Behind the China Missile Hype

AssassinsMace said:

And the US knew where their own satellite was going. Not real war conditions.

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In fairness, the US, Russia, and several other nations would know the instant China or in fact, any nations launches a rather large missile, so there's that warning. If there was no message before the launch indicating a test, that's another warning. And the fact that you can't really hide a large missile coming down at your battle group is another warning. Combat conditions is an icky thing to prove, since (IIRC), the DF-21D has never been utilized in combat conditions anyways, from what we know, a SM-3 has a pretty good chance actually, of shooting down a DF-21D.

Bltizo said:

Certainly, of course it's a possibility. More than that it's a credible weapon to use DF-21D in the right circumstances.
But comparing USA-193 to DF-21D is awkward, given that satellite was theirs in the first place and had all the data and control they needed to make the shootdown easier. Not to mention it wasn't performing evasive maneuvers, designed with small RCS etc.

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Well, two things really. Evasive maneuvers aren't much from what we know already. From the lack of information in regards to the DF-21D's evasive maneuvers however, I can't assume much, except that it is guaranteed to have a MaRV, or a Maneuverable Reentry Vehicle, which is necessary for an Active Radar Guided (or IIR guided) terminal-phase. That's the only maneuverable thing that we know of, for sure for sure. A MaRV isn't going to dodge like a fighter jet, it is going to make it difficult to intercept, but how much so is not known and could go either way.

How small of an RCS is really irrelevant when the missile itself is going to be tracked by radars deep in US territory alone and, not to mention that the AN/SPY-1 was able to track and engage the falling satellite from about 240 km altitude. Even at Mach 10, that gives the CBG a bit over 70 seconds to engage. Experience tells us that even if you design something with "low RCS" (how low of a RCS is even debatable), the closer it gets the 'clearer' it is, not to mention hotter.

EDIT:

Following some googlefu, some crude depictions of the DF-21D's flight trajectory (bring your bag of salt):



Assuming that is the case, my initial assumption that the "maneuvering" that the DF-21D's warhead would do is in it's terminal phase, as per the logical requirement for an ARH or IIR guided warhead to be inherently on a MaRV.

And a diagram (again, salt) of the DF-21D's warhead (someone translate please):

In fairness, the US, Russia, and several other nations would know the instant China or in fact, any nations launches a rather large missile, so there's that warning. If there was no message before the launch indicating a test, that's another warning. And the fact that you can't really hide a large missile coming down at your battle group is another warning. Combat conditions is an icky thing to prove, since (IIRC), the DF-21D has never been utilized in combat conditions anyways, from what we know, a SM-3 has a pretty good chance actually, of shooting down a DF-21D.

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And you think that's the only condition for a real war situation?

IronsightSniper said:

In fairness, the US, Russia, and several other nations would know the instant China or in fact, any nations launches a rather large missile, so there's that warning. If there was no message before the launch indicating a test, that's another warning. And the fact that you can't really hide a large missile coming down at your battle group is another warning. Combat conditions is an icky thing to prove, since (IIRC), the DF-21D has never been utilized in combat conditions anyways, from what we know, a SM-3 has a pretty good chance actually, of shooting down a DF-21D.

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I think he was talking about knowing the "exact" trajectory, rather than the general direction which you could garner from a ballistic missile launch from a foreign nation which can maneuver in midcourse flight.

There is some debate as to how effectively DF-21D has been, and needs to be, tested for it to go into "IOC" -- because from 2009 we had details the system was already in IOC from anywhere as early as 2007, 2008 yet there's been no such public announcement or knowledge of a ballistic missile test fired at a barge or anything.

Well, two things really. Evasive maneuvers aren't much from what we know already. From the lack of information in regards to the DF-21D's evasive maneuvers however, I can't assume much, except that it is guaranteed to have a MaRV, or a Maneuverable Reentry Vehicle, which is necessary for an Active Radar Guided (or IIR guided) terminal-phase. That's the only maneuverable thing that we know of, for sure for sure. A MaRV isn't going to dodge like a fighter jet, it is going to make it difficult to intercept, but how much so is not known and could go either way.

