MIT paper modelling various scenarios for contested airspace, which concludes that current US strategy is dangerously flawed.
I read this MIT report. However, two assumptions seem unclear, reducing the reliability of these models.
1: "and then launch intermittent 'aerial sweeps' to overwhelm the PLAAF aircraft on station."
This operational strategy offers no protection for the US Navy's own fleet, transport convoys, anti-submarine aircraft, patrol aircraft, AEW systems, or unmanned ISR systems.
First, if the Chinese Air Force employed the same "aerial sweeps" model, it would pose similar challenges to US logistics across the Pacific. The PLAAF's larger combat groups could clearly handle similar missions simultaneously. Second, it would significantly reduce the importance of non-fighter assets in network-centric warfare. The study prioritizes China's ISR capabilities while ignoring these assets.
2: Significantly reduce the loss weight of air-to-air engagements. Report: 70. The losses in the U.S. 6 Bases scenario include: air-to-air losses (12); HAS losses (34); and “open-parked” (when U.S. fighters must be parked in the open) losses (379). The losses under the Dispersed to 24 Bases scenario are: air-to-air losses (20); HAS losses (46); and open-parked losses (233). For full results, see online appendix A.
After the air battle between Pakistan and India in May, it's almost unbelievable that air-to-air engagements are still viewed with such cavalier nonchalance.
No matter how many "raid and sweep" fighters are deployed, a single engagement could result in the loss of five or more fourth-generation fighters. Especially if the enemy possesses comprehensive ISR capabilities, it's entirely possible for five to eight low-observable fighters to conduct a "counter-sweep." Such losses could be even faster than ground-based losses.
If the consideration is simply to obtain HAS funding for publicity purposes, this type of assessment may be feasible.