its own missiles.

Not only does China have poorer early warning looking north through the pole, it also has far less BMD positioned to take on transpolar missiles in mid stage. It has far better BMD in the east since the PLAN (terminal phase) is positioned there and ground based BMD - dedicated BMD and ASAT weapons are presumably going to be equally well positioned against both eastern and northern approaches. The LR-SAMs for terminal phase intercepts are again like PLAN, going to be much more concentrated near Taiwan, SCS, East sea, North sea, and India. None of them are in the right places to even perform terminal intercept against transpolar nukes. There are of course some SAMs near industrial areas and cities but they're there anyway.