055 DDG Large Destroyer Thread

[Totoro]

it's all about definitions. I personally can't make myself define "challenging dominance" as something other than having a go at parity. In my mind, its not about making other side's dominance weaker, but having a try at being equally dominant as the opponent.

 

[latenlazy]

This post assumes "challenge the usn dominance in the pacific" means complete parity at half way point between US and China.

How could a 2028 PLAN compete with USN in the pacific? Don't see that as possible. 2028 PLAN will have something like 4 carriers with 120-135 combat planes to go into pacific. USN will have 11 carriers (if there's a war for the pacific, USN Atlantic fleet will pretty much be diverted to Pacific as well) with 500 or so combat planes.

PLAN will operate perhaps one dozen nuclear attack subs. USN will be operating 50 or so.

PLAN may have 50 more conventional subs, but reaching half way into pacific would require half or more of sub's fuel reserve. And it'd take some 20 days, if snorkeling the whole way. Since that's not survivable, less direct routes with going deeper would be needed - eventually making the whole trip even longer. With no bases nearby, it'd be very hard to sustain such subs half way in the pacific, and their usefulness would be just a fraction of what it is around the first island chain.

PLAN will have something like 80-90 large surface combatants. But a fair part of them will be smaller frigates, and 054A won't be that potent or modern in 2028 (it's a bit behind the curve as it is even today) USN will have similar number of large surface combatants. But they will all be 9000 tons or larger. Burke is more modern and capable than 054A. Yes, there will be maybe a dozen 055 by then, but that's not the overwhelming advantage in the sense USN advantage in carriers and subs is.

056 is pretty small, will be very hard pressed to be useful half way into pacific. LCS, however limited it is in firepower, is larger and made for transoceanic ops.

Most importantly, USN will still have a bunch of bases for force projection. Japan, Guam, Wake, Hawaii. China will have none, except those they manage to capture. Which, since US will have extra planes at those bases and since US will still have 2-3 times larger assault fleet, likely won't happen. At best, first island chain bases might get taken.

Anyway, if one defines challenging USN dominance in the pacific as merely chipping away at their dominance, then PLAN already can prevent much USN ops within the first island chain. And by 2028 that might even expand to PLAN deterring USN from most ops within second island chain.

“Parity” largely depends on spatial and positional context. As a global military force China will continue to fall short of the US by 2028, but within its own geographic domain a more accurate comparison of power would need to consider both geographic advantages and disadvantages, as well assets outside their navies, especially given that China and the US, by nature of their strategic positions within the theater of interest, wouldn’t share the same vulnerabilities and strengths and thus wouldn’t be fighting in the same ways. This then means different types of assets will matter in determining relative strength for each country within the confines of their unique conditions and circumstances.

Furthermore, I think a direct 1 to 1 comparison of each country’s naval fleets is a bit misleading. By burden of their broader set of global interests, which they still have to be able to defend, the entirety of the US’s naval power wouldn’t be available to fight in the Westpac. At best the USN could maybe allocate 60%-70% of their fleet to fight in a conflict with China. Any more and the US risks starting fires in other parts of the world where they have adversaries and rivals, which can then threaten to unravel the whole foundation of global American power. The USN is so huge because of the excess capacity necessary to maintain distant force projection across the whole world. At least in 2028 China’s navy won’t be strapped down by the same conditions.

 

[latenlazy]

it's all about definitions. I personally can't make myself define "challenging dominance" as something other than having a go at parity. In my mind, its not about making other side's dominance weaker, but having a try at being equally dominant as the opponent.

I get where you’re coming from, but even that mental exercise isn’t as straightforward as it may seem. For China to achieve overall strategic parity with the US it doesn’t need to match US power one for one everywhere around the world. It just needs to overmatch the US in one major theater enough to neutralize the US’s ability to contest any region it wants without severe impunity. Just as there are incumbent advantages, there are also incumbent disadvantages.

