09V/09VI (095/096) Nuclear Submarine Thread

[antiterror13]

Ohio class's beam is 13m and displacement is 18000t.
Borei class is 13.5m and 24000t

So, I would think they aim around Ohio class in size. Anything smaller, probably not large enough for stealth.

18K to 20K t would be a good bet considering Type 094 is already over 11K t

 

[ACuriousPLAFan]

18,000 tons displacement with 16 SLBM tubes is quite standard for most SSBNs today, but an Ohio-class can fit 24 SLBM tubes within that displacement. So if the Type 096 is also around 18,000-20,000 tons in displacement, might it be possible for it to fit 20-24 SLBM tubes?

Why bring this up? Its just me recalling one of the early rumours about the Type 096 back in 2013, where it was speculated to be designed with 24 SLBM tubes at that time.

There is always the saying of "Don't put (all) your eggs into one basket".

While having 20 (ala Typhoon) or even 24 (ala Ohio) IC-SLBMs per SSBN sounds pretty cool - It's not really conductive to concentrate so many nuclear warheads onto one single boat, given how there are plenty of combat (e.g. damaged and/or sunk by enemy action) and non-combat (e.g. maintenance, refueling, accident etc) reasons that would keep an SSBN from performing its responsibilities.

This is especially true for today's China, where she only has a much smaller (albeit rapidly expanding) nuclear arsenal than the US and Russia. Sure, China may need less boats that can carry more warheads per boat - But the cost to China's strategic nuclear deterrence will be heavy during/in case of any one of the aforemention instances.

Hence, it is actually safer to have less IC-SLBMs per boat, but having a larger number of boats that can be available at any given time. This serves well to enhace the reliability and resilience of China's sea-based nuclear deterrence and second-strike (if not also pre-emptive) capabilities.

 

[plawolf]

There is always the saying of "Don't put (all) your eggs into one basket".

While having 20 (ala Typhoon) or even 24 (ala Ohio) IC-SLBMs per SSBN sounds pretty cool - It's not really conductive to concentrate so many nuclear warheads onto one single boat, given how there are plenty of combat (e.g. damaged and/or sunk by enemy action) and non-combat (e.g. maintenance, refueling, accident etc) reasons that would keep an SSBN from performing its responsibilities.

This is especially true for today's China, where she only has a much smaller (albeit rapidly expanding) nuclear arsenal than the US and Russia. Sure, China may need less boats that can carry more warheads per boat - But the cost to China's strategic nuclear deterrence will be heavy during/in case of any one of the aforemention instances.

Hence, it is actually safer to have less IC-SLBMs per boat, but having a larger number of boats that can be available at any given time. This serves well to enhace the reliability and resilience of China's sea-based nuclear deterrence and second-strike (if not also pre-emptive) capabilities.

I think it’s the other way around. The primary consideration for SSBNs is survivability. How many missiles they carry is in turn determined by how survivable they are deemed to be and the impact of carrying those missiles on its survivability, which in turn is determined both by its own intrinsic stealth, but also on the perceived threat environment.

The Ohios carry 24 because they were deemed untouchable, so while carrying 24 might have an overall negative impact on its intrinsic stealth compared to 12 or 20, it was still deemed almost impossible that the Russian navy would be able to hunt them down and kill them before they can launch. So it was a worthwhile cost to sacrifice a small amount of stealth for more missiles, especially when the post-sacrifice stealth level is still beyond what the adversaries can detect.

The Typhoons, OTOH, carry 20 because they had low survival chances due to geography and technology. Thus when you are expecting high loss rates, you want to ensure the few boats that might survive pack enough punch to be able to dissuade opfor from thinking it can ‘win’ a nuclear exchange by pushing the projected cost beyond their tolerance.

For China, I think the priority would be range of missiles over numbers.

Even if the 096 turns out to be as good as hoped, I still don’t think the PLAN would use them to do deep pacific patrols like the US. Due to geography and the vast numerical advantage of USN subs.

