00X/004 future nuclear CATOBAR carrier thread

[weig2000]

The gap between the first sortie by the first American nuclear powered submarine and the start of construction of the major American nuclear surface ship was 2 years. The gap to the start of construction of the first nuclear carrier Enterprise was 3 years. The gap to the start of the construction of the first two reactor nuclear carrier Nimitz was 13 years.

When the Nimitz started construction, the US has built and operated 15 large commercial nuclear reactors that were more powerful than any onboard ships

By my count the time elapsed since the first sortie of the first Chinese nuclear powered submarine is 48 years.

Currently the Chinese have built and operated 53 commercial nuclear reactors more powerful than any onboard any ships.

What is the reason for believing the Chinese would taking larger technical risks by starting the construction of the power plant for a nuclear powered aircraft carrier right now than the Americans were at the start of the construction of the power plants for the Enterprise or Nimitz?

China's carrier development program is largely a peacetime development program, what with its defense spending at ony 1.3% of GDP. It simply cannot be compared with what the US was doing during Cold War or indeed, WW2. Clearly China and Chinese take enormously pride in their carriers and carrier program, just like its space program. Still we need to put things in perspective, in terms of overall national priority.

A few years back, I said at SDF that US might be impressed by its super carriers like Ford (at $13 billion a pop), but China was no less impressive, building anywhere between half dozen to dozen high-speed rail that cost similarly to supercarriers simultaneously during any year. It's just different national priorities. Another way to look at it, at the time the US built its nuclear anything, it was the pioneer in those fields and led the world. China started far behind in its carrier program, and it wants to catch up with the best but doesn't want to build a lot of backward junks. And it's not the highest national priority in the grand scheme of the thing. So it has to plan and execute the program methodically.

 

[Richard Santos]

China's carrier development program is largely a peacetime development program, what with its defense spending at ony 1.3% of GDP. It simply cannot be compared with what the US was doing during Cold War or indeed, WW2. Clearly China and Chinese take enormously pride in their carriers and carrier program, just like its space program. Still we need to put things in perspective, in terms of overall national priority.

A few years back, I said at SDF that US might be impressed by its super carriers like Ford (at $13 billion a pop), but China was no less impressive, building anywhere between half dozen to dozen high-speed rail that cost similarly to supercarriers simultaneously during any year. It's just different national priorities. Another way to look at it, at the time the US built its nuclear anything, it was the pioneer in those fields and led the world. China started far behind in its carrier program, and it wants to catch up with the best but doesn't want to build a lot of backward junks. And it's not the highest national priority in the grand scheme of the thing. So it has to plan and execute the program methodically.

China’s peace time carrier development program also didn’t have to compete with the frantic and massive build up of every other type of arms that the US carried out during the 1950s.

So it is by no means clear to me why China could not have devoted more resources to marine nuclear power over a relatively peaceful 48 years with many fewer really urgent competing resource demands than the US did in 2-3 years while facing many more really urgent competing Cold War resource demands.

 

[latenlazy]

I think something worth considering is that if the reactor design is more modern, it might be inherently safer and thus require a less conservative roadmap for development. A lot of the expectations of slower development really hinges on the fact that nuclear is a riskier technology that is best digested slowly. Toggle that variable down and the rest of the carrier shouldn’t really be much different from the type 003 in technology.

 

[Blitzo]

At this point, it makes a lot of sense, from development, training and operational standpoints, to build at least two 003 class carriers as I expounded a while back in this thread. Any deteriorating geopolitical environment actually reinforces the arguments for building more 003 class carriers asap. As it stands, 003 is sufficiently powerful and advanced. Nuclear-powered is nice but not necessary at this point if it takes more time.

I think this is something worth discussing in a bit more detail -- specifically "the priority and opportunity/cost of a fourth aircraft carrier in the 2025-2030 era".
If we are all in agreement that China and the PLA may face a higher degree of geopolitical pressure and likelihood of conflict in the 2025-2030 era -- or most likely in the late 2020s -- then naturally it follows that their procurement expenditure should seek to make the best decisions in terms of opportunity/cost.

