056 class FFL/corvette
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Back on topic.
Yes, Asif, they are moving right along towards finishing the first 20 vessels.
I now have HD as having launched 4 and building their fifth, HP as having launched 4 and building their 5th, Liaonan as having launched three and building their 4th with a 5th's parts/kit laying there, and Wuchang as having launched three and I am not sure of the status of their 4th and 5th.
Fourteen of these vessels have already been launched and are in the water. Three are on sea trials, three are outfitting, and eight are commissioned already. A very fast build rate.
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let's not kid ourselves. it's not just in recent years that china has "become aware" of the importance of being a maritime power, it's only in recent years that china has had the economic strength to support a strong navy, and the need to protect overseas interests related to its economy as well as the ability to project power.
countries represent their own interests, japan and china, though economically tied, have divergent interests when it comes to resources and geopolitical alliance. because china has become more influential economically and militarily, it now tries to push against the american hegemony of the seas (of which japan is a part of) to solidify its own sphere of interest. sensing that the americans are not so on top of their game as before and that japan is also having some problems, china is deliberately testing the waters with more and more audacious moves just to see what they could get away with.
at the same time, japan is stuck in economic trouble, so the right wing wins support and drums up the china threat to make the country cohesive. what this leads to is rampant militarism on both sides. (perhaps more justified on china's end considering the current balance of power/china's size)
this is great for us military fans, but the situation is dangerously reminiscent to the economic malaise/nationalistic militarism among the major powers in the 1930s. my only hope is that we are much too connected economically now, that war will be good for no one, and that the political pundits are more bark than bite.
as long as no one fires the first shot, china has the long term advantage in that its military and its economy still has alot of room for growth, and we armchair generals can continue to marvel at all the spanking new 056s and 052Ds that they put out.
i believe that the 056 is specifically tailored to patrols and potential standoffs in the south china sea. by nature and armarment it does not seem suitable for any major offensive role but is adequate for establishing a credible deterrant to interference with chinese interests within the south china sea and green water zones.
the development of the 056 shows that china takes a nuanced approach when dealing with potential adversaries... well warranted as china's potential adversaries come in many shapes and sizes.
the development of the 056 shows that china takes a nuanced approach when dealing with potential adversaries... well warranted as china's potential adversaries come in many shapes and sizes.
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I agree with you and I think we can see a clear pattern to the modernisation since 1990.
Each decade has seemed to concentrate on one specific arm of the PLA, based both on the overall cost and technological capability and the strategic need (one tending to tailor according to the other). I am also referring not so much to unveiling of new systems and platforms, but more properly, their introduction in significant numbers.
In the 90's it was land forces that were at the cutting edge, where numbers were dramatically cut and the remainder transformed from a "Peoples Army" to a modern fully mechanised force. China is a land power first and foremost and defence of its land borders with land forces its most critical mission. Land forces are also the cheapest to upgrade and the easiest to deploy and maintain.
In Noughties, it was the Airforce and we saw the transformation from an Airforce of J8's to one significantly composed of J10's and J11's. The importance of Air Power needs no discussion, but this was the decade that Chinese Air Power was able to move from being a defensive deterrent, to the PLAAF developing basic power projection and a greatly enhanced range of capabilities. An Airforce is more expensive than an army, but cheaper than a navy
This decade it is the turn of the Navy and the first major event is the mass production and replacement of the lighter vessels, principally with the Type 056 and the Type 054 family of frigates. We also know that a range of larger ships and Amphibious/Aviation Carriers will be along very soon. Likewise to the other Arms of the PLA, the PLAN is moving from a simple coastal deterrent to a Maritime Power in its own right. IT is the last of the major services, the one with the least historical significance to China and also the most expensive to build and maintain.
I agree with your overall analysis, just wanted to note a few points where my opinion differs.
China's Army is now fully motorized (as in all equipped with vehicles) but not mechanized (as in all equipped with armored vehicles). The level of armor protection in the majority of Chinese armored vehicles is questionable and it seems unlikely that body armor is widely available to its troops.
China's Air Force is only partially modernized through the deployment of advanced multirole fighters. Bombers, transports (as well as all sorts of specialized planes based off of transports), and helicopters of all types are still lacking in quality and quantity.
With the rapid production and deployment of the Type 056 China's Navy is being thoroughly modernized in quality with modern types across the force, but is still in the process of building up enough quantity of existing types and introducing some new types (such as CVs, LPDs, LHDs) to meet the organic growth in the country's needs for a blue water force.
Despite all the equipment modernization and media coverage of exercises it is unclear to what degree personnel, tactics, and strategy have been adjusted to make full use of the modernized equipment. It is also noteworthy that China's military has not seen combat for decades and has never seen combined arms combat.
In a self-improvement context China's military has dramatically improved capabilities, this is also true relative to its weakest potential adversaries. However when compared to its strongest potential adversaries who have continued their own military advancement, China has merely kept up with having military capabilities that are barely sufficient to deter aggression and some coercion.
in a purely material sense you are perhaps correct, but i cannot agree with your analysis of the implications of china's military modernization. in the world of international military affairs, it is more about what you have and what people think you can do, rather than what you actually would and could do. china's biggest deterrant to agression were already created in the 1960s when they built the atomic bomb. delivery systems and potential consequences aside, everybody suddenly had to take china seriously in a way they didn't have to before. in the volitile world of cold-war superfactions, disagreements with potential adversaries like the soviets and the u.s. could very well spell atomic war (or the threat of atomic war), and china had to have something to bring parity to the table.
with nukes in the pocket, china didn't have to worry about much for a very long time. nobody was going to invade the most populous country in the world holding nukes, no matter how antiquated and ineffective their conventional troops were. because china did not have many relations with other countries, it did not have economic interests to protect overseas. when china began its economic boom with market reform, planners realized that soon china may become involved in disputes related to its economy, over influence, territory, sea lanes of communication, etc. that is when they began overhauling the conventional forces (the influx of cash and american support in the 1980s helped too) to deal with such a contingency.
china's military development has always been practical before anything else. it knows it does not yet have the ability to project hard power through a land/air war very far (technological bottlenecks like large transport aircraft/engine design, political obstacles like american hegemony) while it can muscle its way into getting what it wants through diplomatic solutions most of the time simply because of the size of its economy.
today, america rules the waves, and china has recently been trying to achieve naval technological parity with the west because the sea lanes of communication and trade are where its priorities are, so it can secure continued access over the raw materials that are the lifeblood of its economy. access and security of sea lanes are not something that any country will likely shoot off nukes over, but they are critical just the same, which is why china feels the need to expand the reach and capibility of its navy over the other branches of its armed services at this particular juncture.
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