Thus being able to hit deep into CONUS while in the SCS or waters around China would be a much bigger priority over carrying a shedload of shorter ranged missiles that require the 096 to punch deep into the pacific to be in range to use.

Thus I think missile length would determine hull diameter and displacement principally for the 096.

It’s only after Taiwan has been reunified with the mainland and China can break the geographical chock-hold that US enjoys, as well as having balanced out the numbers and reached technological parity or superiority that the PLAN would see deep pacific patrols as viable.

 

[Sardaukar20]

There is always the saying of "Don't put (all) your eggs into one basket".

While having 20 (ala Typhoon) or even 24 (ala Ohio) IC-SLBMs per SSBN sounds pretty cool - It's not really conductive to concentrate so many nuclear warheads onto one single boat, given how there are plenty of combat (e.g. damaged and/or sunk by enemy action) and non-combat (e.g. maintenance, refueling, accident etc) reasons that would keep an SSBN from performing its responsibilities.

This is especially true for today's China, where she only has a much smaller (albeit rapidly expanding) nuclear arsenal than the US and Russia. Sure, China may need less boats that can carry more warheads per boat - But the cost to China's strategic nuclear deterrence will be heavy during/in case of any one of the aforemention instances.

Hence, it is actually safer to have less IC-SLBMs per boat, but having a larger number of boats that can be available at any given time. This serves well to enhace the reliability and resilience of China's sea-based nuclear deterrence and second-strike (if not also pre-emptive) capabilities.

I think it’s the other way around. The primary consideration for SSBNs is survivability. How many missiles they carry is in turn determined by how survivable they are deemed to be and the impact of carrying those missiles on its survivability, which in turn is determined both by its own intrinsic stealth, but also on the perceived threat environment.

The Ohios carry 24 because they were deemed untouchable, so while carrying 24 might have an overall negative impact on its intrinsic stealth compared to 12 or 20, it was still deemed almost impossible that the Russian navy would be able to hunt them down and kill them before they can launch. So it was a worthwhile cost to sacrifice a small amount of stealth for more missiles, especially when the post-sacrifice stealth level is still beyond what the adversaries can detect.

The Typhoons, OTOH, carry 20 because they had low survival chances due to geography and technology. Thus when you are expecting high loss rates, you want to ensure the few boats that might survive pack enough punch to be able to dissuade opfor from thinking it can ‘win’ a nuclear exchange by pushing the projected cost beyond their tolerance.

For China, I think the priority would be range of missiles over numbers.

Even if the 096 turns out to be as good as hoped, I still don’t think the PLAN would use them to do deep pacific patrols like the US. Due to geography and the vast numerical advantage of USN subs.

Thus being able to hit deep into CONUS while in the SCS or waters around China would be a much bigger priority over carrying a shedload of shorter ranged missiles that require the 096 to punch deep into the pacific to be in range to use.

Thus I think missile length would determine hull diameter and displacement principally for the 096.

It’s only after Taiwan has been reunified with the mainland and China can break the geographical chock-hold that US enjoys, as well as having balanced out the numbers and reached technological parity or superiority that the PLAN would see deep pacific patrols as viable.

Considering China's current geopolitical situation, it is actually in a very disadvantaged position with regards to using SSBNs as a credible strategic deterrence. Unlike the rest of the P5, China does not enjoy direct access to any of the world's Oceans. Therefore China's SSBNs had been forced to operate within a naval bastion in the ECS and SCS. Due to the large amounts of hostile naval assets nearby, China's SSBN force would also require more distributed lethality.

Therefore one of the more sensible SSBN design idea for China's requirements are smaller-sized boats that can operate in shallower waters in larger numbers compared to having a couple of large SSBNs lurking in the oceans. These boats would also need to carry larger missiles, due to the requirement to hit CONUS from regions like the SCS. Therefore the better design for the Type 096 should be closer to the existing Type 094 SSBN in size rather than something as large as an Ohio-class (18,000 tons). So objectively, a modernized version of the existing Type 094, upgraded to around 12,000-14,000 tons displacement with the same amount of 12 SLBM tubes is going to be the more sensible design.