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I actually want to elaborate on the part about midcourse maneuvers. Like you said, the missile must have MaRV to engage a moving carrier in the terminal phase (whether it will execute evasive actiosn in that phase as well is another question), but it must also have some degree of midcourse flight control to move into the "general direction" of the CVBG pre terimnal phase. So I think it is not unlikely for it to be capable of midcourse evasive maneuvers simply from that.
Further in one of tphuang's blog posts on AShBM he mentioned it would have a "third stage" for evasive maneuvers, and other posters on forums like CDF have mentioned it would feature actions to make it harder to intercept in midcourse flight -- talk of anything from unconventional ballistic flight characterstics to straight up evasive maneuvers.
I would understand if one didn't believe these rumours, but personally imo if we're already accepting the existence of such a weapon, and the chinese themselves having seen american advances in ABM, they would logically try to make it harder for the missile to be intercepted in arguably its most vulnerable phase, against a counter which would already have existed for years.

How small of an RCS is really irrelevant when the missile itself is going to be tracked by radars deep in US territory alone and, not to mention that the AN/SPY-1 was able to track and engage the falling satellite from about 240 km altitude. Even at Mach 10, that gives the CBG a bit over 70 seconds to engage. Experience tells us that even if you design something with "low RCS" (how low of a RCS is even debatable), the closer it gets the 'clearer' it is, not to mention hotter.

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Yes, I agree -- my main point was USA 193's interception could not be compared with an interception of DF-21D. In fact imho few of the SM-3 tests could be argued to be comparable to an intercept attempt of DF-21D, and almost none if we consider the idea it is capable of mid course evasive actions. That's not to say it isn't capable of potentially intercepting it, just like how the lack of a full fledged DF-21D test against a moving target with escorts and ECM doesn't mean it isn't capable of hitting anything.

Bltizo said:

I think he was talking about knowing the "exact" trajectory, rather than the general direction which you could garner from a ballistic missile launch from a foreign nation which can maneuver in midcourse flight.

There is some debate as to how effectively DF-21D has been, and needs to be, tested for it to go into "IOC" -- because from 2009 we had details the system was already in IOC from anywhere as early as 2007, 2008 yet there's been no such public announcement or knowledge of a ballistic missile test fired at a barge or anything.

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Mhm. Lack of information is the bane of all Defense-forum wars!

I actually want to elaborate on the part about midcourse maneuvers. Like you said, the missile must have MaRV to engage a moving carrier in the terminal phase (whether it will execute evasive actiosn in that phase as well is another question), but it must also have some degree of midcourse flight control to move into the "general direction" of the CVBG pre terimnal phase. So I think it is not unlikely for it to be capable of midcourse evasive maneuvers simply from that.
Further in one of tphuang's blog posts on AShBM he mentioned it would have a "third stage" for evasive maneuvers, and other posters on forums like CDF have mentioned it would feature actions to make it harder to intercept in midcourse flight -- talk of anything from unconventional ballistic flight characterstics to straight up evasive maneuvers.
I would understand if one didn't believe these rumours, but personally imo if we're already accepting the existence of such a weapon, and the chinese themselves having seen american advances in ABM, they would logically try to make it harder for the missile to be intercepted in arguably its most vulnerable phase, against a counter which would already have existed for years.

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Mid-course evasion is possible, but really wouldn't do much good anyways, since, lets admit it, the most developed ABM system in the world belongs to the US, and even ours doesn't have much weight on the 1st and 2nd stages of the enemy missile. The majority of our interceptors are designed for the exoatmospheric stage, or terminal stage of the enemy missile's flight. Terminal phase maneuvers are of course, a tricky thing to even speculate about, since we know for sure that the DF-21D has to have a MaRV for it's terminal phase, many people can confuse that with meaning that the warhead could do elaborate evasive maneuvers like the Iskander could. So, again, damn you lack of information!

Yes, I agree -- my main point was USA 193's interception could not be compared with an interception of DF-21D. In fact imho few of the SM-3 tests could be argued to be comparable to an intercept attempt of DF-21D, and almost none if we consider the idea it is capable of mid course evasive actions. That's not to say it isn't capable of potentially intercepting it, just like how the lack of a full fledged DF-21D test against a moving target with escorts and ECM doesn't mean it isn't capable of hitting anything.

