Behind the China Missile Hype

AssassinsMace

Lieutenant General
Seems there is a plasma surrounding your head to where you cannot understand the concept of a communications blackout during re-entry.

Well I tried to give you the reasons why DF-21 is an interesting concept but has so many problems it has not addressed that any talk of this missile being operational is just hype.

So believe what you like and enjoy dwelling in the darkness of ignorance.

I'm out

Just like you claimed that no one mentioned plasma, you're just reading titles. Read the pdf file and it says more than inertial guidance. Pick and choose what you want to believe and ignore the rest as usual.
 

NikeX

Banned Idiot
This says it's more than inertial guidance.
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I was referring to your spin on plasma not how the ASBM is the same as an ICBM. If an ASBM will be affected by plasma and won't work according to you then the same goes with ICBMs.

There is actually another method to where the plasma itself is turned into an antenna. I am surprised that you missed this idea.
However these methods are years away from being perfected and cannot be considered part of any communication system

The fact remains: DF-21 RV is blind and deaf during re-entry and cannot be considered an operational system now or in the foreseeable future.
 

AssassinsMace

Lieutenant General
There is actually another method to where the plasma itself is turned into an antenna. I am surprised that you missed this idea.
However these methods are years away from being perfected and cannot be considered part of any communication system

The fact remains: DF-21 RV is blind and deaf during re-entry and cannot be considered an operational system now or in the foreseeable future.

You just don't want to read it, right? It says it in that PDF file it's more than inertial guidance for an ICBM. It doesn't matter how you can lessen the effects. That wasn't the discussion. You're the one that claimed plasma makes the ASBM ineffective. What? Are you again saying measures to lessen plasma effects only works on your side because God says so?
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
As I have explained to you before, ballistic missiles use inertial guidance systems. DF-21 claims it will find a moving target, the CVN, and correct its course to hit this moving target.

... Older ballistic missiles ONLY used inertial guidance systems. Modern ballistic missiles at least have GPS/satellite guidance on top.

The question is how will it hit this moving target when the plasma surrounding the warhead bars communications from outside sources and stops the DF-21 from using whatever radar it has to locate the target.

Iskander/pershing II has shown high mach re entry does not make terminal guidance ineffective. The fact that DF-21D's target is moving does not somehow make the "plasma problem" more prevalent compared to a terminal guidance for fixed targets.

In the terminal phase/re entry the RV will not need to communicate with the satellites because it'll already be on top of the CVBG.

Terminal homing on a FIXED target that is not moving is very different from trying to locate and hit a target that is moving at over 35 knots

FFS I ALREADY ADMITTED THAT. But the fact that one terminal guidance is homing into a moving target compared to a guidance system for a fixed target does not make the plasma problem more prevalent for one or the other!

The DF-21 is hype

Define hype.

As I have asked before and ask again: How will these offboard sensors communicate with the DF-21 when the hot plasma associated with re-entry is causing a total communications blackout? You cannot violate the laws of physics

Off board sensors will be communicating with DF-21D in mid course flight the same way as GPS helps out modern ICBMs and IRBMs. In ther terminal phase/re entry terminal guidance will take over.


However all the offboard sensors in the world will be unable to communicate with DF-21 because re-entry into the atmosphere will make the warhead unable to receive their guidance. Poor DF-21 will plunge into the ocean because it could not receive the signal

Bold all you want but you have not explained how the signal the DF-21 RV needs to locate the CVN will penetrate the hot plasma surrounding the warhead. The re-entry blackout is the showstopper for DF-21

In re entry/terminal phase, the RV's terminal guidance will take over. As shown by iskander/pershing ii, your so called plasma problem is a non issue.


No its that problem of the plasma and the communications blackout it causes. You cannot escape the physics.

And the physics problem is why people do not believe Df-21 is a viable concept

You make it sound like we're arguing against physics lol. And again you changed goalposts.

In the re entry/terminal phase where your so called plasma problem is most prevalent, terminal guidance will take over. There will be minimal need to communicate with off board sensors

---------- Post added at 06:37 PM ---------- Previous post was at 06:32 PM ----------

Seems there is a plasma surrounding your head to where you cannot understand the concept of a communications blackout during re-entry.