Alternatively, the Type 096 could be built larger. More comparable to the upcoming French SNLE 3G SSBN at around 15,000-16,000 tons displacement, and carries a standard load of 16 SLBM tubes. Such a boat could offer more strategic flexibility. It is relatively small enough to operate within the bastion of the shallow seas, or it can also operate further out in the ocean, if another bastion could be created over there. Having a little extra SLBM tubes would give each boat a slightly bigger deterrence value than the older 12-tube boats they were supposed to replace.

Which ever design style the Type 096 might pursue will depend on how stealthy it could get. The more stealthy it could get, the more survivable it is, thus enabling larger designs. Considering the current level of Chinese nuclear submarine technology, I think it is fair to say that China can produce an SSBN with at least competitive levels of stealth compared to Western designs. So I'm leaning more towards the larger designs of around 15,000 tons above, rather than something more comparable to the Type 094 in size.

 

[sunnymaxi]

Considering China's current geopolitical situation, it is actually in a very disadvantaged position with regards to using SSBNs as a credible strategic deterrence. Unlike the rest of the P5, China does not enjoy direct access to any of the world's Oceans. Therefore China's SSBNs had been forced to operate within a naval bastion in the ECS and SCS. Due to the large amounts of hostile naval assets nearby, China's SSBN force would also require more distributed lethality.

Therefore one of the more sensible SSBN design idea for China's requirements are smaller-sized boats that can operate in shallower waters in larger numbers compared to having a couple of large SSBNs lurking in the oceans. These boats would also need to carry larger missiles, due to the requirement to hit CONUS from regions like the SCS. Therefore the better design for the Type 096 should be closer to the existing Type 094 SSBN in size rather than something as large as an Ohio-class (18,000 tons). So objectively, a modernized version of the existing Type 094, upgraded to around 12,000-14,000 tons displacement with the same amount of 12 SLBM tubes is going to be the more sensible design.

Alternatively, perhaps they Type 096 could be built larger. More comparable to the upcoming French SNLE 3G SSBN at around 15,000-16,000 tons displacement, and carries a standard load of 16 SLBM tubes. Such a boat could offer more strategic flexibility. It is relatively small enough to operate within the Bastion of the shallow seas, or it can also operate further out in the ocean, if another bastion could be created over there. Having a little extra SLBM tubes would give each boat a bigger deterrence value, and perhaps also allow it to carry a few decoy missiles to aid with ABM defence penetration.

Which ever design style the Type 096 might pursue will depend on how stealthy it could get. The more stealthy it could get, the more survivable it is, thus enabling larger designs. Considering the current level of Chinese nuclear submarine technology, I think it is fair to say that China can produce an SSBN with at least competitive levels of stealth compared to Western designs. So I'm leaning more towards the larger 15,000 tons and above design rather than a modernized Type 094 "small SSBN" design for the Type 096.

you need reasonable size of SSBN to house equipment and systems in order to become submarine more stealthy .. what we have seen in research papers and satellite images. it is safe to assume, type 096 will be much bigger submarine as compared to type 094.. obviously with 16 VLS tubes and much bigger SLBM JL-3 ..

if you read my some old massages, i have said one thing.. there is no doubt that, Geographical limitations exist but type 096/type 095 are much needed in order to catch up with western world/Russia in submarine technology. China couldn't afford to loose in this critical sector as they have already late.. just like in other military technologies they have caught up. this is the reason why they have spend Billions on R&D in last decade.

So objectively, a modernized version of the existing Type 094, upgraded to around 12,000-14,000 tons displacement with the same amount of 12 SLBM tubes is going to be the more sensible design.

Type 094A coming with better sensors/equipment and possible with more displacement. improvement in manufacturing process and materials ..

Type 096 is a separate program and have nothing to do with type 094 and modernized type 094A

 

[ACuriousPLAFan]

For China, I think the priority would be range of missiles over numbers.

Even if the 096 turns out to be as good as hoped, I still don’t think the PLAN would use them to do deep pacific patrols like the US. Due to geography and the vast numerical advantage of USN subs.