 

[Totoro]

And that home theater in this case happens to be the Pacific. Which is basically US' home ocean. It's gateway to US itself. So if there is one theater US would go all-in when protecting against China, it'd be the Pacific.

Anyway, the ships and planes are nice to have, but that conflict would be decided by bases. Until China can somehow negate US access to those bases (politically or militarily), PLAN will always be quite far behind. And to do it militarily, PLAN and PLAAF would have to be even stronger than USN and USAF in overall, nominal terms.

While i don't agree US would divert only 65% of its forces towards china if a total war with china starts, for this mental exercise i'll go along with it. And say that even just 65% of USN numbers that i stated in my first post of this discussion are enough to prevent PLAN from taking over or blockading any second chain bases (or farther bases). Probably Guam, very likely Wake and certainly Hawaii bases would still be operational. (by Hawaii I mean several bases, reaching all the way to Midway islands)

 

[latenlazy]

And that home theater in this case happens to be the Pacific. Which is basically US' home ocean. It's gateway to US itself. So if there is one theater US would go all-in when protecting against China, it'd be the Pacific.

Anyway, the ships and planes are nice to have, but that conflict would be decided by bases. Until China can somehow negate US access to those bases (politically or militarily), PLAN will always be quite far behind. And to do it militarily, PLAN and PLAAF would have to be even stronger than USN and USAF in overall, nominal terms.

The Pacific isn’t one theater. There isn’t enough land between the two sides of that ocean to make it so. Furthermore, if the US does commit the entirety of its forces to defend the Pacific, it won’t matter whether it beats China or not. It will still be ceding the foundations of its global power all the same. Beating China isn’t the sole purpose for which the US military exists. That will factor into the US’s strategic decisions in any conflict with China in the WestPac.

Bases close to home are very different from bases maintained at vast distance. Bases built on contiguously shared territory are stronger and more persistent than bases scattered across wider geographic spaces and territories. The US has more aircraft carriers because it *needs* more aircraft carriers to make up for spatial dispersion. Furthermore, the longer your supply lines stretch the more points of weakness and the more vulnerable they are to disruption. Resilience matters in determining overall calculations of strength. I don’t think the sum of those parts equate to the PLAN and PLAAF needing to be stronger than the USN and USAF in overall nominal terms, or matching the US on the same kinds of assets. There’s a reason the Pentagon is still scrambling to come up with effective answers against A2AD even as China is layering and augmenting A2AD with more conventional power.

 

[Totoro]

I agree. Which is why USN would the hardest time operating near China. And a hard time operating between 1st and 2nd island chain. But as I am talking about Pacific mid point - PLAN would be very much helpless there, compared to USN.

 

[latenlazy]

I agree. Which is why USN would the hardest time operating near China. And a hard time operating between 1st and 2nd island chain. But as I am talking about Pacific mid point - PLAN would be very much helpless there, compared to USN.

Okay. It sounds like we were speaking past one another there (sorry!). I agree with you about contesting the Pacific midpoint, but my point is once we’re talking about ceding the second island chains to China the US ceases to be a power in the WestPac region, and that effectively means China has attained strategic parity, even if it doesn’t mean China has attained total force parity.

 

[Iron Man]

This post assumes "challenge the usn dominance in the pacific" means complete parity at half way point between US and China.

How could a 2028 PLAN compete with USN in the pacific? Don't see that as possible. 2028 PLAN will have something like 4 carriers with 120-135 combat planes to go into pacific. USN will have 11 carriers (if there's a war for the pacific, USN Atlantic fleet will pretty much be diverted to Pacific as well) with 500 or so combat planes.

PLAN will operate perhaps one dozen nuclear attack subs. USN will be operating 50 or so.

PLAN may have 50 more conventional subs, but reaching half way into pacific would require half or more of sub's fuel reserve. And it'd take some 20 days, if snorkeling the whole way. Since that's not survivable, less direct routes with going deeper would be needed - eventually making the whole trip even longer. With no bases nearby, it'd be very hard to sustain such subs half way in the pacific, and their usefulness would be just a fraction of what it is around the first island chain.