You can't seem to understand the concept that a communications black out during re entry won't matter because by that phase terminal guidance will take over by that phase and as shown by iskander/pershing ii high mach re entry does not make terminal guidance ineffective.
I swear I can ctrl+c/ctrl+v some of these discussions with you.

Well I tried to give you the reasons why DF-21 is an interesting concept but has so many problems it has not addressed that any talk of this missile being operational is just hype.

So believe what you like and enjoy dwelling in the darkness of ignorance.

I'm out

Right whatever.
 

IronsightSniper

Junior Member
1. DF-21D is launched
2. It climbs to 500 km apogee
3. It's RV descends towards where the CV was last detected
4. It's onboard sensors detects, tracks, and guides the RV to the CV
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
1. DF-21D is launched
2. It climbs to 500 km apogee
3. It's RV descends towards where the CV was last detected
4. It's onboard sensors detects, tracks, and guides the RV to the CV

Counter proposal

1. DF-21D is launched.
2. With mid course guidance, mid course correction is achieved to follow the CVBG. (Potential for mid course evasive maneuvers depending who you believe)
3. RV descends to where CVBG was last, by mid course guidance. Then mid course guidance turns off, terminal turns on.
4. Its onboard sensors detects, tracks and guides RV to the CVN.

The RV simply being shot at where the CV was last detected without mid course guidance and relying for its own relatively weak onboard sensors to search a large piece of ocean will be harder than using off board sensors (which already detected and tracked the CVBG in the first place) to track and send mid course correction to the missile and using the onboard sensors instead to have an easier job searching a much smaller piece of ocean, because it'll have been following the CVBG rather than the "radius" of which CVBG could have moved since DF-21D was fired.
 

IronsightSniper

Junior Member
The difference is, as illustrated by analyses of the PLA's test of the DF-21D against the concrete slab, is that the carrier doesn't actually have much far to go.

I haven't bothered to calculate how long it takes a 3,000 km ranged missile like the DF-21D to go up and go down on a target around 3,000 km away, but assume it takes 30 minutes to do so, which is around the time it takes an ICBM to go around the globe and hit something. At 35 knots, the CV could have travelled 32.41 km in any direction. The terminal stage of the DF-21D most likely goes active relatively soon after it's terminal stage begins, which means it has the advantage of being able to scan a large swath of ocean in the first place. It doesn't need a rather powerful on-board sensor system, because it's a rather large on-board sensor system.

About mid-course guidance, of course, like we've concluded before, there's no proof for or against mid-course guidance anyways, so I'm not going to pursue an argument there.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
Fair enough.

Though I think it would be strange if the sensor assets didn't assist in the guidance of weapon systems themselves, whether it be AShBM or the likes of YJ-62s or swarms of 022s with YJ-83s.
 

Hyperwarp

Captain
Ok, more one the Pershing II :

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...Pershing II was launched from a M-790 flatbed trailer towed by a M-1001 prime mover. This had a max speed of 40mph and a road range of 450 miles. (To save money, only enough M-1001’s were bought for active units in Europe, stateside training units used existing HEMTT prime movers.) It was guided inertially through most of the flight. After atmospheric re-entry, the RADAG (Radar Digital Area Guidance) system took over. This took four successively-closer radar “snapshots” of the target as the MARV descended, giving the guidance computer a 128 square-pixel portrait to home on. In the event RADAG was jammed or failed, the Pershing II continued on inertial guidance. The warhead could be set for impact or airburst. The first and second rocket stages, essentially identical, were of a new design that used Kevlar and hybrid-alloy materials. Steering was by vanes in the exhaust in the atmosphere and a reactive system above it. The first stage separated at 1/3rd of the apogee altitude....

I posted this before I'll post it again :
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I also attached to screenshots from "Chapter 2 : Missile Description (2-9 to 2-16)"

Plus,

Off-course MGM-31C, Iskander-K/M, etc all are used against FIXED targets and not something that is moving. Hitting a something moving at 30kt making evasive moves....well thats different story
 

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s002wjh

Junior Member
The same logic should also apply to all category of missile system. Just because the opfor has counter measure, It doesn't negate the effectiveness of existing missile system. I don't know of any country who give up their missile systems because of it. The game of arrow and shield has been going on for as old as humanity themselves.

For every arrow there is always a shield and for better shield there will always a better arrows.

