Going back to the earlier comments regarding the US proposed strategy of "island hopping missile launchers". There were some previous comments about the lack of mass, lack of damage, or other logistical/operational limitations. From a purely operational perspective, I agree with most of these comments about limitations.
However, it's useful to consider the strategic context in which these plans are made & articulated from the US perspective. Here's what I think the high-level strategic picture looks like from the US POV:
1. It's crystal clear by this point that TW can't be "saved" if the Mainland pursues armed reunification; sending in the "great white fleet" in an attempt to "save" TW would be suicidal at this point, & Would be the definitive end of US global hegemony.
2. Since TW can't be saved, the next best available option (from a purely realist perspective) is to maximize the ML's cost of taking TW.
In this context, the "island hopping" missile strike attempts can potentially serve a few purposes:
1. Impose costs by striking critical PRC infrastructure (especially civilian infrastructure along the PRC's east coast);
2. Disrupt PRC maritime trade by making the 1st & 2nd island chains unsafe for civilian maritime shipping;
3. Try to do enough damage to the PRC's industrial capacity to have something of a fighting chance, if the US chooses to engage in a protracted war of attrition vs the PRC over TW.
4. Even if the US chooses not to engage in a protracted war, they can still engage in political damage control by saying "we did our best & we did a lot of damage".
A rough analogy of this strategy is what the Houthis are doing in the Red Sea. The Houthis obviously don't have the ability to stop Israel from committing genocide vs the Palestinians, but they can impose costs on Israel & the West by disrupting maritime trade to a sufficient degree. The US obviously are not as weak as the Houthis, but the fundamental approach is roughly analogous.
One more thing to note is that when US forces are "island hopping", they're not necessarily just going to limit themselves to tiny uninhabited rocks with zero maneuver room & no place to hide, the entirety of Japanese & Filipino territory can be used in such a fashion, where there are plenty of space & plenty of civilian human shields that they give zero fucks about. In fact, Japan & the Philippines are currently the only places from which such a strategy is even feasible, given the relatively limited range of their existing missile arsenal.
Bottom line - we shouldn't overestimate this strategy as something that can stop or even slow armed reunification, but we also shouldn't underestimate it, since it can be part of a broader strategy that we need to counter in a protracted war.