Behind the China Missile Hype

Lezt

Junior Member
NikeX,

It seems like you find everything "simple" to do for the Americans and not simple for the Chinese.

But lets agree to disagree, you can believe that NOTHING can harm a CVBG; While I will still clamor that a ASBM presents new creditable threats to a CVBG to deal with.

You keep forgetting that geo politics are not just limited to the USA/China. The DF21 have its uses against... Indian CVBGs, Australian CVBG or any south east asian claimants - who have limited defence against cruise missiles and more or less non-existent defence against ballistic missiles.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
@Hyperwarp

How do you suppose this maneuvering warhead will hit its target, the CVN? The DF-21D has limited search capabilities on its own and will have to find the carrier to make its terminal approach.

I swear we've been through this. The whole point of AShBM is that it's supported by midcourse guidance, to lead it until it's right on the CVBG until terminal guidance and the maneuvering warhead lands it onto the carrier.
The thing is you can't argue "DF-21D has limited search capabilities on its own" -- because it's not supposed to find targets on its own when its exoatmospheric. AShBM and the C4ISR system are inseparable if we're talking about how the AShBM will work.

If you want to argue "US will jam/destroy all these satellites etc etc" -- then fine, AShBM won't work, you've won. But arguing "AShBM must use it's own sensors to find the CVBG and that'll be very hard" is no argument at all.

How will the DF-21D warhead sensors burn through the hot plasma surrounding the warhead as it moves at Mach 10 trying to find the carrier?

Like hyperwarp said, existing, older IRBMs and ICBMs have already demonstrated terminal guidance. the point of DF-21D's terminal sensors isn't to find the carrier, but to guide it onto the carrier once it's right on top of it.
An analogy -- you have a chequered board as the westpac, 1000x1000 squares. The C4ISR system detects and tracks down the 10x10 square of where the CVBG, sending info back to the missile in flight, which makes the adjustments to "rendezvous" with the moving 10x10 squares. Once the missile is right on top of the 10x10 squares the challenge is for the warhead's own terminal sensors and maneuvering to plant itself onto the 1x1 square which is the carrier, while it is moving at say 30 knots and maneuvering.
that's how the system should operate. AShBM cannot work without the C4ISR system -- but just to be pedantic, the whole "and/or, not and" logic still applies towards the C4ISR system itself (that is, shooting down a satellite, UAV or fishing boat will degrade the system a degree but definitely not make it inoperable). I suppose we can say AShBM can't work without data relay satellites either, but that's included in the whole C4ISR acronym anyway.

So no more "AShBM must use it's own sensors to detect/track CVBG and it'll be difficult" line of arguments plox -- I've explained this principle to death, resurrected it and explained it to death again.
Saying it will be difficult for the warhead's sensors to guide it onto a moving carrier in the terminal phase however is a different matter.
 

s002wjh

Junior Member
still arguing huh. personally i think the Overall system has few weakness and vulnerability that can be exploit by US force, which make the missile almost useless if done right. there are too many layer of defense that china has to penetrate(not just SM3), and too many DF21 system that can be disable/jammed, which make DF21 inaccurate. of course if china play correctly, it can be a very good weapon against US.

also DF21 is not operational yet, who know how long before the things actually working. terminal guidance toward a moving object is not an easy task, especially under US Ewarfare, multiple defense layer condition.
 
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i.e.

Senior Member
Oh God not this again.


----

DF21 wou;dnbn't be used on its own to penetrate the defenses.

its a part of package including AshCMs launched by subs ships and air assets.
 

NikeX

Banned Idiot
@AssassinsMace: Look at your own arguments against the ASBM and the hurdles it faces at going mach 10. Now all of the sudden it works with an ABM trying to hit a vastly smaller target than an aircraft carrier at a combined speed of mach 20?

There are several decades of research and deployment of successful ABM interceptions supporting my arguments. How many successful hits of ANY ships at sea support the concept of the DF-21D? Any? Of course the answer is a big fat no.

