Great posts, t_co! Very informative!
However, what you presented regarding a combined-arms army's see-deep/strike-deep capabilities sounds more like a *potential* than common practice. It relies on the ability of the more advanced army to get accurate intelligence on the infantry army.
Not really. Long range strike/recon capabilities have been standard for the US since the first Gulf War. That's why the Gulf War prompted PLA planners to shrink and modernize their force so much. Those capabilities are now standard in the PLA and Russian militaries, too. Accurate intelligence on a uniformed (not plainclothes) infantry army is easy to get now, thanks to heat-detecting satellites and drones. All the other army has to do is swarm the skies with drones operating at 60,000 feet, out of reach of MANPADS, that look for body heat, and whenever a clumping of dudes is sighted, it calls down surface-to-surface missiles loaded with anti-personnel cluster munitions.
As you said, mobility is no advantage if you're rushing headlong into an ambush, which is exactly what the Americans did in the Korean War. This ties in to the idea of defense: in defensive warfare, the defenders have the advantage of home ground. They would have an extensive information network already in place, while the attackers have to penetrate a fog of war.
Quite true--in defense, the odds get a lot closer, but they'd still be tilted against the infantry army.
So what do you think of my proposed scenario of a South Korean invasion of a fuel-deprived North Korea?
It's not entirely impossible for the North Koreans to do what you described, but the big issue will be how the Chinese could actually resupply the North Koreans with modern weaponry if the DPRK forces themselves don't have trucks or trains. E.g. China could offload tons of food and ammo at, say, Wonsan, or sneak them over the Yalu, but once they've done that, how do they distribute it further to tons of DPRK troops spread out over North Korea?
Remember that in the 1950 Korean War, the biggest issue for the PVA wasn't that they couldn't do infiltration assaults in the face of superior firepower (they could); it was that lack of trucks + US air power made it so that their troops were chronically undersupplied with fuel, food, and ammo, seriously handicapping their ability to fight. This problem grows ten times worse in the modern era, as the high-tech light infantry systems you're describing--21st-century body armor, MANPADS, light artillery, crew-served weapons, small arms--all chew up ammo and supplies like popcorn. Those weapons were designed to operate in the context of a beefy, Chinese, US, or Russian, resupply network, not in the context of a guerrilla war against an adversary with complete control of all supply routes.