They can't. The F-22 is built to very tight tolerances and there's limited room for modification. It's a stealth plane so it's not practical to stick components on the outside like you could do with most aircraft. Maybe if the plane was still in production they'd be able to find a workaround, but this is probably the best they can do.
US Military News, Reports, Data, etc.
- Thread starter tphuang
- Start date
From FY26 Air Force Aircraft Procurement Vol II
There have been plenty of upgrades to F-22 hardware and software starting from around the late 2010s. (Inc 3.2B, implementation of MOSA architecture and a new COTS processor replacing the old processor, Sensor Enhancement packages, etc.) and the F-22 has been easy to upgrade so far, easier than the F-35 in some ways. So far, no other fighter in the USAF has demonstrated the ability to control CCAs, and besides the F-22s, the AIM-260 is only in service with some Super Hornets. Of course some here will believe there have been minimal changes to the backend of the APG-77(v)1 and its other electronics as there's some weird misconception that the F-22 hasn't been touched since the nineties, but the F-22's emitter geolocation and electronic attack is frequently described as comparable to that of the F-35.
They didn’t upgrade the antenna?
I don't recall seeing anything specifically mentioning the 77's antenna but I'd be very surprised if absolutely nothing has been done with it in the past ~10 years considering all the amount of upgrades to related electronics/sensors.
Not the greatest footage, but some footage of today's Dark Eagle (Long Range Hypersonic Weapon - LRHW) test.
Lethe
Captain
Two Virginia-class SSNs will be commissioned shortly.
USS Massachusetts (SSN-798) ... .
USS Idaho (SSN-799) scheduled .
SSN-798 has had the longest journey from construction start to commissioning of any Virginia-class SSN to date at 108 months, though some future units are already anticipated to take longer.
USS Massachusetts (SSN-798) ... .
USS Idaho (SSN-799) scheduled .
SSN-798 has had the longest journey from construction start to commissioning of any Virginia-class SSN to date at 108 months, though some future units are already anticipated to take longer.
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Truth doesn't need long to be proven.
This kind of things happen when you start cutting corners to meet deadline and budgets.
Myriad of reasons, ultimately it's about leadership.
Lethe
Captain
Per the tireless (but, in fact, recently retired) Ronald O'Roarke :
Now, these ostensible numbers are really weird. To be honest, I find it difficult to reconcile them with what we know of the Trump administration's instincts, as expressed most recently in the desire for a 50% uplift in defence spending. But notably, this isn't the first time that a retreat from the 66 SSN goal first expressed in the 2016 FSA has been mooted. Back in 2020, acting SecNav Thomas Moldy :
So this notion of retreating from a 66 SSN inventory goal is one that has been raised before, and was explicitly framed not in the context of operational requirements but in the context of industrial base constraints.
But here's the thing: the 2016 FSA goal was already shaped by resource constraints. From the :
Beyond this general statement, one can observe that the target inventory goal of 66 SSNs maps precisely on to the anticipated 33-year service life of a Virginia-class SSN, i.e. inducting two boats per year each with an anticipated service life of 33 years tends to a steady-state inventory of 66 boats, which reflects the then recent transition to ordering two boats per year. It's implausible that this is a coincidence.
So all of this looks like the industrial tail wagging the Navy "requirements" dog. And so far as I can tell, it is increasingly out of step with developments in the threat environment and corresponding tasking requirements that by all rights should be generating those inventory goals. Back when the 2016 FSA first lifted the inventory goal from 48 to 66 SSNs, the qualitative improvements and quantitative increase in PLAN nuclear submarine production that is only now beginning to bear fruit was scarcely on the horizon -- recalling that anti-submarine warfare has historically been the primary role of the American SSN inventory. Also over the past decade and going forward, the WestPac environment is becoming progressively more hostile to USN surface assets, even as the SSN inventory is increasingly tasked with a broader range of missions, most notably the rise of significant land-attack and stand-off anti-ship roles. Further, public US wargame material suggests that SSNs are indeed regarded as amongst the most pivotal of American assets in conflict scenarios with China.
My point is that the 2016 FSA target of 66 SSNs was likely inadequate even at the time, and that operational requirements have only grown over the subsequent decade. Yet the actual rumblings we have heard since have been of a retreat from that target. There appears to be a large and growing dissonance here.
Now, these ostensible numbers are really weird. To be honest, I find it difficult to reconcile them with what we know of the Trump administration's instincts, as expressed most recently in the desire for a 50% uplift in defence spending. But notably, this isn't the first time that a retreat from the 66 SSN goal first expressed in the 2016 FSA has been mooted. Back in 2020, acting SecNav Thomas Moldy :
So this notion of retreating from a 66 SSN inventory goal is one that has been raised before, and was explicitly framed not in the context of operational requirements but in the context of industrial base constraints.
But here's the thing: the 2016 FSA goal was already shaped by resource constraints. From the :
Beyond this general statement, one can observe that the target inventory goal of 66 SSNs maps precisely on to the anticipated 33-year service life of a Virginia-class SSN, i.e. inducting two boats per year each with an anticipated service life of 33 years tends to a steady-state inventory of 66 boats, which reflects the then recent transition to ordering two boats per year. It's implausible that this is a coincidence.
So all of this looks like the industrial tail wagging the Navy "requirements" dog. And so far as I can tell, it is increasingly out of step with developments in the threat environment and corresponding tasking requirements that by all rights should be generating those inventory goals. Back when the 2016 FSA first lifted the inventory goal from 48 to 66 SSNs, the qualitative improvements and quantitative increase in PLAN nuclear submarine production that is only now beginning to bear fruit was scarcely on the horizon -- recalling that anti-submarine warfare has historically been the primary role of the American SSN inventory. Also over the past decade and going forward, the WestPac environment is becoming progressively more hostile to USN surface assets, even as the SSN inventory is increasingly tasked with a broader range of missions, most notably the rise of significant land-attack and stand-off anti-ship roles. Further, public US wargame material suggests that SSNs are indeed regarded as amongst the most pivotal of American assets in conflict scenarios with China.
My point is that the 2016 FSA target of 66 SSNs was likely inadequate even at the time, and that operational requirements have only grown over the subsequent decade. Yet the actual rumblings we have heard since have been of a retreat from that target. There appears to be a large and growing dissonance here.
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