No I don't think that the Chinese are so naive or to dumb not to recognize the requirement for counter counter measure and if you read the article that I just posted they already think beyond the present system. As they have built in evolution to their ASNM . Initially having few simple system and progressively increase the complexity and sophistication of their systems to ward off any counter measure!

We know that because that is how the world operate !

Missile Defense Countermeasures. Citing a Northwest Polytechnical University and other studies, Qiu and Long believe that the ASBM would adopt sophisticated missile defense countermeasures against U.S. sea-based missile defenses, including masking of the ASBM solid fueled motor’s signature, mid-course maneuvering, decoys, coatings to reduce the warhead’s radar cross section (RCS), and on-board jamming. Equipped with a hybrid solid and liquid fueled third stage, mid-course maneuvering would involve a boost-glide or hopping trajectory concept (跳跃式弹道方案). The missile would incorporate a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) linked with inertial navigation for autonomous mid-course guidance, as well as a possible SAR/millimeter wave radar with passive infrared seeker for terminal guidance. At various stages of flight, the ASBM would adopt speed maneuvers, and means to manage blackout periods due to ionization of the atmosphere above certain re-entry speeds.

Countering U.S. Missile Defense Surveillance and Tracking. In their detailed ASBM vs. sea-based missile defense scenario, the analysis goes through the SBIRS alert process, arguing that SBIRS would not be able to establish an impact prediction point and thus could fail to provide cueing for sea-based missile defense radar systems. They make an argument that Ground Based Radar (GBR) systems in Korea and Japan likely would be unable to establish a track. The analysis also addresses possible attempts by the U.S. High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP) in Alaska could fail to jam China’s OTH-B system, implying the system has a military role.


SBIRS(Space based infra red sensors) is not with its problem read this. It is not that what US touched turn into gold Like anything else they have their share of failure and disappointment

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The first SBIRS-High GEO satellite was expected to launch in 2010, after significant program delays. SBIRS GEO-1 wasn’t delivered to Cape Canaveral until March 2011, however, and the launch took place in May 2011.

According to US GAO auditors, the SBIRS program has suffered from immature technologies, unclear requirements, unstable funding, underestimated software complexity, poor oversight, and other problems that have resulted in billions of dollars in cost overruns and years in schedule delays. The cost of the program has ballooned from an original $4 billion estimate to over $17 billion. Normally, this kind of performance would produce program cancellation, but the USAF had no alternatives for a mission that must be carried out: early detection of ballistic missiles, and detection of nuclear detonations.

In 2006 the USAF finally began a parallel effort known as the Alternative Infrared Satellite System (AIRSS). AIRSS/3GIRS was intended to ensure that the nation’s missile-warning and defense capabilities could be sustained, even in SBIRS-High failed. It showed early progress, and could have provided a less expensive supplement to the SBIRS-High constellation, but AIRSS appears to have been shelved as SBIRS lumbered forward. By the time 3GIRS began to show progress, SBIRS was beginning to show adequate performance, and was now too far advanced to cancel.

Recent budgets and requests include:

i'm sure china has defense against attacks. but how effective are against US strike and how many system does DF21 need, the more system required to support DF21, the more chance that system will be disabled by US. its matter of probability. and right now the odd is in favor of US due to its overall combat ability and equipments.

---------- Post added at 11:24 AM ---------- Previous post was at 11:19 AM ----------

Isn't that true for ANY system? The anti ballistic missile systems are dependent on the early detection satellites, early warning aircraft, UAVs, tracking ships, aegis ships etc. <- all of which can be back-uped by redundant systems but destruction/jamming of any can severely weaken the ABM system -> which makes the CVBG vurnable to saturated attacks.

Not to say the spear and the shield; that one will work and the other will not - they are facing similar hurdles. Both sensors can be destroyed/jammed, both can be decoyed, both can have submunition/multiple approach....

In a shooting war, I highly doubt the USA will send her carriers within China's striking range without believing that they are relatively safe, while China will not strike at CVBGs without being fairly confident of sinking/mission killing the CVN.

some system require less support some require more. the more it require the more chance that part of system will be disable. if we look at overall capability of US force vs china, the odd is favoring US. if DF21 require OTH, Sub, satelite and other system, then disable any of these will reduce the DF21 threat signficanlly. in this case china has to spread its resource to cover all these system in order for DF21 to work. properly.
 
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