icbeodragon
Junior Member
Am I understanding you correctly that you are saying China could just annex the DPRK into a Chinese territory, and the ROK would not complain?
Can you win a war with only light infantry in the 21st century?
- Thread starter solarz
- Start date
Am I understanding you correctly that you are saying China could just annex the DPRK into a Chinese territory, and the ROK would not complain?
Lintuperhonen
New Member
I'm very certain that ROK would complain. But the complaints of ROK are much less than the complaints of the whole world fro supporting DPRK. I won't continue this, as we're drifting off-topic.
Why should any part of North Korea fall to China or the US? Such annexation is contrary to the norms of international behavior. Besides it would not lead to good relations between China and Korea. The best solution is for South Korea to become sovereign and arrange with North Korea and China for reunification. It will be unacceptable to China for US forces to remain in South Korea to maintain their suzereignity over that country.
solarz
Brigadier
Thanks for keeping on topic, heh.
You're right in your assessment of the weaknesses of infantry. However, do you think there are ways for the infantry army to nullify those advantages? For example, teams of manpad operators for taking down helicopters, teams of anti-tank squads moving through mountains and taking down tanks and APCs.
Thanks for keeping on topic, heh.
You're right in your assessment of the weaknesses of infantry. However, do you think there are ways for the infantry army to nullify those advantages? For example, teams of manpad operators for taking down helicopters, teams of anti-tank squads moving through mountains and taking down tanks and APCs.
Again, it depends on the operational (division/corps/group army level) and strategic (military theater/political-level) goals of the war. Put bluntly, the light infantry force will have difficulty mounting offensive operations, but can hold its own defensively, provided there are enough trained troopers and no morale or supply issues.
Is the light infantry force trying defend a particular terrain feature (e.g. a river, a mountain range) on an operational level? Then yes, those tactics work--but only if the combined-arms corps or division commander lets infantry running around at 15 km/h catch up to his tanks and APCs driving around at 50 km/h or runs his helicopters through terrain without clearing it with cluster bombs and napalm beforehand.
The same applies on the strategic level. If the light infantry force is resisting an occupation of a country--then yes, it can make the combined-arms forces bleed a lot, as Vietnam, Afghanistan vs USSR, and Iraq 2.0 have shown us.
But in offensive operations, light infantry simply can't do it. A whole bunch of men assembling bereft of mechanized transport will be horrifically vulnerable to most modern "see-deep/strike-deep" weapons.
(The obvious exception to the rule is the Chinese PVA in 1950-51 Korea. In that case, the US lacked the deep recon platforms that, for example, can detect massed amounts of infantry in real time--such as spy satellites with infrared capability--and hence the US couldn't place accurate fire support down on them.)
A better example of light infantry getting crushed would be the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. In that case, Iraq had a smaller, Soviet-style (loads of tanks and artillery) combined-arms army versus the Iranians, who were under US sanctions at the time. The Iraqis had a rough go of things until they changed their doctrine (from offensive actions to elastic defense with powerful armored reserves) and got US spy satellite feeds on Iranian troop assembly areas. Then they could just wait until the Iranians massed up their light infantry and shell the place with nerve gas and incendiaries, and if the Iranians broke through, then the light infantry would be cut off by a rapidly reforming Iraqi front line and then engaged in one-sided massacres by tanks, helicopters, and lots and lots of artillery. Cue 3-1 and 4-1 casualty ratios for the last three years of the war in favor of the Iraqis, while the Iranians gained essentially no ground.
From a technological standpoint, the dynamic has shifted more and more in favor of the combined-arms force.
From a fire support perspective, see-deep/strike-deep platforms can now react in real-time across "wideband" command and control channels. What this means is that an artillery battalion attached to Brigade A can see what is happening to Brigade C in real-time (either from drones or satellites), and with can support Brigade C whatever is needed (anti-armor, anti-personnel, smokescreens, high explosives, napalm) with only a cursory nod from the division or corps commander. And, thanks to advances in C4I, they can do this across an entire front line that is up to 1000km wide and 100km deep. Meanwhile, the light infantry force can't coordinate nearly to that degree--they'd be lucky if they could call on fire support from mortars 10km away. What this means is that the light infantry force is now always in range of real-time, coordinated, firepower from the entire opposing army, whereas the combined-arms army only has to worry about the enemy directly around them.
From a comms and coordination perspective, combined-arms armies also have the advantage of mobile C4I nets and electronic jamming, which means the corps or army-level commander can pass orders around to every unit, while the light infantry force, with completely jammed long-range nets, essentially fights like a whole bunch of disjointed infantry battalions. An infantry battalion commander with no clue what is going on in his neighboring sectors is a commander that is probably going to die soon with the rest of his troops.
Finally, from a supply perspective, the light infantry force will have serious replenishment problems within one or two weeks of fighting. People can only carry so much food, water, and ammunition on their shoulders, and how is a light infantry force going to coordinate well enough to get the right ammo and supplies from rear area warehouses without trucks and proper logistics units? On the other hand, most modern militaries (NATO, Russia, China) have finally gotten the hang of how to properly resupply a combined-arms division or corps from two weeks to forever without any hassle, even if that division or corps is halfway around the world.