Even the Russians couldn't pull it off.

And you want the world to believe that the Chinese have deployed a workable system? You really must be joking. Try again.

---------- Post added at 12:12 PM ---------- Previous post was at 12:10 PM ----------

Oh God not this again.


----

DF21 wou;dnbn't be used on its own to penetrate the defenses.

its a part of package including AshCMs launched by subs ships and air assets.


Let China demonstrate the package. Give us something besides threats and talk

---------- Post added at 12:25 PM ---------- Previous post was at 12:12 PM ----------

NikeX,

It seems like you find everything "simple" to do for the Americans and not simple for the Chinese.

But lets agree to disagree, you can believe that NOTHING can harm a CVBG; While I will still clamor that a ASBM presents new creditable threats to a CVBG to deal with.

You keep forgetting that geo politics are not just limited to the USA/China. The DF21 have its uses against... Indian CVBGs, Australian CVBG or any south east asian claimants - who have limited defence against cruise missiles and more or less non-existent defence against ballistic missiles.

All you must do is look at the record. There have been successful ballistic missile interceptions since the late 1960s. This was by the Americans and Russians

And only the Russians have ATTEMPTED to deploy a ASBM. And they understood that you had to use a nuclear warhead to make sure you destroyed the CVN

So today with less than ten years of development the Chinese want the world to believe that they have solved the ASBM problem?

And present NO EVIDENCE or proof? DF-21D is joke that China is playing on the world!

---------- Post added at 12:35 PM ---------- Previous post was at 12:25 PM ----------

@Bltizo

I swear we've been through this. The whole point of AShBM is that it's supported by midcourse guidance, to lead it until it's right on the CVBG until terminal guidance and the maneuvering warhead lands it onto the carrier.
The thing is you can't argue "DF-21D has limited search capabilities on its own" -- because it's not supposed to find targets on its own when its exoatmospheric. AShBM and the C4ISR system are inseparable if we're talking about how the AShBM will work.

I agree that we have been all through this before. And no new evidence has been presented that DF-21D is any closer to achieving its mission objectives than it was several years ago

I am looking for solid evidence that DF-21D has made some sort of breakthrough that has advanced it towards becoming a viable weapons system capable of hitting a CVN at sea.

Until solid evidence is presented I will file the DF-21D under proposed weapon systems that reached a technological dead end and are still seeking a solution.

That is all folks

---------- Post added at 12:57 PM ---------- Previous post was at 12:35 PM ----------

@Bltizo

Like hyperwarp said, existing, older IRBMs and ICBMs have already demonstrated terminal guidance. the point of DF-21D's terminal sensors isn't to find the carrier, but to guide it onto the carrier once it's right on top of it.

However there are major questions that you or noone else seem to be able to answer and that is how will the DF-21D warhead see the CVN with its OWN terminal sensors when it is traveling at Mach 10 and surrounded by this intense plasma sheath that NO electronmagnetic radiation can penetrate?

This means that DF-21D is blind at the time when it should be searching for the CVN.

And what external guidance signal from its control base would be able to penetrate this plasma to update DF-21D to correct its course during its terminal dive towards the CVN?

Can any of you DF-21D supporters answer these questions?

"......Reentry blackout occurs when the high speed of the spacecraft obliterates atmospheric molecules, developing a plasma envelope that absorbs electromagnetic waves that are close to a certain frequency called the plasma frequency. That plasma frequency in turn depends on the plasma itself, which can range in density. The resulting breakdown of radio communications is an annoyance for space mission crews and mission personnel, but for military space planes and ICBMs, it can block out navigation signals or even an abort command.."

Here is research on the problem but no solutions are available

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i.e.

Senior Member
Let China demonstrate the package. Give us something besides threats and talk

China is not threatening any one. don't get the rethoric coming off these american think tankers tabloids confuse with anything.
talk is mostly generated by the same sources.

