A caveat for both benchmarks also, is that this is assuming no drastic economic slow down that reduces or inhibits military funding.
You have to account for the risk of that otherwise it is not a strategic analysis. If the carrier program is truly a high priority then China would not cut back on it even if the economy goes down the drain.
You've described what you think China shouldn't need significant carrier capability in relation to some strategic objectives, but haven't described what you believe China's strategic objectives actually are and what tools are necessary to achieve them.
For instance, in relation to naval power I see the two main strategic necessities as being the ability to fight a modern high tech war in the western pacific, and the other being the ability to project power in low intensity conflicts (both to protect Chinese SLOCs against non state actors and/or 3rd rate navies, and also to conduct war against small low tech foes in blue water and around Africa namely to protect Chinese interests, citizens, and to support evacuation if need be)
I've already described why I think both of these two strategic needs require carriers, so I'm interested to see what you think China's naval goals for the future are.
China wants to pursue further development until it reaches per capita productivity and a standard of living for the vast majority of its people that is "moderately prosperous" by world standards by 2050. What does that mean? Let's say China being comfortably within the top third of the world by GDP(PPP) Int$, around 30,000 per the World Bank 2011-2013 actual data.
In order to do this China needs a peaceful rise. Peaceful means no full scale conflicts with anybody and certainly not one with the most powerful military on earth. Rise needs closer economic integration with every country along the Silk Road and Belt which is the vast majority of Eurasia and Africa, as well as ideally all nations along the Pacific Rim. That's the entire world less some Atlantic Rim countries.
It also means minimal antagonizing anyone in that entire region (beyond China's periphery, because it order to effectively defend itself it has to be able to deliver high intensity combat power along its periphery) with either the capability to project long distance high intensity combat power or any desire to do so which means managing communication and PR, including anyone else's China threat propaganda.
There is no way China's military can match the US, not to mention US + allies, unless China has already achieved its peaceful rise. The Chinese leadership and military knows this. This does not mean they will just roll over whenever the US or its allies come knocking, they will try to maintain a minimum effective deterrence against anyone interfering in its core interests and will play brinksmanship when such interference occurs.
In terms of military tools to achieve this it hearkens back to Mao's "rather have nukes than have pants" slogan for realizing China's nuclear weapons program. Today, it is about hypersonic delivery vehicles, missile shields, lasers, railguns, electronic warfare, cyber, C4ISR, space, drones, nuclear subs, long range bombers, long range missiles, and my fav LHD. All of these are more effective and/or more efficient for China's goals than carriers because they are any or all of the following:
- more survivable
- cheaper
- larger quantity
- can more easily threaten forces who may attack China
- can more easily threaten the homeland of any country who may attack China
- less sensational or less visual thereby less susceptible to China threat negative PR
- more appropriate for humanitarian missions to build positive PR not just for China but also specifically for the Chinese military
- more appropriate for low intensity offensive operations
Starting to repeat some of what I already said, so here, and there are more posts if you care to look them up.
In terms of foreign policy and strategic goals:
- Non-interference in other states' internal affairs.
- Peaceful rise. In other words pushing back the China threat PR campaign.
- Avoiding full scale conflict with the US and probably any full scale conflict that might draw in the US outside of China's core interests, which is clearly identified as Taiwan and the Spratlys, less clearly so the Diaoyus/Senkakus.
- Hedging SLOC's with the Silk Road land route which requires the co-operation or non-interference of countries which may be bothered, justifiably or not, by Chinese naval "expansion", namely the US and India.
A CV program that goes beyond training runs counter to all of the above. However a LHD program has a much less aggressive demeanor, is less capable offensively as you pointed out, and is much more appropriate for MOOTW such as SAR and humanitarian missions, all of which helps all of the above more, or at least doesn't hurt them as much as a CV program. That LHD's are simpler and cheaper than CV's just makes them that much more efficient to have.
If worse comes to worse and China has to fight a full scale conflict with top tier opponents beyond the First Island Chain China has no chance even if it has a few CV's which would just be juicy targets. More importantly the CV's communicate aggression rather than deterrence. Better to develop long range missiles, land based airpower, space, cyber, and even unconventional weapons which stand a better chance of actually deterring a conflict in the first place as well as being more survivable in one.
CV's are even less effective in a full scale conflict within the First Island Chain with top tier opponents, rather it ties down assets having to defend it and all of the above weapons can be both more efficient and more effective in combat than CV's.