Like, if I was an infantry division commander without any wheeled or tracked support and I was told to mount a ground offensive against a mechanized opponent with air supremacy, I would just hand the staff a receipt for 15,000 bullets and tell them that this is a cheaper way of getting all my men killed. But if it was a defensive war, then yes, there are a bunch of tactics that can be used to at least inflict heavy casualties on the invaders.
vesicles
Colonel
I am not suggesting annexation. I was having East Germany in mind when I was talking about China having a hand in governing NK. The Soviets did not occupy East Germany, but it had huge influence in the nation. China could do something similar until NK becomes stronger that unification with SK is possible. The main goal of China is two-fold: to have a peaceful border and not to have the US anywhere near China. please keep in mind that what i have been saying is based on the premise set up by Solarz and SK and the US are about to attack NK. At that point, NK will fall and China would have no choice but to get involved so that its objectives would not be compromised. I am NOT suggesting that China should simply annex NK without and reason. All I have said is based on the assumption that NK is already under attack and is about to fall into the hands of SK and the US. At that point, the best thing China can do is to negotiate a deal with SK and the US because, with their overwhelming military advantages, SK and the US would not simply pull their troops and go back to the old status quo, I.e. having an independent NK and SK. China will have to be involved. The best way of getting involved without doing the same thing that they did in 1951 would be some kind of deal.
solarz
Brigadier
Great posts, t_co! Very informative!
However, what you presented regarding a combined-arms army's see-deep/strike-deep capabilities sounds more like a *potential* than common practice. It relies on the ability of the more advanced army to get accurate intelligence on the infantry army.
As you said, mobility is no advantage if you're rushing headlong into an ambush, which is exactly what the Americans did in the Korean War. This ties in to the idea of defense: in defensive warfare, the defenders have the advantage of home ground. They would have an extensive information network already in place, while the attackers have to penetrate a fog of war.
So what do you think of my proposed scenario of a South Korean invasion of a fuel-deprived North Korea?
However, what you presented regarding a combined-arms army's see-deep/strike-deep capabilities sounds more like a *potential* than common practice. It relies on the ability of the more advanced army to get accurate intelligence on the infantry army.
As you said, mobility is no advantage if you're rushing headlong into an ambush, which is exactly what the Americans did in the Korean War. This ties in to the idea of defense: in defensive warfare, the defenders have the advantage of home ground. They would have an extensive information network already in place, while the attackers have to penetrate a fog of war.
So what do you think of my proposed scenario of a South Korean invasion of a fuel-deprived North Korea?
Why not simply cut to the chase and deal with the question that I believe is what will be interested in knowing.
If a major land war broke out in Asia, how would China be able to use its vast numerical advantages to good effect?
One very interesting question to begin with, is how many civilians could China put into Uniform without noticeably impacting on normal economic activity?
How then could these numbers be utilised and deployed?
I think there is little doubt that the vast majority of these forces would have to form light infantry, but would be at the very least motorised. I would see a modern force, with modern assault weapons, manpads for anti air and anti armour, plus smaller mortars and field guns. If such forces were still integrated into full situational awareness (informationalisation), I do indeed believe that they could form very formidable adversaries for an enemy force, albeit with significant restrictions to their abilities.
Key roles for such forces would be securing captured territory during an advance and thus secure the rear and flanks of the elite and heavy units from counter attack, likewise holding territory in the face of an enemy advance, denying them room to manoeuvre and generally bogging down enemy fast and heavy formations.
If you move up a notch to mechanised light infantry, I think again the PLA could field a large amount of these formations with their full range of six and eight wheeled vehicles. Add to these close support units using modified legacy heavy armour, then you have a very potent urban warfare capability.
Finally of course, if you want to discuss "Can you win a war with only light infantry in the 21st century? " it would help to stop discussing wars of 50 years ago, unless you are discussing conflicts between some of the poorest developing nations, which does seem rather pointless, as you might just as well then discuss traditional tribal warfare in Papua New Guinea.
If a major land war broke out in Asia, how would China be able to use its vast numerical advantages to good effect?
One very interesting question to begin with, is how many civilians could China put into Uniform without noticeably impacting on normal economic activity?
How then could these numbers be utilised and deployed?
I think there is little doubt that the vast majority of these forces would have to form light infantry, but would be at the very least motorised. I would see a modern force, with modern assault weapons, manpads for anti air and anti armour, plus smaller mortars and field guns. If such forces were still integrated into full situational awareness (informationalisation), I do indeed believe that they could form very formidable adversaries for an enemy force, albeit with significant restrictions to their abilities.
Key roles for such forces would be securing captured territory during an advance and thus secure the rear and flanks of the elite and heavy units from counter attack, likewise holding territory in the face of an enemy advance, denying them room to manoeuvre and generally bogging down enemy fast and heavy formations.
If you move up a notch to mechanised light infantry, I think again the PLA could field a large amount of these formations with their full range of six and eight wheeled vehicles. Add to these close support units using modified legacy heavy armour, then you have a very potent urban warfare capability.
Finally of course, if you want to discuss "Can you win a war with only light infantry in the 21st century? " it would help to stop discussing wars of 50 years ago, unless you are discussing conflicts between some of the poorest developing nations, which does seem rather pointless, as you might just as well then discuss traditional tribal warfare in Papua New Guinea.
A war on the Korean peninsula would be extremely damaging to the Koreans and to the Chinese. China's likely response to an aggression prepared by the US and South Korea would be to bring the matter to the Security Council ( which will of course not reach a conclusion ) and to demand of South Korea the expulsion of the US forces. South Korea would be very stupid if it didn't comply.
China might well mobilize as described by Sampan Viking and if aggression still started intervene in the first instance with the Second Artillery.
The political developments in Japan might suggest to South Korean leaders that a change of alliances has become more attractive than preparing for war.