Now, I've long been an advocate for a capable and competitive carrier fleet for waging high intensity air-naval-missile conflict in the pacific.
However, that has always been predicated on a few things:
- Possessing a minimum carrier fleet size of six carriers (ideally more, in the longer term -- like 10-12 carriers as a steady minimum in the 2040 era)
- Maturity of carrier flight operations and aircraft that composes its airwing, for individual carrier combat effectiveness.
- Possessing a sufficiently competitive and modern carrier escort force (in terms of surface combatants, but also in terms of SSNs, and land based assets)
(and of course, that the carriers all built after 003 would continue to be relatively large CATOBARs)

I believe those are all necessary prerequisites for the PLAN's carrier fleet to have be worth developing and fielding in the first place. I.e.: that way they are at least able to be combat effective against the expected opfor, but also possess the capability to potentially achieve favourable outcomes in war.
If those factors do not much a sufficient prerequisite level, I believe that your carriers become at best a ship that will remain at port during a conflict -- at worst it would be a vulnerable target to the enemy that can be neutralized or sunk relatively easily. In other words, a liability.

For the PLAN, it means that as part of building that eventual minimally competitive carrier force, they will have to accept there will be a long period of time in which they will possess a number of carriers but where they may not yet reach six carriers, or where the individual carriers themselves still need years to be individually combat effective and have a mature airwing with mature flight operations on the given carrier (the latter is just part of the workup of any new carrier, even in the USN).
In times of peace or acceptable levels of tension, making that long journey to achieve that carrier fleet is not a huge issue. Because you are essentially making investments into capabilities that will kick in many years down the line. Using resources to invest in future longer term capabilities is very reasonable.
But if there is a significant change in near term geopolitical tension and likelihood of conflict, then that may change your short to medium term investment strategies in terms of opportunity cost.


If we ask ourselves that question "the priority and opportunity/cost of a fourth aircraft carrier in the 2025-2030 era" -- we need to ask how many of those aforementioned prerequisites a fourth carrier (either a second 003, or perhaps a CVN) can achieve in the 2025-2030 era.

Now, I am not yet concrete in having an answer for that -- this is national level assessments of strategic priorities and opportunity cost that we do not have the information to make informed conclusions on.
But I do think that the assumptions that "higher geopolitical tensions in the 2025-2030 era means the PLAN needs an additional carrier in service by that time," may not be as straight forward as it sounds, and that depending on certain factors, possessing an additional carrier in the 2025-2030 period "in service" might actually be a strategic and operational liability for that specific timespan.

 

[Kalec]

I think this is something worth discussing in a bit more detail -- specifically "the priority and opportunity/cost of a fourth aircraft carrier in the 2025-2030 era".
If we are all in agreement that China and the PLA may face a higher degree of geopolitical pressure and likelihood of conflict in the 2025-2030 era -- or most likely in the late 2020s -- then naturally it follows that their procurement expenditure should seek to make the best decisions in terms of opportunity/cost.

Now, I've long been an advocate for a capable and competitive carrier fleet for waging high intensity air-naval-missile conflict in the pacific.
However, that has always been predicated on a few things:
- Possessing a minimum carrier fleet size of six carriers (ideally more, in the longer term -- like 10-12 carriers as a steady minimum in the 2040 era)
- Maturity of carrier flight operations and aircraft that composes its airwing, for individual carrier combat effectiveness.
- Possessing a sufficiently competitive and modern carrier escort force (in terms of surface combatants, but also in terms of SSNs, and land based assets)
(and of course, that the carriers all built after 003 would continue to be relatively large CATOBARs)

I believe those are all necessary prerequisites for the PLAN's carrier fleet to have be worth developing and fielding in the first place. I.e.: that way they are at least able to be combat effective against the expected opfor, but also possess the capability to potentially achieve favourable outcomes in war.
If those factors do not much a sufficient prerequisite level, I believe that your carriers become at best a ship that will remain at port during a conflict -- at worst it would be a vulnerable target to the enemy that can be neutralized or sunk relatively easily. In other words, a liability.

For the PLAN, it means that as part of building that eventual minimally competitive carrier force, they will have to accept there will be a long period of time in which they will possess a number of carriers but where they may not yet reach six carriers, or where the individual carriers themselves still need years to be individually combat effective and have a mature airwing with mature flight operations on the given carrier (the latter is just part of the workup of any new carrier, even in the USN).
In times of peace or acceptable levels of tension, making that long journey to achieve that carrier fleet is not a huge issue. Because you are essentially making investments into capabilities that will kick in many years down the line. Using resources to invest in future longer term capabilities is very reasonable.
But if there is a significant change in near term geopolitical tension and likelihood of conflict, then that may change your short to medium term investment strategies in terms of opportunity cost.


If we ask ourselves that question "the priority and opportunity/cost of a fourth aircraft carrier in the 2025-2030 era" -- we need to ask how many of those aforementioned prerequisites a fourth carrier (either a second 003, or perhaps a CVN) can achieve in the 2025-2030 era.

