Yes, the cost of drydocks should be relatively minor compared to the cost of the carrier.
00X/004 future nuclear CATOBAR carrier thread
- Thread starter AETHER
- Start date
Yes, the cost of drydocks should be relatively minor compared to the cost of the carrier.
Ok
So the USN has 2 drydocks for 11 large carriers. That is 1 drydock per 5.5 carriers.
So if the Chinese build a comparable number of carriers, that implies an entirely new drydock will be needed.
So it might as well be sized for the optimum carrier size from the beginning, which may be 150,000 tonnes
Graving docks (ie dry docks dug into the ground) can be quite expensive, depending on geological/seismological conditions at the site concerned and the certification requirements, especially if they are intended to accommodate nuclear powered vessels. Prices can vary widely, but for the sake of comparison nuclear certified graving docks in the US or Australia easily cost a couple billion dollars. While I'm sure Chinese construction prices are somewhat lower (the entire HZ yard on Changxing was quoted to have costed 2.8 bln USD), at the end of the day its not an inexpensive effort.
Extending an existing dock also amounts to major efforts, because the structural integrity is baked into the original design and would need certain revisions. My main point here though is the drydock at Sanya is rather brand-new, so I dont think its very plausible that PLAN did not consider their future carrier aspirations when they designed it.
Extending an existing dock also amounts to major efforts, because the structural integrity is baked into the original design and would need certain revisions. My main point here though is the drydock at Sanya is rather brand-new, so I dont think its very plausible that PLAN did not consider their future carrier aspirations when they designed it.
I'm not what you'd call knowledgeable about naval and carrier maintenance and logistics, but I have a small hypothesis . What if this new-ish drydock at Sanya was dedicated for maintaining the current carrier fleet, which will be made up of 4 ships if we include CV-19? And what if CVN-20 was going to also be around the same size, so that PLAN may fully test all the new nuclear-based systems before deciding to invest in a larger-sized design? That would mean 5 carriers will be maintained in Sanya and PLAN will have yo build a new drydock anyway if they want to expand further, so they can then account for a larger ship size.
Why would all 4 or all 5 of the PLAN carriers need to go to Sanya for maintenance and repair works?
Having them together at the same location isn't just going to be heavily taxing on the supporting facilities and infrastructures at Sanya, but also introducing the risks of putting all the eggs in one basket.
Moreover, the large drydock at Sanya is more of a PLAN warship maintenance and repair "arm" that extends from the mainland. To have warships based at Sanya sailing all the way up and to the shipyards on the mainland that are qualified for repairing and maintaining them would've taken much longer periods of time than is desirable/acceptable, especially during wartime.
In retrospect, those in the North and East Sea Fleets technically don't face problems as acute as the South Sea Fleet - Ningbo has Shanghai (i.e. Jiangnan + Hudong-Zhonghua) as neighbors, whereas Qingdao has itself + Dalian across the Bohai Sea as neighbors.
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proelite
Junior Member
365m
A carrier 365 meters in length should be around 130,000 tons assuming all dimensions scale in the same factor.
A carrier 365 meters in length should be around 130,000 tons assuming all dimensions scale in the same factor.
asif iqbal
Lieutenant General
if 004 shows up at Dalian then we could see the launch by 2030
post 2030 JNCX could be getting ready to launch CVN 005
and then DL can start on CVN 006 to get it in the water by 2035
another words in the next 10 years China could have
CV-16 and CV-17 STOBAR with 24 x aircraft each
003 and 004 CV CATOBAR with 36 x aircraft each
005 CVN and 006 CVN with 48 x aircraft each
Total naval aircraft 216 units
post 2030 JNCX could be getting ready to launch CVN 005
and then DL can start on CVN 006 to get it in the water by 2035
another words in the next 10 years China could have
CV-16 and CV-17 STOBAR with 24 x aircraft each
003 and 004 CV CATOBAR with 36 x aircraft each
005 CVN and 006 CVN with 48 x aircraft each
Total naval aircraft 216 units
Think about it.
At Sanya, we're potentially looking at 4 carriers plus another 5+ Type-075/076 which can usefully use that drydock.
I expect that single existing large drydock at Sanya won't be enough.
Those podcasters are plausibly a good source for rumours and news and serve as a good point of personal access to people and institutions however too many times I've noted errors to give them any credibility as experts or analysts. When they encroach on specific fields of military or technological knowledge their opinions should be treated with extreme caution, if not outright ignored (my recommendation).
Displacement does not translate directly to combat effectiveness. The relationship has at best moderate correlation. Full displacement is a measure similar to "Maximum Take-Off Weight" of the ship which includes all fuel, munitions etc. Consequently a carrier can have 10 000t of displacement added for the purpose of expanding autonomy of operations of the ship and its escort. Such carrier will not be more effective when in combat compared to its lighter counterpart but will be able to perform combat operations for longer periods of time without the need for replenishment.
There is no better example of that than the development of Ford-class which can generate and sustain at minimum 25% more sorties compared to Nimitz-class due to improved ship architecture and greater optimisation of deck operations while having displacement similar to that of Nimitz.
Another problem is the shifting of perception of carrier operations between 1945-1991 and 1991-2015. During the Cold War aircraft carriers were intended for operations at sea while after 1991 the primary role of a carrier was in support of land operations. Many analyses conducted in that period have therefore focused on those alternative uses which is how the concept of light carrier (an adapted LHA) re-emerged - ironically, considering that light carriers or "sea-control ships" of the past were intended for escort duties.
