055 DDG Large Destroyer Thread

[AndrewS]

The logic goes as follows.

The US doesn't have SRBMs and would probably take a decade to develop and field such a capability. Arming the current ICBMs with conventional warheads runs the risk of a disastrous response. And if the nukes start flying, ABM on the Type-55 is not going to make any real difference.

No one else in the Western Pacific has ballistic missiles either, and would probably take the same time to develop such a capability.

Russia has conventional SRBMs, but because China-Russia share a land border, ABM on the Type-55 is not much use. Plus Russia has a huge nuclear missile force, which again means ABM on the Type-55 is not much use.

India has a smaller missile force than Russia, but again, China-India share a land border, so ABM on the Type-55 is not much use, when any potential conflict will be settled on that land border.

This is all obvious when you look at the overall strategic situation.

 

[plawolf]

Whoops. That should have read credible conventional ballistic missile programme.

The point I'm making is that ABM capability on a Type-55 simply doesn't make much sense.

ABM makes most sense against enemy nuclear ballistic missiles.

While you may have a point that ABM against the US is a little pointless given the sheer number of missiles and warheads the US can bring to bear, which would be a fair point.

However, given global trends, its not really a field one should deliberately neglect.

Given how long it takes to develop such capability, one has to take a far longer termed view with regards to the possible and potential threats that might emerge when you might need an seaborne ABM capacity.

Just off the top of my head, having a sea based ABM capacity could move very useful in case NK truly goes off the deep end and threatens China with its nuclear arsenal. Their missiles might struggled to each CONUS, but they would should have a far easier time reaching Beijing. In which case having ABM assets that can be deployed in the Yellow Sea can be a massive help.

Further down the line, there is also the distinct possibility of SK and/or Japan also seeking to develop a nuclear weapons programme, which could potentially be countered or even dissuaded if China already has a credible and deployed sea borne ABM capacity.

Even further afield, seaborne ABM could be a useful counter against Indian SSBNs once they develop such a capacity.

Those are just the nuclear scenarios. There is also the possibility that others might follow China's lead and start developing AShBMs, which would require ABM to defend against.

Future hypersonic conventionally armed glider vehicles would also require many of the same tools to counter as you would need for ABM.

Basically, ABM is something everyone is investing in and developing, so China cannot afford to fall behind in that field.

There are also any number of possible scenarios where having ABM could prove to be incredibly useful in the near and medium future.

 

[Ultra]

The logic goes as follows.

The US doesn't have SRBMs and would probably take a decade to develop and field such a capability. Arming the current ICBMs with conventional warheads runs the risk of a disastrous response. And if the nukes start flying, ABM on the Type-55 is not going to make any real difference.

Your logic don't make much sense.
Of course sea-based ABM makes a huge difference, especially against US - currently biggest threat to China. If each Type 055 DDG can carry the maximum of 128 missiles - let's say 75% are for ABM that translate to 96 missiles for ABM on each ship alone. 10 of these ships would neutralize about half of america's ACTIVE nuclear arsenals (estimated at 2000 warheads). Let's not forget the Type 052C and D that are out there which will compliment its ABM capability.

Taking out half of OpFor's nuclear arsenals is already a massive improvement on survivability, let's not forget China has land-based ABMs (SC-19, DN-3, S-400) too so it adds another credible deterrent to China's defence.

Having ABMs means that it becomes an incredibly costly war of attrition - knowing more than half of your nuclear arsenal won't make it to your opponent and only tiny fraction of it possibly breaking through would make any opponent avoid to pick a fight against such adversary as it becomes too costly with no real winning condition.

 

[FORBIN]

If each Type 055 DDG can carry the maximum of 128 missiles - let's say 75% are for ABM that translate to 96 missiles for ABM on each ship alone

75 % of ships loadout ABM missiles

The reality in fact even for USA which have a huge budget these missiles are very expensives and much more as the ennemy BM but " politicaly correct " ... and if USN have 33 ABM capable ships have a stock of about only 270 with SM-2 Bl IV less long range but anti-aircrafts also, SM-3 is only ABM, an average of 9/ship, for destroy a ABM salvo for give an idea.
One SM-3 Block IB want 10 mill $ FY 2014 !!!

Much less expensive and efficient destroy the launcher but less easy for political reason ofc.

 

[AndrewS]

Your logic don't make much sense.
Of course sea-based ABM makes a huge difference, especially against US - currently biggest threat to China. If each Type 055 DDG can carry the maximum of 128 missiles - let's say 75% are for ABM that translate to 96 missiles for ABM on each ship alone. 10 of these ships would neutralize about half of america's ACTIVE nuclear arsenals (estimated at 2000 warheads). Let's not forget the Type 052C and D that are out there which will compliment its ABM capability.