Now, I am not yet concrete in having an answer for that -- this is national level assessments of strategic priorities and opportunity cost that we do not have the information to make informed conclusions on.
But I do think that the assumptions that "higher geopolitical tensions in the 2025-2030 era means the PLAN needs an additional carrier in service by that time," may not be as straight forward as it sounds, and that depending on certain factors, possessing an additional carrier in the 2025-2030 period "in service" might actually be a strategic and operational liability for that specific timespan.

I think we have all misinterpreted one thing. "Design is not finished yet" doesn't necessarily mean the "its subsystems' tests have started yet." I remember someone posted that the land-based reactor demonstration project was in Sichuan and construction began as early as 2018 and the codename for CV reactor should be 龙兴 or something else.

Could someone please post construction timetable for Nimitz or Ford, for a meaningful comparison?

Also it is interesting that the moderator deleted the whole original thread discussing CV development.

 

[latenlazy]

I think we have all misinterpreted one thing. "Design is not finished yet" doesn't necessarily mean the "its subsystems' tests have started yet." I remember someone posted that the land-based reactor demonstration project was in Sichuan and construction began as early as 2018 and the codename for CV reactor should be 龙兴 or something else.

Could someone please post construction timetable for Nimitz or Ford, for a meaningful comparison?

Also it is interesting that the moderator deleted the whole original thread discussing CV development.

Yes, as pop3 himself seems to be suggesting “design is not finished yet” hardly means there’s still a lot of work left before they’re reading to start construction phase.

 

[Blitzo]

I think we have all misinterpreted one thing. "Design is not finished yet" doesn't necessarily mean the "its subsystems' tests have started yet." I remember someone posted that the land-based reactor demonstration project was in Sichuan and construction began as early as 2018 and the codename for CV reactor should be 龙兴 or something else.

Could someone please post construction timetable for Nimitz or Ford, for a meaningful comparison?

Also it is interesting that the moderator deleted the whole original thread discussing CV development.

To clarify, I am not talking about the maturity of the aircraft's own internal subsystems (like catapults, propulsion or reactor).
I wasn't even necessarily talking about the fourth carrier being CVN -- my post applies for the "fourth carrier" in general, whether it is a second 003 or the CVN.

Hypothetically speaking, if initial construction work for the fourth carrier begins in the second half of this year (steel cutting for modules), it will still take a good 2 years at least for the ship to be launched -- i.e.: late 2024 or early 2025.
Even assuming all internal subsystems on the carrier are mature (regardless of whether it's a second 003 or the CVN), it will still take another year of fitting out, and another year of sea trails. (Keep in mind this is all discussing the fourth carrier as if it is able to breeze through all of these milestones without issue in a very optimistic way)

By then, it will be late 2026 or early 2027, for the ship to "enter service".
However, there's a major difference between "entering service" and being "combat effective". That process (depending on the degree of past institutional carrier experience and existing carrier related infrastructure) might take anywhere from two years to multiple years. Let's assume it is only "a year and a half" (again, wildly optimistic), and that the fourth carrier is "combat effective" by mid 2028.

That's about six years from first steel cutting to being operationally "combat effective" -- again, I want to reiterate, this is a wildly optimistic, for the purposes of discussion.

Now, great, the fourth carrier is "combat effective".
BUT, there's also a major difference between a carrier itself being "combat effective" versus the PLAN's overall carrier fleet of the 2025-2030 (or late 2020s era) being sufficiently capable to be the best procurement option in terms of strategic opportunity cost.

As I wrote in #7544 -- an ideal minimum carrier force for the PLAN is to possess six combat effective carriers, with a sufficient number of competitive surface and subsurface escorts, as well as possessing a capable and mature airwing and crew.
If we assume that the carrier has a capable and mature airwing and crew due to it somehow managing to achieve "combat effectiveness" by 2028, that is great....

.....but it still leaves the issue of having sufficiently capable surface and subsurface escorts (in this case, the major question is subsurface escorts as they would need a very capable and competitive SSN fleet to meet the threat of US and regional submarines), as well as the question of whether four carriers in the late 2020s is a sufficiently large carrier fleet to meet the challenges of that period of predicted geopolitical tension and possible conflict..... and all of that in turn has to be weighed against whether money for that period might be better invested into other more mature and less risky capabilities instead.


