It will certainly behoove the PLA to execute A2/AD operations with a multitude of attack vectors. That is something no reasonable person can disagree with.
Likewise, as you noted, the DF-27 has only recently entered service in limited numbers.
However, if and when the H-20 enters service, how many DF-27s will have been inducted, and how many more could have been manufactured with funding redirected from the H-20 program?
Unfortunately, there isn't enough reliable data to make a quantifiable comparison on just what system or mix of systems will offer the best ROI.
However, for reasons I will elaborate further, it might be time to fundamentally re-evaluate the value of heavy subsonic stealth bombers in particular and certain approaches to stealth in general.
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With regard to EW, do you expect the J-36 or its CCAs to be doing most of the heavy lifting in terms of disrupting and degrading hostile communications and sensor systems?
Needless to say, the J-36's electrical system, which is arguably revolutionary, will give it an extraordinary amount of juice for all sorts of EW operations.
However, the requisite capabilities in play here are not exactly purely passive, but tend to release emissions that may make an aircraft more detectible and vulnerable against sophisticated adversaries capable of recognizing and/or counteracting EW.
This may in part be why the US NGAD is reportedly working towards EW oriented CCAs. By no means does that man the NGAD itself will be lacking in EW capabilities; if anything, both next generation Chinese and American systems will have teapots and teacups capable of executing collaborative EW missions in a complementary fashion.
According to publicly accessible DoD data, a single DF-17 is ~11 meters long and weighs ~15 tons. How many of these do you think a H-20 will be able to carry?
TBF, sooner or later, someone will arm the PLAAF with more reasonably sized hypersonic weapons. Perhaps something akin to the MD-22, which is reportedly ~4 tons, or the YJ-21, but with a HGV warhead, which is reportedly even lighter?
However, I don't know if airborne carriers of such missiles will necessarily be more survivable than their ground counterparts.
For starters, whereas the H-20 is designed to fly to or at least near (though near can mean any number of things) the 3IC to conduct strikes, DF-27 crewmen probably don't ever expect to step off Chinese soil. So obviously, they may feel a little less vulnerable to hostile fire.
The emergence of orbital ISR constellations capable of persistent, real-time identification and tracking against moving ground, sea and air based targets is the real problem and threat to all sorts of stealth.
Moreover, the bigger you are and the slower you move, the more likely you'll be caught within the field of view of these systems.
Before someone starts questioning the existence of such orbital capabilities, I would like to encourage them to visit the website of ICEYE (
), a Finnish nanosat company that reportedly not only sold imagery, but also an IMINT satellite to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Let that sink in. If a relatively unknown Finnish nanosat company is openly marketing persistent spaceborne SAR capabilities, what do you think an agency with the NRO's budget and access to SpaceX's technology will be up to?
The answer is
Starshield: you've probably heard of it, but if not, think militarized Starlink satellites that can also perform missions like IMINT and SIGINT collection.
One of the biggest upsides to this solution is that it's intended to be a constellation of at least several hundred satellites, which means enough sets of eyes for persistent, real-rime coverage over certain areas from LEO.
Now, let's ask ourselves:
- How many H-20s will be manufactured by XAC?
- Which airbases will H-20s fly out of?
- What mission profiles will H-20s employ given the most likely crisis and conflict scenarios in play?
These are all details that Uncle Sam will be able to approximate, and from there they'll develop collection parameters that will task Starshield satellites to observe H-20 satellites from takeoff to missile launch to landing.
Once fully fielded, such a constellation could be deployed to find and fix both heavy subsonic bombers, and light or at least relatively lighter supersonic aircraft like the J-36.
However, what's more likely to get spotted? Something big and slow, or something small and fast?
Moreover, when it comes to finishing, what sort of platform will be more likely to survive against SAMs and AAMs cued by such satellites?
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Some reports have suggested that these Starshield satellites will also be employed to detect and track ICBM launches, which implies the ability to detect and track other missiles and perhaps some aircraft via infrared.
Against a constellation of such satellites, would you really want one of your most expensive, if not the most expensive aerial platform -- especially something that is heavy, subsonic and perhaps even politically symbolic -- loitering for hours waiting to strike enemy surface combatants?
More likely than not, the H-20 will operate at standoff distances to increase survivability. The more distance and escorts you put between such a heavy bomber and its targets, the more likely it is to survive.
However, that also makes the H-20's superior range -- which is inevitably a product of significant effort and expense -- less relevant, if not at some point moot.
At some point, you have to ask yourself:
- Is this solution suboptimal?
- is there a cheaper or better way to do things?
Disclaimer: Not here to upset or bait anyone with some emergent, mystery, anti-stealth wunderwaffen from Elon Musk and Northrop Grumman.
China is certainly developing comparable capabilities, and in all likelihood, so are a few other countries, and let's not even get started on ASAT capabilities coming into play.
Granted, outcomes will inevitably vary, but the general contours of such orbital ISR constellations should be clear enough, especially in terms of its potential impact on stealth aircraft.
Mods: If this is getting off topic, please don't hesitate to move/delete.