055 DDG Large Destroyer Thread

[AndrewS]

Land based road mobile missiles are still restricted to the host country's contiguous territory, unless the country is as extensive as Russia and all of it is utilized for hosting missiles, road mobile missiles still represent a well defined threat tube for American ballistic missile defense, unless the Df-41 has a unacknowledged fractional orbit bombardment capability.

SSBN on the other hand, can potentially threaten the target from any direction. Thus an effective SSBN force able to truly patrol in distant oceans represents an exponentially more difficult problem for area ballistic missile defense than land based road mobile ballistic missiles.

You assume ballistic missile defence is a feasible strategy.

However, in the competition between ballistic missile defence against a large number of incoming MIRVs, the cost-benefit ratio is skewed hugely in favour of attack.

Incoming ICBMs and MIRVs work out as of moderate cost, and would be accompanied by cheap decoys.

This massively increases the incoming target set.

These then have to be intercepted by expensive missiles supported by expensive high-performance, long-range radars and expensive offboard cueing assets.

Then we have the future development of maneuverable warheads, which will further increase the disparity between defence and attack.

Therefore the direction of incoming nuclear warheads is irrelevant, and blows up your analysis about the the usefulness of land-based ICBMs based on the Chinese mainland versus SLBMs located on mobile SSBNs.

 

[AndrewS]

We disagree, that is all.

In the competition between land-based TELs hiding versus overheads assets seeking, who wins?

Cheap land-based TELs can literally hide anywhere on land. Think of the millions of warehouses/garages and the millions of civilian trucks just in Northern China alone.

But the overhead seekers stand out in the empty sky and in space, as they have no natural background which they can use to hide. Furthermore, they have to actively emit radar signals in order to find a target.

So overhead seekers looking to operate over hostile territory defended by AWACs/fighters/radars have to:

1. Have extremely expensive levels of stealth and survivability
2. Be very long range, adding to size and cost
3. Be able to communicate whilst over hostile territory
4. Limit their radar emissions (and therefore capability to search) in order to avoid detection

So in the competition between land-based TELs versus overheads assets, who wins?

 

[james smith esq]

Good discussion!

But, is this the Chinese ICBM thread?

And, btw, from the northernmost point in the Altai region, Chinese ICBMs can cover the continental US.

 

[AndrewS]

Good discussion!

But, is this the Chinese ICBM thread?

And, btw, from the northernmost point in the Altai region, Chinese ICBMs can cover the continental US.

It is off-topic, but we can't let an incorrect analysis stand.

At a larger scale, that is how countries get into wars and lose, because one side gets their analysis wrong.

We only have to look at the stuff currently coming out of the India to see this.

 

[dingyibvs]

The problem is that they wouldn't be dispersed over the entirety of China, only the eastern portion of China, and mostly the northeastern portion, otherwise the missiles wouldn't have the range to strike the continental US or have the civilian and environmental cover to hide in.

You sure about that? Both countries are in the northern hemisphere, I'd imagine DF-31 and 41 series can fire north and hit at least most of the US from anywhere in China, particularly northern sections. I haven't done the actual measurements so I really don't know.

 

[Equation]

The problem is that they wouldn't be dispersed over the entirety of China, only the eastern portion of China, and mostly the northeastern portion, otherwise the missiles wouldn't have the range to strike the continental US or have the civilian and environmental cover to hide in.

You sure about that? Both countries are in the northern hemisphere, I'd imagine DF-31 and 41 series can fire north and hit at least most of the US from anywhere in China, particularly northern sections. I haven't done the actual measurements so I really don't know.

Here's proof.

China now has dozens of nuclear-capable missiles that could target almost the entirety of the US, according to the Department of Defense's 2015

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on the Chinese military.

The annual report to Congress focuses on China's military modernization, possible invasion plans for the self-governing and US-allied island of Taiwan, advances in space technology, and Beijing's rapidly advancing missile capabilities.

China's conventional capabilities are improving. But Beijing also now has what could be considered the ultimate military asset for a rising superpower: the ability to deliver nuclear warheads nearly anywhere on earth (outside of South America, at least).

The following map from the report highlights the maximum missile ranges of China's medium and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The longest-ranging of the missiles, the CSS-4, can target almost the entirety of the US (except for Florida).

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The CSS-4 has the largest range of any Chinese ICBM. The missile is nuclear-capable,

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to the DoD report, and is housed in silos across the Chinese countryside. Beijing is estimated to have between 50 and 60 silo-based ICBMs.

The DF-31A has the second-longest range of any Chinese missile. It is capable of hitting the majority of the US' Pacific coast in addition to portions of the mid-West. Unlike the CSS-4, the DF-31A is a road-mobile missile. This means Beijing can move the ICBM to various points throughout the country to better target various locations and avoid possible incoming strikes.

The DF-31, the CSS-3, and the CSS-5 are all also road-mobile and nuclear-capable. But unlike the CSS-4 or the DF-31A, these missiles are intended for regional deterrence against neighboring powers like Russia and India.

Unlike the other land-based missiles on the chart, the JL-2 is a sea-based nuclear-capable ballistic missile.

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to the DoD, the JL-2 will be carried by China's future

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as a nuclear deterrent. So far China has commissioned four JIN-class submarines with a fifth one under construction. The Pentagon report expects the JIN to begin patrols in 2015.