I don't see how that's a no-go for China, as the PLAN is gradually normalizing operations in the "true blue" portions of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In fact, the USN has a rapidly growing list of things to worry about than just PLAN SSBNs.

True, the SCS serves as a pretty good bastion for Chinese SSBNs to hide in. However, large segments of the Nine-Dash Line in the SCS is still very much bordered by other countries that are either increasingly and openly hostile (Philippines) if not with the potential to become hostile (Vietnam and Singapore) towards China.

From the way I see it, China's option of hiding her SSBNs in the SCS bastion will become more constrained as how naval warfare will be fought are getting ever more challenging and complex into the future, not just on the surface but especially in the underwater domain.

Hence, it does seem that the only probable way forward for Chinese SSBNs is into the deep, open oceans.

Thus being able to hit deep into CONUS while in the SCS or waters around China would be a much bigger priority over carrying a shedload of shorter ranged missiles that require the 096 to punch deep into the pacific to be in range to use.

Thus I think missile length would determine hull diameter and displacement principally for the 096.

Sure, I hold no disagreements with the length of newer/future Chinese SLBMs, i.e. JL-3. Having a longer SLBM means greater quantity of fuel, which translates to either of the two - Greater strike range with a smaller payload, or greater payload capacity with shorter range.

 

[plawolf]

I don't see how that's a no-go for China, as the PLAN is gradually normalizing operations in the "true blue" portions of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In fact, the USN has a rapidly growing list of things to worry about than just PLAN SSBNs.

I never said it would be no-one, and it is an operational reality that existing PLAN SLBMs don’t have the range to hit deep into CONUS from home waters, thus pacific patrols are a necessary evil.

However, from a strategic POV, it makes little sense to go to the enemy’s home court where they have all the advantages and you are significantly handicapped if you can avoid it.

This becomes especially important when it comes to signature protection. Why send your newest boats through geographical choke points where you know the enemy has listening arrays? If you know the precise sound signature of a target, you can specifically search for it to find it even if it’s quieter than ambient background noise. Why gift America that advantage needlessly?

True, the SCS serves as a pretty good bastion for Chinese SSBNs to hide in. However, large segments of the Nine-Dash Line in the SCS is still very much bordered by other countries that are either increasingly and openly hostile (Philippines) if not with the potential to become hostile (Vietnam and Singapore) towards China.

None of the neighbouring countries in the SCS have any need nor means to hunt PLAN SSBNs. Moreover, the principle benefit of the SCS is its size, and the fact that China has full spectrum dominance of the area due to geography.

That means if anyone gets enough idiotic and tries to mess with China’s SSBNs there, it can immediately challenge and defeat those attempts to keep its boats safe. Not an option in the pacific unless the PLAN permanently forward deploy carriers, which it’s not remotely close to being able to do in numbers that would be able to go toe-to-toe with the USN.

From the way I see it, China's option of hiding her SSBNs in the SCS bastion will become more constrained as how naval warfare will be fought are getting ever more challenging and complex into the future, not just on the surface but especially in the underwater domain.

Not a realistic threat in practice. The SCS has extremely deep areas that are surrounded by extremely shallow approaches. China enjoys the home field advantage there due to its island fortresses and vast surveillance presence.

Simply put, the PLAN has the muscle to protect its SSBNs from hostile MPAs during transit of the shallows, while it also has MPAs and surface assets that gives it a great chance of detecting hostile subs transiting those same shallows.

Can hostile SSNs sneak in? Probably, especially during peacetime. But China is constantly improving its surveillance capabilities in the SCS, so it comes ever more likely that it will catch foreign SSNs trying to sneak through. At which point it can direct its own MPAs to drop sonar buoys/ASW helicopters to deploy dipping sonars etc close by the foreign sub(s) and record their sound signatures so the PLAN will have a much easier time finding them again in the future.

That puts the USN in a bind. Do it deploy subs in peacetime to try and find and tail Chinese SSBNs and risk getting their own signatures compromised; or do they allow PLAN SSBNs to operate unmonitored to establish credible sea based second strike capabilities?

