@nlalyst bro I think you got the information wrong, we welcome those nouveau riche mainlanders cause it helps our economy and how can you distinguish SK, JAPAN, TW and Chinese facial feature with each other, people see South Korean walking down the street and automatically they assume its Chinese. So any undesirable action is reported as Chinese, South Korean is our number 1 market for tourism not China and the negative report are being done as a propaganda tool. But there is concern regarding the proliferation of POGO and gambling which employed a lot of Chinese, which the gov't allow (revenue) despite of the protestation of the Chinese gov't.
One of the things that came to my mind recently about where Russia can be helpful is a potential agreement to operate PLAN SSBNs in Russian waters. As an example, the JL-2A supposedly has a range of 11,200 km. That's sufficient to hit a very large chunk of the US from the Bohai Sea - it only leaves around 20% of the US uncovered. However, from there it falls just short of hitting Washington, DC, but it gets so close that I'm struck by the suspicion that the "11,200 km" number was cooked up specifically to achieve that effect.
It seems reasonable to me that the number could well be at least 12,000 km, since missile range improves dramatically with better propellants and motors. Once you pass a certain range threshold, it's incrementally easier to add to the range of the missile just by how the physics works.
Whatever the case, if launched from north of the Bohai Sea (e.g. the Sea of Okhotsk) the JL-2A can cover the entire US and then some.
It seems reasonable to me that the number could well be at least 12,000 km, since missile range improves dramatically with better propellants and motors. Once you pass a certain range threshold, it's incrementally easier to add to the range of the missile just by how the physics works.
Whatever the case, if launched from north of the Bohai Sea (e.g. the Sea of Okhotsk) the JL-2A can cover the entire US and then some.
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@ZeEa5KPul bro that is asking to much even for the Chinese, The understanding between China and Russia is one of respecting each core interest. What the Russian will provide and that of China is raw materials and technology if total sanction is implemented. Right now Russia is supplying China what previously being imported from Australia. The reason the Chinese had the confidence to punish Australia cause they had secure their left flank.
Why would that be asking too much? That adds to the strength of Russia's strategic deterrent at no cost to itself. It also "assures" Russia (if it even requires assurance of China's intentions) since Chinese SSBNs would be vulnerable to Russian interdiction; hence Russia would be certain that those weapons weren't aimed at it. I think the depth of the China-Russia relationship and scope for further deepening is commonly underestimated.
Also, I want to highlight that this basing/operating option would be for current Type 09-IV submarines with (somewhat limited) JL-2A missiles to maximize their utility. Type 09-VIs with longer ranged, heavier JL-3s could operate from Bohai and/or the open Pacific once China secures egress points.
If there's anything that concerns me about a Russian basing/patrol option, it's that Russia wouldn't have sufficient capabilities to secure its bastions. I think this option becomes more viable in future when the Type 09-VI enters service; until such time I believe China would want to keep its primary naval deterrent close to home, even if it means a reduction to its capability.
While Russia and China have significant trust, the idea of one side operating their SSBNs to the bastion area of an ally -- even if it was hypothetically a treaty ally -- is a bit much.
Not even the US and UK do this, and it sort of defeats the purpose of having a bastion for Russia and defeats the purpose of China having an independent undersea strategic deterrent.
It's not an impossible idea, but so much additional trust and high level strategic alignment would have to be first achieved before this could even be talked about as a possibility. It's certainly not something that can be talked about so casually IMO.
Well, it wasn't that long ago that the idea that Russia would help China with its early warning system and move toward a common BMD would have been similarly outlandish, yet here we are. Forecasters, even well intentioned ones, consistently underestimate developments vis-à-vis China and should be bolder in their predications. Having said that, this isn't something I see happening in the near future because those Type 09-IVs - limited as they are - are the entirety of China's undersea nuclear force. It wouldn't do to place them in any risk, and the list of targets they can threaten from a Chinese bastion is ample. It makes the most sense to keep them close to home.
The idea starts to look better when Type 09-VIs enter service in sufficient numbers to become the primary undersea deterrent. Then it makes more sense to spread the Type 09-IVs around (or even convert them into conventional cruise missile carriers) and have the Type 09-VIs garrisoned in a Chinese bastion (where they have better range and payload) or roaming the open ocean (where they're more survivable).
In a somewhat related idea, since we're talking about a purely propaganda "alliance" in this thread, there's plenty of propaganda value in a Chinese SSBN docking at a Russian base (and vice versa), quite apart from any operational arrangements. That'll really give the prattling airheads something to talk about.
The reason I do not like talking about these sort of strategies that involve other nations, is that it requires the other nations to cooperate and agree in the first place.
This is very different to the normal activity of what we consider as PLA watching, because for PLA watching we try to project out what new developments and procurements and deployments may emerge in the near future based on assessments of domestic Chinese industry and R&D capabilities, based on their own efforts.
What you're describing -- whether it's the idea of sending SSBNs alongside Russian bastions, or any other kind of defence cooperation with XYZ nation -- requires China and XYZ partner nation to agree to it in the first place before we even have the grounds to speculate what the cooperation could look like. It is very very different to PLA watching, and I would add it is not something that foreign observers have "underestimated".
Foreign observers have underestimated the scale and speed of PLA developments in multiple respects.
But it's an overreach to use that as a basis for arguing that we can talk about that level of strategic cooperation for SSBNs between China and Russia without any current hint of that kind of intent at present.
I agree fully. I don't consider what I do "PLA watching" in a narrow sense. I certainly understand and respect the methodology you sketched out here (even though I think you err too much to the side of caution even in PLA watching as strictly defined, to the extent that you discard valid inferences out of an abundance of caution). I'm more interested in China's rise and what it augurs - what I consider the story of our age - and the PLA is a very prominent and important part of that. As such, I'm more willing to indulge in "speculative geopolitics" and prognostications about how China will transform the world around it.
I'm fully aware that since, alas, we lack precognition, this is by necessity a vaguer and fuzzier enterprise than counting ships and planes, and reporting what credible rumours manage to survive long enough on the Chinese internet to get snapshotted. Having said that, I think that I bring far more rigour and sound method to it than the typical Western think tankie paid to write wishful thinking geopolitics fanfic.
Sure. That's why I threw it out there as an idea to be examined, not a hard and fast prediction about how Chinese and Russian strategic relations are going to develop. But I will say that I do strongly believe that Chinese and Russian cooperation is going to strengthen further going forward, regardless of whether or not it takes this particular shape.
Oh, but they have. This is something that, unfortunately, I know more about than I would like. I've read report after report from Western think tanks about the China-Russia relationship being fragile and on the verge of collapse (collapse seems to be a favoured theme in anything to do with China), and invariably the underlying reason is an odious combination of the author's racism and wishful thinking.
Indeed. Whether because of a high dedication to correctness (even if it introduces false negatives) as in your case, or the simultaneously comical and bilious racism as in so many other cases.
Is it? If for whatever reason the historical analysis has consistently underestimated China (both in strict PLA watching and more broadly), why is it unsound for me to revise the estimates upward? I'm far more likely to be right than wrong in doing that, just because that's how things have always turned out.