There are many more factors that go into optimising a design for a complex system like a supercarrier. The ability to generate more sorties is not in itself the most important factor. The ability to generate and sustain the maximum number of sorties for a given ship size is always desirable, but these are not the same problem.
The conclusion that simply because China can build and berth a 380m carrier which will generate 50% sorties than a 330m carrier doesn't mean it's the optimal solution for the force as a whole. The most obvious consideration is defensibility - larger carriers are considered preferable to smaller carriers because so far all analyses were based on USN requirements and USN assumed that carriers will not be likely targets. However - for example - expending 2000 anti-ship missiles against a USN CSG is a viable cost-effect approach that would be catastrophic against a single carrier task force.
Not "aircraft" but fighters. FYI: helicopters are rotary-wing aircraft while fighters are fixed-wing aircraft.
Total number of aircraft will be higher and on CVNs the number of fighters is likely to be closer to 60 rather than 48. 48 Hornets/Super-Hornets is USN complement from GWoT period.
Here is the standard CVN air wing composition in 1990 (per Wiki):
- 2 sqn F-14 (24)
- 2-1* sqn F/A-18 (24-12)
- 1-2* sqn A-6E (10-20) + KA-6D (2-4, tanker)
- 1 sqn E-2C (6)
- 1 sqn S-3A (10)
- 1 sqn SH-3/SH-60 (6)
- 1 det ES-3A (4)
- 1 det C-2A (4)
Note that of 60 fixed-wing combat aircraft 24 (40%) are dedicated long-range air superiority fighters, designed for countering Soviet AShM attacks. Out of 90 aircraft total 16 (17,5%) are ASW - long range S-3A and short range SH-3/SH-60.
Here is maximum official Liaoning & Shandong air wing (per Wiki):
- 24x J-15 (multirole)
- 6x Z-8H (ASW)
- 6x Z-8J (AEW)
- 2x Z-9
Once 4 CATOBAR carriers enter service it may be more practical to use 001 and 002 for ASW roles considering that USN submarines will be the main threat to all PLAN ativity or the next 20 years. That would mean limiting fighter complement to 1 squadron (12 or perhaps 16 fighters) and increasing the number of ASW helicopters. Fighters should be sufficient to extend air cover beyond range of escort's SAMs.
In any case PLAN would really benefit from having a S-3 equivalent if it intends to operate outside of 1IC. The Viking was possibly the most ingenious element of the air wing. But an ASW variant of KJ-600 would be sufficient. Size and flight duration are essential.
But returning to the USN CAW complement - the reason why CAW had those specific numbers of aircraft wasn't "maximum that fit on a carrier" as that number would be larger, but rather they were direct consequences of tactical requirements for a given number of aircraft available at a given readiness rate.
10 Vikings were needed because 6 of 10 were available for operations and that meant 2 patrols in constant rotation (2x 3 aircraft). 6 Hawkeyes allow for 2 aircraft in the air - one defensive above CSG and another offensive supporting long range strike team. 4 Hawkeyes allow only for 1 aircraft in the air at any time. 24 Tomcats meant 16-18 available which meant 4 sorties of 4 each carrying 24 Phoenix' which in turn reflected the likely salvo of Soviet missiles or number of bombers intercepted. Etc etc.
The complement of a PLAN carrier air wing will reflect whatever tactical role the carrier will have. There will naturally be an overlap but I don't expect that a CATOBAR nuclear supercarrier wold have the same role as a limp STOBAR carrier like Liaoning.
My guess is that the figure for a 150,000 tonne carrier being "1.8-2x more combat effective" refers to the Ford configuration as a baseline, whose sortie generation rates and layout have been available for some years now.
And focusing on displacement isn't the key criteria. It's that "the cost is only slightly/moderately higher" than a 100,000 tonne carrier design.
That sounds like a 10-30% cost differential, but which gives you an 80-100% increase sustained sortie rate, simply based on a larger number of available aircraft. And that assumes the aircraft are the same size, but 6th gen aircraft are better when they are larger, so you might have to physically increase the size of the carrier deck (and therefore the carrier), if you want to continue allowing 2 rows of aircraft to park behind the jet blast deflectors.
And my understanding is that his background is in aeronautical engineering, and I'm assuming he is quoting hearsay regarding the results of an internal Chinese Navy study.
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As for the vulnerability of a large aircraft carrier, yes, it is worth expending thousands of missiles against a carrier, whether it is Chinese or American.
But in the context of Guam and the Second Island Chain (2IC)
1. US carriers will face large missile salvoes launched from mainland China and from land-based bombers, accompanied by land-based air superiority aircraft operating at a distance of 3000km
2. In contrast Chinese carriers realistically won't be face this. Guam will be inoperable and US land-based aircraft have to operate from Hawaii which is 6000km away from Guam. That only leaves US carriers with limited missile salvoes
And if China carriers (with land-based air) can win blue-water naval battles in the Guam area, then the Western Pacific has been sealed off from the USA and China has effectively won.
But if the US still wanted to continue, then Chinese shipyards can build more large carriers for distant operations, whether they be 100,000 tonnes or 150,000 tonnes.
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