It’s basically the reversal of positions with PLAN SSBNs trying to patrol in the deep pacific.

Hence, it seems that the only way forward for Chinese SSBNs is into the deep, open oceans.

The deep open oceans is always the desired destination. The big question is how you get there and the costs of doing so.

Right now the PLAN is testing and trying with old subs that the USN probably already have recorded signatures of, so it looses nothing. All of that is designed to pave the way for future generations of PLAN subs that they might be able to reliably slip into the deep open oceans without taking unreasonably high risks of being detected and tailed.

 

[ACuriousPLAFan]

I never said it would be no-one, and it is an operational reality that existing PLAN SLBMs don’t have the range to hit deep into CONUS from home waters, thus pacific patrols are a necessary evil.

However, from a strategic POV, it makes little sense to go to the enemy’s home court where they have all the advantages and you are significantly handicapped if you can avoid it.

This becomes especially important when it comes to signature protection. Why send your newest boats through geographical choke points where you know the enemy has listening arrays? If you know the precise sound signature of a target, you can specifically search for it to find it even if it’s quieter than ambient background noise. Why gift America that advantage needlessly?

None of the neighbouring countries in the SCS have any need nor means to hunt PLAN SSBNs. Moreover, the principle benefit of the SCS is its size, and the fact that China has full spectrum dominance of the area due to geography.

That means if anyone gets enough idiotic and tries to mess with China’s SSBNs there, it can immediately challenge and defeat those attempts to keep its boats safe. Not an option in the pacific unless the PLAN permanently forward deploy carriers, which it’s not remotely close to being able to do in numbers that would be able to go toe-to-toe with the USN.

Not a realistic threat in practice. The SCS has extremely deep areas that are surrounded by extremely shallow approaches. China enjoys the home field advantage there due to its island fortresses and vast surveillance presence.

Simply put, the PLAN has the muscle to protect its SSBNs from hostile MPAs during transit of the shallows, while it also has MPAs and surface assets that gives it a great chance of detecting hostile subs transiting those same shallows.

Can hostile SSNs sneak in? Probably, especially during peacetime. But China is constantly improving its surveillance capabilities in the SCS, so it comes ever more likely that it will catch foreign SSNs trying to sneak through. At which point it can direct its own MPAs to drop sonar buoys/ASW helicopters to deploy dipping sonars etc close by the foreign sub(s) and record their sound signatures so the PLAN will have a much easier time finding them again in the future.

That puts the USN in a bind. Do it deploy subs in peacetime to try and find and tail Chinese SSBNs and risk getting their own signatures compromised; or do they allow PLAN SSBNs to operate unmonitored to establish credible sea based second strike capabilities?

It’s basically the reversal of positions with PLAN SSBNs trying to patrol in the deep pacific.

The deep open oceans is always the desired destination. The big question is how you get there and the costs of doing so.

Right now the PLAN is testing and trying with old subs that the USN probably already have recorded signatures of, so it looses nothing. All of that is designed to pave the way for future generations of PLAN subs that they might be able to reliably slip into the deep open oceans without taking unreasonably high risks of being detected and tailed.

I believe we can agree to disagree.

You may hold on to your "the SCS bastion is an impenetratable underwater fortress" idea/theory - While I'll maintain my stance where newer/next-gen Chinese SSBNs that are expected to be comparable to at least the Ohio and Vanguard will only be wasting their potentials when they can only spend much of their time swimming within a pre-definied geographical feature.

Also, SSNs are only one part of the increasingly huge equations at play in the SCS and elsewhere. Things are actually much more complex and uncertain for subsurface warfare in the regions than what you have just described.

Hence, the better idea would be by having multiple units of PLAN SSBNs (perhaps with fewer SLBMs per boat) to be on nuclear deterrent patrol in the vast oceans across the world at any given time. This guarantees that certain number of sea-based nuclear warheads that will survive and available for retaliatory/pre-emptive strikes against the enemy.

