Do you think you can find the link? Thx!The latest news is Beidou-2 global coverage will be reached in 2017, 3 years earlier than original plan
Do you think you can find the link? Thx!The latest news is Beidou-2 global coverage will be reached in 2017, 3 years earlier than original plan
So China would probably have its own equivalent to RS-24 Yars as early as 2018 then. Beidou-guided MIRVs. That could possibly reduce the CEP to less than 100 meters, like the Trident D5. In fact, if you can reduce the CEP of an ICBM warhead (conventional, not nuclear) to less than 20 meters (guided by satellite navigation systems), then you could potentially have the Prompt Global Strike.
Well...the U.S. has the privilege of having jet fighters and cruise-missile armed destroyers patrolling every corner of the world supported by hundreds of military bases abroad, so PGS makes little sense for the U.S. However, for China (doesn't have any forward operational bases abroad), using conventional warhead-tipped ICBM against NON-nuclear adversaries could be a potential option for a quick counter-strike. For example, what if Boko Haram or ISIS slaughter some 50 overseas Chinese citizens, and there no 052Ds or H-6K bombers within range? For politicians, they always need to do something immediately under the pressure of domestic audiences. So from the perspective of gesture politics in protecting Chinese citizens abroad, I see a some potentials for China to develop PGS type ICBMs as an instrumental political tool, as ridiculously expensive as it sounds. Wasting a few expensive hypersonic conventional (glider) warheads several thousands of kilometers away is better than having the families of victims marching onto Tiananmen Square (or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to denounce CCP leaders' for being weak. Keep in mind that Clausewitz and Mao never delinked weapons from politics, so weapon systems are themselves also political tools in addition to simply being killing machines. Given the importance of CCP's domestic legitimacy being ties to showing strength toward those who dare to harm Chinese citizens, a PGS might not be so expensive in terms of political legitimacy.So you are left with using it to bully hopelessly outmatched foes and spending 10-20m per missiles for the privilege when you could be sending a cruise missiles or fighter jet to drop a LGB on the same target.
Well...the U.S. has the privilege of having jet fighters and cruise-missile armed destroyers patrolling every corner of the world supported by hundreds of military bases abroad, so PGS makes little sense for the U.S. However, for China (doesn't have any forward operational bases abroad), using conventional warhead-tipped ICBM against NON-nuclear adversaries could be a potential option for a quick counter-strike. For example, what if Boko Haram or ISIS slaughter some 50 overseas Chinese citizens, and there no 052Ds or H-6K bombers within range? For politicians, they always need to do something immediately under the pressure of domestic audiences. So from the perspective of gesture politics in protecting Chinese citizens abroad, I see a some potentials for China to develop PGS type ICBMs as an instrumental political tool, as ridiculously expensive as it sounds. Wasting a few expensive hypersonic conventional (glider) warheads several thousands of kilometers away is better than having the families of victims marching onto Tiananmen Square (or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to denounce CCP leaders' for being weak. Keep in mind that Clausewitz and Mao never delinked weapons from politics, so weapon systems are themselves also political tools in addition to simply being killing machines. Given the importance of CCP's domestic legitimacy being ties to showing strength toward those who dare to harm Chinese citizens, a PGS might not be so expensive in terms of political legitimacy.
I like your argument. However, regarding your last two points, both Myanmar and Vietnam are right next to the Chinese border. Regarding Vietnam, several of my elder Chinese relatives told me that one of the reasons why China invaded Vietnam in 1979 was because of the political purges and severe discrimination toward ethnic Chinese in Norther Vietnam. In this sense, giving the proximity of the border, even the rag-tagged 1970s PLA was able to wreck some havoc in Northern Vietnam (who won is still up to debate, but the PLA did something as gesture, which had multiple political usages ranging from gaining American support to sending a defiant message to both Hanoi and Moscow). I guess if the Burmese Army keeps shelling Yunnan, the PLA could probably do the same.Finally, China already has mechanisms in place to deal with your scenario, and that is to increase cooperation with the country in question to root out and capture the perpetrators. Refer to the Mekong murders for a stellar example.
If, on the other hand, the perpetrators are state actors, then China's response would be to evacuate its citizens and retaliate through economic measures. Look at the recent Vietnam riots. Even though the Vietnamese government lauded the "patriotic" acts, they quickly agreed to compensation and clamped down on further "demonstrations". You can be pretty sure that they didn't do it out of the goodness of their hearts, but you will also never be aware of what exactly happened.
I agree with most of you assessment. However, other than Pakistan (I even put a question mark on this) or Djibouti, I don't see any countries willing to share bases with the PLA, or allow PLA troops to conduct COIN operations in their territories. Sorry, but I don't see how China could be an "empire by invitation" like the U.S., in words of historian John Gaddis. Or another option is to launch cruise missiles from SSNs?If they are unable or unwilling to do so, China would negotiate a deal with local or neighbouring governments to allow the PLAAF to airlift PLA special forces and equipment into the area and use local government bases to launch search and rescure operations to get as many civilians to safety as quickly as possible.
I agree with most of you assessment. However, other than Pakistan (I even put a question mark on this) or Djibouti, I don't see any countries willing to share bases with the PLA, or allow PLA troops to conduct COIN operations in their territories. Sorry, but I don't see how China could be an "empire by invitation" like the U.S., in words of historian John Gaddis. Or another option is to launch cruise missiles from SSNs?