In all fairness, I can understand it. After all, the military is doing a task that is mostly set out by the political leaders, and psyops are very much a part of the job. And it's not like the mainland doesn't do similar things in principle.
PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency
- Thread starter pugachev_diver
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In all fairness, I can understand it. After all, the military is doing a task that is mostly set out by the political leaders, and psyops are very much a part of the job. And it's not like the mainland doesn't do similar things in principle.
While these trainings are happening, we see more amphibious ships in the area (and other major combatants, not sure if related)
Unrelated but a super long bridge barge, ~200m. Not sure about time and location
What makes these sorts of psychological operations, if that's how we're to characterize them, problematic to say the least is that they do not target an enemy or adversary, but rather the domestic population and political constituents of an "ally."
I am seeing that Taiwan is getting more and more divided, the DPP is getting more desperate and tyrannical. So you want a good chunk of the population, probably more than half, in your "side" so to speak, in fact i do think the casus belli could be the liberation of the "pro-china" population. The problem I have is IF the conflict is not resolved quickly that island will be destroyed and probably never recover.
Regarding barges, ShiLao and Yankee also explained the advantages of barges from the perspective of stability: In the past, shore-to-ship connectors relied on buoyancy. This means: 1. Damage to the hull and reduced buoyancy means that it loses its function, which make it very vulnerable to weather or firepower. The barge is connected to the seabed, attacking the hull cannot sink it, since it is no longer a ship, but a structure similar to a gravity dam, you have to blow up the pillars. But PLA can even pour cement into the pillars and sink them semi-permanently on the coast, which really becomes a dam. Now, try to blow it up
Ayi: The more reliable method I can think of is to use an unmanned boat filled with tons of explosives. ROCA’s current counter measures of it is a bit like the Ukrainian army in Kherson dealing with the Antonovsky Bridge, using HIMARS ATACMs to fight quick-drying cement. The problem is that there are many Antonovsky bridges now.
2. Traditional piers will shake up and down, which is very unstable. Vehicles can only move forward at a "parade-like" speed, and the unloading speed is very slow. If the vehicle is mishandled and falls directly into the water, at least it will not affect the landing queue. If it is lying across the piers, it will be very difficult to deal with. There is no such concern on the barge, and the vehicle can go down the bridge at normal speed.
Ayi: The more reliable method I can think of is to use an unmanned boat filled with tons of explosives. ROCA’s current counter measures of it is a bit like the Ukrainian army in Kherson dealing with the Antonovsky Bridge, using HIMARS ATACMs to fight quick-drying cement. The problem is that there are many Antonovsky bridges now.
2. Traditional piers will shake up and down, which is very unstable. Vehicles can only move forward at a "parade-like" speed, and the unloading speed is very slow. If the vehicle is mishandled and falls directly into the water, at least it will not affect the landing queue. If it is lying across the piers, it will be very difficult to deal with. There is no such concern on the barge, and the vehicle can go down the bridge at normal speed.
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An addendum here:
Regarding the design of the operation to assault Hostomel airport, it appears that an initial assault was planned with undersized troops for the area to be conquered. Hostomel airport has a perimeter of approximately 10 km and an area of about 3 km², and the first-tier Russian troops had only 300 soldiers who, although elite, would not be able to occupy the main points of the airfield. The Russian maneuver, therefore, depended on the arrival of the main troops in cargo planes, and was extremely risky. The rendering of the runway useless by Ukrainian artillery prevented the arrival of the troops responsible for conquering and maintaining the airport.
To date, however, it is not known why Russia did not carry out an airborne assault with parachutes instead of an assault landing with planes, since the Russian units, in theory, would have had the training and equipment to do so. The deployment of the 72nd Ukrainian Mechanized Brigade may have prevented the operation from continuing, as recommended in Western doctrine.
Another aspect considered relevant that differentiates it from comparisons with a possible PLA operation in Taiwan is that in this operation the long distance planned for the airborne assault was approximately 160 km (150 km from Chojniki and 172 km from Mazyr). One of the limitations of airborne assault operations is the high consumption of aviation fuel, limiting the depth of the airborne assault, in principle, to 100 km, a condition that was not observed by Russia. The distance of the assault in Hostomel was also far from the reach of the higher-echelon field artillery.
In Russia's case, rear fire support to first batch of landing troops is none.
But in Taiwan's case, fire support to the chosen landing coast could be very easy, massive, & precise. Not only from mainland MLRS, but most decisively from sea. Many warships & marine aircraft can offer direct fire suppression to coastal enemies, covering friend troops to field barges & transport large numbers of heavy vehicles to shore.
But in Taiwan's case, fire support to the chosen landing coast could be very easy, massive, & precise. Not only from mainland MLRS, but most decisively from sea. Many warships & marine aircraft can offer direct fire suppression to coastal enemies, covering friend troops to field barges & transport large numbers of heavy vehicles to shore.
The PLA can have MLRS support from the mainland;
MLRS support from amphibious ships like here:
MLRS support from Taiwan's islands west of the coast that are very close
If you require substantial fire support for your troops when it is time for them to land, then something has gone awry with your operation in the first place. All opposing assets that remain a major threat to your troops should've been dealt with before you put boots on the ground.
Interesting theory: Due to the poor sea & road conditions on the east coast of Taiwan, the Huadong Defense Command responsible for guarding the area has less than 6,000 troops and a small number of armored vehicles, mainly to prevent PLA air assaults and airborne landings at airports and ports. The Hualien Airport and port itself is very vulnerable to amphibious landings, but due to poor sea conditions, the window for amphibious landings is short. But if the PLA chooses to air assaults on the highway near the airport and then land by barge, then the last line of defense of ROCAF, The Chiashan Air Force Base, will be in danger. Due to poor road conditions, it is difficult for the PLA here to continue to attack southward and northward, but conversely, it is also difficult for the northern and southern ROCA to recapture here. Even the ROCA destroyed Hualien Port and Airport, barges can also be used for subsequent landing and supply, not affected by weather. After the PLAFG rocket artillery and attack heli units enter Hualien, they can cover Taipei and Taichung, air defense and anti-submarine/ship forces can also block naval and air support from the Pacific
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