 

[Sardaukar20]

I don't see how that's a no-go for China, as the PLAN is gradually normalizing operations in the "true blue" portions of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In fact, the USN has a rapidly growing list of things to worry about than just PLAN SSBNs.

True, the SCS serves as a pretty good bastion for Chinese SSBNs to hide in. However, large segments of the Nine-Dash Line in the SCS is still very much bordered by other countries that are either increasingly and openly hostile (Philippines) if not with the potential to become hostile (Vietnam and Singapore) towards China.

From the way I see it, China's option of hiding her SSBNs in the SCS bastion will become more constrained as how naval warfare will be fought are getting ever more challenging and complex into the future, not just on the surface but especially in the underwater domain.

Hence, it does seem that the only probable way forward for Chinese SSBNs is into the deep, open oceans.

I agree. The PLAN's SSBN bastion strategy was made to compensate for the limitations of the existing Type 094 fleet. The Type 096 must be an evolution over the 094. So it has to be designed with next-level stealth, and the ability to operate in the open oceans. Hence, the design of Type 096 should be aiming for something like a modern ocean-going Western SSBN. If China needs another "bastion type" SSBN, then they might as well build more Type 094A boats.

Even though the US Navy is powerful in the oceans, the oceans are still an immensely big place. Finding a ship in an ocean is already a challenge, so finding a submarine there is an even more formidable task. A Chinese SSBN can find many more places to hide in the Pacific or Indian ocean than in the ECS or SCS. Of course a major concern is getting the Chinese SSBN to and from the ocean undetected. That is where the Type 096 requires the highest levels of contemporary stealth technology to sneak through the gaps between the First Island Chain undetected. I think achieving this high-level of stealth has been one the most challenging parts of the development of the Type 096 and even 095 boats.

 

[plawolf]

I believe we can agree to disagree.

You may hold on to your "the SCS bastion is an impenetratable underwater fortress" idea/theory - While I'll maintain my stance where newer/next-gen Chinese SSBNs that are expected to be comparable to at least the Ohio and Vanguard will only be wasting their potentials when they can only spend much of their time swimming within a pre-definied geographical feature.

Also, SSNs are only one part of the increasingly huge equations at play in the SCS and elsewhere. Things are actually much more complex and uncertain for subsurface warfare in the regions than what you have just described.

If anything, the better idea would be by having multiple units of PLAN SSBNs (perhaps with fewer SLBMs per boat) to be on nuclear deterrent patrol in the vast oceans across the entire world at any given time. This guarantees that certain number of sea-based nuclear warheads that will survive and available for retaliatory/pre-emptive strikes against the enemy.

If the SCS bastion is so much desirable per your description - Then I'd suggest that China should not build any more SSBNs. Building underground missile silos in Hainan would be a better choice instead.

I guess we just have to agree to disagree, but one thing I would stress is that the open oceans are not as vast as you might think when it comes to suitable locations for SSBNs to lurk.

Recall that only a few years ago, British and French boomers actually collided with each other while out on patrol. What are the odds of that happening if the whole world’s oceans are all their playgrounds?

So even after breaking out into the open Oceans, don’t be surprised if PLAN SSBNs stay within certain bastions for no other reason that geographical realities limiting the truly best hiding places.

Also, the best submarines in the world are still subject to geographical realities. And being the quietest subs in the world counts for nought if you need to sail past enemy hydrophone arrays and other detection systems that can detect you and assign you an enemy SSN tail wherever you go.

For SSBNs, the only performance metric that matters is the ability to reliably launch on command and hit your targets. If you can do that from home waters, so much more power to you. Just like how you wouldn’t care about an enemy fighter being more agile if you can nail him from BVR ranges before he can even get a chance to put that agility to use.

Also, building a world class SSBN is a long journey, not something you can do in one go. That would be like Jai Hinds wanting their Tejas to be the best fighter in the world and refusing to buy it until then. Compared to China starting with J6s and getting closer to the state of the art with each generation until the J20. Which approach do you think is most effective?