055 DDG Large Destroyer Thread

[vincent]

055 is versatile. Sure if it's protected entirely by 052D/054s for the MR/LRSAM, then it can just load up with 112 strike missiles. But in reality, it really can't rely on those ships being there at all times. That really reduces operational flexibility. It needs to operate as the focal point of area defense and provide ABM. It needs to be jack of all trades. It needs to be a heavy strike power kind of warship. It needs to be able to seamless perform sensor fusion and providing targeting data to other ships.

I mean, if you were to build a ship with a lot of UVLS, powerful sensors, stealth and speed, 055 is pretty ideal.

Yes, 055 is a jack of all trades. However, considering 055’s sensors are mainly focus on anti-air warfare, loading majority of its UVLS with anti-air missiles is a much better use of its abilities. If PLAN wants fo fire hundreds of anti-ship missiles at an American carrier battle group, an arsenal ship is a much cost effective solution.

 

[dirtyid]

The book's skepticism is partly from the test results from the August 26th, 2020 test of DF-21D and DF-26. So if we, as critical readers, want to confirm or refute these views, then it's a matter of determining whether those tests succeeded.

"When interviewed about it (sic. the August 26th tests) in November 2020,

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... Months later, Vice Admiral Jeffery Trussler, the deputy chief of naval operations for information warfare, implied that the US Navy was

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."

So you can collate different sources, assess their credibility, then draw your conclusion. And viola, a way to assess the validity of these views. No one said that it would be trivial.

This test has racked my brain for a while. Some unstructured thoughts. The propaganda layer of Aug 2020 test is interesting, PRC noting test was successful without detail, initial US confirmation that missiles struck target, retraction merely confirming launches, some doubt over number of missiles, former PRC senior colonel Wang Xiangsui confirming missiles successfully hit moving ships 3 months later in November. No followup by US denying claim. Herzinger assumes lack of offical PRC evidence of successful test = lack of confidence in capability. Even though test was announced days earlier, US almost daily ELINT flight in region can demonstrate PRC AShM is vapourware but chose not to which is interesting considering how big of a propaganda win that would have been. Then Herzinger posits PRC moved testing back to inland because they're not confident of capabilities, and not for the obvious reason of opsec - again basically daily western ELINT. Collate other developemenmts, PRC conducts hundreds of missiles tests in the desert, rarely any over water for opsec reasons, constant trickle of new PRC sensor and guidance developments, OSINT of new mock up targets being struck. Frankly Herzinger popped onto the scene barely a couple years ago, there's nothing to suggest he has particular expertise. Doyle is a general Asian defense writer. Trussler and US brass talk shit for propaganda like PRC brass, I think he placed high confidence in disrupting killchain, but developments suggest PRC kill chain and terminal guidance becoming more durable last few years (tons of yaogan launches, news of better sensors/algos, not just on interceptor but regional infra). Reviewing OSINT/industry talks like CSIS group panels on hypersonic defense last few years and the consensus seems to be, need better interceptors, maybe available mid 20s. Are PRC missiles vapourware? I don't know, but gut feeling is Herzinger doesn't know any better. Also consider fact that he has very few prior writings on the subject and went straight to book sales.

E: I just noticed Patchwork called him a goober which is probably not a bad attribution if you have good sense of Herzingers twitter history. Honestly had to do a double take when the book was announced and saw his name attached.

 

[Mirabo]

.

 

[tphuang]

Yes, 055 is a jack of all trades. However, considering 055’s sensors are mainly focus on anti-air warfare, loading majority of its UVLS with anti-air missiles is a much better use of its abilities. If PLAN wants fo fire hundreds of anti-ship missiles at an American carrier battle group, an arsenal ship is a much cost effective solution.

So, what would your arsenal ship look like and how would it be different from 055?

 

[Temstar]

The book's skepticism is partly from the test results from the August 26th, 2020 test of DF-21D and DF-26. So if we, as critical readers, want to confirm or refute these views, then it's a matter of determining whether those tests succeeded.

"When interviewed about it (sic. the August 26th tests) in November 2020,

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

... Months later, Vice Admiral Jeffery Trussler, the deputy chief of naval operations for information warfare, implied that the US Navy was

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

."

So you can collate different sources, assess their credibility, then draw your conclusion. And viola, a way to assess the validity of these views. No one said that it would be trivial.

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

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We had a discussion right on this forum back in 2020 why there was this "2 missile vs 4 missile" confusion coming from the US and one possibility was the two missiles each released a suborbital targeting module which provided the warheads with terminal guidance data via the cooler rear of the warhead not affected by reentry plasma sheath. US being not familiar with how this system worked may have at first mistook those modules for MIRV'd warheads.