PLAN will have something like 80-90 large surface combatants. But a fair part of them will be smaller frigates, and 054A won't be that potent or modern in 2028 (it's a bit behind the curve as it is even today) USN will have similar number of large surface combatants. But they will all be 9000 tons or larger. Burke is more modern and capable than 054A. Yes, there will be maybe a dozen 055 by then, but that's not the overwhelming advantage in the sense USN advantage in carriers and subs is.

056 is pretty small, will be very hard pressed to be useful half way into pacific. LCS, however limited it is in firepower, is larger and made for transoceanic ops.

Most importantly, USN will still have a bunch of bases for force projection. Japan, Guam, Wake, Hawaii. China will have none, except those they manage to capture. Which, since US will have extra planes at those bases and since US will still have 2-3 times larger assault fleet, likely won't happen. At best, first island chain bases might get taken.

Anyway, if one defines challenging USN dominance in the pacific as merely chipping away at their dominance, then PLAN already can prevent much USN ops within the first island chain. And by 2028 that might even expand to PLAN deterring USN from most ops within second island chain.

You're not thinking logistics. USN will certainly not be operating "50" subs anywhere near the Western Pacific; BTW this is what I am referring to in terms of parity in the next decade or so, not the entirety of the Pacific Ocean. A PLAN that can reach the West Coast of the US in force is a PLAN that has reached parity with the USN, so that is not what I am talking about. The US military is first of all split 60/40 in the Pacific and Atlantic theaters; this includes USN, USAF, etc. Second, the bases in Japan, Korea, and Guam do NOT contain all of the 60% of the Pacific forces. Most are in fact based either in Hawaii or on the West Coast of the continental US, which means most of the Pacific forces will have to travel long distances to get to theaters of operation with significantly less availability as a result. Conversely, Chinese forces will have much less distance to travel and much shorter logistics chains. Third, it is not clear that the bases closer to potential theaters of conflict even have the capacity to sustain all the forces that could enter the Western Pacific over the long term, or even on a short term basis. Fourth, the bases that are actually closer to potential theaters are easily within range of massed ballistic and cruise missile attacks from China's coastline which will significantly degrade their effectiveness. China doesn't even need to have the same number of forces in total that the USN does in the Western Pacific to reach parity in military strength with the US in that region. The kicker is that the US military has recently become afflicted by the simultaneous misfortune of both having bases too close to China and too far away from China, the former misfortune as I said being the result of the mass proliferation of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles, and soon the result of extending the range of PLAN, PLANAF, and PLAAF forces as well as their armaments.

 

[latenlazy]

Fourth, the bases that are actually closer to potential theaters are easily within range of massed ballistic and cruise missile attacks from China's coastline

Just a niggle here, but increasingly, as China’s missile technologies continue to improve, that battery of missiles will be moved further inland, and made increasingly unreachable to counter strikes. In some ways this actually makes the US’s geographic weaknesses in a potential conflict with China *understated*, which is quite a headache if you’re the Pentagon (and if I’m of the US side it should be quite concerning that this particular scenario doesn’t seem to be getting nearly the central attention it warrants in the US defense establishments strategic and conflict assessments, even as we should expect nesting missile assets further inland to increasingly become the norm for China).

 

[Totoro]

Since I was not talking about western pacific but mid pacific, I won't comment further on that. Obviously China would have it easier the closer the fight is to its shores.

once we’re talking about ceding the second island chains to China the US ceases to be a power in the WestPac region

As for the claim above, ceding actual islands to China? For that to happen, so many other things have to happen first. Japan must force out US military and become more or less neutral. Taiwan needs to be neutral during a larger China-US conflict or already be under Chinese control. And even then China being able to actually take and own (not just deny US access to) various Mariana Islands would require China having near parity in numbers and quality to USN and USAF.

With real world politics, that's something very long way off. Decades needed for political climate to change to accommodate all that.