075 LHD thread

An interesting question is whether China would build possibly smaller (relative to a LPD) LPHs to complement its 071 LPDs rather than building all-in-one LHDs. While I have long espoused China having more use for a LHD over a CV, I can see LPHs fitting the bill to complement the 071 in a dispersion strategy for flexibility in MOOTW during peacetime and for survival during wartime. This is especially true if building and operating multiple LPHs do not cost significantly more than operating a single LPD.
 

Blitzo

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An interesting question is whether China would build possibly smaller (relative to a LPD) LPHs to complement its 071 LPDs rather than building all-in-one LHDs. While I have long espoused China having more use for a LHD over a CV, I can see LPHs fitting the bill to complement the 071 in a dispersion strategy for flexibility in MOOTW during peacetime and for survival during wartime. This is especially true if building and operating multiple LPHs do not cost significantly more than operating a single LPD.

I think it's worth keeping in mind what a LPH, LPD, and LHD and LHA all are.
LPH = landing platform helicopter
LHD = landing helicopter dock
LHA = landing helicopter assault

LPHs, LHDs, and LHAs are the archetypal "helicopter carriers" but only LHDs have well decks, while LPHs and LHAs lack well decks and only operate helicopters and/or VSTOL planes.
That is to say, I don't think we should use the LPH designation to refer to "smaller" LHAs such as the Iwo Jima class, or the UK's Ocean class. If anything the LPH designation seems increasingly out of date, and if one wants to suggest a "smaller sized LHA", I think simply describing it as so is more accurate than using the older LPH designation.


Now, on the subject at hand, I personally also believe the Chinese Navy should consider building a number of smaller sized LHD type ships (note I use "LHD" -- such ships should optimally have the ability to take on landing craft and AAVs and to launch them as well), but this should not come at the expense of larger LHDs. (I also don't see why China should adopt smaller dedicated LHAs which lack well decks; forgoing well decks will make such ships dedicated helicopter carriers rather than more flexible amphibious assault ships which can perform a wider variety of missions and help contribute to carrying LCACs, LSTs, or AAVs during wartime. I'd rather have a Mistral type ship than a Hyuga or Ocean type ship)

That is to say, I think there is a benefit of having a large number of smaller aviation capable amphibious assault ships for the very reasons you mentioned (MOOTW, dispersion, and also lower operating costs during peacetime), but I think there is also a place in the Chinese Navy for a smaller number of larger and more capable LHDs that can support larger aviation complements, more landing crafts, and with more internal capacity overall.

Depending on how the economy goes, around 2030 I'd eventually like to see something like this:
8 25k ton 071 LPDs
8 22k ton LHDs
4 40k ton LHDs
To make 4 amphibious assault groups each with a 40k ton LHD, two 22k ton LHDs and two 25k ton LPDs

However, if the Chinese Navy is forced to choose between only procuring 40k ton LHDs vs only procuring 22k ton LHDs, the choice becomes somewhat more difficult to balance, as it will depends on the procurement and maintenance costs of both classes of ships and the budget available.
For instance, is the budget to buy and operate and maintain four 40k ton LHDs enough to buy, operate and maintain eight 22k ton LHDs instead? If not, then is it enough to buy/operate/maintain a smaller number such as six 22k ton LHDs? If the cost is equal for both, then are there any other downsides to cost regarding having more (but lesser capability) LHDs versus having less (but higher capability) LHDs with regards to the Chinese Navy's amphibious assault and sealift doctrine?
 

Totoro

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just what for would china need such a large intercontinental amphibious fleet for as early as 2030? That'd almost make it on par with US fleet circa 2030. And including the 072 ships, zubrs (which don't seem they're going away) it may even be as potent as US amphibious fleet.

US I get, it wants to be involved half way around the world, it wants to be able to disembark literally 10-15 thousand combat troops in a single day. Chinese needs, circa 2030, seem more modest. Perhaps an intercontinental intervention order of magnitude several thousand troops/wave in a situation where US would not be involved in any way. But if USN is involved, then any intercontinental assault fleet would just not get anyhwere in 2030. Probably not even in 2040.

So for 2030 timeframe I see chinese primarly goal being upkeep of medium distance assault fleet. Assaulting various neighbour land masses, perhaps up to 1000 or 2000 km away at most. That's something PLAN can hope to try to achieve even with US involved.

So a fleet of 4-6 071 plus 3-4 25-ish thousnad ton LHD seems more than enough by 2030. Accompanied by a modernised 072 fleet (Even if it means developing a whole new successor class of very light LPD ships. which recent 072 with their docks are, in reality)
 
I think it's worth keeping in mind what a LPH, LPD, and LHD and LHA all are.
LPH = landing platform helicopter
LHD = landing helicopter dock
LHA = landing helicopter assault

LPHs, LHDs, and LHAs are the archetypal "helicopter carriers" but only LHDs have well decks, while LPHs and LHAs lack well decks and only operate helicopters and/or VSTOL planes.
That is to say, I don't think we should use the LPH designation to refer to "smaller" LHAs such as the Iwo Jima class, or the UK's Ocean class. If anything the LPH designation seems increasingly out of date, and if one wants to suggest a "smaller sized LHA", I think simply describing it as so is more accurate than using the older LPH designation.


