PLA Strike Strategies in Westpac HIC

[BoraTas]

Just read the article.

In a way I'm pretty glad that all those USAF Colonel quacks (and have you noticed, all the quacks who write opinion pieces are all Colonels) are all retired. Because what the article, and by extension, its writer, is advocating for is unlimited conventional strikes on Chinese mainland.

To quote: "It is not enough for the U.S. to simply prevent the PLA from seizing ground on the shores of Taiwan. That by itself will not guarantee victory. A war-winning strategy must also deny sanctuaries to the PLA—including sanctuaries on China’s mainland—and enable U.S. forces to degrade China’s ability to launch long-range air and missile salvos that could cripple U.S. joint force operations in the Pacific. ...

History has repeatedly demonstrated the imperative to deny operational sanctuaries that enable adversaries to husband resources, produce war materiel, train replacement warfighters, secure military leadership, and protect their lines of communication. Because freedom from attack is crucial to enable the freedom to attack, denying sanctuaries is an essential element of any successful warfighting strategy."

Anyone with half a brain-cell would know that such proposed actions will result in nuclear war.

That is also why Chinese needs some capability to strike CONUS, if even limited. The Anglosphere is INCREDIBLY used to waging war without getting their homelands touched. This is visible everywhere and is one of the core assumptions of their militaries and statecraft. Even a limited capability will have a disproportionate impact in every way.

 

[BoraTas]

The problem is not just stealth, but stealth + stand off strike combo that makes it difficult to deal with. China can detect B-21 but at what range? If the detection range is less than cruise missile range than it is meaningless because the plane would be on return flight before you detect it.

The current best bet to neutralize B-21 threat is just to decimate Guam or any other basing within China's strike range. Just B-2 alone will not be able to generate enough sortie to have meaningful impact.

It would be much better if China can intercept B-21, which is why the talk of ultra-long range SAM is generating some interest, it comes down to whether it is possible to build the kind of detection capability that can support this.

Edit: Another way to deal with B-21 is to have an ISR picket way out beyond 1IC, say a string of KJ's and unmanned awacs patrolling 500km away from the coast. Not an easy thing to set up to say the least.

Space based detection, new OTH radars, J-36 and KJ-3000 are exactly for countering a very stealthy bomber launching stuff from 1500 km away. Sustained high speed, survivability, huge sensors and persistent patrol is how you do this. And of course, there is also the hitting back part which ties back to my previous message.

 

[MC530]

That is also why Chinese needs some capability to strike CONUS, if even limited. The Anglosphere is INCREDIBLY used to waging war without getting their homelands touched. This is visible everywhere and is one of the core assumptions of their militaries and statecraft. Even a limited capability will have a disproportionate impact in every way.

If we're discussing limited strikes, I recommend liquid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) armed with multiple conventional warheads.

Wartime systems and modern manufacturing techniques can significantly reduce the cost of producing these rockets and improve production efficiency.

Relying on a small number (less than 100) of expensive strategic bombers for similar missions would also require more sophisticated and compact standoff missiles—their seekers, rocket motors, and solid propellants are equally difficult to scale up.

They would even require more labor than large liquid-fueled rockets.

 

[MC530]

MIT paper modelling various scenarios for contested airspace, which concludes that current US strategy is dangerously flawed.

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I read this MIT report. However, two assumptions seem unclear, reducing the reliability of these models.
1: "and then launch intermittent 'aerial sweeps' to overwhelm the PLAAF aircraft on station."
This operational strategy offers no protection for the US Navy's own fleet, transport convoys, anti-submarine aircraft, patrol aircraft, AEW systems, or unmanned ISR systems.
First, if the Chinese Air Force employed the same "aerial sweeps" model, it would pose similar challenges to US logistics across the Pacific. The PLAAF's larger combat groups could clearly handle similar missions simultaneously. Second, it would significantly reduce the importance of non-fighter assets in network-centric warfare. The study prioritizes China's ISR capabilities while ignoring these assets.

2: Significantly reduce the loss weight of air-to-air engagements. Report: 70. The losses in the U.S. 6 Bases scenario include: air-to-air losses (12); HAS losses (34); and “open-parked” (when U.S. fighters must be parked in the open) losses (379). The losses under the Dispersed to 24 Bases scenario are: air-to-air losses (20); HAS losses (46); and open-parked losses (233). For full results, see online appendix A.
After the air battle between Pakistan and India in May, it's almost unbelievable that air-to-air engagements are still viewed with such cavalier nonchalance.