Short of a general war you would not see the full effect.

your statement is always a safe statement.

---------- Post added at 01:28 PM ---------- Previous post was at 01:10 PM ----------

However there are major questions that you or noone else seem to be able to answer and that is how will the DF-21D warhead see the CVN with its OWN terminal sensors when it is traveling at Mach 10 and surrounded by this intense plasma sheath that NO electronmagnetic radiation can penetrate

Apparently Pershing II was able to do active radar area correction in terminal phase, all with 1960s technology.

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Iskander-E has an optical terminal homing system. either send back the image with a data link, or self guide onto target.
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your own lack of knowledge in this area does not preclude the possibility.
 
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Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
There are several decades of research and deployment of successful ABM interceptions supporting my arguments. How many successful hits of ANY ships at sea support the concept of the DF-21D? Any? Of course the answer is a big fat no.

Even the Russians couldn't pull it off.

And you want the world to believe that the Chinese have deployed a workable system? You really must be joking. Try again.

Is this what it's coming down to then? Disbelief simply stemming from a notion of Chinese incompetence?
Just for the record, many decades of research and development WILL have gone into this thing.

And only the Russians have ATTEMPTED to deploy a ASBM. And they understood that you had to use a nuclear warhead to make sure you destroyed the CVN

The middle of the cold war is no comparison to today.

So today with less than ten years of development the Chinese want the world to believe that they have solved the ASBM problem?

Actually it's probably more like less than 20 years development, and it hasn't reached FOC yet. It's an evolutionary thing. I'm not sure what is so hard for you to believe this could work, given the prowess of modern technology

And present NO EVIDENCE or proof? DF-21D is joke that China is playing on the world!

Wow this is just coming across as venting now. But in case you havent noticed, the PLA always plays its cards close to its chest.

I agree that we have been all through this before. And no new evidence has been presented that DF-21D is any closer to achieving its mission objectives than it was several years ago

I am looking for solid evidence that DF-21D has made some sort of breakthrough that has advanced it towards becoming a viable weapons system capable of hitting a CVN at sea.

Until solid evidence is presented I will file the DF-21D under proposed weapon systems that reached a technological dead end and are still seeking a solution.

That is all folks

How is that even a response to my post? I never said anything about you believing it or not, my point was that when you do argue for a point, at least know how the weapon is supposed to work.


However there are major questions that you or noone else seem to be able to answer and that is how will the DF-21D warhead see the CVN with its OWN terminal sensors when it is traveling at Mach 10 and surrounded by this intense plasma sheath that NO electronmagnetic radiation can penetrate?

This means that DF-21D is blind at the time when it should be searching for the CVN.

And what external guidance signal from its control base would be able to penetrate this plasma to update DF-21D to correct its course during its terminal dive towards the CVN?

Existing weapons already demonstrate terminal guidance at high speeds, iskander, DF-21C, DF15C, pershing ii etc.

As for the question of mid course guidance -- you realize all modern ICBMs use a similar but less specialized system to achieve higher accuracy right? GPS guidance?? DF-21D will get mid course guidance a similar way only from more sources (through a relay sat).

Can any of you DF-21D supporters answer these questions?

Done.
 

AssassinsMace

Lieutenant General
I love how he needs solid evidence when yet he concludes how smoke is used in modern tank warfare shows that an ASBM can be fooled. Two completely different scenarios. First he says it's impossible for something that moves at mach 10 to find its target. Then he contradicts himself saying the US has an ABM that moves at mach 10 and works at intercepting an smaller object moving at mach 10 than an aircraft carrier moving at 35 knots. Wasn't the smoke screen enough? He doesn't have to worry about the ASBM hitting at Mach 10. He even admits himself the US can't develop an ASBM yet he says the US has an ABM that can do what he says cannot be done. Contradiction after contradiction.

Tha fact is he's concluding the Chinese can't do anything first and all this other stuff he keeps posting over and over again is his smoke screen to cover his conclusions based on prejudice and not "evidence."
 