A Chinese JIN-class submarineNavy Office of Legislative Affairs



The improvement in China's nuclear deterrent has been spurred by developments in countries that China might consider to be its strategic competitors.

China modernized its missile forces because of "continued advances in the US and, to a lesser extent, Russian strategic ISR [Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance], precision strike, and missile defense capabilities," the report

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.

Likewise, India's own nuclear force has put pressure on China to continuously update and better its own capabilities.

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[Iron Man]

Here's proof.

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Sorry, but your post only proves my point. Of the only two missiles in your diagram that can hit the continental US, the largest circle is the DF-5, which is not road-mobile and does not use TELs, and therefore is not part of the discussion. The DF-31 can only hit Washington state and parts of Oregon, Idaho, and Montana from the northeastern-most portion of China (assuming it actually has a range of 8,000km, as some commentators believe its range is only ~7,200km). The DF-31A can only hit the entirety of the continental US from the northeastern-most portion of China. Only the DF-41 (not represented in your diagram) would be able to hit the entire continental US from anywhere inside China.

In the competition between land-based TELs hiding versus overheads assets seeking, who wins?

Cheap land-based TELs can literally hide anywhere on land. Think of the millions of warehouses/garages and the millions of civilian trucks just in Northern China alone.

But the overhead seekers stand out in the empty sky and in space, as they have no natural background which they can use to hide. Furthermore, they have to actively emit radar signals in order to find a target.

So overhead seekers looking to operate over hostile territory defended by AWACs/fighters/radars have to:

1. Have extremely expensive levels of stealth and survivability
2. Be very long range, adding to size and cost
3. Be able to communicate whilst over hostile territory
4. Limit their radar emissions (and therefore capability to search) in order to avoid detection

So in the competition between land-based TELs versus overheads assets, who wins?

What are you even remotely talking about LOL In which reality would the US try to use aircraft sensors to try and find road-mobile ICBM targets, unless it had achieved air dominance over Chinese airspace in the first place, in which case this hypothetical war would have already gone nuclear long ago. No, in the case of China, the US would rely on satellite imaging and rapid response weapons such as nukes or off-shore cruise missiles. Again, I'm not saying it's easy to find TELs in urban or forest environments, but it's also not impossible.

 

[SinoSoldier]

It can keep us, just not quietly. Furthermore the cCBG won't be running at maximum speed most of the time. Most of the time the screening submarine with insufficient silent speed to keep up quietly can adopt the sprint and lurk approach where it overtakes the CBG By running at 30+ knots, slow to silent speed, lurk, listen for threats, then sprint again. Keep in mind Submarines only has to be really quiet if they try to get somewhere undetected.

Submarines screening a CBG are not trying to sneak somewhere undetected. The CBG advertises its presence with sound of surface ships no air operation. The enemy already knows there can be enemy submarines near by when they hear a CBG coming. Yes, the noise perhaps allows the enemy sub to better pin point the precise location of the screening sub. But the screening sub is likely operating with aerial ASW support from the carrier. It's not like the enemy can freely use information from the screening sub's noise to attack the screening submarine as if it were alone. Any effort to kill the screening sub likely betray the attacking sub to other components of the carrier's ASW screen, and expose it to a combined arms counterattack and potentially makes it impossible for the attacking sub to fulfill its primary mission.

In addition, even the fact that the silent enemy submarine has a more precise fix on a sprinting and lurking screening sub is not an insurmountable advantage for the screening sub. The screening sub knows the enemy already knows where it is. It can freely use active sonar to pin down the more silent enemy sub.

All good points, I must say, but why does it have to be an enemy sub that could potentially track and take down the screening sub? Having one more source of noise means that not only is your CBG more exposed to passive acoustic sensors but your enemy could not more precisely track the defending assets. After all, submarines that are slated for CBG protection would still have to "fight it out" with an attacking asset, and the fact that it is louder would place it at a disadvantage. I'm not sure how big of a difference the carrier's ASW screen would make since any attacking force would have supportive naval platforms of their own.

Personally I don't think any nation should compromise sub acoustic stealth for the sake of faster development.

 

[PiSigma]

All good points, I must say, but why does it have to be an enemy sub that could potentially track and take down the screening sub? Having one more source of noise means that not only is your CBG more exposed to passive acoustic sensors but your enemy could not more precisely track the defending assets. After all, submarines that are slated for CBG protection would still have to "fight it out" with an attacking asset, and the fact that it is louder would place it at a disadvantage. I'm not sure how big of a difference the carrier's ASW screen would make since any attacking force would have supportive naval platforms of their own.

Personally I don't think any nation should compromise sub acoustic stealth for the sake of faster development.

Of course the last 5 pages are completely off topic. Back to 55 boys

 

[Equation]

Sorry, but your post only proves my point. Of the only two missiles in your diagram that can hit the continental US, the largest circle is the DF-5, which is not road-mobile and does not use TELs, and therefore is not part of the discussion. The DF-31 can only hit Washington state and parts of Oregon, Idaho, and Montana from the northeastern-most portion of China (assuming it actually has a range of 8,000km, as some commentators believe its range is only ~7,200km). The DF-31A can only hit the entirety of the continental US from the northeastern-most portion of China. Only the DF-41 (not represented in your diagram) would be able to hit the entire continental US from anywhere inside China.

So China TELs CAN hit the continental United States than. This was what you said before :

...the missiles wouldn't have the range to strike the continental US or have the civilian and environmental cover to hide in.