I'm definitely pleasantly surprised by this news, but "astonished" is a bridge too far. I was 50/50 on whether China would continue with conventional propulsion or switch to nuclear immediately, and I never thought that China was so far away from nuclear carrier propulsion given that it has a mature nuclear submarine program, a highly developed, world leading civilian reactor program, and is focused on developing nuclear powered carriers. I also never bought the "requirements" that a naval reactor would have to be installed on an icebreaker or fishing trawler or whatever else it was.
Well you are the one that said that "astonishing" is just "typical," I'm just using the same choice of words used previously.
Whatever. My point is that the idea of the fourth carrier being nuclear overall is a surprise and unexpected.
I understand the need to be realistic, but I feel you're "pessimizing" this piece of news. We can of course question pop3's credibility and source for this information but if we accept that he's legit then we should accept it at face value, not try and concoct the most negative spin possible.
Personally, I have internalized that China is no longer a giant rice paddy populated by hayseeds wearing conical straw hats and riding bicycles, so I don't put nuclear aircraft carriers (or advanced nuclear submarines, stealth bombers, etc.) as beyond its capability. Some people still see China in that old light, so they think it's a minor miracle when China develops some piece of advanced technology. At some point the "miracles" have to be normalized.
There are also domains of technology, subsystems and end products that we have yet to see "miracles" in.
A few of these include:
High performance and competitive turbofans.
Competitive nuclear submarines.
And yes, nuclear propulsion appropriate for aircraft carriers.
Yes, we are likely to see them emerge in time.
But however you cut the mustard, the idea of the fourth carrier being nuclear is a surprise.
If the fourth nuclear carrier does begin construction in the next few years, yes that would very much be a significant pleasant surprise.
Not beyond the scope of possibility -- that is to say, the likelihood of it happening is above zero. But it is not something we can simply look at now, shrug off and say "that sounds obvious".
That's a reach grafted onto an already weak theory. If the Chinese leadership's view were so dire (and I wish it was), we would see very public indications of that: First and foremost, a vastly expanded military budget; a greatly accelerated expansion of the nuclear arsenal instead of the current languid one (for context, the US went from 300 to 18,500 in the decade from 1950 to 1960); an expansive propaganda push preparing the population for war. We see none of these things.
In addition to that, it's a reach to claim that China sees CATOBAR carriers as unsuited for a war against the US because... I guess they don't think they'll have crossed every t and dotted every i by then? I don't buy this at all.
I never stated that China sees CATOBAR carriers as unsuited for a war against the US.
In fact, I've been one of the longstanding proponents for the need for a large and competitive CATOBAR fleet as a method of waging high intensity air-naval-missile warfare in the pacific.
What I said was that China may not see having
four CATOBAR carriers with their expected level of capability, maturity and readiness in the mid/late 2020s as the best use of resources to hedge against a marginally higher possibility of conflict against the US in the mid/late 2020s.
If we go through the history and look at the pessimists' and optimists' respective records, which one was more accurate? Underestimating China and its capabilities also counts as a bounced cheque.
I've come to really appreciate the wisdom of China's strategy of just keeping its mouth shut. The most natural thing for people to do - even people who spent decades observing its military progress and don't have the racist biases so common among its enemies - is to doubt it. Even though China has disproved all doubts time and again.
I'm not sure how this applies to what I am saying.
If this is a matter of assessing the past track records of people trying to track PLA projects, are you trying to insinuate that I am a "pessimist" or that I have "underestimated" the PLA's progress in developing new projects, weapons and capabilities?
Or that perhaps I have a historical track record of poorly predicting PLA developments in a manner that was ultimately demonstrated that they are actually much more ahead and capable than I had predicted?
Because otherwise, I have no clue why you keep addressing "pessimists" and "optimists" -- doing so, implies that you are relating those people's predictions to my position that I am holding now.
I'd like you to do a little thought experiment: Suppose the US announced tomorrow (or there was a leak from a credible insider) that it was going to build and field ten more carriers. Would you treat that news with the same skepticism you treat this or would you just take it at face value?
Yes, I would be quite skeptical of the USN's ability to carry out such a shipbuilding and procurement and manning plan (dependent on timespan of course). However I don't want to get into counterfactual hypotheticals too much.