Or to sum up my position: "What is the opportunity/cost for pursuing a fourth carrier that will enter service in the late 2020s, in context of the PLA's overall assessment of its strategic environment of the late 2020s -- and how does that compare to delaying its fourth carrier to enter service somewhere down the line a few years later (such as early 2030s) and to use money intended for the "fourth carrier in the late 2020s" for other capabilities and assets intended to enter service in the late 2020s instead?"

Again, I don't have a clear answer for it, but I do think the rationale underlying it, and the timelines we are facing now, is one where we cannot simply assume that buying a fourth carrier intended for service in the late 2020s is the PLA's best choice in terms of opportunity/cost.


And I want to reiterate -- six years from steel cutting to combat effectiveness is ludicrously optimistic. Even if the fourth carrier is a second 003, in reality it will end up taking 2-3 years or even 3-4 years more than that (i.e.: 8-10 years from steel cutting to combat effectiveness).

 

[ACuriousPLAFan]

Could someone please post construction timetable for Nimitz or Ford, for a meaningful comparison?

Nimitz-class:


Gerald R. Ford-class:


Earlier Nimitz-class ships took around 7 years to complete the construction. (That is, calculating from laying down the keel to comissioning the ship)
Mid and later Nimitz-class ships reduced that to around 5-6 years.
Current estimates put the later Ford-class ships at around 6 years.

The first 2 ships of the Ford-class, due to already-known EMALS-related issues, have their construction and testing (plus rectifying) time signficantly lengthened.

By comparison, Shandong takes around 4 years. But she's a medium-sized conventionally-powered STOBAR, so the comparison with US CVNs doesn't really matter much.

There is no offcial date for laying down the keel for the 003 that could be found, however.

 

[weig2000]

I think this is something worth discussing in a bit more detail -- specifically "the priority and opportunity/cost of a fourth aircraft carrier in the 2025-2030 era".
If we are all in agreement that China and the PLA may face a higher degree of geopolitical pressure and likelihood of conflict in the 2025-2030 era -- or most likely in the late 2020s -- then naturally it follows that their procurement expenditure should seek to make the best decisions in terms of opportunity/cost.

Now, I've long been an advocate for a capable and competitive carrier fleet for waging high intensity air-naval-missile conflict in the pacific.
However, that has always been predicated on a few things:
- Possessing a minimum carrier fleet size of six carriers (ideally more, in the longer term -- like 10-12 carriers as a steady minimum in the 2040 era)
- Maturity of carrier flight operations and aircraft that composes its airwing, for individual carrier combat effectiveness.
- Possessing a sufficiently competitive and modern carrier escort force (in terms of surface combatants, but also in terms of SSNs, and land based assets)
(and of course, that the carriers all built after 003 would continue to be relatively large CATOBARs)

I believe those are all necessary prerequisites for the PLAN's carrier fleet to have be worth developing and fielding in the first place. I.e.: that way they are at least able to be combat effective against the expected opfor, but also possess the capability to potentially achieve favourable outcomes in war.
If those factors do not much a sufficient prerequisite level, I believe that your carriers become at best a ship that will remain at port during a conflict -- at worst it would be a vulnerable target to the enemy that can be neutralized or sunk relatively easily. In other words, a liability.

For the PLAN, it means that as part of building that eventual minimally competitive carrier force, they will have to accept there will be a long period of time in which they will possess a number of carriers but where they may not yet reach six carriers, or where the individual carriers themselves still need years to be individually combat effective and have a mature airwing with mature flight operations on the given carrier (the latter is just part of the workup of any new carrier, even in the USN).
In times of peace or acceptable levels of tension, making that long journey to achieve that carrier fleet is not a huge issue. Because you are essentially making investments into capabilities that will kick in many years down the line. Using resources to invest in future longer term capabilities is very reasonable.
But if there is a significant change in near term geopolitical tension and likelihood of conflict, then that may change your short to medium term investment strategies in terms of opportunity cost.


If we ask ourselves that question "the priority and opportunity/cost of a fourth aircraft carrier in the 2025-2030 era" -- we need to ask how many of those aforementioned prerequisites a fourth carrier (either a second 003, or perhaps a CVN) can achieve in the 2025-2030 era.

Now, I am not yet concrete in having an answer for that -- this is national level assessments of strategic priorities and opportunity cost that we do not have the information to make informed conclusions on.
But I do think that the assumptions that "higher geopolitical tensions in the 2025-2030 era means the PLAN needs an additional carrier in service by that time," may not be as straight forward as it sounds, and that depending on certain factors, possessing an additional carrier in the 2025-2030 period "in service" might actually be a strategic and operational liability for that specific timespan.

Ok, now we're at the strategic planning mode (which makes sense given the nature of carrier program). There are two potential routes to play what-if's.