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Hendrik_2000

Lieutenant General
still arguing huh. personally i think the Overall system has few weakness and vulnerability that can be exploit by US force, which make the missile almost useless if done right. there are too many layer of defense that china has to penetrate(not just SM3), and too many DF21 system that can be disable/jammed, which make DF21 inaccurate. of course if china play correctly, it can be a very good weapon against US.

also DF21 is not operational yet, who know how long before the things actually working. terminal guidance toward a moving object is not an easy task, especially under US Ewarfare, multiple defense layer condition.

The same logic should also apply to all category of missile system. Just because the opfor has counter measure, It doesn't negate the effectiveness of existing missile system. I don't know of any country who give up their missile systems because of it. The game of arrow and shield has been going on for as old as humanity themselves.

For every arrow there is always a shield and for better shield there will always a better arrows.

No I don't think that the Chinese are so naive or to dumb not to recognize the requirement for counter counter measure and if you read the article that I just posted they already think beyond the present system. As they have built in evolution to their ASNM . Initially having few simple system and progressively increase the complexity and sophistication of their systems to ward off any counter measure!

We know that because that is how the world operate !

Missile Defense Countermeasures. Citing a Northwest Polytechnical University and other studies, Qiu and Long believe that the ASBM would adopt sophisticated missile defense countermeasures against U.S. sea-based missile defenses, including masking of the ASBM solid fueled motor’s signature, mid-course maneuvering, decoys, coatings to reduce the warhead’s radar cross section (RCS), and on-board jamming. Equipped with a hybrid solid and liquid fueled third stage, mid-course maneuvering would involve a boost-glide or hopping trajectory concept (跳跃式弹道方案). The missile would incorporate a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) linked with inertial navigation for autonomous mid-course guidance, as well as a possible SAR/millimeter wave radar with passive infrared seeker for terminal guidance. At various stages of flight, the ASBM would adopt speed maneuvers, and means to manage blackout periods due to ionization of the atmosphere above certain re-entry speeds.

Countering U.S. Missile Defense Surveillance and Tracking. In their detailed ASBM vs. sea-based missile defense scenario, the analysis goes through the SBIRS alert process, arguing that SBIRS would not be able to establish an impact prediction point and thus could fail to provide cueing for sea-based missile defense radar systems. They make an argument that Ground Based Radar (GBR) systems in Korea and Japan likely would be unable to establish a track. The analysis also addresses possible attempts by the U.S. High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP) in Alaska could fail to jam China’s OTH-B system, implying the system has a military role.


SBIRS(Space based infra red sensors) is not with its problem read this. It is not that what US touched turn into gold Like anything else they have their share of failure and disappointment

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The first SBIRS-High GEO satellite was expected to launch in 2010, after significant program delays. SBIRS GEO-1 wasn’t delivered to Cape Canaveral until March 2011, however, and the launch took place in May 2011.

According to US GAO auditors, the SBIRS program has suffered from immature technologies, unclear requirements, unstable funding, underestimated software complexity, poor oversight, and other problems that have resulted in billions of dollars in cost overruns and years in schedule delays. The cost of the program has ballooned from an original $4 billion estimate to over $17 billion. Normally, this kind of performance would produce program cancellation, but the USAF had no alternatives for a mission that must be carried out: early detection of ballistic missiles, and detection of nuclear detonations.

In 2006 the USAF finally began a parallel effort known as the Alternative Infrared Satellite System (AIRSS). AIRSS/3GIRS was intended to ensure that the nation’s missile-warning and defense capabilities could be sustained, even in SBIRS-High failed. It showed early progress, and could have provided a less expensive supplement to the SBIRS-High constellation, but AIRSS appears to have been shelved as SBIRS lumbered forward. By the time 3GIRS began to show progress, SBIRS was beginning to show adequate performance, and was now too far advanced to cancel.

Recent budgets and requests include:
 
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