In the past, China, along with Britain, UK and Israel, can afford a limited second strike capability because none of these countries were in danger of become the primary nuclear attention of a Cold War superpower. So they only needed enough retaliatory capability to be unpalatable to attack for limited gains. They don’t want to be taken en passant by one of the two nuclear superpowers in a all out nuclear war.
Now, this status is changing for China. China may become the primary opponent of the nuclear superpower. This means the whole calculus of second strike capability will change dramatically. A limited retaliation or second strike capability will become increasingly worthless. Instead, the Chinese second strike capability must be:
1). able to deliver a substantial percentage, say 30-50% of the total number of warheads the US and it’s allies can in theory deliver. This is necessary to avoid the appearance that China would not escalate because sheer difference in firepower means China will be destroyed before her opponent in any uncontrolled escalation. Such an appearance encourages the opponent to launch a limited first strike on the conviction that China can’t afford to escalate.
2. diverse enough to be able deliver an array of different types and magnitudes of second strikes, and have enough credible depth to be able deliver several second strikes of different types, awaiting response in between each. This is necessary to avoid the impression that China has no options between doing nothing on the one hand and all out nuclear retaliation on the other. Because if one has not options besides an unsuitable responses, one is more likely not to respond.
Now, this status is changing for China. China may become the primary opponent of the nuclear superpower. This means the whole calculus of second strike capability will change dramatically. A limited retaliation or second strike capability will become increasingly worthless. Instead, the Chinese second strike capability must be:
1). able to deliver a substantial percentage, say 30-50% of the total number of warheads the US and it’s allies can in theory deliver. This is necessary to avoid the appearance that China would not escalate because sheer difference in firepower means China will be destroyed before her opponent in any uncontrolled escalation. Such an appearance encourages the opponent to launch a limited first strike on the conviction that China can’t afford to escalate.
2. diverse enough to be able deliver an array of different types and magnitudes of second strikes, and have enough credible depth to be able deliver several second strikes of different types, awaiting response in between each. This is necessary to avoid the impression that China has no options between doing nothing on the one hand and all out nuclear retaliation on the other. Because if one has not options besides an unsuitable responses, one is more likely not to respond.
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