1. Carrier program development under regular environment, in which case the development path largely follows the plan with necessary adjustments.

In this case, I think most people will probably agree that building two 003's would make most sense, as I argued above and before. Although this route does not rule out changes to the plan because it takes so long to build carriers and the program covers such a long period of time (decades). In terms of China's carrier development program, it has happened not once, but a least twice before. Once by adding Shandong, the other by switching to EMALS.

If we assume pop3's rumor has any grounds at all, what would be the trigger point? I think most likely it would be technologies, particularly nuclear reactor. If that's the case, it has to be quite significant advances. Here is a hypothetical question: if the next carrier after 003 being nuclear means three-year delay in service, which one do you prefer, a 003 or a nuclear one? I would go for 003 in this case. What if the delay is only one year? Well, I don't know. Let me think ...

Three years are being used hypothetically. Again, it would be astonishing that they have made significant progress in technologies, but we can't rule it out, just like EMALS before.

2. Carrier program under deteriorating geostrategic environment, specifically during the period of 2025-2030.

I don't necessarily think they're targeting 2025-2030. It's very difficult to predict, but it's clear that environment is getting grimmer by the month. In this case, the earlier and better you're prepared, the better. I think two 003's (plus the two CATOBARs) are the minimum to make some differences, backed by the land-based forces.

As I said previously, both the normal and deteriorating geopolitical environments favor at least two 003's. At a minimum, canceling the 2nd 003 and replace it with a nuclear-powered one is not the answer to a deteriorating geopolitical environment.

To summarize, building two 003's are the default plan, a good one at it. To change the default plan, you need strong justifications.

Maybe we're experiencing another EMALS episode if the rumor turns out to be true.

 

[Blitzo]

Ok, now we're at the strategic planning mode (which makes sense given the nature of carrier program). There are two potential routes to play what-if's.

1. Carrier program development under regular environment, in which case the development path largely follows the plan with necessary adjustments.

In this case, I think most people will probably agree that building two 003's would make most sense, as I argued above and before. Although this route does not rule out changes to the plan because it takes so long to build carriers and the program covers such a long period of time (decades). In terms of China's carrier development program, it has happened not once, but a least twice before. Once by adding Shandong, the other by switching to EMALS.

If we assume pop3's rumor has any grounds at all, what would be the trigger point? I think most likely it would be technologies, particularly nuclear reactor. If that's the case, it has to be quite significant advances. Here is a hypothetical question: if the next carrier after 003 being nuclear means three-year delay in service, which one do you prefer, a 003 or a nuclear one? I would go for 003 in this case. What if the delay is only one year? Well, I don't know. Let me think ...

Three years are being used hypothetically. Again, it would be astonishing that they have made significant progress in technologies, but we can't rule it out, just like EMALS before.

2. Carrier program under deteriorating geostrategic environment, specifically during the period of 2025-2030.

I don't necessarily think they're targeting 2025-2030. It's very difficult to predict, but it's clear that environment is getting grimmer by the month. In this case, the earlier and better you're prepared, the better. I think two 003's (plus the two CATOBARs) are the minimum to make some differences, backed by the land-based forces.

As I said previously, both the normal and deteriorating geopolitical environments favor at least two 003's. At a minimum, canceling the 2nd 003 and replace it with a nuclear-powered one is not the answer to a deteriorating geopolitical environment.

To summarize, building two 003's are the default plan, a good one at it. To change the default plan, you need strong justifications.

Maybe we're experiencing another EMALS episode if the rumor turns out to be true.

Right, so to clarify, what I wrote in post 7544 was about a "fourth carrier by 2025-2030" in general -- it could be either a second 003 in that period, or it could be the first CVN. We could treat it as either.

I do agree that having two combat effective CATOBAR carriers (let's say two 003 pattern carriers for the purposes of discussion) would provide significant combat capability.
The question is about opportunity/cost. That is to say, for the period in which the second 003 could become combat effective, is the money expended on procuring it and working it up to be combat effective, the best way in which military funds can be spent to result in the best combat capability for the medium term future's potential conflict environment?

Or, as I wrote in post 7547:
"What is the opportunity/cost for pursuing a fourth carrier that will enter service in the late 2020s, in context of the PLA's overall assessment of its strategic environment of the late 2020s -- and how does that compare to delaying its fourth carrier to enter service somewhere down the line a few years later (such as early 2030s) and to use money intended for the "fourth carrier in the late 2020s" for other capabilities and assets intended to enter service in the late 2020s instead?"