Taking out half of OpFor's nuclear arsenals is already a massive improvement on survivability, let's not forget China has land-based ABMs (SC-19, DN-3, S-400) too so it adds another credible deterrent to China's defence.

Having ABMs means that it becomes an incredibly costly war of attrition - knowing more than half of your nuclear arsenal won't make it to your opponent and only tiny fraction of it possibly breaking through would make any opponent avoid to pick a fight against such adversary as it becomes too costly with no real winning condition.

Sigh

You need to bone up at missile defence.

ABM on a Type-55 can only hit targets closeby. But compare that to the incoming target set of warheads and decoys that could be deployed from ICBMs much further away.

It is much easier and cheaper to build BMs/warheads/decoys - than it is to build a super accurate ABM system with expensive missiles. Plus remember the Type-55 can only cover the Chinese coastline. What about the Chinese interior where two-thirds of the population live?

 

[AndrewS]

ABM makes most sense against enemy nuclear ballistic missiles.

While you may have a point that ABM against the US is a little pointless given the sheer number of missiles and warheads the US can bring to bear, which would be a fair point.

However, given global trends, its not really a field one should deliberately neglect.

Given how long it takes to develop such capability, one has to take a far longer termed view with regards to the possible and potential threats that might emerge when you might need an seaborne ABM capacity.

Just off the top of my head, having a sea based ABM capacity could move very useful in case NK truly goes off the deep end and threatens China with its nuclear arsenal. Their missiles might struggled to each CONUS, but they would should have a far easier time reaching Beijing. In which case having ABM assets that can be deployed in the Yellow Sea can be a massive help.

Further down the line, there is also the distinct possibility of SK and/or Japan also seeking to develop a nuclear weapons programme, which could potentially be countered or even dissuaded if China already has a credible and deployed sea borne ABM capacity.

Even further afield, seaborne ABM could be a useful counter against Indian SSBNs once they develop such a capacity.

Those are just the nuclear scenarios. There is also the possibility that others might follow China's lead and start developing AShBMs, which would require ABM to defend against.

Future hypersonic conventionally armed glider vehicles would also require many of the same tools to counter as you would need for ABM.

Basically, ABM is something everyone is investing in and developing, so China cannot afford to fall behind in that field.

There are also any number of possible scenarios where having ABM could prove to be incredibly useful in the near and medium future.

If NK goes off the deep end, I say China organises a coup inside NK to remove fatty Kim. In his place will be the military and/or the Kim sibling that China and Singapore have stashed away for this contingency. There's no point waiting for the nukes to come.

In terms of ABM capability, it makes more sense to deploy them as LAND based systems like we see with the current ABM testing. They can actually protect the places that matter AND should be cheaper than a sea based system AND still act as ASAT systems as well.

If SK/JP develop BMs with ballistic missiles, there will be plenty of time to add ABM to the Type-55, particularly since the land-based version will already be ready.

 

[plawolf]

If NK goes off the deep end, I say China organises a coup inside NK to remove fatty Kim. In his place will be the military and/or the Kim sibling that China and Singapore have stashed away for this contingency. There's no point waiting for the nukes to come.

Easier said than done.

Trying something like that always carries the risk that something could go wrong. In which case its best to have a contingency just in case the worst comes to pass.

In terms of ABM capability, it makes more sense to deploy them as LAND based systems like we see with the current ABM testing. They can actually protect the places that matter AND should be cheaper than a sea based system AND still act as ASAT systems as well.

What makes you think a sea based system cannot do any of that? Also, why does it have to be a this or that choice between land and sea based ABM?

Much of the core technologies are closely related enough that if you are developing land base ABM, it wouldn't cost that much more to also develop a sea based one as well.

As I already mentioned, land based ABM usually can only come into range of incoming missiles during terminal stage, when they are the most difficult to intercept because of the speed, terminal manoeuvring and release of decoys etc.

A naval ABM can engage incoming missiles at both the boost and cruise stage, when their speeds are lower, flight paths are easier to calculate and predict, denying them the chance to use many of the more advanced and effective penetration aids, not to mention the added benefit that if you shoot the missile down in boost or early cruise stage, the radioactive debris will end up in the sea or over enemy territory rather than falling on your territory and citizens.

Its not for nothing that America is doing all it can to base its land base interceptors as close to target nations as possible, as opposed to contending themselves with basing them only on home soil.

If SK/JP develop BMs with ballistic missiles, there will be plenty of time to add ABM to the Type-55, particularly since the land-based version will already be ready.

You seems to underestimate both the time and difficulty in developing and fielding naval ABM as well as the speed at which SK or Japan could make a sprint at a bomb.

If it can down to a race between whether SK/Japan could get a working and deployable nuke first or China to adapt land base ABM for naval application, I have little doubt China will loose that race.

You also cannot count on having a robust ABM as a deterrence against countries developing nukes if you have gaping holes in the ABM coverage.