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Well, I'd disagree. There's a difference between comparing the SM-3's trial tests and it's actual use against the USA-193. The first was that, unlike the April 15th, 2011 test of the SM-3, which the SM-3 shot down an IRBM while it was at it's mid-course stage, the USA-193 shoot-down demonstrated that the SM-3 could engage an exoatmospheric "object" at the very least. So while you can say that the SM-3 would be a threat to mid-course DF-21D's, that would be unlikely, as the SM-3's range is only known to be 500 km, and the DF-21D's is known to be at least 4 times that, so why would the DF-21D's mid-stage be within range for the SM-3? In most scenarios, it probably wouldn't and the SM-3 would be forced to deal with a terminal-stage DF-21D. You can argue that the USA-193 isn't exactly the best representation of a terminal phase warhead (in fact, it isn't), but what I am arguing is from the angle of sheer velocity. A common talking point on the interwebs is that the DF-21D is of course, a very fast missile. But being fast has it's disadvantages, in this case, it has to dive from the atmosphere to reach it's target. If it were a seaskimmer, that'd be a different story, but being a ballistic missile essentially means that any chance for it being not-detected, almost goes to null. Thus, velocity is going to be one of it's largest talking points. Mach 10, or, 3,400 meters per second, is fast, but because the SM-3 was able to knock out a falling satellite that was travelling at about Mach 30, we can at least assume, at the very least, that velocity isn't going to be that big of a factor here. If comparing the DF-21D to the SM-3, the only things you can really argue, from the view point of the DF-21D is: 1. How maneuverable is it? and 2. How small of a RCS does it have? Fortunately, both of those things we have no solid information on, so there's that

^ Indeed.

Well then I suppose the question on whether the USA 193 interception can be compared to a hypothetical DF-21D shoot down would depend on whether it has terminal evasive maneuvering or not.

Also, if the USN was so inclined it could easily place aegis ships between the CVBG and chinese waters to try and SM-3 DF-21D in midcourse. It's a simple enough act, and while other anti ship assets and the C4ISR would make it a hard deal for said aegis ship to stay there hidden for long, it could jeopardize the weapon in the more vulnerable mid course phase -- as could other ABM systems of US allies in the region. That was also part of the thinking for me, that mid course evasive actions would be installed in DF-21D as a prudent precaution.

The present version of the DF21-D seems to only have a single warhead. However missiles can be upgraded

Seems that warhead size is around 600kg. That would in theory allow for sixty 10kg non guided though streamlined sub-munitions. The idea being not to sink the carrier but to prevent it from using its aircraft.

Assume separation into submuntions takes place at 100km out. Now at Mach 10 that gives 3km per second, or around 30 seconds between being 100km out and impact. Now a carrier at 30knts is approx 15 meters per second. Thus in 30 seconds the carrier could move 450m in either direction. Thus ideally a missile would want to target a box of around 1000m x 1000m, at say 25m between each sub-munition that box needs 1600 sub munitions. Now 1600/60 is approx 25 missiles.

Thus if China was able to locate a carrier battle group accurately, they might possibly launch 15 or so missiles, and have a good chance of scoring several hits on the carrier and adjoining ships. A minority of submunitions could even be programmed to detonate at say 2000m high into dozens of large ballbearings each, raining hundreds if not thousands of tiny balls down with the aim of damaging the deck surface sufficiently to prevent aircraft from landing. These might damage the radars of adjoinging ships, keeping them out of action for awhile. Each ballbearing might have a small explosive inside, some might be solid. Some might detontate into thousands of ballbearings at say 8000m high.

Thus in years to come, China might possibly deploy hundreds more of these missiles, in that event firing one or two dozen at a single target might be a reasonable thing. They might have a mix of ballbearing warheads, submunition warheads and single warheads. Trying to differentiate between a dummy warhead, a submuntion and a solid warhead is all going to become highly, highly complex.

NikeX said:

And that is the beauty of passive smoke to screen the carrier. Particles suspended in the smoke can be tuned to absorb and diffuse radar waves to confuse radar seeker heads. And these obscurants are just one layer of defense against the ASBM

The application of obscurants on the modern battlefield has been widely examined by U.S. Army strategists and operators for over a decade and a half; (2) obscurants are firmly imbedded in U.S. Army doctrine. (3) Moreover, the effectiveness of obscurants against a panoply of terminal homing systems, from the visual to the millimeter-wave spectrum, is proven. In simple terms, the particles suspended in the medium of smoke can be adjusted in size to absorb and diffuse radar waves emanating from the seeker heads of incoming antiship missiles, thereby denying any homing information to the missile. In the modern naval battle space, where antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) are a principal threat, adapting obscurant systems and developing tactics and operational schemes for their use at sea is prudent. Given the stark potential of antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), this adaptation may be essential. (4)

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Well all this is speculation since the DF-21 has never been tested in a real world application of the technology. Until they somehow test this missile on a ship at sea this will all be guesswork.

Are they afraid of failure in a test?

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Why would you ask them if they are afraid? Did any country need to publicly test biological weapons to prove it's potency?