Now, on the subject at hand, I personally also believe the Chinese Navy should consider building a number of smaller sized LHD type ships (note I use "LHD" -- such ships should optimally have the ability to take on landing craft and AAVs and to launch them as well), but this should not come at the expense of larger LHDs. (I also don't see why China should adopt smaller dedicated LHAs which lack well decks; forgoing well decks will make such ships dedicated helicopter carriers rather than more flexible amphibious assault ships which can perform a wider variety of missions and help contribute to carrying LCACs, LSTs, or AAVs during wartime. I'd rather have a Mistral type ship than a Hyuga or Ocean type ship)

That is to say, I think there is a benefit of having a large number of smaller aviation capable amphibious assault ships for the very reasons you mentioned (MOOTW, dispersion, and also lower operating costs during peacetime), but I think there is also a place in the Chinese Navy for a smaller number of larger and more capable LHDs that can support larger aviation complements, more landing crafts, and with more internal capacity overall.

Depending on how the economy goes, around 2030 I'd eventually like to see something like this:
8 25k ton 071 LPDs
8 22k ton LHDs
4 40k ton LHDs
To make 4 amphibious assault groups each with a 40k ton LHD, two 22k ton LHDs and two 25k ton LPDs

However, if the Chinese Navy is forced to choose between only procuring 40k ton LHDs vs only procuring 22k ton LHDs, the choice becomes somewhat more difficult to balance, as it will depends on the procurement and maintenance costs of both classes of ships and the budget available.
For instance, is the budget to buy and operate and maintain four 40k ton LHDs enough to buy, operate and maintain eight 22k ton LHDs instead? If not, then is it enough to buy/operate/maintain a smaller number such as six 22k ton LHDs? If the cost is equal for both, then are there any other downsides to cost regarding having more (but lesser capability) LHDs versus having less (but higher capability) LHDs with regards to the Chinese Navy's amphibious assault and sealift doctrine?

I'm still not sure why the designation of LPH got changed to LHA but if that's the terminology today I'll go with it, same difference. Obviously LHDs are the complete package, I'm just throwing it out there that LHAs could also meet China's needs.

My thoughts on what China needs and wants are much more similar to Totoro's thoughts. A basic amphibious force for outlying island defense, needs which the 071s already fulfill, and a minimal capacity to learn about or exercise seaborne airpower such as the Liaoning and perhaps one or two additional CVs, and in a similar vein with LHDs/LHAs. This would allow for medium scale airborne evacuations from even hostile territory in the case of Chinese citizens suddenly finding themselves in a failed state or warzone, and small to medium scale but well-rounded amphibious operations in war.
 

Blitzo

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@Totoro
That many LPDs and LHDs is probably a bit much; I'm just very fond of rounded numbers and clean ratios. I agree that 4+8 LHDs and 8 LPDs by 2030 is not likely.

However I do foresee the need for the Chinese Navy to conduct large scale and complex amphibious assault operations around Africa by the early 2030s against any 3rd rate state military, while also having a permanent and smaller amphibious assault presence in the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific as well.... keeping in mind that actual complex blue water operations (such as around Africa) would likely only occur when they are "China vs country/failed state XYZ". that is to say, the US would not directly seek to militarily intervene against China. It's not an unreasonable assumption; china and the US have many similar interests in blue water and africa, beyond their disagreements in the western pacific.

I'm not sure what all this will actually translate to in terms of amphibious assault ships and types of ships by that time... I'd put it at 8 25k ton 071 LPDs and 4 40k ton 075 LHDs. The smaller 072 LSTs are very useful in westpac but simply lack the endurance for true blue water missions. Given that during any blue water operation only a proportion of the blue water capable amphibious assault fleet will be available (as some will be in maintenance, some will have crews on rest, and some may even be engaged elsewhere), I think only one third to half of any hypothetical navy would be immediately available to respond to a crisis, let's say 3 071s and 2 075s out of 8 071s and 4 075s in the navy's orbat. such a force would be very capable of course, and supported by other auxiliaries and sealift ships, could allow the navy to do a medium scale comprehensive amphibious assault operation with minimum casualties, especially if supported by either the air force deployed to the region from forward bases, or possibly a CSG.
However I'd also like to see some smaller and more cost effective amphibious assault ships as well; I think the 22k ton LHD is a bit too big to buy en masse if one is also buying the 40k ton LHD... however the export 071 LPD around 10,000 tons could be a candidate.


All in all it sounds like we differ in terms of our visions of the kinds of missions China's navy will be doing by 2030.
I envision the navy seeking to permanently have 2/3 of its orbat in westpac as a "home fleet", while 1/3 of its orbat is permanently in blue water whether it is around africa, the indian ocean, or doing port calls around the world. I also envision the navy to be capable of complex blue water power projection missions at long distances, but retaining the use of that same capability in westpac as well. I see the need for unilateral, complex power projection and intervention (not involving US as a direct opfor) as real and one which will grow, while the goal to dominate westpac will become more realistic and palpable by 2030 as well, through sheer capability, however neither mission will be conducted by the navy simultaneously.
In other words, I see the navy as needing to be capable enough and with enough long range ships to do the blue water missions if need be, but to have them in sensible enough numbers such that they can be useful for westpac contingencies against high tech opfors as well. I think there is an overlap between these two missions that can produce a fleet structure which is capable in both missions but also cost effective such that neither mission receives so much focus that it compromises the ability of the navy to complete the other if need be.
 
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