 

[PanAsian]

...

ABM on a Type-55 can only hit targets closeby. But compare that to the incoming target set of warheads and decoys that could be deployed from ICBMs much further away.

It is much easier and cheaper to build BMs/warheads/decoys - than it is to build a super accurate ABM system with expensive missiles. Plus remember the Type-55 can only cover the Chinese coastline. What about the Chinese interior where two-thirds of the population live?

These are not redundant nor mutually exclusive capabilities but rather complementary and necessary given likely threats, as well as being a part of the PLA's intention to catch up with the cutting edge in all military technology. ABM is a critical defensive capability which can open up WMD offensive options, it is already possessed by others who are deploying it against China in capability if not in stated intent.

I have similar reasoning for China to not grow its CV fleet as aggressively as others expect but not deploying a capability en masse is not the same as not developing the capability at all. It is not clear to me which position you are saying China should take regarding naval ABM.

 

[AndrewS]

Easier said than done.

Trying something like that always carries the risk that something could go wrong. In which case its best to have a contingency just in case the worst comes to pass.



What makes you think a sea based system cannot do any of that? Also, why does it have to be a this or that choice between land and sea based ABM?

Much of the core technologies are closely related enough that if you are developing land base ABM, it wouldn't cost that much more to also develop a sea based one as well.

As I already mentioned, land based ABM usually can only come into range of incoming missiles during terminal stage, when they are the most difficult to intercept because of the speed, terminal manoeuvring and release of decoys etc.

A naval ABM can engage incoming missiles at both the boost and cruise stage, when their speeds are lower, flight paths are easier to calculate and predict, denying them the chance to use many of the more advanced and effective penetration aids, not to mention the added benefit that if you shoot the missile down in boost or early cruise stage, the radioactive debris will end up in the sea or over enemy territory rather than falling on your territory and citizens.

Its not for nothing that America is doing all it can to base its land base interceptors as close to target nations as possible, as opposed to contending themselves with basing them only on home soil.



You seems to underestimate both the time and difficulty in developing and fielding naval ABM as well as the speed at which SK or Japan could make a sprint at a bomb.

If it can down to a race between whether SK/Japan could get a working and deployable nuke first or China to adapt land base ABM for naval application, I have little doubt China will loose that race.

You also cannot count on having a robust ABM as a deterrence against countries developing nukes if you have gaping holes in the ABM coverage.

Hence a coup against fattie Kim is only justified when the risks become large enough. But Kim knows that if he becomes a big enough liability, China will seek to remove him. Hence all the purges he has been conducting to try and leave him as the only person in NK to deal with.

In the long-run, I think the solution has to be a reunified Korean Peninsula, but the only way that will be acceptable to China is the end of the UK-SK security and economic alliance.

===

It's a cost benefit calculation at the end of the day as to naval ABM. I see the top priority for the Type-55 as being able to conduct effective air defense using CEC, preferably against stealthed targets which is a capability that is actually useful. Trying to build an ABM capability will detract from that objective. That's not to say that it couldn't be added to a later AEGIS baseline version way down the line.

Yes, naval ABM would be of use in the boost phase if BMs were launched from SK or JP. But there are no credible scenarios where this happens. If they get through the political/financial/technological challenges of building nukes AND ballistic missiles, they still know that if they start launching nukes at China, they will likely see their own extinction from the nukes coming back the way. So is there any rush to get naval ABM ready when the land-based version will already be in place?

Plus how close can the Chinese Navy realistically get to a hostile JP or SK coastline?

===

Remember that deterrence against nukes ultimately doesn't come from having an ABM system, because the attacker has a huge cost advantage over the defender. So it comes from having enough nukes of your own. But if we ever get to the point where nukes are being thrown around, then there are no winners, only losers.

===

Side note, every ABM system doubles as an ASAT system. For the US, the cost equation goes $10million for an SM-6 type-missile to shoot down a satellite which may cost say $200-$1000million.

So I suspect ASAT is the primary driver of the current Chinese programme and ABM is actually secondary.

===

I also find it quite amusing that you were decrying China from spending $200million more on the Type-55 hull with way more conventional capability than the Type-52D, yet a naval ABM system will cost far more for a contingency which is not very useful.

 

[AndrewS]

These are not redundant nor mutually exclusive capabilities but rather complementary and necessary given likely threats, as well as being a part of the PLA's intention to catch up with the cutting edge in all military technology. ABM is a critical defensive capability which can open up WMD offensive options, it is already possessed by others who are deploying it against China in capability if not in stated intent.

I have similar reasoning for China to not grow its CV fleet as aggressively as others expect but not deploying a capability en masse is not the same as not developing the capability at all. It is not clear to me which position you are saying China should take regarding naval ABM.

Answers in previous post above.

Put naval ABM on the back-burner for now, and focus on land-based ASAT/ABM