Sure Smoke can work to a certain degree, but let me ask you this, 1) a ASBM have a ~5-7 minute flight time, from launch to target. How fast can the anti missile system react (how the smoke screen to reach critical density). 2) what about dummy ASBM, lets launch 100 scuds, with a DF21, how will the defense system decide which is the real threat? 3) how much smoke do the ship carry? if it runs it continuously, how can flights ops operate if it the smoke blocks visual + radio waves? -> does that not mean the carrier is mission killed? 4) no one will send in only one ASBM, it is only a part of a comprehensive package which will be backed up with cruise missiles, strike aircraft, naval assets. In short, you are only providing an additional avenue for attack to occur, meaning dividing the defending resource further with some ship to scan for balistic missile, some for cruise missile, some for submarines. -> meaning the CVBG will be weaker against traditional threats.

It doesn't have to work, just be credible.

That cutaway you posted is of the shkval supercavitating torpedo. See link below



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peterAustralia said:

Thus in years to come, China might possibly deploy hundreds more of these missiles, in that event firing one or two dozen at a single target might be a reasonable thing. They might have a mix of ballbearing warheads, submunition warheads and single warheads. Trying to differentiate between a dummy warhead, a submuntion and a solid warhead is all going to become highly, highly complex.

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Seems the Navy and others are already working on the problem of dealing with multiple targets being launched at the CVN and her escorts

"....MDA is concerned about the problem of multiple targets -- decoys and countermeasures as well as warheads. The agency hopes to flight test and field the systems around 2015 to 2017. They are intended for use first on the Ground-Based Midcourse Interceptor and then the SM-3 Block IIB and the Kintetic Energy Interceptor later....."



Raytheon's includes a single kill vehicle design, building off the company's MKV and SM-3 kill vehicle experience. Raytheon was downselected out of the competition years ago, but recently brought back in. The company is shooting for affordability with existing technologies.



Lockheed Martin's relies on a carrier vehicle employing a yet-to-be proven 512X512 two-color IR focal plane array. The carrier vehicle would use the advanced sensor system to deploy the smaller kill vehicles late in the endgame of an engagement.

---------- Post added at 01:12 PM ---------- Previous post was at 12:53 PM ----------

Lezt said:

Why would you ask them if they are afraid? Did any country need to publicly test biological weapons to prove it's potency?

Sure Smoke can work to a certain degree, but let me ask you this, 1) a ASBM have a ~5-7 minute flight time, from launch to target. How fast can the anti missile system react (how the smoke screen to reach critical density). 2) what about dummy ASBM, lets launch 100 scuds, with a DF21, how will the defense system decide which is the real threat? 3) how much smoke do the ship carry? if it runs it continuously, how can flights ops operate if it the smoke blocks visual + radio waves? -> does that not mean the carrier is mission killed? 4) no one will send in only one ASBM, it is only a part of a comprehensive package which will be backed up with cruise missiles, strike aircraft, naval assets. In short, you are only providing an additional avenue for attack to occur, meaning dividing the defending resource further with some ship to scan for balistic missile, some for cruise missile, some for submarines. -> meaning the CVBG will be weaker against traditional threats.

It doesn't have to work, just be credible.

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The smoke or as it is known obscurant is rapid blooming. Meaning it can reach its potential within tens of seconds. Regarding multiple launchings of DF-21s to overwhelm the defenses of the CVN battle see post #118. This smoke can be generate by ship and aircraft. It was done so many times in WW2. The smoke is only needed to spoil the terminal homing of the DF-21D's warhead. So that means less than 30 seconds.

Again just think of the difficulty of a warhead or several warheads attempting to fight their way to the carrier battlegroup and finally encountering this scene below as these warheads try to find the carrier before diving into the ocean.

All the while the CVN battle group is shooting at these warheads.

And imagine the problem for these warheads if that obscurant is giving off a radar return. That would be one giant target for any radar targeting system aboard the DF-21 warheads.




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Bltizo said:

Yep I agree. What I don't agree with is whether CVBGs will be equipped with this "opaque smoke" and whether AShBM will be fitted with a sensor able to see through or counter it. Using smoke and other soft kill devices are not new to anyone, and the PLA's own ships have dedicated flare, chaff and smoke launchers. yet despite the fact most modern ships have these countermeasures nations still use active radar guided AShMs! They must be foolish, knowing that their AShMs will not be able to make the difference between a destroyer and a cloud of smoke launched by said destroyer!

