The 688i still represents about half the US Navy's active SSN fleet. If the Type 093B matches (or exceeds) the quietness of the 688i, the US Navy would be engulfed in panic and hysteria right now. But they do not appear to be particularly concerned. And I think that says a lot about their internal assessment of the Type 093B. Regardless of what they say in public, I just don't believe they perceive the 093B as a genuine threat. They certainly don't act like it.
That's just pure cope. We haven't seen the PLAN in panic and hysteria over latest virginia either, by the same logic, it should be presumed ASW, 093Bs and SSKs render those into complete non-genuine threats?
DoD folks -- at least the ones doing the leg work -- might
on occasion panic about emerging adversarial capabilities
in private, but
almost never in public.
Usually they won't even panic or "panic" in front of their bosses, especially of the GO/FO/SES level, and if they do, they tend to
proceed carefully with their words as no one wants to be mistaken for celebrating the advances of the "other team," never mind for a lack of military bearing. Besides, a lot of bosses tend to dislike "bringers of bad news," and the military isn't necessarily much different.
For all practical purposes, company and field grades aren't really allowed to discuss classified reporting on adversarial capabilities in public. So even if they panic, they probably won't be able to fully, or at all explain why they're panicking, unless they're panicking in front of their colleagues.
On the other hand,
GO/FO/SES and the elected officials they brief
are more free to "panic" in public.
However, they tend to do so carefully and selectively, and usually for
political purposes, in particular to demand
more funding for pet programs.
As such, just because DoD officials aren't panicking in public doesn't mean they aren't concerned or outright freaking out in private.
I imagine the PLA doesn't "panic" at all in public, as that's just poor form by Chinese norms.
In politics, the less the public knows the better. You don't know what kind of problems you'll get if you start to disclose there is a PLAN SSN right outside Australia.
I can't find the video now, but I'm pretty sure Marles or someone from Australia defense said something alone the line of they don't know if there was a sub in the task force.
I think it is likely that PLAN had sent a 093A along with the fleet.
My
general suspicion aligns with
@tphuang here, and even if the Australians failed to detect her initially, they're probably operating under the assumption that she's somewhere off their coastline and have certainly been looking.
The reason for this is quite simple, the presence or even potential presence, adequately verified or not, of a PLAN nuclear submarine will help RAN leadership
lobby for more funding.
Considering Australian Defence Minister Richard
per SBS:
"We don't know whether there is the presence of a submarine, and that, in part, speaks to the nature of submarines," he told ABC radio on Thursday.
"So, we can't answer that question definitively, which is precisely why it's important that Australia has a long-range submarine capability."
It's pretty obvious
whether the RAN detected her or not, assuming she was even there, and regardless of whether it's officially and clearly disclosed or not, certain
senior Australian officials very much intend to make the most out of this opportunity for the AUKUS program and whatever else they have in mind.
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PLANS 107 Zunyi, 468 Hengyang and 887 Weishanhu all belong to the
South Sea Fleet, so if there was indeed a 093A as a part of the task force, it was either
409 or 410, which are both assigned to the South Sea Fleet as well.
Not sure if any 093B boats have been assigned to the South Sea Fleet yet, especially as the North Sea Fleet traditionally gets first dibs, but I wouldn't completely rule it out.
So it's possible a 093B escorted the task force, but we probably won't know for sure anytime soon, if ever, unless CCTV-7 decides to make a documentary out of it.
This is kind of interesting to me. When facing a middle power like Australia, the importance of nuclear sub really shows up, because 055 essentially protects sub from having frigates and MPAs getting really close. If diesel sub is nowhere nearby, which is likely the case here with Collins class, there is not much Australian navy can do to actually get close enough to hunt down a moderately quiet nuclear submarine.
Under combat conditions, the presence of a highly capable AAW platform like the 055 DDG would certainly keep enemy MPA and rotary ASW platforms at a distance.
However,
not so much when we're at peace . . .
In 1968, a Soviet Tu-16 crashed in the North Sea while repeatedly overflying the USS Essex, an American aircraft carrier. The Tu-16, which was of an ELINT variety, flew so low, it eventually ended up hitting the water, and killing all aboard.
The USN even has footage of the incident:
I doubt Australian P-8A pilots are as "daring" as their Soviet colleagues of the 1960s, but if they're anything like their SASR colleagues in Afghanistan, they're probably significantly more aggressive than their American counterparts.
Ultimately, rather doubtful a 093 of any variety was sailing in formation with the PLANS 107 Zunyi led task force or otherwise too close for most of the trip, assuming a PLAN SSN was in fact deployed. As otherwise, the PLAN might be making it a little "too easy" for adversarial ASW assets to locate her submarines.
In fact, I wouldn't be surprised if she was
generally speaking hundreds, if not over a thousand miles from the task force. There are at least a couple of potential reasons for this.
For starters, SSNs escorting CSGs, ESGs and other major surface groupings, at least in NATO practice, tend to operate in the periphery and in advance of capital vessels, as their mission in such instances are typically to screen for hostile threats, in particular other submarines.
However, as you noted, considering the current state of the Royal Australian Navy's fleet of Collins class submarines, with
, odds are a SSN wasn't deployed by the PLAN to screen for a Collins.
As
@Lethe and possibly others have already suggested or otherwise hinted to:
Looks like they are going to circumnavigate the continent. Will be interesting to see how close they pass by HMAS Stirling (a facility, not a ship) on the south-west coast.
HMAS Stirling is currently undergoing upgrades to host US, UK and (eventually, notionally) Australian nuclear submarines, so PLAN may well pop around and say hello.
EDIT: USS
Minnesota SSN-783 is
at HMAS Stirling as we speak.
It's reasonably plausible a PLAN SSN was dispatched to surveil USS Minnesota and/or HMAS Stirling, in which case,
the PLANS 107 Zunyi led task force was likely dispatched in part to "distract" adversarial assets capable of searching for the PLAN SSN, assuming she was indeed deployed.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
At some point in the next decade, PLAN SSNs will likely be patrolling regularly off of HMAS Stirling in wait for USN, RAN and perhaps even RN submarines heading towards the South China Sea and elsewhere, with the intent of shadowing and tracking adversarial boats upon detection.
However, until the PLAN SSN fleet is of the requisite size for conducting such operations regularly, the primary mission of PLAN submarines operating off the Australian coast will most likely be focused on deploying payloads to provide capabilities analogous to SOSUS and its successor programs.
As you can imagine, such missions and the deployed payloads are less likely to go detected and more likely to succeed if they are able to occur while PLAN surface vessels are occupying as many ASW platforms belonging to the RAN and RAAF as possible.