No matter how many "raid and sweep" fighters are deployed, a single engagement could result in the loss of five or more fourth-generation fighters. Especially if the enemy possesses comprehensive ISR capabilities, it's entirely possible for five to eight low-observable fighters to conduct a "counter-sweep." Such losses could be even faster than ground-based losses.


If the consideration is simply to obtain HAS funding for publicity purposes, this type of assessment may be feasible.

 

[Dante80]

If we're discussing limited strikes, I recommend liquid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) armed with multiple conventional warheads.

That was, is and will continue being a patently stupid idea.

Still remember the PGS days. Not fondly.

 

[MC530]

That was, is and will continue being a patently stupid idea.

Still remember the PGS days. Not fondly.

I don't understand the PGS days, but at least explain why using ICBMs for conventional purposes is foolish.

 

[another505]

I don't understand the PGS days, but at least explain why using ICBMs for conventional purposes is foolish.

Cause its extremely dangerous as your enemy cannot distinguish whether it is a nuke or conventional warhead until it impacts. All they see is an projectile with icbm trajectory.

Politicians then only have a few minutes to decide in their response which could lead to a misunderstanding and into nuclear escalation.

All that potential fallout for a measly few hundred kg of explosive warhead isnt worth it.

 

[Dante80]

I don't understand the PGS days, but at least explain why using ICBMs for conventional purposes is foolish.

In your scenario (the one you were recommending the ICBM for, to be exact), you are talking about a limited strike on the contiguous United States, using an ICBM with a conventional warhead.

The United States of America has a Launch On Warning nuclear capability. Their current communicated doctrine says they don't have a LOW posture, but there is enough ambiguity left in. On purpose.

This means, if you launch an ICBM @ the US, you are getting nuked in retaliation, most probably before the missile even lands. They have no way of recognizing what type of warhead your missile uses.

Historically speaking, nuclear countries have thought about this in the past. My reference to PGS was exactly that, as an example.

Hope that helps.

 

[xmupzx]

IMO, a few missiles are difficult to be mistaken for a first strike nuclear attack; in fact, early warning launches may have never become a viable option.

 

[MC530]

Cause its extremely dangerous as your enemy cannot distinguish whether it is a nuke or conventional warhead until it impacts. All they see is an projectile with icbm trajectory.

Politicians then only have a few minutes to decide in their response which could lead to a misunderstanding and into nuclear escalation.

All that potential fallout for a measly few hundred kg of explosive warhead isnt worth it.

As we all know, the US military's arsenal includes the B61 series, which has a lower barrier to entry. So, will politicians consider the possibility of nuclear escalation when seven B2s, escorted by 125 escort aircraft, enter mainland China?

Similarly, both the Ohio-class and Columbia-class missile carriers are capable of launching large numbers of tactical cruise missiles. So, if the Chinese military spotted an Ohio-class carrier approaching China, no politician would be able to tell whether it was in a nuclear strike mode.

So, if the US statement can prove that an airstrike on China by B2 did not involve any nuclear attack, then the Chinese statement can similarly prove that its liquid-fueled rockets, deployed from open-air launch sites in the desert, do not carry any nuclear warheads.

In your scenario (the one you were recommending the ICBM for, to be exact), you are talking about a limited strike on the contiguous United States, using an ICBM with a conventional warhead.

The United States of America has a Launch On Warning nuclear capability. Their current communicated doctrine says they don't have a LOW posture, but there is enough ambiguity left in. On purpose.

This means, if you launch an ICBM @ the US, you are getting nuked in retaliation, most probably before the missile even lands. They have no way of recognizing what type of warhead your missile uses.

Historically speaking, nuclear countries have thought about this in the past. My reference to PGS was exactly that, as an example.

Hope that helps.

So, we can assume that if the Americans are right to justify their "launch on warning" policy, then China could declare a similar policy: "Any unidentifiable nuclear vehicle" could potentially be interpreted as a launch on warning.

Then, simply put, the F-35, B-2, B-21, and similar vehicles should ideally not be present on Chinese soil.

The MAD principle is the best tool to prevent apocalypse.

We can expect the US to declare its "low profile."and willing to engage in proxy wars rather than discuss direct attacks on mainland China.

I was also born during the Cold War. I think the new century has made many people forget the cruelty of total war.