My point is this miracle smoke you speak of seems hardly uncounterable, and if anything such countermeasures should already have been considered in development of the missile's seeker given it's not exactly new technology.

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Exactly ! nobody know what kind of sensor ASBM would use. We could only guess most likely a multiple sensor that can be switched depending on the situation . Both synthetic aperture radar and millimeter wave radar are not susceptible to obscurants , I mean that is the rational of using synthetic aperture radar that they can pierce thru the cloud.
And there is technique called locked before launched and considering that the time from launch to hit is measured in second it not infeasible to use it.

Adjusting particle to mask a particular wave length is easier said then done. How are they going to do it. anyway they have to measure the wave length first and calculate the size of the particle then make or adjust the particle all of them take time meantime the warhead already on top of your head!.Obscurants is not a panacea. the paper is only suggestion to explore the idea not a finish system.Anyway traditionally navy all over the world prefer active defense mechanism not passive one. Using obscurant is an old idea certainly the Chinese know it since they have similar system like the Bodyguard.

As to the idea hitting multiple warhead and multiple missile. someone did the probabilistic model and his conclusion is that it might be possible to hit one or two missile but hitting multiple missile and multiple warheads is physically impossible

Millimeter wave radar is now common in missile like the latest Brimstone missile that can hit moving tank
Now if you read the description of the missile seeker it fit perfectly the specification for ASBM seeker and all this in compact head measuring no more than 5 or 6 in Now imagine what they can cram in missile with 1 or 2 meter diameter

Seeker

Brimstone is equipped with a small robust millimetric wave radar seeker operating at 94GHz, giving the capability to operate in all weathers and by day and night. The seeker operates in low visibility, contaminated battlefield conditions and is not susceptible to battlefield obscurants such as smoke, dust, flares and chaff.
"Brimstone is being integrated into the RAF fleet of Harrier GR7, GR9, Tornado GR4, GR4A and Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft."

The high-millimetric band seeker provides a high-resolution radar return image of the target. The high frequency gives a small beamwidth and therefore very high angular resolution and reduced unwanted clutter for the given antenna size, which is limited by the diameter of the missile.

The millimetre wave radar gives wide band operation allowing the use of very sophisticated electronic counter-countermeasures. Millimetric radar attenuates more rapidly than conventional centemetric radar in rain, sleet and fog but its advantage is high penetration, in comparison to infrared sensor systems when countermeasures are employed. The seeker incorporates a terrain avoidance capability, allowing it to cruise at a fixed height above the ground.

A digital autopilot provides mid-course guidance. The digital autopilot with a high accuracy digital inertial measurement system provides the high precision navigation to locate targets at long range and in off-boresight operations. The highly advanced guidance system on the launcher's fire control unit and on the missile uses the target coordinates, course and speed, distance to target, missile trajectory data and data from other sensors to direct the missiles controls and accomplish the optimum flight path to the target.

Embedded algorithms allow Brimstone to attack only valid targets within a specified area. The high selectivity allows Brimstone to target armoured vehicles and ignore other fixed or moving assets, such as houses or cars. It is possible to program the missile to engage targets with a specific radar signature, for example patrol boats(aircraft carrier my comment).


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Exactly ! nobody know what kind of sensor ASBM would use. We could only guess most likely a multiple sensor that can be switched depending on the situation . Both synthetic aperture radar and millimeter wave radar are not susceptible to obscurants , I mean that is the rational of using synthetic aperture radar that they can pierce thru the cloud.
And there is technique called locked before launched and considering that the time from launch to hit is measured in second it not infeasible to use it.

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Sadly it seems the materials posted sailed over your heads, because it clearly states that the obscurants used to screen the CVN have particles suspended in the medium that block the visibility of the CVN and other ships to multiple parts of the spectrum. This includes millimeter wave radars which are the most likely mode to be used by the DF-21D seeker head to home in on the carrier.

"......The application of obscurants on the modern battlefield has been widely examined by U.S. Army strategists and operators for over a decade and a half; (2) obscurants are firmly imbedded in U.S. Army doctrine. (3) Moreover, the effectiveness of obscurants against a panoply of terminal homing systems, from the visual to the millimeter-wave spectrum, is proven. In simple terms, the particles suspended in the medium of smoke can be adjusted in size to absorb and diffuse radar waves emanating from the seeker heads of incoming antiship missiles, thereby denying any homing information to the missile. In the modern naval battle space, where antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) are a principal threat, adapting obscurant systems and developing tactics and operational schemes for their use at sea is prudent. Given the stark potential of antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), this adaptation may be essential......"