If that's true then US assessment on value of anti-ship ballistic missiles doesn't strike me as all that valuable.

 

[lzmfVw]

US intelligence told US secretary of defence that China won't have an operational stealthy fighter before 2025. We plebs are not alone in the dark. I won't say they are as incompetent this time as last time, but I won't be as confident as you in them.

I see where you are going with this. It is important to note that being skeptical does not detract from, nor does expressing it mean you are ridiculing, PLA modernization accomplishments. It is natural for any endeavor to have fits and starts. In fact, it behooves you to be skeptical and curious because that is the type of mind that is necessary to identify one's own deficiencies and address them.

 

[FairAndUnbiased]

The book's skepticism is partly from the test results from the August 26th, 2020 test of DF-21D and DF-26. So if we, as critical readers, want to confirm or refute these views, then it's a matter of determining whether those tests succeeded.

"When interviewed about it (sic. the August 26th tests) in November 2020,

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

... Months later, Vice Admiral Jeffery Trussler, the deputy chief of naval operations for information warfare, implied that the US Navy was

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

."

So you can collate different sources, assess their credibility, then draw your conclusion. And viola, a way to assess the validity of these views. No one said that it would be trivial.

There you go, I highlighted the relevant part for you.

 

[vincent]

So, what would your arsenal ship look like and how would it be different from 055?

Just a fast ship with loads of UVLS, a few CEC receivers and maybe communication system for missiles mid-course guidance. No AESA radars, no VDS, no towed sonar arrays, etc.

 

[lzmfVw]

This test has racked my brain for a while. Some unstructured thoughts. The propaganda layer of Aug 2020 test is interesting, PRC noting test was successful without detail, initial US confirmation that missiles struck target, retraction merely confirming launches, some doubt over number of missiles, former PRC senior colonel Wang Xiangsui confirming missiles successfully hit moving ships 3 months later in November. No followup by US denying claim. Herzinger assumes lack of offical PRC evidence of successful test = lack of confidence in capability. Even though test was announced days earlier, US almost daily ELINT flight in region can demonstrate PRC AShM is vapourware but chose not to which is interesting considering how big of a propaganda win that would have been. Then Herzinger posits PRC moved testing back to inland because they're not confident of capabilities, and not for the obvious reason of opsec - again basically daily western ELINT. Collate other developemenmts, PRC conducts hundreds of missiles tests in the desert, rarely any over water for opsec reasons, constant trickle of new PRC sensor and guidance developments, OSINT of new mock up targets being struck. Frankly Herzinger popped onto the scene barely a couple years ago, there's nothing to suggest he has particular expertise. Doyle is a general Asian defense writer. Trussler and US brass talk shit for propaganda like PRC brass, I think he placed high confidence in disrupting killchain, but developments suggest PRC kill chain and terminal guidance becoming more durable last few years (tons of yaogan launches, news of better sensors/algos, not just on interceptor but regional infra). Reviewing OSINT/industry talks like CSIS group panels on hypersonic defense last few years and the consensus seems to be, need better interceptors, maybe available mid 20s. Are PRC missiles vapourware? I don't know, but gut feeling is Herzinger doesn't know any better. Also consider fact that he has very few prior writings on the subject and went straight to book sales.

E: I just noticed Patchwork called him a goober which is probably not a bad attribution if you have good sense of Herzingers twitter history. Honestly had to do a double take when the book was announced and saw his name attached.

Yes! I would say this, the conclusion that the book drew, although probably to the surprise of no one, is that China's AShBM, regardless of its efficacy, has fulfilled its function as a deterrent when China did not have conventional parity with the USN.

Nowadays, it is the huge conventional PLAN + PLARF + PLAAF anti-shipping complex that is the deterrent. My boring personal take to extend the obvious conclusion: the continued deterrence value of AShBM is no longer the sole factor, or perhaps even an important factor, in a peer conflict.

 

[FairAndUnbiased]

Yes! I would say this, the conclusion that the book drew, although probably to the surprise of no one, is that China's AShBM, regardless of its efficacy, has fulfilled its function as a deterrent when China did not have conventional parity with the USN.

Nowadays, it is the huge conventional PLAN + PLARF + PLAAF anti-shipping complex that is the deterrent. My boring personal take to extend the obvious conclusion: the continued deterrence value of AShBM is no longer the sole factor, or perhaps even an important factor, in a peer conflict.

I see. If I am to understand, you are stating that a long ranged munition that is expensive and difficult to intercept is completely unimportant in naval combat.