Or these wonderful SK friends can "frag" these interloper Americans and blame these evil commie NK's-it is Japan I am really worried about-only a Chinese full-on,crystal clear warning issued about incinerating little japan should she interfere in anyway will be taken seriously.
PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency
- Thread starter pugachev_diver
- Start date
I have wondered about that, it makes sense for Kim to at least make a statement, such as DPRK will intervene if Japan is involved. DPRK's survival is predicated on a powerful China.
Well, DPRK as of recently is most certainly a credible ally.
Those who laughed at fatty Kim don't laugh any longer.
For South Korea, this is a national emergency of highest order. SK is one of the most devoted US allies period, but their current existence is tied to two poles.
Ultimately, despite strongest US pressure, SK maintains almost complete neutrality even v Russia...
Trump is doubled standard fool; saying repeatedly there's only one China; but keeps on supplying arms to Taiwan. On the world tariff he keeps on changing from day to day. Day 0ne 10%, next day 15%! Can you trust this guy?? He has lost his self esteem and not many countries trust him, wonder why? Board of Peace??hahaha
Tangentially related to USMC strategy of occupying islets to set up missile bases aimed at China:
Ostensibly due to the threat of Iranian ballistic missile salvos targeting US bases in Middle East, US has evacuated hundreds of personell from US bases.
USMC: Hold my beer while I set up on tiny, stationary, non-hardened islets to get blasted by PLAARF rocket force.
Ostensibly due to the threat of Iranian ballistic missile salvos targeting US bases in Middle East, US has evacuated hundreds of personell from US bases.
USMC: Hold my beer while I set up on tiny, stationary, non-hardened islets to get blasted by PLAARF rocket force.
Going back to the earlier comments regarding the US proposed strategy of "island hopping missile launchers". There were some previous comments about the lack of mass, lack of damage, or other logistical/operational limitations. From a purely operational perspective, I agree with most of these comments about limitations.
However, it's useful to consider the strategic context in which these plans are made & articulated from the US perspective. Here's what I think the high-level strategic picture looks like from the US POV:
1. It's crystal clear by this point that TW can't be "saved" if the Mainland pursues armed reunification; sending in the "great white fleet" in an attempt to "save" TW would be suicidal at this point, & Would be the definitive end of US global hegemony.
2. Since TW can't be saved, the next best available option (from a purely realist perspective) is to maximize the ML's cost of taking TW.
In this context, the "island hopping" missile strike attempts can potentially serve a few purposes:
1. Impose costs by striking critical PRC infrastructure (especially civilian infrastructure along the PRC's east coast);
2. Disrupt PRC maritime trade by making the 1st & 2nd island chains unsafe for civilian maritime shipping;
3. Try to do enough damage to the PRC's industrial capacity to have something of a fighting chance, if the US chooses to engage in a protracted war of attrition vs the PRC over TW.
4. Even if the US chooses not to engage in a protracted war, they can still engage in political damage control by saying "we did our best & we did a lot of damage".
A rough analogy of this strategy is what the Houthis are doing in the Red Sea. The Houthis obviously don't have the ability to stop Israel from committing genocide vs the Palestinians, but they can impose costs on Israel & the West by disrupting maritime trade to a sufficient degree. The US obviously are not as weak as the Houthis, but the fundamental approach is roughly analogous.
One more thing to note is that when US forces are "island hopping", they're not necessarily just going to limit themselves to tiny uninhabited rocks with zero maneuver room & no place to hide, the entirety of Japanese & Filipino territory can be used in such a fashion, where there are plenty of space & plenty of civilian human shields that they give zero fucks about. In fact, Japan & the Philippines are currently the only places from which such a strategy is even feasible, given the relatively limited range of their existing missile arsenal.
Bottom line - we shouldn't overestimate this strategy as something that can stop or even slow armed reunification, but we also shouldn't underestimate it, since it can be part of a broader strategy that we need to counter in a protracted war.
However, it's useful to consider the strategic context in which these plans are made & articulated from the US perspective. Here's what I think the high-level strategic picture looks like from the US POV:
1. It's crystal clear by this point that TW can't be "saved" if the Mainland pursues armed reunification; sending in the "great white fleet" in an attempt to "save" TW would be suicidal at this point, & Would be the definitive end of US global hegemony.
2. Since TW can't be saved, the next best available option (from a purely realist perspective) is to maximize the ML's cost of taking TW.
In this context, the "island hopping" missile strike attempts can potentially serve a few purposes:
1. Impose costs by striking critical PRC infrastructure (especially civilian infrastructure along the PRC's east coast);
2. Disrupt PRC maritime trade by making the 1st & 2nd island chains unsafe for civilian maritime shipping;
3. Try to do enough damage to the PRC's industrial capacity to have something of a fighting chance, if the US chooses to engage in a protracted war of attrition vs the PRC over TW.
4. Even if the US chooses not to engage in a protracted war, they can still engage in political damage control by saying "we did our best & we did a lot of damage".
A rough analogy of this strategy is what the Houthis are doing in the Red Sea. The Houthis obviously don't have the ability to stop Israel from committing genocide vs the Palestinians, but they can impose costs on Israel & the West by disrupting maritime trade to a sufficient degree. The US obviously are not as weak as the Houthis, but the fundamental approach is roughly analogous.
One more thing to note is that when US forces are "island hopping", they're not necessarily just going to limit themselves to tiny uninhabited rocks with zero maneuver room & no place to hide, the entirety of Japanese & Filipino territory can be used in such a fashion, where there are plenty of space & plenty of civilian human shields that they give zero fucks about. In fact, Japan & the Philippines are currently the only places from which such a strategy is even feasible, given the relatively limited range of their existing missile arsenal.
Bottom line - we shouldn't overestimate this strategy as something that can stop or even slow armed reunification, but we also shouldn't underestimate it, since it can be part of a broader strategy that we need to counter in a protracted war.
The Houthis are able to do what they do because they have extensive fortifications embedded in rough terrain, making prosecution against them very difficult. Islands in the western pacific do not provide such cover.
Based on US public rhetoric about their strategy, I think the US is focused more on mobility & geographic flexibility rather than protection from fixed positions. I'm not suggesting they're correct in their assessment, but I'm just interpreting based on their rhetoric. Also, as long as the PRC doesn't start the reunification op, the US still has time to prepare launch points in Japan & the Phillipines.
I should've also added the caveat in my previous post that there are plenty of flaws with this strategy, it might not be effective, but it is the best available option they have given their current circumstances.
Positions on small islands aren’t very mobile, and mobility by water also isn’t that great when you can be threatened by air. Furthermore mobility by itself only offers survivability benefits in line with terrain cover if you assume poor surveillance. I am very doubtful the surveillance gaps are wide enough these days for that to be the case. I do think there’s conceptual merit to the idea in the abstract but I just don’t think the practical details really make sense once you look at them closely.
I agree that it's not really an operationally feasible strategy today. But keep in mind that our own A2/AD strategy wasn't built in a day either. I see this as the best available strategy they can aspire to given current circumstances, not something that they can realistically execute today. It's very much a "work in progress".